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Abstract
This study explores the process of decision-making in central 
government health policy. It also documents the history of the 
pressure group Aid for the Elderly in Government Institutions 
(AEGIS) and thus the career of its Chairman Mrs Barbara Robb as a 
social reformer. There are two major arguments in the thesis.
Firstly, the study demonstrates that AEGIS played the key role in 
initiating and sustaining the extraordinary succession of scandals 
in the mental hospital service between 1965 and 1975 and that 
these were one of the major determinants of policy between 1970 
and 1980. There are two broad areas of policy. The establishment 
of mental illness and mental handicap as priority services. 
Empirical evidence is presented to support the argument that the 
policy has achieved a considerable measure of success. The second 
area is the redress of grievances in the NHS through the 
development of formal complaints procedures, special inquiries and 
the Health Commissioner, where the conclusions are that reforms 
have been largely cosmetic and largely unaffected the established 
autonomy of the medical profession to investigate allegations of 
performance failure brought against its members.
Secondly, none of the major competing models of state activity 
gives a complete understanding of the process of change in the 
study. The policy process in mental health thus emerges as an 
example of the professionalised state thesis in neo-pluralism, set 
within an ideological framework which establishes medicine as the 
dominant profession.
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CHAPTER ONE
CONTEXT. AIMS. AND METHODOLOGY
"Social Policy is easier to describe than to define." 
(Francois Lafitte)
"Now what I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and girls 
nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant 
nothing else, and root out everything else. You can only 
form the minds of reasoning animals upon Facts: nothing else 
will ever be of service to them." (Thomas Gradgrind, Hard 
Times, Charles Dickens)
"A person does not exist without a social context. You 
cannot take a person out of his social context and still see 
him as a person, or act towards him as a person. If one 
does not act towards the other as a person, one de­
personalises oneself." (R.D.Laing)
On the 21st of January 1965, Mrs Barbara Robb, of 10 Hampstead 
Grove, London NW3, visited an acquaintance in Friern Barnet 
Psychiatric Hospital in Southgate. Mrs Robb was accompanied on 
subsequent visits by her friends and associates, David (Lord) 
Strabolgi the Labour Peer and later Minister, and Audrey Harvey, 
the poverty campaigner.^ For these three people, the first 
visits to Friern were their initiation into the shabby, twilight 
world of the back wards of British Mental Hospitals in the 1960s. 
As a result of her experiences at Friern and beyond, Mrs. Robb, 
with the assistance of her two friends and a number of other 
influential people, had, within 6 months, founded the small, elite 
pressure group, Aid for the Elderly in Government Institutions 
(AEGIS). Within a year she was spearheading a national media
^■MacGregor S, The Politics of Poverty.(London:Longman. 1981) 
pp.138-9 and Banting, K.G., Poverty. Politics and Policy. (London: 
Macmillan, 1979) p.24
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campaign on conditions in psychiatric hospitals and was engaged in 
a protracted wrangle with the Ministry of Health about changing 
them. Within three years she had published a book called Sans 
Everything  ^ setting out her case, and within five had been 
instrumental in restructuring the political agenda in mental 
health and health policy generally. By the time she died of liver 
cancer in 1976, the political history of psychiatric services and 
health service complaints machinery had been altered 
irreversibly.
Sans Everything was the first in a wave of mental hospital 
scandals which lasted beyond Mrs Robb's death and into the 1980s. 
During her lifetime, inquiries at Ely, Farleigh, Whittingham and 
South Ockendon Hospitals and the events which gave rise to them 
made front-page news. What is less well known about these events 
is the critical role AEGIS played in instigating and sustaining 
the press interest, and by thus raising the issue of care in 
mental hospitals, inspired the principal complainants at Ely and 
Whittingham to pursue their grievances. The South Ockendon 
Inquiry would never have taken place without the efforts of 
Barbara Robb over three years beginning with the first serious 
injury to a patient there in 1968.
This study documents Barbara Robb's political career as a social 
reformer between 1965 and 1976. It also examines in detail the 
career of policy reforms which concerned AEGIS, up to the present 
day. But the fundamental objective is to use a case-study to 
analyse the process of policy change in health policy in England 
and Wales.
In this introductory chapter, the context of the study in academic 
social administration is established. The aims are then set out 
and followed by a review of the major schools of methodology from 
which a framework for analysis is distilled and discussed in the
^Ed. Robb, B. Sans Everything: a case to answer. (London:Nelson, 
1967)
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context of the source material used. Finally, the structure of 
the study is outlined.
Context
The study has been conceived of and researched within the academic 
tradition of social policy and administration. This originated 
in a number of empirical investigations in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries into the lot of groups in society whose state of 
material, physical and social well-being troubled the conscience 
of the elite groups from whom the investigators were largely 
drawn.^ In addition to documenting the plight of the 'submerged 
10th', studies also advocated government action to remedy the 
evils unearthed. Pre-dating this work, utilitarian philosophers 
such as Jeremy Bentham had developed moral theories of what was 
beneficial to individuals both in isolation and as members of 
society and formulated and promoted elaborate prescriptions of 
government intervention to foster welfare as defined.4 Bentham 
himself even designed a technical device to implement some of his 
prescriptions. Just as the contemporary steam engine was forming 
the technological base for the development of mass industrial 
production, so the Panopticon served as the blueprint for the 
workhouse and the insane asylum which facilitated mass social 
engineering.  ^ Then in the late-1920s the Webbs embarked upon
^See Simey, T.S. and M.B. Charles Booth:Social Scientist 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960)
4Klein argues that the first example of policy analysis in 
social administration was the work of the Benthamite Poor Law 
reformers, See Klein, R., The rise and decline of policy analysis: 
the strange case of health policy-making in Britain, Policy 
Analysis. Vol. 2, No.3, (1976) pp.459-476
5Evans, R. Bentham's Panopticon: an incident in the social
history of architecture, Architectural Association Quarterly. Vol. 
3, Jul. 1977, pp.21-37
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their epic English Poor Law History® and pioneered a historical 
perspective to the emergent discipline.
When the first Chair in social policy was created in 1950, these 
three traditions, the philosophical. the empirical and the
historical were the core approaches of the discipline. However, 
its focus, the social services had by now become so extensive and 
elaborate that whole texts were required simply to outline the 
major elements of health, housing, social security, and local 
authority welfare services^, and a fourth descriptive approach
had emerged. Then later in the decade, the discipline attracted
two young Cambridge academics, Brian Abel-Smith, an economist and 
Peter Townsend a sociologist. With the research which the former 
did on the cost of the National Health Service® and Townsend's 
study into the elderly poor of east London^, social
administration had acquired economic and sociological 
perspectives.
If one was to draw up a comprehensive list of the literature at 
the core of the discipline written before the 1970s, it would be 
possible to classify studies by this six element typology 
philosophical, historical, descriptive, economic and sociological. 
Sirice the categories are not mutually exclusive, the concern in 
this hypothetical allocation would be to identify the primary aim 
of a study. Indeed, it has been the express aim of social 
administrators to develop, and transmit to students, a theoretical
® Webb,S. and Webb, B., English Poor Law History. (London: Frank
Cass, 1963 (reprint)
^Hall, M.P. The Social Services of England. (London: Routledge, 
and Kegan Paul,1952)
®Abel-Smith and Titmuss, R.M. The Cost of the National Health 
Service in England and Wales. (Cambridge: University Press, 1956)
^Townsend, P., The Family Life of Old People. (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1957)
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versatility. Titmuss is perhaps the most brilliant exponent of 
this approach.
"As a subject in the field of further education, it can ..be 
argued that Social Policy and Administration constitutes a 
synthesis - an interdisciplinary way of studying certain 
social institutions, problems and processes in society. 
This subject area does not, therefore, rest to the same 
extent as, for example, economics on a comprehensive body of 
theoretical knowledge. Nor does it exist to describe a 
technical body of information for professional training - as 
do, for example, most law faculties in Britain. It does not
claim to be a distinctive, separate discipline. For some of
its theory and some of its concepts, Social Policy and
Administration draws on economics, and political science, on 
sociology, on psychology, on moral philosophy and related 
disciplines. For its methods of study it leans heavily on 
statistical theory, social survey techniques and 
history."10
His study of the policy and administration of blood transfusion
stands out as a seminal work. The Gift Relationship examines and
compares the mechanics of meeting a particular individual and 
social need and draws on extensive statistical, documentary, field 
study and financial evidence to support a policy prescription for 
the best means of meeting that need.11 The book works at many 
levels in the discipline of social administration, but like much 
of Titmuss' literary output, the primary aim of studying blood 
transfusion becomes one of supporting a moral position involving 
contentions about the nature of human welfare, the supremacy of 
altruism over individualism, and the importance of collectively- 
financed and -administered social services in promoting and
10Titmuss, R.M. Social Policy. (London:George Allen and Unwin, 
1974) pp.57-58
11R.M. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship. (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1970)
fostering these moral values throughout society. Within the 
typology, therefore, the book is written from the philosophical 
perspective.
In the mid-1970s, the national political climate began to change 
and call into question the cross-party, 'Butskellite', welfare 
consensus which had dominated social policy development since the 
early part of the second world war. As the profile of 'new-right' 
politics grew, so did dissatisfaction with established 
explanations of policy and service development written from a 
'whiggish' perspective presenting the process as a progressive, 
inevitable and natural social movement encapsulating the triumph 
of enlightenment and humanitarianism over nineteenth century 
demons such as unrestrained, laissez-faire capitalism and less- 
eligibility. At the same time, the growing influence of decision­
making techniques developed by American political scientists on 
policy-makers in the United States during the 1960s chimed with a 
reaction against the theoretical pragmatism of Titmuss and a 
pursuit of a foundation in theory unique to social policy; 
although it remains contentious whether the greater emphasis given 
to theory over the last fifteen years has isolated and established 
a distinct social administration theoretic. ^
Aims of the study
The concern with greater theoretical depth has unquestionably 
yielded one valuable by-product; the re-examination of the major 
fields of social policy from a political perspective to seek to 
explain the process of policy change and its impact on the nature 
of policy outcomes.
l^Mishra, R. Society and Social Policy. (London:Macmillan, 1977) 
pp. 4-5
See also, Carrier, J., and Kendall, I., Categorisations and the 
political economy of welfare, Journal of Social Policy. Vol.15, 
1986, No. 3, pp.315-335
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It is the aim of this study to develop such an explanation. In so 
doing, issues such as the rights of the clients, concepts of need, 
the historical development of services, and empirical evaluation 
of implementation emerge. However, the primary mode of inquiry 
will be political analysis.
Studies of policy change in social policy
This methodological objective is shared with a number of important 
studies which began to appear in the mid to late 1970s. 
D o n n i s o n ^ ,  Hall et al.^, Hall^, Banting^ and others have 
focussed on the process of political decision in social policy 
rather than evaluating or making prescriptions in the programmes 
considered. This work has added much to the field whilst 
remaining in many ways problematic and limited.
Hall, Land, Parker and Webb's, Change. Choice and Conflict in 
Social Policy, constructed a framework for analysis of the 
political process based upon three theoretics. Firstly they
employed Easton's characterisation of politics as a coherent 
system with inputs, outputs and a constant imperative to maintain 
equilibrium. The conventional pluralist accounts of Lindblom and
others were then fused together with Miliband's functionalist 
Marxist conception of state activity to produce the notion of
'bounded pluralism'. This holds that although decision making is 
pluralistic, it takes place within boundaries of perceived
legitimacy determined by class-based, power relations. Hall et 
al. accordingly carried the analysis of social policy-making into 
new 'macro' realms of debate about the location of
l-^Donnison, D. , Social Policy and Administration Revisited. 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1975) 
l^Hall, P., Land, H. Parker, R., and Webb, A., Change. Choice and 
Conflict in Social Policy. (London:Heinman, 1975) 
l^Hall, p. Reforming the Welfare. (London:Heinemann, 1976) 
l^Banting, k ., Poverty. Politics. and Policy (London: 
Macmillan,1979)
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institutionalised decision-making within wider contexts of the 
structure of power.
They also drew on the evidence in six case studies across a wide 
spectrum of policy fields to derive criteria against which the 
likely 'success' or 'failure' of new policy proposals being 
transformed into material policy initiatives, and implemented, 
could be assessed. They argued that throughout the history of a 
proposal, varying degrees of legitimacy, feasibility, and support 
can be ascribed to it which determine its fate at the hands of 
decision-makers. These criteria are largely self-defining. 
'Legitimacy' is defined in terms of the recognition given by 
political elites. 'Feasibility' refers to the prevalence and 
extent of practical barriers to innovation and reform. 'Support' 
seems a particularly circular analytical concept:
"Since the case studies are all concerned with actual 
changes in social policies, they satisfied, as it were, the 
criterion of support.
Although as explanations of change the criteria in Hall et al.l® 
repeatedly generate the question 'so what?'^-^, they reflect a 
recognition on the part of the authors that there is an 
intermediate level to which the detailed mechanics or 'blow by 
blow' evidence in the case studies can be distilled, but below the 
more abstract macro-level discussion about the structure of power 
from which 'bounded pluralism' emerges.
Hall et al. restricted their choice of macro theories of state 
activity to pluralism and marxism, begging the question of why 
other schools had been omitted. More fundamentally the final 
chapter of the book fails to return to the debate about the
17Hall et. al. op.cit. p.485
18Hall et al. op.cit.
19l owe this point to colleagues in the postgraduate student 
seminars in the Department of Social Science and Administration at 
the London School of Economics
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structure of power and draw any conclusions from the case studies, 
and throughout, builds at best, only tenuous vertical links 
between the horizontal levels of analysis. The added unconcern of 
the authors to structure their empirical material within their 
conceptual framework is one of Ham's principal criticisms.20 Of 
course whether to sacrifice the momentum of chronology in 
presenting case study material is one of the most challenging 
methodological dilemmas - which Ham himself seems not to have 
resolved entirely in his own study of decision-making in the Leeds 
Regional Hospital Board.21
Banting however, is more successful in presenting his case study 
material within his analytical framework in his book on the 
politics of poverty policy and its interface with housing and 
education. But then the framework is far less ambitious. Firstly 
the value of macro-level of abstraction is completely swept aside 
with only cursory debate about the merit of contending
theories^2:
"Our understanding of policy determinants can be refined 
further by abandoning the assumption that there is a single 
policy-process operating identically throughout an 
individual policy change and over all policies. The balance 
of forces at work seems to differ systematically in 
different phases of the process and in different types of 
policies."23
Ostensibly, then, his analysis operates at only two horizontal 
levels. Firstly he is concerned in the content of his case
20nam,C. Approaches to the Study of Social Policy-Making, Policy 
and Politics, Vol. 8 No.l (1980), p.60 
2lHam, C. Policy-Making in the National Health Service. 
(London:Macmillan, 1981) Ham avoids the problem by presenting a 
descriptive account divided into themes corresponding to the 
organisational concerns of the RHB.
22Banting, op.cit pp. 2-4 
23ibid p.10
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studies with the dynamics within the institutions of policy making 
- Parliament, the Executive, Whitehall and local authorities - and 
their interaction and response to inputs from the wider political 
environment, thus pressure groups, the media and public opinion. 
Second at a more abstracted level, he seeks to formulate 'emergent 
patterns' which he contends add up to a comprehensive picture of 
the social policy process. These patterns are structured into two 
'continually interactive' categories of process; intellectual and 
institutional.
However, having earlier eschewed grand theories, he implicitly 
proceeds from within an acceptance of the work of American 
pluralists such as Lindblom and Heclo and Wildavsky who argue that 
in the face of intense issue complexity, uncertainty and 
constantly changing circumstances, policy-making both in practice 
and normatively is bound to be incremental.2^
"The image of policy-making that emerges is of a continuous 
learning process, in which policy-makers are constantly 
adjusting their interpretations of problems and changing 
their policies in response to steady flow of signals from 
their environment."25
Banting sees policy-makers as highly receptive to (even dependent 
on) those individuals most capable of replenishing the 'flow of 
policy intelligence' who are academics and professionals in the 
social s e r v i c e s . 26 The political institutions digest and 
interpret the new ideas penetrating their world. The primary 
institutions here are political parties, the civil service, and 
pressure groups.
Two major limitations of Banting's approach allow corresponding 
conclusions to be drawn about the aims of a more satisfactory 
policy analysis. To begin with it should operate at three levels.
2^See section on pluralism, pp.353-54 
25ganting op.cit. p. 4 
26ganting op.cit p.141
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There is the primary level 'blow by blow' account of issue
identification, campaigning, lobbying, consultation, negotiation, 
Ministerial action and legislation. There is a secondary level 
which aggregates this work into an analysis of the broad ranges 
and sources of demands place upon the state which Dunleavy and 
O'Leary term 'input politics'.
"This phrase is a piece of systems theory jargon which has
become a synonym for studying who makes demands upon the
state, what these demands are, and how these demands are 
made."27
The third level is the highest tier of abstraction which is
concerned with broader sociological issues such as the role of the 
state and its implications for the structure of power in society. 
As noted above, although dismissive of the relevance of a tertiary 
level analysis, Banting writes from a wider construct which 
assumes that policy-making is pluralist. A more satisfactory 
approach needs to be explicit about these issues and evaluate the 
appropriateness of all the major, competing, theories of the 
state. It needs also to address the limitations of the work of 
Hall et al.28 by forging vertical links between the three levels 
and drawing conclusions about the process in the case study 
material at each level of analysis.
Banting is sensitive to the second problem with his approach. 
Policy analysis must also avoid the hazard of using the specific 
content of case study material to draw general conclusions which 
detailed study in other fields may not substantiate. Banting 
discusses this issue in the context of his own work, yet seems to 
fall into his own trap nonetheless, since the significance he 
ascribes to the role of academics whom he sees as central to the 
process of change appears partly tunnelled by his choice of 
subject.
27ounleavy, P. and O'Leary, B. , Theories of the State. 
(London:Macmillan, 1987) p.11
28Hall et al. op.cit.
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The programmes he analysed were directed by Labour politicians 
such as Richard Crossman and Anthony \Crosland . who were academics
t
themselves and in common with many ministers in Harold Wilson's 
Cabinet, suspicious that in-house advice was biased towards 
conservatism. They therefore brought in outside experts who 
supported change consistent with the Government's party political 
persuasions. The receptivity of these politicians to like-minded 
academics is therefore unsurprising but may not be typical. 
McCarthy, for example, draws more cautious conclusions about their 
role in making poverty policy in the mid-1960s. He also makes the 
further important point that having limited their role to problem 
definition and the specification of alternative policy proposals 
(for which role their academic qualifications particularly 
recommended them) they then found that the government was 
initially unsympathetic and accordingly became political 
campaigners.^9
Banting's analysis is further limited in the role he ascribes to 
professionals which is essentially as organised interest groups or 
lobbies. This appears problematic in those fields of policy such 
as health and social services, where professionals directly 
implement policy in the course of professional practice. Indeed, 
there is evidence against Banting's view here in at least one of 
the three policy fields he reviewed. Dunleavy's study of urban 
renewal programmes in Birmingham identifies a much more extensive 
role for professionals in making housing policy than Banting would 
s u g g e s t . T h e r e f o r e ,  rather than demonstrating that his 
emergent patterns can be applied comprehensively to all social
^McCarthy, M., Campaigning for the Poor. (London:Croom 
Helm,1986), pp.38-61
30ounleavy, P., Urban Political Analysis. (London: Macmillan
1980) pp.112-119 or more fully set out in Dunleavy, P., The 
Politics of Mass Housing. 1945-75 (London:Oxford Clarendon Press,
1981)
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policy areas his work tends to indicate that, at least at the 
intermediate level, the nature of political analysis can be 
specific to the field of policy under review.31
Public administration has a longer tradition in the analysis of 
decision-making and has consequently built up a more wide-ranging 
body of theory and extensive literature of case studies at central 
and local government level. Political scientists who are not also 
social administrators would, in the main, consider that limiting 
the analysis of the policy process to social policy issues places 
an artificial boundary around the enterprise.32 They would 
contend that there is no single policy process specific to social 
policy and that one must consider public policy as a whole. 
Indeed some of the most instructive policy analyses of social 
policy change have been undertaken by generalist public policy 
analysts, such as Dunleavy and Heclo.33 34
The definition and delineation of 'social services' through 
legislative and administrative political institutions is the 
product of complex, multivariate historical political processes 
which are dynamic. This evolutionary development produces a 
differential extent and rate of expansion of state intervention 
within different sectors, and a fluctuation of issues which fall
31compare this with Allison's findings in that different 
theoretical perspectives can colour the findings from the same 
case study material. Allison, G.T., Essence of Decision. (Boston, 
Mass.: Little Brown, 1971)
32"...our argument is that the separation of the disciplines of 
politics, social administration and economics has prevented an 
understanding of the real world phenomena, such as government 
policy, which cut across their artificial boundaries." Cawson, A. 
Corporatism and Welfare. (London:Heinemann, 1982) p.59 
^^Dunleavy, P, op.cit.
3^Heclo, H., Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1975)
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under the social policy umbrella at any point in time. In this 
context, it would be highly challenging to attempt to synthesise a 
coherent and specific 'analysis-of-change-in-the-social-services'. 
One may also ask why social administrators who have tried to meet 
that challenge have drawn extensively on political science theory 
developed from studying other policy areas. For there is a 
certain lack of logic in searching for a process of change 
exclusive to social policy using tools of analysis from defence, 
economic, environment and transport policy.
Since this study focuses on highly specific policy areas, it is 
too narrow to draw general conclusions on such wide-ranging 
issues. Its objectives are simply to elucidate the process of 
change in mental and other health policy areas as a contribution 
to the wider debate. The first stage is to construct a framework 
encompassing the three levels of analysis earlier delineated.
An analytical framework.
The primary level of analysis, encompassing Chapters Two to Nine, 
is an exposition of the case study. This presents the major 
events chronologically, but also focuses on four major political 
arenas or spheres of input politics, during successive phases of
the story. Firstly, the construction of a pressure group is
examined, including the crystallisation of its promotional issues, 
its support-building, and entry into the political arena. In the 
second phase, the analysis moves closer to Ministers and the 
internal mechanics of central policy-making. In the third, the 
focus moves out of Whitehall to the mobilisation of 'public 
opinion' by the media, in opposition to professional (largely 
medical) political organisation. Lastly, the passage of 
legislation through Parliament is analyzed, highlighting the 
interactive roles and influence of the pressure group, the 
profession, Ministers and the Opposition.
The second analytical section encompasses chapters Ten and Eleven
and begins by evaluating the impact of the policy reforms up to
-15-
the present day, from the perspective of the aspirations of the 
various partisans. In the final two chapters, the case study and 
the impact of the reforms are taken into the intermediate and 
tertiary levels of political analysis. An exposition of the 
characterisations of 'input politics' is taken as the starting 
point. This is drawn from Dunleavy and O'Leary's categorisation 
of five major i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s - ^ ; pluralism, elite theory, public 
choice theory, Marxism and its variants, and neo-pluralism. Just 
as this typology includes the literature in policy analysis and 
political sociology, so the social policy literature can be so 
categorised. This intermediate analysis examines whether the case 
study material confirms the interpretation contained in each of 
these five models of the major spheres of input politics within 
the policy process. These are pressure groups, the mass media and 
Parliament. The tertiary analysis then draws on this work to test 
the appropriateness of the five models In interpreting the 
responses and outputs of the various administrative and political 
arms of the state and identifying the determining parameters in 
mental health policy change.
Methodology
A requirement of rigorous study is a considered structure for the 
process of research. Methodology like so many other areas in 
social science is contentious. On either side of the field stand 
the positivists, who contend that natural scientific method must 
be applied, and the subjectivists, who argue that the objectivity 
needed to apply positivistic approaches cannot be brought to bear 
by people studying society. A number of other schools have also 
sought to bridge the gulf between these two poles by attempting to 
draw on the best elements of each. Most prominent among these are 
Marxist and Weberian social theories. The following is a 
necessarily brief discussion from which some conclusions are drawn 
about an appropriate method for studying modern political history 
in England and Wales.
^ D u n l e a v y  p. and O'Leary B. Op.Cit.
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Positivist approaches developed from an aspiration for the study 
of social phenomena to achieve the status of a fully-accepted
science. If the social study was to claim to be a real science,
it needed to adopt the methods used by natural scientists.
"Most social scientists were agreed that the social sciences 
should model themselves on the natural sciences, especially
physics, since it was these disciplines that represented the
peak of achievement in human knowledge. "36
Briefly, scientific method involves the development of theory by 
positing hypotheses about an objective reality and submitting them 
to empirical test by observation, data gathering and analysis. In 
applying these techniques, social investigators were required to 
set aside value judgements and conduct the exercise objectively.
The most influential positivist, Karl Popper, developed the 
doctrine of 'falsification'. According to this, it is the task of 
the analyst to put forward systematic theories from which 
hypotheses are deduced which pertain to empirical facts and which 
in turn can be falsified through observation. Scientific advance 
then proceeds through the accumulation of unfalsified theories and 
hypotheses and the rejection of falsified o n e s .
There are several problems with the positivist approach. Firstly, 
Rein argues that in social science, the range and number of 
variables in social events are only partly known and it is often 
difficult to be definite about causal links or whether an unknown 
extraneous variable is at work. Not least, the data which exists 
or can be derived to investigate these problems are often 
incomplete or of poor quality.38
3^Hughes J., The Philosophy of Social Research. (London:Longman, 
1980) p.35
3?See Johnson, T., Dandeker, C., and Ashworth, C., The Structure 
of Social Theory. (London:Macmillan,1984) pp.192-193
3®Rein, M., Social Science and Public Policy. (London: Penguin,
Continued on following page
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Equally importantly, Kuhn and Weber39 have both pointed out that 
natural science does not necessarily follow these strict criteria 
of falsification. According to Kuhn, the Popperian method 
underestimates the extent to which natural scientists abandon some 
theories before they have been falsified and retain others which 
have been shown to be false but which continue to have a pragmatic 
application in certain s i t u a t i o n s . ^  Positivist method is merely 
one paradigm or system of interpretation about what constitutes 
useful data, and what form 'scientific' theories should take. He 
argued that there is a range of competing paradigms in natural 
science and that the grounds for chosing one or another were often 
social or psychological.^
Both these two categories of criticism, complexity of the field of 
study versus the inadequacy of the information base and the 
subjectivity of choice of scientific method in certain 
situations, apply equally to fields of study in natural science. 
Therefore, the third criticism is perhaps the most useful to a 
discussion of social science method since it is specific to 
studies of human activity and organisation. Positivists deny any 
legitimate role for the active interpretation of observed 
phenomena on the part of the observer. They presume, therefore, 
that people can experience an event in a neutral fashion. 
According to subjectivists, this is a fallacy.
Continued from previous page 
1976) pp. 53-54
39For a summary of Weber's position see Giddens, A., Capitalism 
and Modern Social Theory. (Cambridge: University Press, 1971)
pp.138-139
^See Johnson et al., op.cit. pp.193-194. Examples which spring 
to mind include Newton's Laws of Motion, and Boyle's Law on the 
relationship between pressure and temperature in gases.
^Kuhn, T.S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (Chicago: 
University Press, 1962)
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Subjectivism shares with positivism the view that knowledge is 
based in human experience but diverges by claiming that that 
experience is an interpretative process. Society is conceived of 
as a complex of 'socially constructed meanings' comprised of the 
ideas and interpretations its members hold about it. Accordingly, 
treating society as a pre-determined order involves the fallacy of 
regarding a subjective product as an objective thing, or, put 
another way, confuses ideas of reality with reality itself.
Subjectivists, deny that social science can be value-neutral. 
Objective reality exists, yes, but human beings interpret it 
through perception and consciousness. Since such constructions 
placed upon reality are usually shared with others and conveyed by 
socialisation, they are also shared by social scientists. Thus, 
social researchers cannot place themselves in some unique position 
of having stepped outside socially-constructed r e a l i t y .
In its most reduced form, subjectivism poses a problem for social 
analysis since if social scientists are unable to escape 
commonsense assumptions and constructions on reality, how are 
their findings to be validated? Subjectivists respond to this by 
asserting that the most that can be achieved is to establish the 
kind of agreements about reality upon which the functioning of 
society is dependent and the ways in which these are constituted.
As positivists and subjectivists stand in opposition to one 
another, Weber and Marx have tried to harness the tensions of this 
dichotomy to build bridges.
Weber shared the positivist distinction between normative 
statements, which could not be established, and factual ones which 
could. He also accepted that subjectivist contention that human 
beings interpret reality. He tried to resolve the tension between 
the two perspectives by contending that a major task of social 
science was to make intelligible the subjective basis of social 
phenomena through techniques which are scientifically verifiable.
^2Johnson et al. op.cit. p.102
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The range and complexity of reality was to be managed by selection 
of a set of events or 'problem of interest' from the totality. 
However since, according to Weber, the process of selection is 
subjective, it is incumbent on social investigators to make known 
their own values.
Once selected, the problem of interest should be studied through 
the process of constructing 'ideal types'. Neither descriptions 
nor hypotheses, ideal types are abstracted frames of reference or 
models of reality. They are the delineation of the most important 
and distinct aspects of the problem of interest, distilled from 
empirical observation, from the perspective of the analyst. They 
are thus the interface between the real world and research. They
are judged by the criterion of how useful they are in organising
our understanding of the world and are refined through 
observation. Scientific method is applied to estimate the extent 
to which these unreal 'idealisations' have grasped aspects of the 
real events.^
The construction of ideal types is for Weber the mechanism for 
achieving the principal objectives of social research which is to 
understand how social phenomena come to be as they are. This 
requires the establishment of causal relationships which involves 
positive answers to two principal questions. Firstly, is the 
causal relationship verifiable by others and not valid for one
person only? Secondly, would the outcome of the social process
under study be different if the facts or specific events 
identified as causal were modified?
The Marxist approach is based in 'materialism' which starts from 
the premise that objective, material reality constrains the limits 
of human action and social relations. Johnson et al. use the
^^See Giddens, op.cit. pp.133-151, Johnson et al. pp.84-85, 
Bottomore, T.B., Elites and Society (London:Penguin, 1964) p.38 
and note 17. p. 45 (which quotes Weber's own explanation) and 
Cawson, A. op.cit. pp. 61-73
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analogy of a book to distinguish materialism from subjectivism. 
Subjectivists would stress that the physical makeup of a book does 
not determine its meaning. This is conveyed by the author and 
interpreted by the reader and of course the one may differ from 
the other. Materialists would argue that no meanings could exist 
without the manuscript which remains a constraint upon possible 
interpretations. Materialism departs from positivism in its 
conceptualisation of reality. As noted above, positivists contend 
that reality can be explained by direct experience and 
observation. For materialists, the accumulation of facts and 
knowledge about their inter-relationships is purely descriptive. 
Explanation in social science requires the uncovering of 
underlying causal mechanisms which are not given to direct 
observation but which can be constructed or abstracted from it.
"Marx .... believed that external reality did exist and that 
human consciousness could understand it. But doing so 
required a process of theoretical labour in which the 
analyst abstracts from a mass of empirical observations in 
order to detect the underlying order beneath the appearance 
of bewildering variety, and works on the fundamental causal 
processes in operation."^
For Marx, objective reality and human construction of it are not 
distinct concepts, since reality is not external to people. 
Reality is both the product of human activity and the condition of 
that activity. Strategic amongst human activity is sustaining the 
means of existence or productive action on the material world. 
The material world is not universal and determined by abstract 
nature, it is acted on by and transformed by people in society 
through the social relations of production.
"This history of the relations between man and his natural 
environment is one in which nature is progressively 
transformed from an alien force determining our actions into
^Dunleavy, P. and O'Leary, B. Theories of the State 
(London:Macmillan, 1987) p.217
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a socially-constructed reality reflecting our socially 
constructed needs.... Human beings not merely reflect upon 
the natural order of things, they act upon it, control it, 
give it social meaning.
Hence knowledge about the social world cannot be obtained by 
passive observation, only through action. Knowledge is one 
consequence of 'being-in-the-world'.
For Marx, then, there is an objective reality which is the product 
of human action, but also, human beings place interpretative 
constructions upon it through their direct experience of it. 
These constructs are based in ideology or a coherent set of ideas 
about the world. Ideologies are founded in relations of 
material production which in capitalist society are class-based 
and in conflict. Ideologies, like classes, exist in antagonistic 
relation to one another. At any one time, the ideas of the 
ruling-class constitute the dominant ideology in society, through 
which reality is interpreted. By internalising the major value 
assumptions in the dominant ideology, the subordinate class, which 
is exploited - that is has surplus economic value expropriated 
from its labour-power - aligns itself, contrary to its own 
objective interests, with the exploiting class: a state of being 
which Marx called 'false consciousness'.
In summary, the methodological problem in Marxist social theory is 
to explain social reality, not through empirical observation, but 
by uncovering hidden causal relations which pre-determine the 
process of change and development which observation describes. 
Such 'structural' determinants can be political, cultural or 
ideological in character but fundamentally are based in the 
economic structure as defined by the social relations of 
production. For Marxists, structural determinants are features of 
objective reality. They therefore differ from Weberian 'ideal 
types' which are merely models contrived to represent aspects of 
reality to assist explanation.
^ J o h n s o n  e t al. op.cit. p. 138
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For Johnson et al. , there are methodological problems with all 
these strategies whose resolution is a long-term goal of social 
scientists who expose the failures or one strategy or another. 
They have most sympathy with Marx's dialectical approach, in turn 
inspired by Hegel, to set the two 'fundamental axes' of social 
theory, object and subject, in opposition in order to expose the 
limitations of each and synthesise more satisfactory 
approaches.^
Four key issues arise from this brief review of the major 
methodological approaches. Firstly, positivist method is both 
problematic and contentious. Secondly, it is alone in denying the 
involvement of the researchers' own values in the entire research 
endeavour of issue identification, data collection, and analysis. 
Weber warns us that the selection of research topic is a value- 
biased process. Rein and others consider the empirical evidence 
available to social science to be inadequate to the procedures of 
scientific method. Thirdly, subjectivists see active 
interpretation of observed evidence as an inescapable human 
characteristic and therefore inevitable in social research. 
Fourthly, Johnson et al. after Marx, advocate using empirical and 
interpretative approaches in parallel and in opposition, one to 
the other, in order to synthesise method which addresses the 
limitations of each.
In general, my own view accords with the majority of approaches 
presented above and therefore rejects the purist, positivist 
method as mechanistic, limited and limiting. In the course of the 
foregoing study, a wealth of data has been gathered and analysed 
using standard empirical approaches where the evidence allowed and 
this endeavour has undoubtedly added enormously to understanding; 
although the search is unlikely to have been exhaustive. 
Moreover, any student of policy-making in contemporary Britain 
cannot get access to all the necessary evidence since key parts of 
the public record remains secret for thirty years. Hence,
^ J o h n s o n  et al. op.cit. pp.225-6
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interpretation of poor data is inevitable on occasions. More 
importantly, I would argue that interpretation is an illuminating 
and creative intellectual faculty in research even where the 
empirical data is plentiful.
So both positivist and subjectivist techniques are employed in the 
ensuing study. It also tries to explore the utility of the 
respective methods of Weber and Marx, in seeking to abstract from 
complex, observed, empirical data, frameworks of reference or 
structural determinants which aid the task of explaining why
events turn out as they do.
Weber's requirement that the value judgements made in choosing a 
research topic should be made explicit is both a challenge and an 
opportunity. After all, some of the events which are reviewed in 
the course of this study of the impact of mental hospital scandals 
are not amongst the most attractive incidents in modem social 
history, so it is interesting to explore one's motives for chosing 
it.
There are intellectual and 'non-rational' motives. Certainly the 
choice accords with major interests in health and the relationship 
between the process of change and the nature of major policy
outcomes. Curiosity also demands an understanding of why human 
conditions which manifest themselves as an inability to function 
personally and socially, are conceived of as the purview of 
medicine and why policy should reflect this; particularly since
despite the determined efforts on the part of somatic
research psychiatrists over the course of more than a century, 
mental disorders are yet to reveal themselves of a demonstrable, 
somatic aetiology.
But the roots of this study also go back to adolescent memories of 
immediate family members admitted to a large psychiatric hospital 
during the period when AEGIS was active. There are resonant 
images: of two-hour bus journeys to visit; of a massive, sprawling 
institution whose ostensibly benign name was terrible and fearful; 
of the shame of the patient and of the family and the consequent
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imperative to lie to neighbours and relatives; of a locked 
admission ward; of nurses locking doors behind them with bunches 
of keys swinging from steel chains; of cavernous, high-vaulted 
wards with long, shining floors, rows of beds with starched 
counterpanes and no basic privacy. At an intuitive level, it all 
seemed so remote from the personal suffering of the individual and 
felt very wrong at the time and perhaps the story of AEGIS allows 
one to explore the validity of that intuition.
At an academic level, my own approach to social welfare follows a 
former teacher, Francois Lafitte who contends that it should be 
u n s e n t i m e n t a l . This implies a rational approach, which 
stresses technical assessment rather than moral judgement and 
paternalism. It is however, perfectly conceivable that one's 
implicit value-system can colour judgements otherwise presented 
technically; particularly since the definition of need blurs the 
boundaries between these categories.^® Beyond this, Weber's 
challenge is too demanding. It is for others to say whether the 
study in the succeeding pages is unduly value-biased. An honest, 
and thorough attempt has been made to approach the material with 
as open a mind as I have available at the moment.
Sources
The material for the case study is drawn from five major sources. 
The primary, original source is the record left to the British 
Library of Economic and Political Science by Barbara Robb's 
executors. This is an extensive and remarkable collection of 
correspondence, briefing and policy papers, structured evidence to 
Ministers, and the two committees of inquiry she was involved in,
^^An unrecorded speech given on the occasion of his retirement 
from the Chair of Social Policy at the University of Birmingham in 
July 1988.
^®Forder, A. , Concents in Social Administration.
(London:Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974) pp.40-57
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as well as her own observations and notes of phone calls. The 
AEGIS record fills over 120 A4 ring binders. In the last few 
months of Mrs Robb's life, she began a detailed classification of 
her papers to trace the step by step events of her campaign and 
support her own interpretation of events. She managed to finish 
about twenty percent of this enterprise before she died, and the 
major initial methodological task was to complete her work by 
cataloguing and classifying the papers into broad themes and 
writing them up.
The second major source was the official, publicly available 
documentation and relevant statistics. Apart from all the 
standard Parliamentary, Departmental and quasi-government agency 
documentation, and professional and other interest group material, 
this included internal records of the interface between Ministers 
and civil servants and the health service drawn from the archives 
of South West Thames Regional Health Authority.
The third source was material obtained from semi-structured 
interviews with participants. These are listed in Appendix 1. 
The approach adopted was to forward a questionnaire which focused 
on both general issues and the specific role and concerns of the 
individual participant. The individual was then interviewed and a 
record was written up and agreed with the participant as evidence 
for the thesis. The events and issues surrounding AEGIS have also 
been discussed with a number of former and current senior civil 
servants and senior health officers who wished to remain unnamed.
Although this evidence has been extremely useful and in the case 
of some individuals opened exciting fields of inquiry which might 
otherwise have been missed, it has its limitations. Firstly, the 
ability of participants to recall detail 15 years or more after 
the event was variable and in individual cases, people remembered 
more about some issues than others. Moreover, good practice in 
the use of participants as sources requires that they should be 
allowed to comment on aspects of content. The result can be 
inhibiting in areas where substantive evidence is less than
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comprehensive or conflicting and where interpretation is 
required.
Fourthly, extensive use was made of Richard Crossman's unedited 
Diaries in the University of Warwick Modern Records Centre. The 
complete Diaries are several times longer than the published 
version and are a far richer source of evidence on health care; 
the process of editing for publication having clearly focused on 
the parliamentary and inter-cabinet politics. However, as with 
the AEGIS record, an extensive cataloguing and write-up was 
required before the data was usable. Dictated to tape every 
Sunday and covering the previous six days, this record places 
historians in unique proximity to the centre of formal decision­
making. Wherever possible, alternative evidence on the same 
events is presented alongside Crossman's account. In all fairness 
to Crossman, this cross-checking largely corroborates his 
description of events. His perspective and interpretation were 
singular to him and provided they are not confused with 'hard 
facts', they are critical evidence in themselves since he was 
personally involved and highly committed to his initiatives in the 
areas of policy of interest to AEGIS.
Fifthly, the research has involved an extensive, although probably 
not exhaustive trawl through national, local and specialist 
press covering 'hospital scandals' and AEGIS promotional issues 
from 1964 to the present day. A comprehensive and detailed 
content analysis over this entire period would have required more 
resources than were available and has therefore not been 
attempted.^
^Golding and Middleton required a team of coders to analyse the 
national and relevant local press and broadcasts on the Deevy 
social security fraud case, over a six month period. See 
Golding,P. and Middleton, S., Images of Welfare. (London: Basil 
Blackwell, 1982) pp.67-8
Waves of massive media coverage of mental health scandals occur 
over a 10-year period during the history of the AEGIS campaign.
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As intimated above, these sources are not the entire story. 
Access to the full record in modern political history in the 
United Kingdom is impossible. Finding corroborative evidence at 
the level of detail in Mrs. Robb's papers is therefore extremely 
problematic. There is one fascinating internal DHSS meeting 
between Barbara Robb and Crossman which both parties recorded in 
considerable detail. The content is the same, but the 
interpretation very different - an account is given in Appendix 
2. The chronicling of events which emerges from her files has 
been largely corroborated by participants where they have been 
involved and where memory permits. One can also trace the story 
which her records describe through the voluminous official 
documentation. Nevertheless, there are events where her records 
and interpretation are the only sources. In these cases they are 
presented as such. To the extent that this is not 'scientific', 
the researcher can only plead that evidence is evidence even if 
corroboration is impossible. Besides, two years spent reading, 
cataloguing and interpreting Mrs. Robb's records leaves at least 
one student with firm grounds for believing her a reliable source; 
a view also shared by some now very senior and prestigious 
journalists.
It is feasible, therefore, that a future student might write a 
significantly different version of the political history of AEGIS 
and the hospital scandals of the late-1960s and 1970s once the 
public record becomes available from the mid-1990s onwards. For 
the time being, the following is an attempt written from one, 
individual perspective to get as close to the reality of events 
that the above listed sources permit.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE CASE FOR A CAMPAIGN
In the autumn of 1963, Miss Amy Gibbs, a retired seamstress in her 
mid-70s, was admitted to Friem Barnet Psychiatric Hospital at 
Southgate in North London. Her condition deteriorated and she was 
transferred to a longstay ward for confused elderly people (then 
classified as psychogeriatric) and, apparently in anticipation of 
her remaining there, her furniture and household possessions were 
"sold up". Miss Gibbs' case was unexceptional in all but two 
characteristics, without which her quality of life would have 
probably reduced to the meagre existence afforded most of the
180,000 elderly people in longstay hospitals at the time^; a 
personal tragedy left unrecorded. However Amy Gibbs was a member 
of the Hampstead Artists' Society and, unrelatedly, had in her 
past been counselled and befriended by Mrs. Barbara Robb. Her 
admission and subsequent retention in Friern became as a 
consequence what Carr terms "an historical fact"^.
Barbara Robb was a middle-class woman then in her early fifties. 
She had no professional career and lived at number 10 Hampstead 
Grove, Hampstead with her husband Brian. The house is a small 
early-Victorian terrace, just behind the "village" high street of 
Hampstead where, in the 1960s, dwelt those affluent and 
fashionable people who preferred fresh air and greenery to the 
smog and terraced townscapes of Mayfair, Knightsbridge, Belgravia 
and increasingly then, Kensington and Chelsea. The Robbs were not 
rich but with Brian's salary, her inherited, unearned income, and 
no children to drain the budget, they lived comfortably enough.
1-See Townsend, P. The Last Refuge. (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1962) There were a further 115,000 elderly people in other 
longstay hospital care, much of which was ex-poor law infirmary 
pavilion ward accommodation. See Townsend, P. A national survey of 
old people, in Ed. Freeman, H., Psychiatric Hospital Care: a
Symposium. (Balliere, Tindall and Cassell: London, 1965) p.225 
^Carr. E.H. What is History (London:Penguin, 1961) p.12
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She was born an Anne of Burghwallis just before the 1st world 
war. The family were part of the squirearchy in Yorkshire and 
they had a family seat at Burghwallis Hall just outside 
Doncaster.3 Her father pursued a military career and the family 
were devout Roman Catholics. She had no title but the Annes were 
important people in the area and her lineage was a source of great 
self-esteem to a degree that there were those of her acquaintance 
who concluded from her bearing that she had been born into the 
high aristocracy. Her upbringing was conservative and gave her no 
great aspirations to transcend traditional gender roles and train 
for the law or some similar profession. Her Catholicism gave her 
a profound if at times paternalistic compassion. She also learned 
the 'old school' values of loyalty, decency and, perhaps from her 
father, fastidiousness in her work and formidable organisational 
skills. Indeed, her records of meetings demonstrate such a 
capacity for the recall of detail, even down to extensive verbatim 
quotes of conversation, that one would be forgiven for presuming 
she must have carried a tape recorder in her handbag.
At the same time she was far from conventional, since her primary 
interest in her early life was the theatre. In her youth, Mrs 
Robb trained for the ballet but her aspirations to a dance career 
were reversed by an ankle injury. However it is said of her that 
she carried this unattained ambition throughout her life, wearing 
her hair up as if always prepared for class. After the injury she 
changed course somewhat and entered the Chelsea College of Art to 
study theatrical design. At Chelsea she met Brian Robb who 
pursued a distinguished career and became head of the department 
of book illustration at the Royal College of Art. The Robbs were 
devoted to each other and Brian was a source of great moral 
support to his wife. His loyalty inspired him to bear without 
complaint the disruption and inconvenience that AEGIS brought to 
his life. They frequently ate out and Barbara Robb followed a 
punishing schedule which confined her to the basement study for
3It was ironically later turned into a home for the elderly.
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weeks on end. He also provided financial support when her own 
resources were stretched.
She did not pursue any career as such but contented herself to 
keep house and engage in voluntary work through the Catholic 
church. Working with young offenders during the war generated 
her interest in Jungian psychoanalysis which she developed by 
reading widely. She then began to practise as a part-time 
psychotherapist counselling people referred primarily, if not 
entirely, through the local church networks. In this way Barbara 
Rob met and counselled Amy Gibbs in 1943. Miss Gibbs subsequently 
remained in contact with the Robbs and on her retirement, she was 
encouraged by Brain Robb to take up art and became a proficient 
collagist. It was a mutual acquaintance in the Hampstead Artists 
Society who approached Mrs Robb at the old lady's request during 
her second year in Friern.
Barbara Robb had the self-confidence and prandeur characteristic 
of an aristocrat. She feared no-one regardless of status or 
social position and in her work as Chairman of AEGIS was as 
assertive with the Secretary of State for Social Services as with 
the nursing auxiliaries at Friern. As suggested earlier, her 
self-image was further sustained by strongly-held personal and 
religious convictions. She is variously described as 'high- 
minded', 'idealistic', 'a woman of the highest principles'. She 
was a staunch, but liberal Roman Catholic who would cheerfully 
write to the Pope to criticize any church policy (such as the 
Encyclical on birth control) with which she disagreed. If her 
compassion is added to this formula, her commitment to AEGIS 
emerges as the expression of her sense of moral rectitude in the 
cause, and sudden discovery of a vocation in later life.^ Her 
commitment was total. By the middle of 1965, she was devoting 
sixteen hours a day to her work and sustained this pace before 
illness overtook her ten years later. She brought to the task a 
penetrating intellect, a critical, analytical mind, expressive
^Prior to embarking on the AEGIS campaign she had been 
considering the cause of prison conditions.
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lucidity (not to discount wit) in the written and spoken word, and 
a considerable latent talent for political bargaining which became 
highly developed through experience.
She had a powerful personal presence, complemented by a striking 
appearance - with large facial features which she magnified 
further with high-fashion clothes and the broad-brimmed hats which 
became a talking point at conferences on mental health during her 
active years. The care and attention she devoted to her 
appearance were no mere vanity, however, since her files reveal an 
assiduousness to ensure that she was so-dressed for any occasion 
to project a functional image. There were those on the circuit of 
symposia, press conferences and public inquiries who found her 
clothes rather incongruous, even ostentatious for a social
reformer in late middle-age. However it was all part of her self-
presentation as an imposing, rather theatrical, figure. Barbara
Robb was a 'power-dresser' before anyone dreamt up the term.
If this image seems hardhearted, her close friends and associates 
would be anxious to emphasise that her resolution was tempered by 
personal warmth, humour, great enthusiasm and immense charm. 
These qualities were also highly functional to her in engaging the 
support of influential people. Journalists in particular seem to 
have found her approach refreshing and attractive in that 'she 
managed to preserve a degree of freshness and naivety which made 
her appear vulnerable in the hard world of political
bargai n i n g'. ^  Although most of them knew that she very quickly 
developed into a keenly astute, highly organised and extremely 
efficient lobbyist, she never lost her 'old world charm'. She was 
personally generous, offering unsolicited gifts to associates 
after they had helped her. She would send champagne or flowers to 
raise the spirits of ailing supporters or more incongruously, 
sweep into the shabby long-stay wards at Friern laden with fine 
hand-made chocolates and vintage brandy for the otherwise deprived 
residents.
5Interview with Hugo Young
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She ran AEGIS virtually single-handed from the basement of the 
house, consulting her advisers by telephone and motoring around 
London in mini-cabs delivering copies of the latest AEGIS paper to 
potential allies, up-to-date fully-referenced information to 
journalists and briefing documents to politicians and lawyers. As 
the workload swelled, she engaged part-time secretarial 
assistance. Throughout the campaign, her private income and 
savings constituted the principal source of finance and came under 
considerable pressure at times when, as will be documented, her 
legal fees grew. Despite this, she would decline offers of money 
from supporters, although members of the public sent her small 
sums from time to time which she did accept. Encouraged by 
associates to register AEGIS as a charity to attract funding, she 
aborted the application anxious not to compromise her contentious, 
campaigning approach.**
This picture of Barbara Robb contrasts markedly with a reputation 
she acquired amongst certain politicians, civil servants, and some 
other professional and lay lobbyists in mental health. Barbara 
Robb was widely perceived as an irresponsible complainer and 
trouble-maker who was interfering in an area of which she had 
little knowledge or experience. This reputation was in part a 
symptom of frustration with her political effectiveness and sheer 
dogged persistence, however it was undoubtedly, if unconsciously, 
encouraged by Barbara Robb herself. Her chosen modus operand! 
involved a certain amount of mud-slinging in the columns of the 
press. There were the inevitable inter-personal and -group 
rivalries which she aggravated because her cause was paramount, 
and she took a dim view of anyone whom she saw as obstructive or 
even less than wholly committed to it. This left little scope for 
understanding of expediency and compromise which were second
**Mrs Robb aborted an application for charitable status after 
reading of the removal from the Charity Commissioners Register of 
the British Humanist Association for engaging in political 
campaigns, The Times. 3.1.68 and Robb Files. Record of a Campaign 
vol.IV section 1.
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nature to most other members of the political spheres she moved 
in and consequently put her at odds with some potential 
supporters and gave rise to periodic distancing from some of her 
closest allies who, however, usually forgave her before she 
forgave them.
Furthermore, the case that AEGIS initially presented had two 
connotations which alienated some people. Firstly it seemed so 
incredible as to be indicative of exaggeration and sensationalism. 
AEGIS appeared to be spoiling its case through overkill. Again 
she reinforced this impression when, following the publication of 
Sans Everything?. she refused to cooperate with the formal 
inquiry; a decision which convinced some that she lacked 
substantive evidence. Secondly, by focusing on the deficiencies 
in the service, AEGIS appeared insensitive to the genuine 
dedication of and enormous demands upon staff caring for long-stay 
elderly and mentally disordered patients. The presentation of the 
case in the press emphasised the more extreme forms of neglect and 
maltreatment and so fuelled what was essentially a misconception 
about her which opponents were only too ready to exploit.
This is a snapshot of the elegant woman who on the 21st of January 
1965, made the first of many expeditions up the immense and dingy
main corridor at Friern Barnet hospital to what contemporaries
referred to as the 'back wards'. She kept a diary of this and 
subsequent visits which resulted in Amy Gibbs being escorted out 
of Friern and moved to a Convent Home for elderly people where she 
eventually died. The diary appeared in print, and was the subject 
of public controversy. However one fact is indisputable - Barbara 
Robb was profoundly shocked and outraged by what she saw and 
experienced at the hospital.
Friern Barnet had first opened its doors in 1851 as the Middlesex
County Asylum at Colney Hatch. It was featured at the Great
^Ed. Robb, R, Sans Everything: a case to answer (London:Nelson, 
1967)
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Exhibition of the same year as the pinnacle of achievement in 
scientific lunacy administration. Indeed, interested sight-seers 
were ferried out to Southgate on daily trips to marvel at the 
results of the ratepayers' philanthropy. Built to house 1000, it 
was the second great Middlesex County Asylum. Yet its size and 
emphasis in design on economies of scale were the despair of some 
commentators.® ^
In 1965 the mental health services were largely based in the large 
hospitals which had evolved from an interplay of four social 
movements: moral treatment theories formulated during the late
eighteenth century and introduced to pauper lunatic asylums by 
John Connolly!^; Benthamite imperatives to segregate the 
unproductive in society who were excused the rigours of less 
eligibility!^; the energy of a number of social r e f o r m e r s ! ^ ;  and 
professional empire building by asylum doctors of the mid-19th 
c e n t u r y . !3 Not least, changes to the financing of poor law
^Martin Granville, J., The Care and Cure of the Insane, Reports 
of the Lancet Conmiission on Lunatics. 1875/7 Vol.l
^Extract from the Asvlums Quarterly of 1851 cited in Hunter, R,. 
and Macalpine, I., Psychiatry for the Poor. (London: Dawsons, 
1972) p.136
!®See Digby A., Moral Treatment at the Retreat, 1796-1846, In Ed. 
Bynum W.J., Porter, R. , and Shepherd, M. , The Anatomy of Madness. 
Vol.I (London:Tavistock, 1985), pp.2-51, Connolly J., Treatment of 
the Insane without Mechanical Restraint. 1856, Re-published Ed. 
Hunter R. and Macalpine, I., (London:Dawsons, 1968) and Scull, 
A.T., A Victorian Alienist: John Connolly, FRCP,DCL (1794-1866)
in Ed. Bynum W.J., Porter, R. , and Shepherd, M. , The Anatomy of 
Madness. Vol.II (London:Tavistock, 1985), pp.103-150
!!Cochrane, D.A. , The Colonisation of Epsom. (London:!sWTRHA, 
1988) pp.3-4
!2jones, K., A History of The Mental Health Services. 
(London:Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972) pp.132-149 
!^Scull, A.T., Museums of Madness (London:Allen Lane, 1979) 
pp.146-163
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administration in the 1860s and 1870s produced a rapid expansion 
in the numbers certified as insane and a consequent mass 
production of lunatic asylums with 2000 beds in 'barrack 
wards'.^ This policy of mass segregation of lunatics and then 
mental defectives continued well beyond the end of the Great 
War.
Insulin was a great wonder drug of the 1920s. It was administered 
in ever-increasing doses to the mentally ill in asylums until 
insulin-coma-therapy (ICT) was invented. The treatment was 
dangerous and occasionally fatal. It required intensive medical 
and nursing care in special units where, due to their success, 
high staff morale and comradeship contrasted with the 
purposelessness and rigid hierarchy sadly typical of the rest of 
the service.^ A second major innovation arose from flawed 
epidemiological analysis which concluded that dementia praecox 
(schizophrenia) and epilepsy were aetiologically incompatible. 
With a simple conceptual leap it was concluded that the 
administration of a convulsive agent would be therapeutic. 
Electricity was finally chosen because its effects were immediate. 
ECT remains in limited use, modified by muscle relaxants and 
anaesthesia. The third innovation was the use of surgery to 
intervene in the frontal lobes of the brain and thereby eliminate 
some of the more distressing, self-destructive and 'florid 
symptoms' of acute psychosis.
l^Cochrane, D.A., Human, Economical and Medically Wise: The LCC
as Administrators of Victorian Lunacy Policy, in Ed. W.J.Bynum and 
Porter, R., The Anatomy of Madness Vol.III. (London:Routledge , 
1988) pp.248-253 
15Ibid p.261
l^When it was finally proven in the 1950s that insulin could not 
have been the effective agent and ICT was abandoned, the growing 
band of social psychiatrists attributed the therapeutic success to 
the intensive group experience enjoyed the units by jformerly 
neglected patients. See Clark, D.H. Administrative Therapy. 
(London:Tavistock, 1964)
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Titmuss records in his history of the social policy in the second
world war, that of the 140,000 people discharged from hospital to
provide space for the Emergency Medical Service, a substantial 
proportion were mental hospital residents.^ Some institutions 
were used as military hospitals, but the beds were also emptied as 
government officials heeded the advice of psychiatrists that if 
modern warfare produced acute psychiatric disturbance in
soldiers^®, mass bombardment would have a devastatingly 
distressing effect on the civilian population. The predicted mass 
hysteria never materialisedjhowever the post-war administration of 
mental hospitals continued to discharge the more able, long-stay 
hospital residents.
The impact of the next major therapeutic development is
contentious in the literature. Phenothiazines were originally 
synthesised for use in rheumatology. When they were found to have 
potent tranquilising effects, they were taken out of use in this 
specialty and introduced in psychiatry. Jones, who herself worked 
in the service at the time, claims that they transformed it and 
contributed to the decline in hospital resident populations with 
began in 1955 and has since continued.^ Scull accepts that the 
drugs were perceived as performing this role, but argues that the 
attrition in hospital residents began before phenothiazines were 
widely used since average length of stay declined steadily between 
1948 and 1954.^0 Indeed, since the number of residents in
l^Titmuss, R.M., Problems of Social Policy. (LondoniHMSO and 
Longman, 1950) p. 193, See also House of Commons, 32nd Annual 
Report of the Board of Control for 1945. Retrospect for 1939-45, 
(London: HMSO, 1946)
l^See Stone, M., Shell Shock and the Psychologist, In E. Bynum, 
W.J. et al, Vol.II op.cit. pp.248-257
l^Jones, op.cit, pp.291-293
^Scull, A.T., Decarceration. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1977)
pp. 79-87
The view that the impact of phenothizines on hospital rundown in 
the 1950s has been exaggerated has become a recurrent theme in the 
Continued on following page
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hospital is simply an outcome of the balance of discharges and 
deaths against admissions, for the populations to peak and decline 
there would have needed to be a trend increasing the rate of 
discharges and deaths, relative to admissions which predated the 
p e a k . Moreover, in the Edwardian era the administration of the 
London asylums (which provided 25% of the national asylum bed 
stock) indicates that they were largely quiet places, with up to 
40% of wards unlocked and staffed by a comparatively small 
establishment heavily supplemented by patients. There were 
refractory or disturbed wards, true, but the great majority of 
asylum residents must have been compliant and easily m a n a g e d . 22
The belief in government in the late 1950s that the phenothiazines 
were transforming the service was their significant political 
attribute which helped cement the medical model of mental illness 
in p o l i c y . 23 T h e  1930 Mental Treatment Act had tentatively begun
this process by allowing the treatment of the insane in public
hospitals without the legal certification procedures prescribed in 
the 1890 Lunacy Act, and formally re-designating asylums as Mental 
Hospitals. However, the majority of patients remained certified 
in the 1950s; perpetuating the stigma of being mentally ill.
Again before the widespread use of the new drugs, a Royal
Commission was established in 1954 to re-examine the legislative 
base of the psychiatric and mental deficiency services. It
Continued from previous page
literature: see Ramon, S., Psychiatry in Britain: Meaning and
Policy. (London: Croom Helm, 1985), Goodwin, S., Community Care 
for the Mentally 111 in England and Wales: myths, assumptions and
reality, Journal of Social Policy. Vol.18 No.l, pp.29-31
21-For evidence of this in certain parts of the United States see 
Lancet Editorial, 1944, ii, pp.147-8 
22cochrane, D.A. op.cit. pp.261-2
23see Goodwin, S., Community care for the mentally ill in England 
and Wales: myths, assumptions and reality, Journal of Social
Policy. Vol. 18, 1989, no.l pp.30-31
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reported in 1957. Its major assumption was a parallel between 
mental and other forms of ill-health:
"Mental disorders are forms of ill-health and care and 
treatment are usually based on medical diagnosis and 
advice." 24-
Leaving aside its provisions for mentally disordered offenders, 
its key recommendations for mainstream services were:
(a) the abolition of legalised certification p r o c e d u r e s ^  
and their replacement for a minority of specified cases by 
compulsory detention at the discretion of d o c t o r s ^ ;
(b) to shift the administrative base of psychiatric and 
mental handicap services from large institutions to 
'community care' with responsibility divided between the NHS 
which would provide medical treatment and local authorities, 
who would provide preventive services "...and all types of 
community care who do not require in-patient hospital 
treatment or training or who have had a period of treatment 
or training in hospital and are ready to return to the 
community".27
Although what Jones refers to as ' r e v o l u t i o n s ' 28f were actually 
continuities of established administrative and policy reforms,
24jjk, Roval Commission of the Law Relating to Mental Illness and 
Mental Deficiency. 1954-1957, Cmnd, 169, (London:HMSO) para. 86
25ibid paras. 287-307 
26jbid paras.319-358 
27ibid para.603
2 8 j o n e s ,  K., The History of the Mental Health Services, pp.283 - 
305. Goodwin op.cit. pp. 37-41 posits an alternative 'big bang' 
account of policy change in the 1950s which implies a conceptual 
leap from a Victorian model of incarceration in 1950, to community 
care in 1959 and is thus simply an unhistorical analysis.
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policy emerged from the 1950s, medically-inspired and looking to 
develop small-scale, local services in the NHS and local
authorities leading to the eventual demise of the a s y l u m s ^ . The
1959 Mental Health Act implemented most of the Royal Commission's 
recommendations for legal changes, the 1962 Hospital Plan^O set 
out a programme to develop a national psychiatric service based on 
general hospitals and the 1963 Health and Welfare White Paper set
10-year targets for the development of complementary local
authority support s e r v i c e s . T h e  actuarial projections of Tooth 
and Brooke, which underlay the Hospital's Plan's targets,
suggested that half the large hospitals could close in only 
fifteen years if contemporary admission, discharge and death rates 
were maintained.^2 This was seized on by the then Minister of 
Health, Enoch Powell who with his characteristic, graphic rhetoric 
passed a death sentence on the isolated, and feared, Victorian 
madhouses in his address to a startled 1961 Annual Conference of 
the National Association of Mental Health (NAMH).^3 The
hospitals then housed 134,000 p e o p l e . B y  the mid-1950s, when
the population of mental hospitals peaked in England, Friern
housed over 2000.
The 1950s was also a period when social anthropologists began to 
penetrate these institutions. Their studies uncovered rigidly
29see Ramon, S., Psychiatry in Britain. (London: Croom Helm,
1985) pp.285-6
•^National Health Service: A Hospital Plan for England and Wales. 
Cmnd 1604, (London:HMS0, 1962)
•^Ministry of Health, Health and Welfare: The Development of 
Community Care. Cmnd 1973 (London:HMS0, 1963)
^^Tooth, G.C., and Brooke, E.M. 'Needs and Beds: Trends in the 
Mental Hospital Population and their effect on Future Planning, 
Lancet 1961 (i) No. 7179, 1.4.61, pp.710-13
^ Report Qf the Annual Conference of the National Association of 
Mental Health. 1961 (London:NAMH, 1961) pp.4-10 
3^Jones op.cit. p.358
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hierarchical social relations, institutional goals dominating 
therapeutic goals, and systematic processes of what Goffman termed 
'depersonalisation', 'deculturisation', 'role-dispossession' and 
'batch l i v i n g ' . T h e  impact of the institutional routines was 
interpreted as responsible for much of the symptoms attributed to 
illness.363738
The Services in 1965
What was the life like for longstay patients in a typical mental 
hospital by the mid-1960s? In its second annual report the 
Hospital Advisory Service, established in 1969 following a 
proposal by AEGIS, was to report the widespread practice in many 
large psychiatric hospitals of "dumping" chronic and other 
longstay patients onback-wards. A passage headed The Waiting 
Syndrome. describes the daily routine.
"Observation of such wards shows that patients are woken and 
dressed often at an early hour .... the day Is punctuated by 
meals and toilet but otherwise there is no purposeful 
activity. The patients have no social stimulation, no 
variety and are not involved in any activity which has hope 
for the future, or promises an improvement in their lot.
"..relatives and others who have known the patients in the 
past are often aghast at the obvious loss of individuality 
and of interest in life. When such patients are spoken to 
they do not as a rule complain, do not ask for anything and 
produce stereotyped answers to queries. They may be looked 
on as "good patients" by the staff, while those who resent
^^Goffman, E., Asvlums (London: Penguin, 1961) pp.23-65 
^ C a u d h i l l ,  w., The Psychiatry Hospital as a Small Society 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954)
^Goffman, E. op.cit. pp.123-155.
^Martin, D.V., Institutionalisation, Lancet 1955(ii), No. 6901, 
December 3rd 1955 pp.1188-90
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or object to the way of life imposed on them and try to run 
away are regarded as "difficult". On this type of ward the 
television set may be left on all day, sometimes poorly 
adjusted and it may be obvious that not one of the patients 
is actually watching...."^9
Similar findings were to emerge from a major empirical study of 
the country's mental handicap hospitals, conducted during the mid- 
1960s by Pauline Morris* Of the 34 hospitals visited, two-
thirds were based on Victorian buildings many in poor physical 
condition, frequently designed for other purposes such as 
workhouses and functionally ill-suited. Overcrowding was endemic 
with one third of patients in wards of sixty or more (my emphasis) 
and beds crammed in to leave little or no space b e t w e e n . S t i l l  
more seriously, the survey highlighted the absence of observation 
points and noted "..the impossibility of supervising let alone 
nursing patients under these conditions, especially at night".42 
Sanitary facilities were old, inadequate in number and often 
constantly malodorous. Although most patients had some personal 
items saved for special occasions, in the generality clothing came 
from a communal supply and was characteristically dull, 
unimaginative and ill-fitting. Staffing levels were low, and the 
distribution of qualified staff and nursing assistants varied 
widely across the country. Morale was low, particularly amongst 
the front-line nursing staff.4  ^ Acute shortage of domestic 
staff added considerably to the workload of the nurses. 
Mental subnormality institutions were closer to prisons than 
hospitals because the curative function was "effectively
^DHSS, National Health Service Hospital Advisory Service Annual 
Report for 1969-70. (LondomHMSO, 1971) paras. 40-41 
^Morris, P., Put Awav. (London:Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969) 
4 -^69% of patients had two feet or less between their beds; ibid
p.86.
42ibid p.85.
4^Morris, op.cit. p.211
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neutralised".44 Their inmates were less fortunate, however, in 
having to serve indeterminate sentences which often turned out to 
be for life.
When Mrs Robb first crossed Friern's elegant main portal, its 
population had reduced to just over 2000, and some 200 people 
lived in wards of more than 70.4^ it was functioning as a "dump 
for geriatrics" .4^ Although Mrs Robb kept a diary of her visits 
to Friern, it contains no graphic description of the scene with 
confronted her on E3. However it is not difficult to piece 
together from the many thousands of words subsequently written on 
conditions in the psychogeriatric wards of large mental hospitals 
in the 1960s and early 70s. Drab pavilion wards with high-vaulted 
ceilings were crammed with beds which almost touched in rows along 
the walls and down the centre 'aisle', even spilling out onto 
corridors. In the day-rooms, their elderly occupants, hair 
cropped and dressed in ill-fitting clothing, deprived of teeth 
spectacles and hearing-aids, gazed unoccupied into unfocussed 
space, while the ward radio or television entertained if not the 
staff then nobody.
During the first month of her visits to Friern she enlisted the 
support of Mrs Audrey Harvey and Lord Strabolgi. Mrs Harvey was a 
close neighbour who was known in Hampstead village as a person 
involved in 'social affairs'. She was suggested as a possible 
ally by the local newsagent who supplied some of Mrs Robb's books 
and introduced the two women whose friendship quickly took off.
44ibid p.293
45it was the only NWMRHB hospital with wards of this size. 
Nationally, 43 out of 101 psychiatric hospitals had at least one 
ward of this size. 16 had more than 300 in such wards and Winwick 
and Rainhill in Liverpool, housed over 1000 people each in this 
way. See Ministry of Health, The facilities and services of 
psychiatric hospitals in England and Wales. (London:HMS0, 1966) 
^ M i n i s t r y  of Health, The Findings and Recommendations Following 
Enquiries into Allegations Concerning the Care of Elderly Patients 
in Certain Hospitals. Cmnd 3689, (London: HMSO, 1968) para.117
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Audrey Harvey worked at a citizens advice bureau in the East India 
Dock Road. She had developed a special concern for the housing 
conditions and unscrupulous landlords in this locality. Her 
determination to get public recognition of these problems, along 
with her membership of the Fabian Society brought her into contact 
with Prof. Brian Abel-Smith and C.H. Rolph, then legal 
correspondent of the New Statesman. They both encouraged her to 
put her criticisms into print and her subsequent Fabian Pamphlet 
was one of the early documents in the 'rediscovery of poverty' in 
the early 1960s.^ She then became a founder member of the Child 
Poverty Action Group which was launched in December 1965 with the 
publication of The Poor and the Poorest.^ ** Mrs Harvey's support 
was crucial in the early stage of the AEGIS campaign. She gave 
advice, provided practical help and introduced Mrs Robb to some 
key individuals. She also commended her to C.H. Rolph, Abel-Smith 
and Prof. Peter Townsend as someone worthy of support and help.
Lord Strabolgi was one of the Robbs' oldest and closest friends. 
He had been a student of contemporary art at the Chelsea College 
of Art and acted as best man at their wedding. By 1965, he was a 
prominent Labour politician in the Lords and destined to hold 
office in the 1966 Labour Administration. He was to act as AEGIS 
spokesman in Parliament in the early days, pressed its concerns 
during the passage of relevant legislation and gave the whole 
thing kudos and weight by agreeing to have his name on the 
letterhead as 'President'.
Both Lord Strabolgi and Audrey Harvey shared Mrs Robb's feelings 
of profound shock and outrage at the plight of Amy Gibbs, her 
fellow patients and the condition of the ward. It was the first
^Harvey, a ., Casualties of the Welfare State. (London:Fabian 
Society, 1960), the inspiration behind the influential TV 
documentary, 'Cathy Come Home'.
^Abel-Smith, B. and Townsend, P., The Poor and the Poorest. 
(London:Bell, 1965)
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time either of them had been inside a mental hospital. Mrs Harvey 
subsequently described what they found.
"The old ladies sat listlessly about in their State-issued 
pinafores... And with hardly any exceptions (their) 
spectacles, like their dentures their hearing aids and all 
their small possessions, had been taken from them." Their 
hair was "cut off.... to a hideous uniform shortness on 
admission."^
This practise of cropping hair and removing spectacles, dentures 
and hearing aids was usually justified by staff as a precaution 
against possible injury. However on wards full of frail elderly 
people, it could only have had its roots in established 
institutional routines. Whatever its explanation it was totally 
unacceptable to Barbara Robb and her associates. Initially they 
brightened up Amy Gibbs' life with spectacles and a few personal 
possessions but they decided very quickly that any substantial 
general improvements were beyond the capacity of the hospital. 
Indeed, the constant suggestions and reminders by these rather 
grand people seem to have been interpreted as complaints and to 
have invoked defensiveness in some of the staff which did little 
to make the old lady's life more bearable.
So by March 1965 Barbara Robb was intent on moving Amy Gibbs as 
soon as alternative accommodation could be arranged. But she had 
also determined to take up the case of all the hospital's elderly 
patients, the majority of whom she believed to be inappropriately 
hospitalised. She had also begun to see the problem on a national 
scale thanks to an article in The Guardian^  and subsequent 
correspondence. The article, written by an unnamed consultant 
psychiatrist, described a hospital in the London area which he 
claimed was "...typical of the physical conditions under which
^ H a r v e y ,  a. 'The Unknown Prisoners', The Guardian. 10.8.69 
5Q*rhe Guardian. 9,3,65 
51*rhe Guardian. 30.3.65
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psychiatry is practised today."32 Drab, barn-like wards with 
primitive washing and lavatory facilities housed up to 90 long­
stay patients. Staff were extremely short relative to the work­
load, and some of them were poor quality. Subsequent 
correspondence came in the main from various staff members and 
fell into two firmly opposed camps: strong support and vehement
rejection.
At the beginning of April 1965 Barbara Robb approached Kenneth 
Robinson, the Minister of Health, through the intermediary of Lord 
Strabolgi. The Robbs and the Robinsons were acquainted (although 
how closely is difficult to determine) and Amy Gibbs was a 
constituent of the Minister in St. Pancras North. This direct 
approach, was therefore, understandable and presumably expectant 
of a sympathetic response. Mrs Robb sent her Diarv completed to 
March 26th with an appendix of comments and recommendations of 
which she was also the author, signed by all her associates.33 
This appendix introduced a range of issues which were to become 
familiar AEGIS themes. She argued that most of the elderly 
patients in Friern were not mentally ill at all and that living 
alongside those who were, together with receiving electro- 
convulsive therapy was detrimental to their health; this problem 
appeared widespread. She demanded their immediate transfer into 
more suitable accommodation.
Kenneth Robinson had come to office with a substantial record 
in campaigning on behalf of the mentally disordered. Throughout 
the 1950s he was a pioneer and principal parliamentary advocate of 
reform in mental health. In 1954 he used the opportunity gained 
by his first win in the Private Members ballot to lead a debate on 
”... the serious overcrowding in mental hospitals and mental 
deficiency hospitals," and staff shortages in the service. This 
was the first general debate on the mentally disordered since the 
passage of the 1930 Mental Treatment Act. Mr Robinson's speech 
demonstrated a keen awareness of the position. The Victorian
52ibid.
53Robb, B. (Ed.) op.cit. pp.112-3
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heritage constituted the mental hospital accommodation. These 
institutions "... contain vast, unmanageable wards, they are badly 
designed, the sanitation is often inadequate and they are 
practicably impossible to heat properly." The wards were crammed 
with beds which spilled into corridors, and patients' recreational 
space. "In the main, it is the chronic, long-stay .... patients 
who suffer from the grim institutional atmosphere of these
Victorian barracks, and it is on their behalf that I am making my 
main p l e a .  "5^ This debate was instrumental in the establishment 
of the 1954 Royal Commission whose report outlined the philosophy 
which structured the 1959 Act, and the commitment to District
General Hospital psychiatry and community care given by Enoch
Powell in 1961.
Mr Robinson's insight was gained through his service as a member 
of the North-Western Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board and more 
directly, as chairman of its Mental Health Committee until he 
resigned to take up his Ministerial post less than two years
before the approach from Barbara Robb. He was also a leading 
Parliamentarian in the National Association of Mental Health, 
(later MIND), then the leading voluntary association and lobby in 
the field.
Since the 1959 Mental Health Act had abolished the Board of 
Control, one of the major roles of the Mental Health Committee was 
to visit the region's hospitals. Thus Robinson presumably had 
first-hand experience of the long-stay wards at Friern Barnet 
which was the Regional Board's largest mental illness hospital. 
In the decade or so between that debate and the arrival of Barbara 
Robb on E3, the resident populations of psychiatric hospitals had 
been declining and staffing levels had improved. However, apart 
from reductions to the most severe overcrowding, conditions could 
not have radically changed since the mid-1950s and barely since 
Robinson resigned from the Board (to assume Ministerial office) in 
1964.
^ House of Commons Official Report. Vol. 523, cols. 2293-2307 
(19.2.54)
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He should not have been greatly surprised by the general 
conditions described in Mrs Robb's Diary, and was certainly 
concerned about the specific allegations of neglect and 
inappropriate use of ECT. According to Mrs Robb, he expressed 
strong concern and promised an investigation into the old lady's 
c a s e . 55 xhe signatories of the Diary had hoped that the Minister 
would conduct an inquiry of some sort and interpreted his response 
that he would indeed do so. In this connection Mrs Robb was 
invited to the Ministry for an interview with a senior official. 
The content of this meeting was to become a matter of argument 
between Mrs Robb and the Ministry. An assiduous recorder, Barbara 
Robb 'retired to a cafe immediately afterwards' and produced a 
highly detailed, 20-page report.56
According to this account the official introduced her to the term 
'stripping' for the removal of patients personal effects and 
possessions which had so appalled her at Friern. The Ministry 
recognised and deplored its continued practice but could not 
intervene even in the case of non-violent elderly patients since 
it had delegated its powers of control over hospital practices in 
1959 and had greatly reduced the size of his department reducing 
it to an advisory role. The Ministry had long been concerned 
about the poor condition of the capital stock and standards of 
care in the mental hospital sector but did not have the resources 
for comprehensive rebuilding. Mrs Robb had her own scheme for 
selling off the land around the hospitals in order^ finance their 
reconstruction but the official doubted that it could ever be got 
off the ground. In the particular case of Miss Gibbs, the 
Official had on Ministerial request sent a visitor to Friern who 
had found her 'not noticeably worse than all the others'. He also 
offered to use his influence with the Court of Protection with 
which Mrs Robb had been negotiating on the matter of Amy Gibb's
5^This letter has apparently not survived, but Mrs Robb
separately recorded its content in Robb Files. Record of a 
Campaign, Vol.l 'p.57'
56ibid 'pp.61-7'
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savings and belongings, apparently sold up without her knowledge. 
Otherwise Mrs Robb claimed that he did not dissent from her 
conclusion that:
"The government of my country is powerless to protect the 
old and helpless from unnecessary hardship and cruelty known 
to be inflicted upon them in its own institutions."57
The Ministry insisted on restricting itself to advice and 
guidance, but some hospital boards simply ignored it.
Although the reported special pleading has the ring of truth, the 
quote is Mrs Robb's and hardly sounds Civil Service in tone or 
connotation. The precise accuracy of her account is less 
important than the impressions the meeting left on her. Firstly, 
she sensed that the official had divulged more than he should have 
and therefore doubted that he would corroborate her account in any 
negotiation with the Minister. Secondly, she feared she had been 
fed with false information on the Ministry's powers. In fact this 
was not the case given that following the abolition of the Board 
of Control in the 1959 Mental Health Act, central responsibility 
for visiting hospitals passed to health authorities and was the 
primary responsibility of Hospital Management Committees. 
Similarly, the Ministry had indeed conceded its remaining controls 
over resource allocation at regional level in favour of an 
advisory r o l e . 58
Formally, health authorities acted as the agents of the Minister 
under the provisions of the 1946 National Health Service A c t . 59
57ibid 'p. 26'
5®0ne of the pre-Appointed-day circulars, RHB (47)1 declared that 
RHBs should "...enjoy a lively sense of independent 
responsibility..". Subsequent development of this centre- 
periphery relationship is documented in Ministry of Health, 
Committee of Enquiry into the Cost of the National Health Service. 
Report. Cmnd. 663 (London:HMSO, 1956)
^^Specific reference The National Health Service Act 1946. 
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However, since 1948, succeeding Ministers had developed a policy 
of minimum intervention. Not surprisingly as a former authority 
member, Kenneth Robinson considered health authorities to be 
competent to manage their own affairs. He viewed central 
direction as appropriate for extreme contingencies only and 
generally outside the protocol governing relations between centre
and periphery.60
As far as Barbara Robb was concerned, the Minister had the power 
to direct if he chose to invoke it and she felt she was uncovering 
a situation which urgently warranted such action. Her interview 
with the official had strengthened her view that a national 
campaign was called for. She finally resolved to embark upon it 
in June when through Audrey Harvey, she learned of further 
evidence of the widespread practice of the stripping and neglect 
of elderly mental patients from a national survey of social 
service provision for the elderly led by Peter Townsend of LSE. 
According to this survey nearly 60% of the 60,000 people aged over 
65 then resident in psychiatric hospitals had only slight to 
moderate personal incapacity, and less than half were severely 
mentally impaired.
"On the whole, this national evidence supports the
conclusion that rather fewer elderly patients in psychiatric 
hospitals than is commonly supposed, are physically and
mentally incapacitated to a severe extent. A considerable
number possess capacities and skills which are held in check 
or even stultified. Staff sometimes do not recognise their 
patients' abilities, though more commonly they do not have 
time to cater for them. Modern aids and appliances are
Continued from previous page
section 12 "... it shall be the duty of a Regional Hospital Board, 
subject to and in accordance with regulations and such directions 
as may be given by the Minister generally to administer on behalf 
of the Minister the hospital and specialist services." (London: 
HMSO, 1946)
^Interview with the Rt. Hon. Sir Kenneth Robinson
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sometimes not provided when they could be. All this gives 
empirical support to the arguments in favour of developing 
alternatives to institutional care in the community.... But 
it also supports the arguments for introducing greater 
occupational and social opportunities in psychiatry 
hospitals or departments, as well as a large measure of 
comfort...."61
Of the twenty psychiatric hospitals visited ten had more than
1,000 beds. 34 of the 168 wards (or 4,456 beds for the elderly) 
averaged 40 beds and provided no other furniture. In a further 
sixty, only one article, such as a bedside mat, a chair, a locker 
or wooden box was provided per patient. 60% of the wards provided 
'dismal surroundings' in a 'military atmosphere and spartan 
dormitories'.^2
Once aware of this evidence, there was no longer any question of 
Barbara Robb restricting her efforts to Friern. She therefore set 
herself the task of converting her small caucus into a pressure 
group with a national profile.
^ T o w n s e n d ,  P., A national survey of old people, in Freeman H., 
Psychiatric Hospital Care: a Symposium. (London: Balliere, Tindall 
and Cassell, 1965 p.229 See also, Townsend, P. Prisoners of 
neglect: psychiatric hospitals in Britain, in Ed. Townsend, P.,
The Social Minority (London:Allen Lane, 1973) pp.131-135 
62ibid p.231
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CHAPTER THREE
TOWARDS THE LEADING PRESSURE GROUP IN MENTAL HEALTH
Having decided to embark on a campaign, Mrs Robb set about 
building her band of supporters and early networks of influence. 
These were to weave together prominent individuals, other pressure 
groups, key figures in the national press and in the nursing 
profession. She then spent the first two years to the middle of 
1967 trying vainly to get the Ministry of Health to recognise the 
problems she was gradually uncovering. Before documenting these 
developments, and by way of context, some common typologies of 
pressure groups and analyses of their methods are set out and 
discussed.
The anatomy of a pressure group
What is a pressure group? For Mackenzie it is something more 
easily recognised than defined^, and as Bell and Millard 
emphasise, no agreed conceptual boundaries have been drawn which 
encompass all the associations we would recognise as pressure 
groups.^ Determining characteristics include some level of 
cohesion and shared attitudes, and purposeful action to influence 
state activity and policy. They can be large or small, highly 
organised or inchoate.
The word 'group' requires at least two individuals. Membership 
need not be formal or fixed over time. AEGIS and Barbara Robb are 
sometimes thought to be synonymous, in which case AEGIS could not 
be described as a pressure group but merely a front for an 
individual social reformer. Yet Barbara Robb never worked alone 
but engaged the active support of one or more of a range of 
sympathisers, some of whom allowed their names to be used against 
formal-sounding titles such as 'President' (Lord Strabolgi) or
^Mackenzie, W.J. Pressure Groups in Government, in Ed. Rose, R. 
Studies in British Politics. (London: Macmillan, 1976) p.343
^Bell, A.R. and Millard, F., Pressure Politics in Industrial 
Societies, (London: Macmillan, 1986) p.34
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'Sociological Adviser' (Audrey Harvey). Barbara Robb had an AEGIS 
letterhead printed which presented these 'offices' as if there was 
a formal structure, which of course there was not. Although they 
were merely contrived to project a functional and legitimate 
image, AEGIS was nonetheless a pressure group since at any one 
time it represented the joint activity of more than one person 
with shared objectives aimed at changing government policy.
The pressure group literature is also replete with discussions 
about typology. The emergent consensus divides groups into 
'sectional' or 'interest' groups which seek to promote the 
economic needs or demands of their members, and 'promotional', 
'causal' or 'attitude' groups who promote a cause without 
apparent, vested interest. The typology is useful because it 
informs the analysis of group strategies, the delineation of 
appropriate spheres of activity, and the receptivity of the state 
agencies in those spheres.
Although AEGIS served a number of Mrs Robb's psychological needs, 
it was conspicuously detrimental to her economic circumstances and 
therefore was a promotional group. Promotional groups have 
characteristic traits. Firstly, their constituencies are likened 
to a series of concentric circles with an inner-most core, an 
intermittent membership and a wider, non-activist support which at 
the broadest level is bracketed with public opinion. Secondly, 
what Potter terms 'the propensity to support c a u s e s means that 
leading individuals are often associated with more than one group. 
The continuity of membership between several promotional groups of 
the 1960s are facetiously referred to by Davies as 'Hampstead 
Worthies.'^ Thirdly, such groups are often small and therefore 
less dependent upon horizontal mobilisation and organisation (say 
of a group of workers or of a profession) than on the prestige or 
perceived quality of their members. The leading figures must be 
recognised by state agencies as 'authorities'. They are therefore 
often leading academics and other experts and/or share the values
^Potter, A., Organised Groups in British National Politics 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1961) p.139
^Davies, M., Politics of Pressure. (London: BBC, 1985) p.4
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and social background of those who staff the political and 
administrative arms of the state. In other words, promotional 
groups tend to be 'elite pressure groups'. Fourthly, groups who 
campaign over a long enough period to span the different political 
administrations will generally construct a party-neutral 
platform.^
Much of the literature on pressure groups accords a privileged 
position to a core of sectional groups, trade unions, 
industrialist organisations, professional associations, within a 
corporatist framework of policy-making. Exerting effective 
influence is seen as more problematic for promotional groups. 
They have no automatic access to the political and administrative 
executives, characterised as Whitehall, and are reliant on 
indirect methods such as lobbying in Westminster and mobilising 
public opinion through media campaigns. Alternatively, Marsh has 
suggested that whether the relationship is corporatist or 
pluralist depends on the policy area and changes over time.^ 
Economic and industrial policy tends to be corporatist and social 
policy, pluralist. The history of the AEGIS campaign provides an 
opportunity to test the validity of these broad contentions. For 
the moment, an examination of the strategies employed by all types 
of groups to bring pressure to bear on all the major arenas of 
political battle is required. Whitehall, Westminster and the mass 
media will be considered separately.
In terms of their relationships with the Executive, groups are re­
classified as insiders and outsiders^ or 'legitimate' or
5Alderman, G. Pressure Groups and Government in Great Britain 
(London: Longman, 1984) p.123
fylarsh, D. Introduction in Ed. Marsh,D. Pressure Group 
Politics, pp.3-6
^Grant W. and Marsh, D. The Confederation of British Industry. 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977) p.16
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'Illegitimate'.® A major theme in the analysis of the insider 
group activity is reciprocity.
"The relationship between some lobbies and the Ministry are 
very close, each side having something to offer the other. 
The civil service often rely on a lobby for advice; they
work through it to obtain consent; and sometimes they rely
on it for smooth administration. For its part, the lobby 
relies on the civil service to smooth out administrative 
tangles, hopes to get it to adopt policies in its interests, 
and needs information about official intentions.
The communication channels are; formal and informal consultation 
on new policy initiatives; group representation on standing or ad 
hoc advisory committees or inquiries; and informal dialogue. Most 
of the major professions are also represented in the permanent 
Civil Service organisational structure, particularly in a welfare 
Ministry such as the Department of Health. Pressure groups 
provide Ministers and officials with expert knowledge and opinion 
and are a source of information on the demands of the interests
they promote, and likely impact of p r o p o s a l s . C o n v e r s e l y ,  as
problems arise which Ministers judge to be in need of political 
response, groups are also a source of policy proposals. 
Recognition of a group's legitimacy in this role includes 
appointment of its members onto standing committees, Royal 
Commissions, awarding honours to senior post holders, and the 
appearance of Ministers at its annual conferences.
Consultation is open ended and public, but it can also be limited 
to a select group of interests. Civil servants maintain lists of 
organisations considered as legitimate to comment on given areas
®Guy Peters, B. Insiders and outsiders, the politics of pressure 
group influence on bureaucracy, in Ed. Mecgrew A.G. and Wilson, 
M.J. Decision-Making: Approaches and Analysis. (Manchester:
University Press, 1982) pp.261-290
^Finer, S.E., Anonymous Empire. (London:Pall Mall Press, 1966)
p.22
Eckstein, H., Pressure Group Politics. (London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1960) pp,23-24
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of policy.H Confidential proposals and drafts are placed on 
restricted circulation although, inevitably, leaked still further. 
At its most informal level, consultation takes place through 
person to person contact over the phone, or over a meal 'at the
Club'. In these situations, both sides are off the record and can
come out from behind their public positions and address a problem 
frankly and directly. In a political system which some see as 
obsessed with s e c r e c y ^ - 2 ,  these informal networks become critical 
channels of influence. With Cabinets and senior civil service
recruited largely from a limited number of social strata^, those 
groups whose members are of similar social origins are
strategically placed.
As Finer implies, the relationships between groups and the 
Executive are governed by codes of ethics or 'rules of the game'. 
Vested interest provides both sides with incentives to maintain 
the other's goodwill and avoid mutual embarrassment. Confidences 
must be honoured,^ and the groups should not make demands which 
are radically at variance with the departmental view.l^
A consequence of these rules is that those groups whose concerns 
are radically at variance with current departmental perspectives 
are unlikely to form allegiances with officials and therefore 
bring pressure to bear elsewhere. These are the so-called 
outsider or illegitimate groups. At the outset outsider groups 
are often voicing claims, previously unregistered, and accordingly 
pursuing aims which are redistributive.
Similarly the greater the propensity of a group to move into the 
public arena to further a dispute, the less likely it will be part 
of the internal consultation network.^ But outsider groups can
H-Alderman, G. Op.cit p.136
l^ponting, C., The Ripht to Know: The inside storv of the 
Belgrano Affair. (London: Sphere Books, 1985) 
l^Guttsman, W.L. The British Political Elite (London: Macgibbon 
and Kee, 1963) pp.328-320 
^Eckstein, op.cit. p. 158
l^See Finer op.cit p.102 and Potter op.cit. pp. 320-330 
l ^ C o x a l l ,  W.N., Parties and Pressure Groups. (London: Longman, 
1981) pp.88-90
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become legitimate. Relations with the Executive are based in 
mutual trust which develops only over time. Newly-formed groups 
cannot expect to be brought into the inner circles of policy­
making until they have proved themselves legitimate, 
authoritative, trustworthy etc. Introduction to the inner circle 
can be achieved by persistent, effective public campaigning, since 
the more a group is able to prove itself politically dangerous, 
the more likely a Ministry will try to buy its cooperation by 
according it consultative status.^
One option open to outsider groups is to develop support amongst 
MPs. As with the Executive, the basis of the relationship between 
groups and parliamentarians is usually reciprocal. Groups are
sources of material for MPs to make their mark with the Party
hierarchy. There are three mechanisms for the representation of 
group interests by MPs and Peers. Most directly, groups recruit 
Parliamentary spokesmen who lobby Ministers, present Private 
Member's Bills promoted by a group, sponsor meetings in the House 
with other Members, as well as tabling motions, asking questions 
and tabling amendments to legislation.Secondly, a group can 
develop support in the wider party political networks, say through 
the trade unions in the Labour politics, although to so align 
itself to one party undermines its claims to non-partisanship.
Groups are most active in the corridors of Westminster at the
Report and Committee stages of Bills, securing support for
proposed amendments. Questions are one means of engaging press 
interest in an issue. Indeed Wallace sees the fact that 
Parliament is a central locus for news gathering as a principal 
justification for pressure groups to be active there.
"During the Committee stage of a Bill the lobbyists of 
affected interests and concerned groups, often pitted 
against each other, haunt the corridors of Westminster, 
exchanging hurried conversations with 'their' MPs and
l^Finer, op.cit. pp.44-45 
l^Potter op.cit. pp.285-292
19Finer op.cit. p.10
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supplying them with briefs from which to speak......
Ministers and civil servants are well aware of this 
continued activity and cultivate good relations with groups 
on different sides of a difficult issue in the hope of
giving advanced warning  Academic writing on the
'decline' of Parliament and complaints by back-benchers 
about the weakness of the House of Commons should not be 
taken as implying that Parliament is no longer worth 
considering as a major target of pressure group activity; it 
remains one of the most effective means of ensuring 
publicity for an interest or cause and of exerting pressure 
of the Government."20
Thus Parliament is one route to the second major channel of 
influence open to outsider groups, the media.
"The government operates in a climate of politics in which 
responsiveness to opinion is held as a virtue. This virtue 
is inculcated by the need for the government to seek re- 
election. But it is more than that. In the same way as an 
M.P. feels a duty to the constituency, the government feels 
a duty to opinion."21
For the media to be interested in an issue it must be perceived as 
newsworthy. Criteria of newsworthiness and their application to 
the promotional concerns of AEGIS on a topic will be explored in 
some detail in a later c h a p t e r . 22 For the time being the concern 
is the measures used by journalists to identify legitimate sources 
amongst pressure groups over and above the issue itself.
The primary criterion is the group's facility to help journalists 
do their job. This involves providing accurate regular source 
material of proven reliability which is readily transferred into 
copy, and holding press conferences within easy access of the
20wallace, W. , The Pressure Group Phenomenon, in Ed. Rose, R. 
op.cit. p.96
21stewart, J.D., British Pressure Groups. (London: Clarendon
Press, 1957) p. 93 
22see below p.335
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newspaper office. Until recent years, this meant in Fleet Street. 
The most trusted lobbyists will be asked to contribute articles
d i r e c t l y . 23 Personal relationships are also important and groups
need to target the relevant specialist correspondents both in the 
press and broadcasting and also in the professional and other 
journals which the dailies use as sources. As with politicians 
and civil servants, journalists draw a distinction between 
legitimate sources and others.24 one further tactic employed by 
a number of promotional groups in the 1960s was to provide a focus 
on an issue by publishing an expose book.
As a new group, AEGIS could not expect to achieve a great deal 
through direct liaison with the Ministry at both political and 
official levels. Mrs Robb and her advisers therefore used the
first year to place themselves in strategic positions to exploit 
external avenues. Strabolgi was again well placed to make the
small group's concerns publicly known, and found the opportunity 
when the House of Lords debated community care for the mentally 
disordered on the 17th of July 1965. He decided to 'take the lid 
off' during this debate and composed a powerful, emotive speech. 
It focused on the plight of elderly people inappropriately housed 
in psychiatric hospitals and summoned up powerful symbols for 
Labour, Conservatives and Liberals alike. He merged images of the 
poorhouse with the gothic horrors of the Victorian asylum. He 
then condemned the State for dealing out treatment to elderly 
people which was more characteristic of a primitive race, than the 
civilised British. He condemned "stripping" and described the 
rapid deterioration of patients in the face of the inertia of the 
institutional regimen. He claimed that enormous workloads 
shouldered by staff perpetuated neglect and in some cases 
engendered ill-treatment. He urged the Government to expand 
provision of alternative forms of care for patients who were 
merely enfeebled and incontinent, making anonymous references to 
Friern by way of illustration. Finally, he shocked and startled 
the House with the following conclusion:
23potter, op.cit. pp.349-353 
2^Wallace W., op.cit. p.106
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"In olden days primitive tribes used to turn their old 
people into the cold to die. We are more civilised, we 
allow them to rot in mental hospitals. So far as a great 
many people are concerned, especially old people, the 
Welfare State is little more than a sham and a mockery."25
On the whole, his fellow peers were incredulous, outraged and 
interpreted his speech as an attack on hospital staff. Indeed it 
proved so unpopular that he was grateful to have Barbara Robb 
along to give moral support.26
This reaction was unsurprising in the context of the general tenor 
of the debate. By the mid-sixties, the image of a modern, 
curative service transformed by phenophiazines was firmly 
established. The previous March, the Commons had carried the 
motion:
"That this House welcomes the progress made in the provision 
of services for the mentally disordered and urges H.M. 
Government to take steps to encourage further 
development."27
There were occasional, passing references to 'AEGIS' concerns. 
The services were still the 'Cinderella' of the NHS; there were 
instances of intolerable overcrowding and elderly people in 
hospital because there was nowhere else. But no-one dissented 
from the Minister's view:
"We all know that there are bad patches in the Mental Health 
Services, but I think it a remarkable achievement that in 
the face of the kind of difficulties that have been 
described, the devoted staffs of these hospitals are able to
25see House of Lords Official Report Vol. 267 Cols. 1396-9, 
(quote cols 1398-9) 17.7.65 
^interview with Lord Strabolgi
27House of Commons Official Report Vol.708. Col. 1645, 19.3.65
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maintain standards as impressively high as they are in so 
many cases."2®
Maybe the buildings were old and dysfunctional, but the service as 
a whole, like the rest of the NHS, was the "best in the world".
Whatever the reaction of the House of Lords, Strabolgi's speech 
was a huge public relations success and aroused enormous interest 
in Fleet Street.^9 He and Mrs Robb were approached by several 
social service correspondents anxious to discover the name of the 
hospital. Such was the Daily Mail's interest in the story, that 
Barbara Robb persuaded its correspondent to undertake a national 
survey of mental hospital conditions. The signatories of the 
Diary had agreed not to identify the hospital, to avoid singling 
out one institution and because the Minister could give the name 
to the press if he felt it proper. Lord Strabolgi therefore 
issued statements describing their approach to the Minister, Mrs 
Robb's meeting at the department and the Ministry's 
'powerlessness' to intervene.
The sudden appearance of these issues in the press took the 
Ministry of Health off guard. While a spokesman assured 
correspondents that action would be taken if the allegations were 
substantiated^, the Minister wrote to Lord Strabolgi to defend 
himself against the charge of powerlessness. This letter 
presented a rather different version of Mrs Robb's meeting with 
one of his officials.^2. According to the Minister, she had been 
told that the Ministry proposed a full inquiry by the regional 
board into the case of Amy Gibbs but Mrs Robb had been opposed as 
she feared that the old lady would suffer as a consequence.
^ House of Commons Official Report. Vol. 708, col. 1708 
(19.3.65)
29see Daily Telegraph. Guardian. Times (18.7.65)
^^The Daily Telegraph. 9.7.65
^This letter was evidently a reaction to the press coverage 
since it was dated 19.7.65. It was confidential to Strabolgi but 
Mrs. Robb obtained a transcript, see Robb Files. Record of a 
Campaign, Vol 1. p.107 
32see Chapter 2
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Of course there was no question in Mrs Robb's mind of her ever 
having been offered a full inquiry. Her responses to the 
Minister's points were listed in an endpaper attached to a copy of 
her account of her meeting and forwarded by Lord Strabolgi who 
added his own inquiry as to what the Minister intended to do about 
the problem of 'stripping'. Mrs Robb rejected the claim that she 
had discouraged the instigation of an inquiry and suggested that 
had, he . made such an offer, he should not have allowed her to 
influence him in the discharge of his duties. As for the question 
of powerlessness, she asked why the Ministry had failed so far to 
stop the practice of stripping if he had the requisite powers.^3
The Minister accepted his official's account but none-the-less 
decided to issue guidance that patients should only be deprived of 
personal effects if it was in their own interests; claiming that 
going beyond this would have intruded on clinical judgement. He 
also wished to put the Diary before the regional hospital board 
concerned to give it a chance to answer the case. Lastly he 
refused a request from Strabolgi for a formal visit to Friern 
to show one of his Lords critics, Lord Taylor, the substance of 
the case (and which would have seemingly included Peter Townsend 
in the party).^ According to Mrs Robb's account, Lord Strabolgi 
felt that having obtained an inquiry at regional level, they 
should now cooperate with it. But Barbara Robb had grown 
suspicious of the Ministry's motivations. She retained little 
confidence in the impartiality of a regional board inquiry 
conducted in camera and she and her friends were now attracting a 
great deal of publicity and seeking action on a national basis. 
The parochial concerns of the Diary were no longer the primary
^Letter Lord Strabolgi to Kenneth Robinson 15.7.65 and Mrs 
Robb's endpaper in Robb Files. Record of a campaign, vol.l, 
pp.108-115
^According to the correspondence in Mrs Robb's files, the visit 
had been organised following a demand from Lord Taylor, that 
Strabolgi should substantiate his allegations. Peter Townsend had 
accepted an invitation for Strabolgi to accompany them. Audrey 
Harvey felt that with all Townsend's experience of the longstay 
elderly care, the suggestion that he would come along had 
frightened the Ministry off. See Robb Files. Record of a Campaign, 
Vol. 1 pp.123-125
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concern. She therefore hardened her position, informed the 
Minister that they no confidence in the Ministry's complaints 
procedures and had formed other plans for the Diary which was now 
to remain confidential.33
Leaving the Ministry to proceed with the inquiry, the group kept 
the issue of stripping before the public. Peter Shore MP was 
persuaded to table a written question seeking the Minister's view 
of the practice. In his reply, Kenneth Robinson accepted that it 
existed in a 'minority of hospitals where it was rarely in the 
patients best interests' and announced his intention to issue 
guidance.3*> Then early in September, the Daily Mail published 
the findings of its survey, initiated by Barbara Robb. Its staff 
had visited seven hospitals which although chosen 'at random' just 
happened to include Friern Barnet. The hospitals were warned in 
advance but the reports made grim reading and set the issue 
resounding amongst Fleet Street correspondents. The Mail reported 
that thousands of elderly patients were suffering neglect in 
overcrowded insanitary conditions in hospitals. The capital stock 
was obsolete and dilapidated. Staff shortages gave rise to over­
work which made recruitment difficult; moreover expenditure on 
even the most basic elements of hospital care was lower in mental 
hospitals than in an average general hospital.3^
Mrs Robb and her associates had decided to await the Minister's 
response to these findings. In the event of it proving 
unsatisfactory, they had resolved to form a small committee and 
publish a letter in The Times inviting members of the public to 
report experience of malpractice and general short-comings in 
hospitals. The Daily Mail published Kenneth Robinson's reply in 
late October. He conceded that there were 'bad patches' in the 
service but maintained that the articles had presented an 
unbalanced picture. It was misleading to compare expenditure 
between different sectors and in any case, it was up to the 
regional boards to make the allocations. He accepted that much of
35Ibid p.129-32
3^House of Commons Official Report Vol.717. Written Answers 
Col.224, 2.8.65
37pailv Mail. 8.9.65 and 14.9.65
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the capital stock was poor, and had asked regional boards and 
local authorities to give priority to the elderly and mentally 
disordered in reviewing their building programmes. Moreover, his 
department had issued detailed guidance on improving existing 
mental hospitals within available resources; however he felt it 
was too soon for all hospital authorities to have implemented 
these recommendations.38
The specific guidance on improving hospitals had been circulated 
by Mr Robinson's predecessor in June 1964.3^ Just prior to his 
Daily Mail interview, the Ministry had issued further guidance on 
the care of the elderly and on improving services for the mentally 
handicapped; the latter circular squeezed in a reference to the 
elderly and mentally ill in discussing joint planning.^ Now 
many people would have felt it reasonable that some health 
authorities had not made major strides in only fifteen months 
not so Barbara Robb. She was in any case skeptical about the 
value of advisory memoranda which could all too easily be ignored. 
Besides, she and her associates had been seeking direct
Ministerial intervention and it had not been forthcoming.
Hence they drafted a letter to The Times. Mrs Robb obtained 
signatures mainly from prominent people with whom she was
personally acquainted.^ She also secured the name of Prof. 
Brian Abel-Smith whom Audrey Harvey recommended as an expert who 
was generous with his advice and time and importantly, prepared to 
take serious notice of 'lay' reformers. As noted above, small 
promotional groups need an image of authority and Abel-Smith was 
the first prestigious professional to be struck by Mrs Robb's 
character and commitment. His support for the AEGIS case during 
the ensuing decade was to prove crucial. For the time being his 
name would lend a considerable degree of legitimacy. He was
respected both for his academic work, and as a policy adviser.
His name carried prestige and authority in Whitehall, with the
38Pailv Mail 27.10.65
^Ministry of Health, Circular. HM (64) 65 'On Improving the 
Effectiveness of Services for the Mentally 111, June 1964 
^ Circulars HN(65>77 and HM (65) 104. Ministry of Health, 1965 
^Including Baroness Beaumont and Lord Heytesbury
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various professional organisations, in the National Association of 
Mental Health, with the social service correspondents in Fleet 
Street and in the hospital service itself. Without this, Barbara 
Robb and her friends would have been susceptible to dismissal as 
interfering amateurs. Moreover, Brian Abel-Smith was, at that 
time, an adviser to the Child Poverty Action Group, a pressure 
group about to embark on a media campaign with the publication of 
a book which challenged and aimed to overturn the conventional 
wisdom that poverty had been eliminated.
The following is the text of the letter which appeared in The
Times of the 10th of November 1965 and was reproduced in other
newspapers:
"We the undersigned have been shocked by the treatment of 
geriatric patients in certain mental hospitals, one of the 
evils being the practice of stripping them of their personal 
possessions. We have now sufficient evidence to suggest 
that this is widespread.
"The attitude of the Ministry of Health has merely 
reinforced our anxieties. In consequence, we have decided 
to collect evidence of ill-treatment of geriatric patients 
in mental hospitals throughout the country, to demonstrate 
the need for a national investigation. We hope this will
lead to the securing of effective and humane control over
the Ministry which seems at present to be lacking.
"We shall be grateful if those who have encountered 
malpractice in this sphere will supply us with detailed 
information, which would of course be treated as 
confidential."
The letter carried Mrs Robb's home address at 10 Hampstead Grove; 
from then on the postal address of Aid for the Elderly in 
Government Institutions, AEGIS.^ Mrs Robb ordered a supply of
^^Who thought up the name is contentious. Mrs Robb Files says 
Continued on following page
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headed note-paper which presented herself as 'Chairman', Lord 
Strabolgi as 'President' and Mrs Harvey as 'Sociological Adviser'. 
There was no committee, no formal organisation nor membership but 
Barbara Robb had a keen sense of the importance of image.
This letter led immediately to a response from within the service 
which manifested Ministerial involvement as The Times published a 
letter from the Chairman of the North-West Metropolitan Regional 
Hospital Board, Mr Maurice Hackett. To anyone 'in the know', this 
was a coded reference that the mysterious unnamed hospital was 
somewhere in Hackett's region. Now, not only did he have ultimate 
accountability to the Minister for Friern, of course, he had been 
until recently, a colleague of the Minister on the RHB and was 
also his brother-in-law. Indeed, the content of the letter 
suggested that it had been drafted in consultation with the 
Ministry. Mr Hackett claimed that he had first learned that 
Strabolgi's House of Lords speech referred to Friern when 
approached by a journalist from 'a reputable Sunday Newspaper' who 
was in possession both of the patient's name and that of Lord 
Strabolgi's informant. Anxious to investigate something affecting 
one of the hospital's patients, and concerned for staff morale the 
Board asked for 'a public - or private - independent inquiry' into 
the matter. This had not been possible since Lord Strabolgi had 
refused to release his information: accordingly the Board was
conducting its own inquiry.^ jn its reply, AEGIS denied 
Hackett's implication that it had prompted his press visitor, and 
affirmed that had the Minister conducted a proper investigation 
into the report when "he had full permission to use it for any 
action" there would have been no need to raise the matter in 
Parliament.^
Continued from previous page
she dreamt it up in a taxi on the way to visit Amy Gibbs in Friern 
(Robb Files: Record of a Campaign vol.II, p.11), Lord Strabolgi 
thought it was Brian Robb (Interview) and Audrey Harvey attributed 
it to her husband (Interview)
^Letter to the Editor from Maurice Hackett, The Times. 1.11.65 
^Letter to the Editor from Barbara Robb and Lord Strabolgi, The 
Times. 24.11.65
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At this time, AEGIS enlisted the support of C.H. Rolph, then legal 
editor of The New Statesman. Rolph knew Audrey Harvey. He was 
also acquainted with Charles Clark, a publisher, and committee 
member of the Patients Association, who in turn knew Barbara Robb. 
Rolph was a former policeman turned writer and journalist. He was 
already a mental health lobbyist as a member of the NAMH 
Council. At the time, he was also an active member of the the 
Albany Trust which campaigned for the implementation of the 
Wolfenden Report on Homosexual Law Reform: in this way he had
worked alongside Kenneth Robinson amongst others.^ Rolph's 
support provided AEGIS with a national platform through his weekly 
column in The New Statesman from which he would launch issues and 
promote them through his excellent and senior press and 
publishing contacts. He was an invaluable source of advice on 
public relations and and not least had extensive experience in a 
pressure group campaign.
Once was Rolph was recruited, AEGIS had its core membership and 
began to diversify its activities and expand its support networks. 
Through this process it further crystallised its promotional 
issues and formulated its strategy.
Widening the Support
If AEGIS was to be effective in an area of policy with as low 
a profile as mental health, generating support amongst individuals 
and organisations in its active political world was essential. 
This world was relatively small in the mid-1960s. The potential 
support for AEGIS was diffused and located in isolated pockets of 
various groupings whose major concern was not conditions in long- 
stay hospitals. Psychiatry had no Royal College at the time. The 
Royal College of Nursing had a Psychiatric Sub-Committee. The 
National Association of Mental Health was a broad coalition of 
lobbyists and professionals which was operated largely as an 
'insider group'. A major task confronting AEGIS was therefore to 
locate, focus and mobilise influential and sympathetic people and
^Interview with C.H.Rolph
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arenas. This process also further developed issue definition and 
strategy formulation. The major categories of support were well- 
connected experts, other pressure groups, Fleet Street, and 
Parliament.
Barbara Robb was to enlist prominent members of the medical, 
nursing and legal professions. She corresponded with numerous 
geriatricians and psychiatrists, however, two were to identify 
themselves most closely with AEGIS. Russell Barton and Dr. J. 
Anthony Whitehead were prominent critics of mainstream clinical 
practice in psychogeriatrics and the conditions in hospitals and 
politically active, largely outside the established channels of 
medical representation.
Russell Barton's critique of the regimen and standards of care in 
large hospitals was well-established by the beginning of 1966 when 
he was first approached by Barbara Robb.^ He was outspoken and 
contentious in his approach and was not averse to making public
attacks on the service.^ His condemnation of conditions at
Whittingham, at the 1966 Annual NAMH conference brought him up 
before the BMA Ethical Committee. His forceful personality 
undoubtedly alienated people and he became quite a controversial
figure. When he met Barbara Robb, he was a consultant
psychiatrist at Severalls Hospital, near Colchester. He had been 
the medical superintendent and like many who held the post, had 
seemingly had difficulty in adjusting to a multi-disciplinary 
management structure which was introduced after the 1959 Mental 
Health Act. Following a prolonged battle with his regional 
hospital board over the extent of his authority at Severalls to 
influence the practice of consultant colleagues, he resigned. He 
then joined a number of prominent, British anti-establishment 
psychiatrists who emigrated to the United States where he became a 
Professor at Princeton University, New Jersey.
^Barton R.W., Institutional Neurosis. (London: J.Wright and
Sons, 1959)
^?See Nursing Times Vol. 61, no. 51, of 17th December 1965, 
p.1740
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Although a member of the BMA, Barton had little faith in 
established representative, consultative, and complaints channels. 
He felt that they served to emasculate radical and progressive 
initiative from within the service. He used them strategically, 
to legitimate his case, but concentrated efforts combining direct 
pressure and public campaigning in the mass media.
This opinion was certainly shared by Tony Whitehead, who had 
worked with Barton at Severalls. Indeed it was at a symposium 
held at the hospital that Dr. Whitehead and Barbara Robb first met 
in April 1966. Unlike Barton, Whitehead was not a member of the 
BMA. He has always been a prominent proponent of alternative 
views in medical politics and is now highly respected as such. He 
is prolific medical journalist.
There was undoubtedly a personal affinity between Barbara Robb and 
each of these doctors. It is easy to dismiss this as 'all 
trouble-makers together', but after a year as a lobbyist, she had 
accorded with their view about the potential of organised medicine 
to further her cause. Moreover she felt that the model of care 
which they had developed at Severalls was a prime example of how 
good practice could survive the low resource-base and Victorian 
capital stock of psychogeriatrics. They contended that 
confusional states symptomatic of dementia were due to relatively 
minor physical disorders in the majority of cases and, 
consequently, admitting the elderly to psychiatric hospitals was 
usually inappropriate. Moreover, Barton's thesis of institutional 
neurosis held that life on a longstay ward compounded the original 
psychiatric conditions, such as senile d e m e n t i a . I n  the mid- 
1960s these views were contentious (they are now, of course, 
central to policy).
However, by so closely identifying her campaign with these two 
clinicians, Barbara Robb was consciously setting herself in
^®See Barton, R.W., Institutional Neurosis. (London:Wright,
1959), Barton, R.W. Developing a service for elderly dementing 
patients, in Ed. Freeman, H. op.cit. p.244-251 and Whitehead, 
J.A., Myths of mental illness in the elderly, Nursing Mirror. Vol. 
153, No.7, August 27th, 1971. pp.18-20
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opposition to the BMA with all its access to and influence over 
Ministry policy.
In the mid-1960s the profession of psychiatry was represented by 
the Royal Medico-Psychological Association which was a division of 
the Royal College of Physicians. Its major preoccupations at that 
time were to complete the task of gaining recognition for the 
profession as a true medical specialty, fully represented in 
general hospitals and medical teaching, and to achieve that status 
by establishing the Association as a Royal College.^
AEGIS developed extensive contacts and support amongst the nursing 
profession. This operated at three levels. Firstly following the 
publication of The Times letter and particularly once Sans 
Everything was published, Mrs Robb's address was widely circulated 
amongst psychiatric nurses and large numbers wrote to her about 
problems in their own hospitals: she became, in Crossman's words, 
"...a kind of clearing house for all complaints about cruelty and 
torture in the hospitals".^0 Through these reports, Barbara 
Robb began to identify a previously unrecognised and rather 
disturbing problem. Considerable discontent within the service 
never came to the attention of Management Committees or Regional 
Boards because it was stifled by suppression of complaints and 
victimisation of complainants.
As Barbara Robb became more well-known through the press and by 
word of mouth within the service, her post-bag swelled with 
correspondence from nurses supporting her and asking for her 
support for campaigns they were fighting to change things in their 
own hospitals. Any information given to her in confidence was 
scrupulously respected and she would always seek prior permission
^■^See Curran, D., Teaching or Therapy', (Presidential Address to 
the RPMA 123rd Annual Meeting) in British Journal of Psychiatry. 
Vol.110, (1964) pp.2-3. Also Address by Prof. K. Sottowe,
President of the RMPA, 1964/65, to the Royal Medico-Psychological 
Association and American Psychiatric Association Meeting, 16.7.65 
in British Journal of Psychiatry. Vol.Ill (1965) Supplement. 
November 1956 pp.21-22
SOuniversity of Warwick Modern Records Centre, Crossman Diaries. 
JH 69/39
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before passing it on even to her closest collaborators. She 
acquired a reputation of someone to trust, and 10 Hampstead Grove 
became the focus for defracted, atomised discontent throughout the 
service. She supported and promoted the cases of some individuals 
who decided to fight victimisation and patient neglect, sometimes 
paying their legal fees.
Secondly she developed links with the Royal College of Nursing. 
The publicity for Lord Strabolgi's speech precipitated an approach 
by the Reverend Bill Kirkpatrick, a member of the Psychiatric 
Committee of the Royal College of Nursing. Initially anxious 
about the motives and methods of AEGIS, he was soon reassured upon 
meeting Mrs Robb and recruited to her cause. His experience both 
as a Registered Mental Nurse and as a nursing representative had 
led him to share the concerns to effect improvements in standards 
of care for long-stay psychiatric patients. He also corroborated 
the acute and disturbing dissatisfactions with the working 
conditions in some areas of psychiatric nursing that were emerging 
as common themes in the letters arriving at Hampstead Grove. Like 
Barton and Whitehead, he was not afraid to speak out and his close 
association with AEGIS as designated 'Nursing Adviser' caused 
difficulties when he became Regional Nursing Officer with one of 
the London Regional Boards, and he eventually resigned his 
post. 5^ -
In a campaign critical of nursing care it was crucial to maintain 
good relations with the profession and, as far as possible, carry 
nurses along; particularly as Mrs Robb believed there was little 
chance of support from organised medicine. Bill Kirkpatrick 
played a central role as AEGIS brought the conditions in 
psychiatric hospitals to the top of the College's agenda. Firstly 
he was instrumental in persuading it to organise a special 
conference on the impact of the 1964 Ministerial Circular, 
Improving the Effectiveness of Psychiatric Hospitals which took 
place on December 7th and 8th 1965 and was addressed by Russell
^ i n t e r v i e w  with Rev.Bill Kirkpatrick
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Barton.^2 Secondly, Bill Kirkpatrick set up a series of meetings 
with the Professional Secretary of the RCN, Keith Newstead, which 
took place during 1966 and 1967.
The first meeting was attended by Mrs Robb, Rolph, Kirkpatrick, 
Newstead, a prominent officer of the NAMH, the liberal MP Eric 
Lubbock and two journalists and took place on the 9th of November 
1966 in St. Bride's church Fleet Street. By this time, Mrs Robb 
had over 400 complaints from nursing staff on file and AEGIS was 
seriously considering publishing a selection of them. The second 
was held in March 1967 at the London School of Economics and 
chaired by Abel-Smith. This meeting was attended by the College's 
deputy president, Phyllis Rowe. As an insider, professional group, 
the RCN could not have been expected to side publicly with AEGIS's 
contentious methods; although by allowing Kirkpatrick to serve as 
a member of its psychiatric sub-committee, the College Was 
helping her aims. There were two views in the College about 
AEGIS. Older members saw the case as an attack on the profession, 
whilst others considered that there was a case which needed 
investigating.^3
A direct result of this second meeting was the decision by the RCN 
to organise its 1967 conference around the themes to be raised in 
Sans Everything which AEGIS briefed the College on during the 
course of the meeting. As time went on, Kirkpatrick won more and 
more of his colleagues over until the College was itself lobbying 
Ministers on the issues of conditions in hospitals and the 
victimisation of nurse c o m p l a i n a n t s . ^  By July 1968, the RCN was 
petitioning the Prime Minister on Standards of Care in mental 
hospitals and demanding a redistribution of health spending to 
fund the improvements.-*-*
S^See Report in The Nursing Times. Vol.61, No.51, 17.12.65,
pp.1739-40
5^See Robb Files Record of a Campaign Vol. Ill pp.70-73 and 
Record of Campaign Vol. XX for full correspondence and transcripts 
of meetings.
^Interview with Bill Kirkpatrick
S^See letter from John Andrews, Chairman of the RCN Psychiatric 
Sub-Committee to The Sunday Times. 6.10.68
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The third channel of nursing support was the professional press 
and particularly The Nursing Mirror. There existed a similar 
relationship between The Nursing Times and Mirror as that between 
the two major medical journals. The Nursing Times was close to 
the Royal College's public view and whilst generally supportive of 
AEGIS remained reserved in its reports and editorials. The 
Nursing Mirror, was more of a campaigning journal and became a 
great ally. As well as sharing common viewpoints on most of the 
major issues, Barbara Robb developed a close personal rapport with 
Yvonne Cross, who was its editor for many years until killed in a 
yachting accident in the early 1980s. She was ever ready to give 
AEGIS maximum publicity at each key moment in the campaign and 
provided practical help such as the survey timed to correspond to 
the publication of Sans Everything, which demonstrated widespread 
lack of confidence amongst nurses in established complaints 
channels and which was used against the Minister in 
Parliament.^6
Hence, although she was often to be accused of insensitivity to 
the complexities of the issues in psychiatric and geriatric 
nursing, Barbara Robb used these three channels to ensure that she 
was as closely in touch with real nursing opinion as anyone.
The support AEGIS generated in Fleet Street was remarkable. Under 
Rolph's guidance and instruction, Mrs Robb mobilised and 
maintained support throughout Fleet Street and in some specialist 
journals. Within about six months of the founding of AEGIS, 
conditions in mental hospitals became national news and remained 
so for 15 years - often making lead story in the national papers. 
Prior to Barbara Robb's arrival on the scene, the issue seldom 
surfaced and then usually in the form of articles contributed by 
specialists from outside Fleet Street.
She kept her contacts in Fleet Street fully up-to-date with 
accurate, fully referenced, synopses and analyses of any given
^ Nursing Mirror Vol. 124, 16.6.67, p.241, 23.6.67, pp.287-288
Continued on following page
-73-
issue. Transforming her documents into copy involved minimal 
work. This rapidly gained her a reputation as a totally reliable 
source. Influential correspondents face a constant assault from 
lobbyists of all kinds, and are therefore discriminating in 
whom they support. Barbara Robb merited it for three reasons. 
Firstly, journalists take have a cynical view of people promoting 
causes, whereas it was evident that she had no ulterior motives. 
Secondly, she also avoided a professional slickness. As one of 
her closest Fleet Street allies put it, 'throughout she retained 
the style of the typical English middle-class do-gooding lady who 
did not know her way round very well. She never acquired the 
outward skin of the worst kind of professional lobbyist.' 
Thirdly, she extended the warmth and friendship she showed her 
advisers to her press supporters.
For the newspapers involved, there was more at stake than the 
gathering of stories to sell copies. Key correspondents and their 
editors were convinced that here was a cause worth promoting. The 
Minister of the time described the issue as 'ideal grist for the 
journalist m i l l '.57 it was undoubtedly true that it had 
sensational overtones and some newspapers certainly made full use 
of them. Neglect and ill treatment, particularly of 'deserving' 
elderly patients was 'hot news', 'a real human interest story'. 
We will examine the newsworthiness of these issues in the final 
chapters. Two of AEGIS closest allies in Fleet Street were Hugo 
Young on the Sunday Times and David Roxan on the News of the 
World and represent the polarity of newspaper types attracted by 
mental hospital scandal.
Hugo Young was chief leader writer and social services 
correspondent when the AEGIS case first came on to his desk in 
1966. Having met Barbara Robb he was convinced that she was 
revealing a scandalous situation of which newspapers were, in the 
main, unaware; she presented a new issue which had been previously 
'swept under the carpet'. With the appointment of Harold Evans as 
Editor in January 1967, Mr Young enjoyed full support in promoting 
the AEGIS campaign. Evans was a campaigning journalist and under
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his editorship, the paper was to fight a number of celebrated 
campaigns: thus the case very much appealed to him. The
political influence of The Sunday Times has always been 
proportionately greater than its readership (three and a half 
million in the mid-1960s).58 It was read by the middle-classes 
and, of course, members of the political community where it served 
as a forum for debate and opinion within national politics. As 
chief leader writer and subsequently Political Editor, Hugo Young 
was a powerful a l l y . 59
Writing on The News of the World with a circulation of six and a 
half million and thus a readership of around sixteen million,60 
David Roxan was no less powerful a supporter in presenting the 
case to a much wider public. He was one of the few journalists 
who was familiar with the problem having fought a campaign on 
behalf of a Rampton patient in the late 1950s consequently freed 
from wrongful detention. Having met with obstruction and 
hostility in official circles and witnessed the conditions in 
Rampton at first-hand, he approached Barbara Robb to offer his 
support in February 1966. Mr Roxan argued that Fleet Street's 
massive support for AEGIS reflected a collective guilt complex 
about an issue of which it was distantly conscious but 'which had 
been kept under wraps'. Unlike Hugo Young, he had to persuade an 
editor not generally inclined to campaigning to promote the case. 
It was a measure of his success that the News of the World was to 
be instrumental in the establishment of the Ely Hospital 
Inquiry. 61-
Other journalists whom Barbara Robb recruited included John Roper 
on the Times. Anne Shearer on the Guardian. Anne Allen on the 
Daily Mirror. Helen Mason on the Sunday Telegraph. John Prince on 
the Daily Telegraph. The Sunday Telegraph and Daily Telegraph 
carried articles also authored by Barbara Robb herself. Although
Continued from previous page 
and 7.7.67, pp.320-323
5?Interview with Rt.Hon. Sir Kenneth Robinson
58seymour-Ure, C., The Press. Politics, and the Public. 
(London:Methuen, 1968) p.52
^^interview with Hugo Young 
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these papers were probably closest to her own political views, 
getting direct access to their pages was particularly useful in 
maintaining for AEGIS an image of political neutrality. Without 
this and with supporters such as Rolph, Audrey Harvey and Able- 
Smith, AEGIS could have been perceived (rather like CPAG) as a 
Labour Party lobby.
Press contacts were maintained and developed by sophisticated 
press relations. AEGIS issued press releases, held press 
conferences in the library of St. Brides Church, Fleet St., 
entertained correspondents over dinner, and invariably secured 
maximum publicity for significant events in the campaign. This 
also took Barbara Robb into the studios of television and radio. 
In return, the press gained a new issue for mass publicity and 
open access to mental hospitals, previously unavailable to them. 
By the late 1960s representatives from national and local 
newspapers were scouring the service in search of 'scandals' and 
when they found them, maintaining the pressure on the Department. 
Public opinion, which may well have been indifferent at the outset 
- at least it was thus seen by journalists - was being mobilised 
against two presenting images: a mental hospital service which
neglected and ill-treated its patients; a Ministry which refused 
to recognise the problem.
Other Pressure Groups
By the end of 1966, AEGIS' primary concerns were standards of care 
in long-stay hospitals and complaints procedures in the hospital 
service. None of the other major pressure groups was promoting 
standards of care as a predominant issue, although the Patients' 
Association(PA) had had a long-standing preoccupation with the 
pursuit of complaints generally in the Health Service. Barbara 
Robb liaised with the PA, the NAMH (later MIND), the Disablement 
Income Groups and the National Old People's Welfare Council (later 
Age Concern).
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The Patients Association was a small group run essentially by two 
or three women of whom its then Chairman Helen Hodgson was the 
most active. She supported the AEGIS case from the outset and 
although not a greatly significant figure politically was 
important to Mrs Robb as a source of encouragement and advice in 
the early stages of her career. The PA supported the AEGIS case 
on complaints throughout the campaign.
In the mid-1960s the National Association for Mental Health (NAMH) 
was the most significant lobby in the field. This organisation 
was effectively a broad coalition of views and interests mostly 
from within the service with psychiatry highly prominent. A
number of key actors in the AEGIS story were active members of the
Association. Rolph, Russell Barton and Kenneth Robinson were all 
members of the Council, the latter resigning his Vice-Presidency 
to take up his office as Minister of Health. Rolph had become a 
member of the Advisory Committee in 1957 and Brian Abel-Smith 
contributed to the occasional Annual Conference.
These conferences served as a forum for the debate of contemporary 
issues in the field.^2 Before AEGIS came on the scene, the 
predominant concerns at the NAMH conferences were the
implementation of the 1959 Mental Health Act and the problems 
created for community care by the relative poverty of the
services.
Thus when Barbara Robb approached the NAMH General Secretary for 
advice and support there were pockets of sympathy within the 
organisation but predominant concerns with other issues. Her 
intention to use the press to disseminate a picture of neglect of 
elderly patients conflicted with the NAMH policy to overcome 
public fear of mental institutions. NAMH worked as an insider 
group and its political coalitions would have undoubtedly become 
strained if Mary Applebey, the then Secretary, had thrown her 
weight fully behind Barbara Robb.*>3
60seymour-Ure, op.Cit 
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However, Mary Applebey recognised Mrs Robb's conviction, and 
sympathised with her cause, and privately welcomed her radical 
strategy to motivate public opinion. Mrs Robb believed that Mrs 
Applebey and the Press Secretary of the NAMH, Joyce Emmerson, 
wanted to give whole-hearted support but encountered internal 
opposition.^ Certainly, they were privately supportive in the
early days of AEGIS but the groups never became close allies. 
However in the wake of Sans Everything the subject for the Annual 
Conference in February 1968 had become, "What's wrong with the 
Mental Health Services" and was to become a recurrent theme in 
subsequent years.^5 With the appointment of David Ennals as
campaign director in 1971, and subsequently through the work of
Larry Gostin and Tony Smythe over the reform of the 1959 Act, 
MIND, as it became known, had rather borrowed a leaf out of 
Barbara Robb's book and moved on the public offensive. But in 
1965, the NAMH was regarded as 'part of the psychiatric 
establishment'.^6
Although approaches to other organisations generally resulted in 
expressions of support^, they revealed that AEGIS would be
filling a void in two respects. No group was promoting standards 
of care as a primary concern, or using a media campaign in mental 
health which the press was clearly ready for. The road was open 
for AEGIS to take the initiative, and it is perhaps one 
explanation of the NAMH ambivalence to AEGIS that Mrs Robb was 
very quickly able to establish AEGIS as the prominent mental 
health pressure group of the late-1960s and early-1970s and
dominated the policy agenda over that period.
^Interview with David Roxan
^interview with Mary Applebey, then Secretary of the NAMH
^ I n t e r v i e w  with Mary Applebey
6^Robb Files. Record of a Campaign Vol. VIII
^NAMH, Report of the 1968 Annual Conference. (London:NAMH, 1968) 
Addresses included one by Abel-Smith on the lessons of Sans 
Everything. for complaints machinery, a very defensive speech by 
Kenneth Robinson, and one from Dr. Alex Baker of Banstead 
Hospital, itself pseudonymously referred to in the book, proposing 
an inspectorate of hospitals similar to the Scottish Mental 
Welfare Commission. See also Annual Reports for 1969 and 1973 
6^See Smythe, T. 'MIND'- an assessment, British Journal of 
Psychiatry. Vol. 129 (1976) Vol.129, Supplement May 1976 pp.16-18 
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Lastly, AEGIS canvassed support in the House of Commons. It is 
not certain what Mrs Robb's personal politics were, although her 
friends believed they were initially conservative and moved left 
as her career as a reformer progressed. She collaborated closely 
with senior figures in the Labour Party but was never associated 
with Labour to the exclusion of support from other parties. 
Mental Health is a cross-party issue which serves as a vehicle for 
backbenchers to get themselves noticed. Hence Barbara Robb 
obtained the support of MPs from all sides of the House, including 
those with particular interest in mental health, such as Eric 
Lubbock (Liberal and active in NAMH) and Eric Moonman (Labour), 
Mervyn Pike, then Conservative Opposition spokesman on Health, and 
her strongest ally in the Commons, Ben Whittaker who was Labour MP 
for Hampstead until 1970. As with the press correspondents, Mrs 
Robb kept them up to date with events and supplied questions 
prepared by her advisers to pressurise, embarrass or squeeze 
information out of the Minister or Secretary of State.
Finally, because the issues of complaints procedure and 
victimisation took AEGIS into issues of administrative law, 
Barbara Robb recruited legal advice. Although the letterhead 
presented Rolph as 'legal adviser' to AEGIS, this role was 
restricted to reading her pre-publication copy for possible libel. 
Otherwise Barbara Robb consulted a number of legal experts in the 
first few months before settling on Theo Fitzwalter-Butler. He 
came into the campaign through Mrs Robb's social contacts. He was 
a judge, the recorder at Newark, and for many years edited the law 
reference book Archibold's Criminal Pleadings. If he personally 
did not have the expertise on a given problem, he had direct 
access to a barrister who did. Barbara Robb's legal bills were 
considerable throughout her reforming career. Without Fitzwalter- 
Butler 's generosity with his time, she may well have had to 
abandon the enterprise due to bankruptcy. Moreover his 
consultancy and inside information greatly enhanced the quality of 
AEGIS submission documents. The small intimate team of advisers 
which Mrs Robb gathered around her and constituted her 
'organisation' as it was presented in the public sphere, was thus 
complete. Most of them became friends as well as advisers.
Continued on following page
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Having once enlisted their support for the cause, she used them 
wisely and economically. They also enriched her life.
Liaison with the Ministry and Definition of issues and po.U<?y
proposals
On receiving her invitation to the regional board inquiry into her 
Diary, Mrs Robb had decided not to attend and wrote to the inquiry 
and also to The Times and setting out her terms for cooperation:
(a) the tribunal would be chaired by a barrister totally 
independent of the Board or its management committees;
(b) secondly all witnesses would be legally represented;
(c) thirdly AEGIS would be permitted to call any witnesses 
as necessary.
Having despatched this letter, she learned that Lord Strabolgi had 
been invited independently and accepted on the grounds that having
pressed the Minister to establish it, it would have been
unreasonable for AEGIS to ignore it.®^ Hence, despite being 
informed by the inquiry's chairman that it was to proceed as 
planned not withstanding AEGIS' objections, Barbara Robb attended 
somewhat unwillingly in order that her group should not appear
d i v i d e d . 70 she also secured the appearance of a letter in The
Times, on the morning of the inquiry. This declared that her 
former willingness to allow the Minister to use her report in 
April had been replaced by a complete lack of confidence either in 
the Ministry's ability to take effective action or in the 
procedures established for investigating complaints about the 
hospital service.71 She arrived at the inquiry clutching her
67Robb Files. Record of a Campaign, Volume VIII 'Organisations in
touch with AEGIS'
®®Letter from Barbara Robb to the Inquiry's secretary dated 
8.12.65 in Robb Files. Record of a Campaign, Vol.II p.22
6^Robb Files. Record of a Campaign, Vol.II pp.24-37
7QRobb Files. Record of a Campaign Vol.V
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Diary to her breast just in case the Regional Board had decided to 
meet AEGIS conditions. As the majority of the Committee's 
membership turned out to be members of the RHB, Mrs Robb sat 
through the hearing with the report unopened on her lap, 
repeatedly demanding an independent inquiry, and orally listed her 
dissatisfactions with the treatment of Miss Gibbs and conditions 
on ward E3.72
The Committee conceded shortage of resources and asserted that the 
adverse publicity was demoralising staff. When its findings were 
eventually communicated to Lord Strabolgi by the Minister, it had 
clearly adopted a defensive if carefully worded position. It 
accepted that the buildings were antiquated and that staff and 
facilities were insufficient, but denied the suggestions of 
unkindness and ill-treatment. It similarly rejected the 
allegation of routine stripping: "The Committee went into this
very carefully indeed, and closely questioned everybody concerned. 
Patients who are confused may have their dentures removed at 
bedtime - as is done on E3 - but there is no routine stripping of 
those p o s s e s s i o n s . " ^  However this was not to be the last word 
on Mrs Robb's Diary.
Shortly afterwards, it became clear that AEGIS was beginning to 
penetrate the Minister's armour. Abel-Smith informed her that 
Kenneth Robinson had consulted him about AEGIS, 'stripping', and 
hospital complaints. Abel-Smith was at the time a member of a 
team of outside experts used by Kenneth Robinson to supplement the 
advisfe from his o f f i c i a l s . 74 He felt the Minister could not be 
expected to start issuing directives in favour of patients while 
engaged in the difficult negotiations with the BMA about the 
remuneration of GPs. However Enoch Powell had devised an 
intermediate mechanism between direction and ordinary hospital 
memoranda which were all too easily ignored; the so-called 'pink 
circulars'. These documents listed the recommendations and also
^ The Times. 18.12.65
^interview with Lord Strabolgi, Mrs Robb's detailed account of 
the hearing is in Robb Files, op.cit. pp.38-60
^Letter Kenneth Robinson to Lord Strabolgi, 16.5.66 in Robb 
Files Record of a Campaign, Vol.II pp.65 
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required the hospital authorities to report back on the action 
taken. Abel-Smith suggested that hospitals could be advised that 
patients should be deprived of their possessions only following 
certification by a consultant that it was essential on grounds of 
safety; it was the intention to prevent nursing staff having 
discretion in this area.75 With Mrs Robb's support, Abel-Smith 
sent this proposal to the Minister who immediately replied that he 
would consider it.76
In February 1966, AEGIS learned that the suggestion had been 
adopted although not through a pink circular. Mrs Robb was 
contacted by two women who had respectively petitioned the Queen 
and the Prime Minister's wife about the 'stripping' of elderly 
relatives in hospital. They had each been duly informed by the
Minister of Health that although he had no evidence of this 
practice, he had sent out appropriate guidance to hospital 
authorities.77 This was news to Mrs Robb and even to Abel-Smith; 
there had been no public announcement or circular. So she 
mobilised Brian MacArthur of the Daily Mail who asked the Ministry 
directly, and she also arranged for Eric Lubbock to put down a
Written Question. The Ministry confirmed that hospitals had been 
advised at the end of the year to review practices to ensure that 
patients retained their personal possessions whenever possible. 
The Minister's Written Answer confirmed that they had also been 
advised to remove aids and belongings only on medical advice. 
Kenneth Robinson had decided to adopt the less public procedures 
of a letter to the Secretaries of the Regional Boards.78 So 
AEGIS had scored its first success.
Meanwhile Rolph had been mobilising the press campaign. He
published an article criticising the limits on the power of the
Court of Protection and advocating that the Court conduct an
7^Interview with Kenneth Robinson 
75Rpbb Files, op.cit. pp.70-74
76Letter Brian Abel-Smith to Kenneth Robinson, dated 7.12.65 in 
Robb Files. op.cit. p.76 
77Letter E.B.S.Alton (Ministry of Health) to Geraldine 
Richardson, 31.12.65 in Robb Files, op.cit. 'p.137'
78House of Commons Official Report Vol.725. Written Answers Cols. 
184-5, 28.2.66
-82-
investigation into conditions on wards for the elderly.^9 
Subsequent articles and correspondence dealt with variation in 
standards of care between institutions and defensive attitudes 
adopted by staff in the face of c r i t i c i s m . Rolph's article 
had brought with it approaches by Brian MacArthur of The Daily 
Mail, who had introduced Eric Lubbock to AEGIS, by The Sunday 
Telegraph, and by David Roxan on The News of the World. All three 
papers pressed AEGIS concerns with the Minister. Mr Roxan 
obtained information from the Ministry and agreed both to allow 
Rolph and Barbara Robb to read his article before he went to press 
and to print extracts from reports gathered by Barbara Robb from 
her contacts in the s e r v i c e . T h e  pressure was building up.
It was therefore timely when, at the beginning of March the 
Ministry issued a 'pink circular' giving specific advice to 
hospital authorities on handling complaints. Mrs Robb's copy 
arrived through Brian Abel-Smith whose advice lay behind this 
Ministerial initiative. The circular, HM(66)15, broke new ground 
in detailing procedures for handling complaints according to two 
principles; promptness; and that the complainant should be made 
aware that his complaint had been 'fully and fairly considered.' 
The circular prescribed a hierarchical procedure starting at ward 
level and graduating to higher authority if the complainant 
remained unsatisfied. The patient was to be fully informed of his 
rights and assisted in drafting a written complaint which could 
then proceed to senior level. All written complaints were to be 
seen by the Secretary of the Management Committee or the Board of 
Governors - or a senior member of staff designated by this 
official - who would then agree with the complainant and the head 
of the hospital department concerned on the action to be taken. 
If there was still no satisfactory outcome, the complaint would go 
to the HMC or Board of Governors who would conduct an 
investigation with an informal hearing at which the complainant 
and the person complained against would appear but without 
compulsion.
7^New Statesman. 11.2.66
8QNew Statesman 4.3.66, 11.3.66, 18.3.66
83-Robb Files, op.cit. pp.82-89
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The most important section considered what were envisaged as a 
small number of cases serious enough to warrant an 'independent 
inquiry' at Regional Hospital Board level. AEGIS had criticised 
existing health authority inquiries on the grounds that members of 
a board could not be considered independent when investigating a 
complaint about a service for which they were responsible. They 
were 'judges and juries' in their own cases. The new guidance 
went some way to meeting this criticism by moving the Regional 
Board Inquiries towards more formal legal procedure.
"The general rule should be that an independent lawyer or 
other competent person from outside the hospital service 
should conduct the enquiry, or preside over a small 
committee set up for the purpose, whose membership should be 
independent of the authority concerned and should include a 
person or persons competent to advise on any professional or 
technical matters. The complainant and any persons who are 
the subject of the complaint should have an opportunity of 
being present throughout, the hearing, and of cross-
examining witnesses, and should be allowed to make their own 
arrangements to be legally represented if they so wish."®2
In all cases, this formal procedure was not to be invoked without 
consultation with the Minister himself. Lastly, hospital 
authorities were asked to keep systematic records of written
complaints graded according to importance and subject.
With the Ministry now beginning to respond to its concerns, AEGIS 
had to sustain the pressure. Hence it ensured that letters and 
articles sympathetic to its cause appeared throughout the next six 
months; in the columns of the Lancet and the Guardian in March, 
the Daily Telegraph in April, Mental Health and the magazine Nova 
in June, the New Statesman in August, and the Sunday papers in 
S e p t e m b e r . T h i s  was a chain reaction as the national dailies
^Ministry of Health, Circular HM(66)15 para.(iii)b 
83The Guardian 18.3.66, 23.3.66., 26.3.66, Sans Teeth, Sans
Eyes, Sans Everything, in Lancet 1966 (i) no. 7430 p. 646
Continued on following page
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picked up on stories appearing in the specialist journals 
constantly encouraged by Barbara Robb and Rolph both by 
approaching journalists and direct contributions in the form of 
letters and articles.
By the Spring of 1967, AEGIS had synthesised two major promotional 
issues. Firstly, it claimed that thousands of people were 
inappropriately housed in long-stay psychiatric wards where 
standards of care were poor, and in many cases amounted to nothing 
less than neglect and ill-treatment. Secondly, it alleged that 
anyone trying to remedy the position through complaint encountered 
obstruction and denial, if a member of the public, and also risked 
victimisation, if a member of staff. Both contentions were 
publicly disputed by the Ministry of Health.
In early January 1967, Barbara Robb finally determined that AEGIS 
would follow the example of Abel-Smith and Townsend and go into 
print with a politically-motivated book, and so told the 
press.
Continued from previous page
Daily Telegraph. 26.4.66, article by Helen Mason in Nova. June 
1966 (also of the Sunday Telegraph and married to Hugo Young), and 
Mental Health. June 1966 (article by Rolph), Mrs Robb appeared on 
Granada TV on 1.6.66, New Statesman 26.8.66, The Observer 4.9.66, 
and The Sunday Telegraph. 26.9.66 
8^The Times. 5.1.67
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SANS EVERYTHING AND A CASE UNANSWERED
”.... some of the mental hospitals are very near to a public 
scandal and we are lucky that they have not so far attracted 
more limelight and publicity."(Aneurin Bevan 1950)^
When the good fortune referred to by Bevan ran out, the resultant 
adverse publicity cast a shadow over a Minister of Health who had 
devoted much of his career in public life to pressing for 
improvements in services for the mentally disordered. Kenneth 
Robinson was unfortunate that the issue burst into the public 
domain during his period of office since he could have hardly been 
blamed for the back-log of neglect which he inherited in 1964, 
still less have expected to have made up the deficiencies in only 
two and a half years. However, when Sans Everything appeared in 
June 1967, his Department's posture was to evince a marked degree 
of insensitivity, a fatal underestimation of AEGIS as a political 
adversary and not least ignorance of what was happening at 
hospital-level. The book opened the floodgates to a torrent of 
discontent and deficiencies which stranded the Ministry.
The launch of the book on the 30th June was the spearhead for an 
assault on three fronts. There would be widespread, favourable 
press publicity, attacks on the Ministry in Parliament, whilst the 
pressure so created fortified AEGIS in its negotiation with the 
Minister to obtain independent inquiries into the book's 
allegations. The outcome was a White Paper^ purporting to
^Public Records Office, CAB 129/38, NHS, Control of Expenditure, 
Memorandum by the Minister of Health, 10.3.50, quoted in Klein, 
R., The Politics of the National Health Service. (London:Longman, 
1983) p.36
^Ministry of Health (MOH), National Health Service, Findings and 
Recommendations Following Enquiries into Allegations Concerning 
the Care of Elderly Patients in Certain Hospitals. Cmnd 3687, 
(London:HMS0, 1968)
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answer the case which satisfied very few, became widely viewed as 
a whitewashing exercise, and amplified the impact of events 
precipitated by the publicity. Firstly, some of the inquiries 
were unsatisfactory answers to the AEGIS case, and raised 
questions of procedure and content. Secondly, the Ministry was 
completely out-manoeuvered by Barbara Robb in managing the press. 
Thirdly, by presenting the White Paper as a total refutation of 
the allegations, the Ministry prepared the way for an enormous 
backlash when obliged comprehensively to answer the case at Ely. 
Fourthly, it precipitated the Minister to propose a major 
extension to complaints machinery in a Green Paper.
Hugo Young opened Mental Health Week with a foretaste of the book 
in the Sunday Times of June the 4th. ^  Two of the accounts^ 
from the book were reproduced side by side with a powerful 
supporting article explaining that AEGIS hoped ".. to create the 
sort of public shock which alone seems capable of stimulating a 
better psycho-geriatric s e r v i c e . The great majority of 
elderly residents of mental hospitals were n ... vegetating amid 
the despair if not the cruelty .." described in the reports.^  
Problems created by staff shortages were aggravated by poor- 
working conditions and the low-status of mental nursing. Nurses, 
patients and relatives faced reprisals if they complained whilst 
regional boards and management committees were often either 
unaware of the situation or unable to change it. Mrs Robb was 
reported as proposing the re-deployment of available resources 
according to the system of care at Severalls and the establishment 
of a lay commissioner for hospital complaints.7
In response the Minister issued a press statement condemning 
"distress caused to patients' relatives and to hospital staff", 
asserting that none of the allegations was supported by 
particulars which would have made it possible to pursue inquiries
3Sunday Times. 4.6.67
^Robb, R . , Sans Everything: a Case to Answer. (London: Nelson,
1967) p.18 and p.37
5Sunday Times Op.cit.
6Ibid
7ibid
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and rejecting the suggestion that specific complaints or evidence 
about ill-treatment or neglect of patients would lead to 
reprisals.® The response from other parties did not share this
confidence. There was strong support in the newspaper's letters 
column from Mary Applebey of the NAMH and from Yvonne Cross.^ 
The Nursing Mirror endorsed AEGIS' claims that nurses faced 
reprisals if they publicly aired their complaints, and asked its 
readers to write in with their own views and experience.1® The 
Nursing Times reserved judgement in anticipation of the 
forthcoming RCN Conference on standards of care, which AEGIS had 
inspired.H Even the voice of hospital administration felt that
the possibility that the reports were substantially true gave 
cause for concern.12 The reports went largely unnoticed in the 
medical press.
The Sunday Times continued the theme the following week, June 
11th, replying to a demand from the Chairman of the South-East 
Metropolitan RHB that AEGIS reveal its sources^-®, by endorsing 
Mrs Robb's mistrust of in-house inquiries.14 Meanwhile, 
Government front-bench spokesman in both Houses faced a barrage or 
questions partly due to the publicity and partly from Mrs Robb 
lobbying her supporters in Parliament.1^ Kenneth Robinson told 
Nigel Fisher that he believed existing methods of dealing with 
complaints were adequate for all concerned, and raised cheers when 
he assured Bernard Braine that he was "... only too ready and 
anxious to investigate anything which can be investigated .." but 
that he deprecated " ..these generalised smears against the
®Ministry of Health, Conditions of the Elderly in Hospitals. 
Press Release, 6.6.67
^See Sunday Times Letters Column 11.6.67 
l^Nursing Mirror. Vol. 124, p.241, 16.6.67 
U Nursing Times Vol.63 p.777
^ B r i t i s h  Hospital Journal and Social Services Review. Vol.777 
No.4027 p.146, 23.6.67 
l®Letter from Sir Ivor Julian, Sunday Times 11.6.67 
14Sunday Times Editorial, 11.6.67
l^See House of Lords Official Report. Vol.283, Col.1263
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psychiatric hospital services". Hence the battle-lines had 
been firmly drawn when Sans Everything appeared on June 30th.
The content of the book corresponded closely with AEGIS 
promotional issues. Mrs Robb's Diary together with accounts from 
six pseudonymous nurses and two social workers presented the case 
on standards of care and i l l - t r e a t m e n t . ^  Tony Whitehead 
described his alternative model of psycho-geriatric care.^® Bill 
Kirkpatrick claimed that victimisation was a major problem for 
nurses.^ Brian Abel-Smith developed this theme in a chapter on 
complaints machinery. He maintained that fear of victimisation or 
ignorance of procedures prevented nurses from pursuing complaints. 
Doctors were hesitant to interfere in what they saw as nursing 
matters or were simply unaware of deficiencies at ward level. 
Hospital authorities, however well-meaning in their attempts to do 
justice to complaints that did reach them, were still acting as 
judge and jury in areas of their own responsibility. Hospital 
visits by authority Members were ineffective and crowded out by 
officers and senior staff. Reviving a proposal abroad at the time 
of the establishment of the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration, he proposed an office of Commissioner specifically 
for the hospital service to handle c o m p l a i n t s ^ ,  and to visit 
hospitals as part of a national hospital inspectorate service.21
^ House of Commons Official Report Vol. 74. cols.69-70 
l^Ed.Robb, R. Op.cit. pp.13-48 and 69-114
l®Whitehead, J.A., A comprehensive psycho-geriatric service, in 
Ed. Robb, op.cit. pp.115-123
l^Kirkpatick, W.J.A. Conscience and Commitment: a commentary, in 
Ed.Robb, B., op.cit. pp.48-57
^Action taken on or on behalf of the Minister of Health 
(including that of health authorities) had been specifically 
excluded from the powers of the PCA, against the wishes of some 
MPs. See Chapter 11 
2lAbel-Smith, B., A hospital commissioner, In Robb (Ed.), op.cit. 
pp.128-135
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The book's reception in Fleet St. was predictably favourable.22 
The professional journals were also supportive. The Lancet found
no fault in the AEGIS case.23 The editor of The Nursing Times
accepted it in part and called for more staff, more money and a
reduction in overcrowding. The press also reported that the RCN
and the National Council of Nurses supported the case, with the 
former launching a national investigation into the extent of ill- 
treatment in hospitals.2^ The Nursing Mirror firmly endorsed the 
book's claims in regard to conditions, bad nursing practice, and 
the fear of reprisals and proposed a statutory committee to 
guarantee anonymity to nurses pursuing complaints.23 The 
hospital administrators journal criticised the emotional 
presentation of the accounts but accepted their substance and the 
case for a hospital commissioner.2**
Mrs Robb appeared on national radio2^ and the BBC's 24 Hours 
programme where she was filmed with Amy Gibbs at the Catholic 
home, attacked existing complaints machinery and defended the 
anonymity of her collaborator's. Following a supportive 
appearance by Yvonne Cross, Desmond Wilcox, the programme's 
presenter, introduced the Minister of Health.2® Apparently, 
AEGIS had not been warned of this and was completely taken off 
guard. Kenneth Robinson declared that the book contained no 
evidence which enabled investigation and reminded viewers of his 
primary interest in mental health prior to taking office. He 
further asserted that Mrs Robb's charges arising from the patient 
in Friern had been fully investigated and found to be
22The book and related issues were major daily themes, commanding 
Front Page space, in the press throughout the whole of July, See 
The Sunday Times. The Times. The Guardian. 26.6.67, and 30.7.67
23Lancet 1967 (i) No. 7505 pp.85-6
2^The Times. 22.7.67 and The News of the World 25.6.67
23Nursing Mirror. Vol.124 p.296 30.6.67
^ British Hospital Journal and Social Science Review. Vol.77 
No. 4031, July 21st 1967, pp.1346-7 and 1373
2?BBC The World at One. Transcript in Robb Files Sans E. Vol. VI
29.6.67
28fiBC 24 Hours, 30.6.67, Transcript in Robb, files. Sans E 
Vol.VI
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unsubstantiated. He then retreated significantly from this 
position, adding "... if any of this is true, and to the extent 
that it is true, I am sure that it was far truer 10 years 
ago".^
The Minister was losing the argument. The Nursing Mirror 
published a selection of responses from nurses to their questions 
on victimisation which without exception, confirmed that there was 
a widespread fear of and frequent experience of reprisals.^0 The 
most significant coverage was to prove to be David Roxan's review 
in The News of the World. On the 25th of June, with the book due 
out the following Friday, he had asked his readers in the hospital 
service with similar experience to approach the p a p e r . A s  a 
result of this appeal, he received a number of disturbing letters. 
Having interviewed the authors, Roxan forwarded five accounts to 
the Minister, and published extracts from them on August 20th, 
including one from a former nursing assistant at Ely Hospital in 
South Wales.^2
Not surprisingly, the Minister had been one of the first 
recipients of a copy of the book. On the 29th of June, a Private 
Secretary wrote to Mrs Robb hoping that she would identify the 
pseudonymous contributors or at least, the hospitals referred to, 
so that a 'full enquiry' could be held. Mrs Robb's hand-delivered 
reply requested details of the envisaged procedures, and was 
immediately informed that they would be conducted by legally- 
qualified, independent chairmen. She was asked to disclose the 
identity of the hospitals, in confidence and the following day she 
informed the press that the form of investigation proposed seemed 
satisfactory and would now be asking her fellow contributors if 
they would consent to her informing the Ministry, confidentially,
29ibid
^ Nursing Mirror Vol 124, 23.6.67, pp.287-322 and 7.7.67, pp.320- 
322
^ The News of The World 26.7.67,
^2News of the World. 20.8.68
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of the names of the hospitals.^3 Two days later she wrote to the 
Minister listing the institutions: Banstead, Cowley Rd. , Oxford,
Friern, St James, Leeds, St. Lawrences, Bodmin, Storthes Hall, 
Huddersfield and Springfields, Manchester.^
Mervyn Pike, Conservative Opposition spokesman on health, had 
planned with AEGIS a Supply Day debate on Sans Everything. AEGIS 
briefed a number of Members by suggesting over forty questions 
drafted by Mrs Robb, Russell Barton, and Bill Kirkpatrick in the
weeks before the book was p u b l i s h e d . 35 In her opening speech,
Miss Pike drew attention to and elaborated on the major themes of 
the book. She expressed her support for the Commissioner 
proposals and a hospital inspectorate. She then asked the 
Minister whether the inquiry chairmen were to be advised by 
medical and nursing staff and demanded an assurance that the
members of the committees would have no connection with the
hospitals or regions concerned.36
Robinson's reply was more reserved than his previous parliamentary 
references to AEGIS. The Nursing Mirror survey had caused him to 
revise his view on reprisals, although he added that he could not 
conceive of such practices being widespread. He said he had been 
given the names of the hospitals in the book and merely awaited 
information relating specific complaints to specific hospitals 
before "... the hospital board chairman can arrange for inquiries 
to be carried out by a legally qualified chairman from outside the 
NHS assisted by other persons unconnected with the hospital 
service".37 Finally, in winding up the debate, the Government
33Correspondence with R.S. Matthews , the Private Secretary at
the Minsitry of Health, in Robb Files, Sans E. Vol.5 section i.
^Letter Barbara Robb to Kenneth Robinson, 3.7.67 in Robb Files
op.cit.
35see correspondence to with Mervyn Pike, Ben Whittaker, Eric 
Moonman, David Owen, David Kerr, Bernard Braine, Lord Balniel,
Douglas Houghton, Hugh Gray in Robb Files. Sans E. Vol.3
^ House of Commons Official Report Vol.750. Cols. 431-7
37ibid. cols. 451-4
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announced its intention to make public the findings and 
recommendations of the tribunals.38
AEGIS was disturbed to learn that the tribunals were to be 
established by the Regional Board Chairman and not directly by the 
Minister himself. For this took them beyond the scrutiny of the 
Council on Tribunals.3^ On the 21st of July, Mrs Robb issued a 
press statement explaining that she had identified the hospitals 
referred to in the book on the assumption that the Minister would 
himself appoint the Chairmen. AEGIS had to be satisfied that the 
inquiries would be both thorough and impartial or no further 
assistance would be forthcoming.^® For its part, the Ministry 
was only prepared to grant 'qualified privilege' to the testimony 
of witnesses and declined to answer specific questions posed by 
AEGIS on the aims and procedures of the inquiries.^
AEGIS wanted its case examined according to formal legal procedure 
covering all aspects of administration. The Ministry preferred a 
less formal procedure focussing on specific allegations in the 
accounts. Findings and recommendations would then be published to 
answer the case in the public sphere. As the press carried blow 
by blow accounts of the argument, the need to find a compromise 
became increasingly apparent. Again it originated with Brian 
Abel-Smith, who proposed in the course of a television debate with 
Maurice Hackett that the Lord Chancellor should appoint the 
members of the committees of enquiry who should be drawn from 
outside the service to guarantee their independence.^  This 
proposal was welcomed by the Minister and incorporated into a 
formula announced to the press on the 9th of August.^3
38Ibid 
39See p.96
^®Letter Barbara Robb to R.S.Matthews, released to the press, 
copy in Robb Files Sans E Vol.5 
^Letter to C. Wade of Oswald Hickson, Barbara Robb's solicitors, 
to L.R.Warner, Private Secretary, in Robb Files, op.cit.
^^BBC 24 Hours 28.7.68, Transcript in Robb Files Sans E. Vol.VI 
^3Press Statement in Robb Files. Sans E. Vol. 5, reported in The 
Guardian 10.8.67
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The Chairman of each committee of inquiry was drawn from a list of 
QCs prepared by the Lord Chancellor, all of whom were experienced 
in medical litigation cases. Each committee would also comprise a 
doctor, a nurse and one lay member. All members would be 
unconnected with the regional board concerned. Each committee 
was to sit in private, the precise details of procedure left to 
the discretion of its chairman within the departments guidance. 
Although this still excluded any statutory role for the Council on 
Tribunals, Mrs Robb and her advisers felt obliged to cooperate if 
they were not to lose face in the public sphere.
From this point of apparent accord, relations soon deteriorated 
again. In informing the Minister of the willingness of the Sans 
Everything contributors to cooperate with the inquiries, AEGIS 
took the precaution of reminding him that information so far 
conveyed to the Ministry had been on a basis of strict 
confidentiality and AEGIS reserved its position on allowing it to 
be made public.^ This issue then blew up into a major dispute. 
The Minister replied that, regardless of AEGIS view, he intended 
to publish the findings and recommendations together with the 
identity of the institutions involved.^
Given the enormous publicity, it seems reasonable that the 
Minister should publish the reports. He had a dual 
responsibility; allegations of ill-treatment had to be 
investigated thoroughly and independently; the service was also to 
be protected from generalised smear campaigns which damaged staff 
morale and hampered recruitment. As he explained to AEGIS through 
one of his officials, when he had asked for the names of the 
hospitals 'in confidence' the phrase meant that there would be no 
publicity until an inquiry had made its findings known to him. 
The inquiries were to be held at the hospitals concerned and 
inevitably rumours would circulate, not least to the press. The
^Confidential Letters Barbara Robb to Kenneth Robinson, 3.7.67 
and 9.8.67 and to R .S.Mathews, 19.7.67 and 21.7.67 in Robb Files, 
Sans E. vol. 5
^Tw o  Letters R.S.Matthews to Barbara Robb, both dated 21.7.67, 
in Robb Files. op.cit.
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book's allegations reflected on all hospitals caring for the 
elderly and the identification of those involved would avoid this 
general implication. Moreover, failure to publish would arouse 
the suspicion that serious shortcomings were being concealed. 
Besides^ ^ thl^ the Government had committed itself to publish in 
the House of Commons and such was the usual practice.^
AEGIS privately accepted some of these arguments, but it feared 
a whitewash.^ Yet no Minister in his right mind was likely to 
concede what the group was demanding. AEGIS was seeking the right 
to see the enquiry reports and approve them for publication on the 
basis of its assessment of fairness, thus giving AEGIS an 
effective veto over the reports. The Minister could reasonably 
argue that he was responsible both for the establishment of the 
committees and for the hospitals under investigation, and could 
do with the reports whatever he considered in the best interests 
of the service and the public. That responsibility rested upon 
electoral accountability whereas Barbara Robb was a self-appointed 
guardian of public interest. So Mrs Robb elected to take her 
chances and cooperate with the committees on the Minister's terms. 
At the same time she decided to monitor their procedures closely 
in case she would need to appeal to the Council on Tribunals.
She duly lodged an appeal on the 7th of June the following year, 
roughly a month before the committee reports appeared. The 
Council on Tribunals had been established following pressure from 
administrative lawyers both in and outside Parliament for 
standardisation and regulation of the adjudication by standing 
tribunals which proliferated in the Government sphere after the 
second world war. The 1957 Report of The Franks Committee 
recommended the creation of a council to advise on procedural 
standards for tribunals. The Conservative Government extended 
Franks' proposals to bring statutory ad hoc committees of inquiry
^Letter From L.R. Warner to C. Wade, Mrs. Robb's
solicitor, Robb Files, op.cit.
^note of discussion between Mrs Robb and Rolph, in Robb Files 
op.cit.
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into the Council's r e m i t . A s  far as inquiries were concerned, 
the 1958 Tribunals and Inquiries Act empowered the Council to 
consider and report on matters referred to it by the Lord 
Chancellor concerning administrative procedures involving the 
conduct of an inquiry by or on behalf of a Minister of the 
Crown. ^
The Council's judgement was to be governed by principles 
of natural justice which Franks summarised as openness. fairness. 
and impartiality.
"In the field of tribunals openness appears to us to require 
the publicity of proceedings and knowledge of the essential 
reasoning underlying decisions; fairness to require the 
adoption of a clear procedure which enables parties to know 
their rights, to present their case fully and to know the 
case which they have to meet; and impartiality to require 
the freedom of tribunals from the influence, real or 
apparent. of Departments concerned with the subject-matter 
of their decision." ^0
The restriction to mandatory inquiries was intended, as Wraith and 
Lamb^l point out, to exclude private investigations in 
administrative departments, however in practice it excluded 
inquiries, such as those into Sans Everything, established by 
agents of the Minister at his request. The Council itself was 
critical of this and an amending Act of 1966^2 provided that 
Orders could be made designating discretionary inquiries to be 
brought within the Council's jurisdiction. However, the 
discretion was exercised following consultation between the
^ H a r l o w  c. and Rawlings R., Law and Administration. (London: 
Weildenfield and Nicolson, 1984) pp.166-181
^ W r a i t h ,  R.E. and Lamb, G.B., Public Inquiries as an Instrument 
of Government. (London:George Allen and Unwin, 1971) pp.220-229 
~5QReport of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and 
Inquiries. Cmnd 218 (London:HMS0, 1957) para.42 
^^■Wraith and Lamb op.cit.
S^The 1966 Tribunals and Inquiries Act, (London: HMSO, 1966)
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Department concerned and the Lord Chancellor's Office.33 It was 
following an order made under this Act that section 70 inquiries 
were designated as statutory. Given that there was no such 
process prior to the establishment of the Regional Board 
Inquiries, the Council on Tribunals had no authority to monitor 
their procedures.
Despite having no direct jurisdiction over non-statutory 
inquiries, the Council accepted the complaint from AEGIS. 
It found grounds in the Minister's decision not to make use of his 
powers to appoint directly under section 70 of the 1946 NHS Act. 
This, it argued, would have been more satisfactory for the 
complainants without prejudicing the interests of the hospital 
authorities.3^ More generally It took the view that Franks' 
three principles should apply and that it should have the 
authority to ensure that they do.33
Equally important, as the 1976 Annual Report makes clear, the 
Council has always interpreted its brief widely where it is 
satisfied that an omission or defect of a procedural or 
administrative nature may have prejudiced a complainant.3** An 
examination of the procedure of two of the Sans Everything 
committees together with a detailed analysis of the published 
reports suggests that this last condition obtained to a marked 
degree.
The Ministry seems to have issued only the most general guidelines 
on procedure. These were not made public, however, it can be 
safely assumed that they corresponded closely to those provided 
for the Ely Inquiry and published in its report.
"(a) the Inquiry was to be conducted in private, with 
evidence being given in confidence, except in cases where
53Ibid
^Council on Tribunals, Annual Report for 1968. (London:HMS0, 
1969) paras.48-52
33Harlow and Rawlings, op.cit.
^ C o u n c i l  on Tribunals, Annual Report for 1975/6. (London: HMSO, 
1976)
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witnesses wished to make serious allegations against named 
individuals, in which circumstances they had to be prepared 
to give evidence in the presence of the person accused, who 
were to have opportunities to question the evidence;
(b) the committee were to have no power to summon witnesses, 
to take evidence on oath or to make any recommendations in 
respect of the award of costs;
(c) the Chairman .... was to decide whether any persons 
should be represented ....  legally or otherwise;
(d) the Committee's investigation was to include;
(i) inspection of the accommodation and equipment in the 
part of the hospital concerned;
(ii) interviews with all members of staff (current and 
former) who worked in the relevant parts of the hospital 
during the relevant periods;
(iii) interviews with persons who were patients....
This procedure extended the guidance in HM(66)15 and gave the 
committee chairman considerable discretion with the risk that each 
committee might follow a different procedure.
AEGIS envisaged that the chairmen would adopt a strictly judicial 
approach, affording full rights of cross examination, and 
representation. It was the variation in the extent to which the 
six chairmen interpreted their roles that formed the general case 
in AEGIS' complaint to the Council. So profound were Mrs Robb's 
disagreements with the Chairman at Friern, that she became 
convinced that her case would not get a fair hearing and withdrew 
all cooperation.
^DHSS, National Health Service, Report of the Committee of 
Inquiry into Allegations of Ill-treatment of Patients and Other 
Irregularities at the Elv Hospital. Cardiff. Cmnd 3975, 
(London:HMSO, 1969) para.5
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The AEGIS complaint to the Council on Tribunals fills two large 
folders and contains an enormous amount of detailed evidence, 
prepared by Mrs Robb's lawyers, She had it read by six 
barristers. There are five general dissatisfactions beginning 
with the 'breach of confidence issue'. Secondly it was claimed 
that holding the inquiries at the hospitals concerned made a 
nonsense of Ministry claims that they took place without publicity 
given that word soon got round each hospital, within range of any 
local journalist in search of a story. Thirdly, potential nurse 
witnesses sympathetic to the AEGIS case were, it was claimed, 
deterred from testifying by the prospect of being recognised going 
into the hearings and thereby running the risk of reprisals. 
Fourthly, although the hospital authorities were legally 
represented, presumably out of the region's budgets, no public 
money was provided for those complaining who, if proved justified, 
were risking their own careers to render a valuable public 
service. Indeed, Mrs Robb met all the legal costs of presenting 
AEGIS' case at each inquiry. Lastly, the 'lay' member of four of 
the six committees was either a current or former member of a 
regional hospital board or hospital management committee and not, 
in Mrs Robb's view, independent of the service.
Mrs Robb's refusal to give evidence to the Friern Inquiry was 
interpreted by some as an indication that she did not after all 
have a case. This view was mistaken. Barbara Robb was advised 
that the inquiry did not meet AEGIS's strict interpretation of 
procedural impartiality. This fuelled her already fiercely 
burning suspicion that it was merely a whitewashing exercise to 
emasculate her politically.
Early in October, Mrs Robb was asked by the committee's secretary 
for details of the complainants.^® He re-stated that legal 
representation would be according to chairman's discretion but 
legal expenses not be met. He assumed that the information would
5®Letter H.Roberts to Barbara Robb, 9.10.67, in Robb Files. Sans 
E. Vol 7B. Vol I.
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be forthcoming by the 23rd of October and gave notice that she 
herself was scheduled to give evidence on the 30th. This gave her 
only three weeks to prepare her case, and given that she was still 
embroiled in the confidentiality dispute with the Ministry she 
telephoned the Chairman for a postponement. Mrs Robb recorded 
that although agreeing to read her correspondence with the 
Department on the dispute, he seemingly offered no hope of a 
delay. He declined to give a decision on whether she would be 
allowed representation until she had submitted all her allegations 
plus the names and addresses of witnesses.^
A principal complainant, Mrs Robb was evidently expected to make 
accusations and divulge all her confidential information without 
any guarantee that she would be allowed a lawyer. Mrs Robb 
pointed out that this contravened the Ministry's most recent 
guidance which stated clearly that in cases serious enough for 
referral to an independent inquiry, "... the complainant and any 
persons who are the subject of the complaint ... should be allowed 
to make their own arrangements to be legally represented if they 
so w i s h . According to her note of the conversation, this 
circular 'was all news' to him though he suggested that the 
passage referred to a departmental inquiry.61 He was determined 
that there was to be no delay, Mrs Robb was to give her evidence 
as scheduled, and he would make no decision on representation 
before seeing her complaint.
Prophetically, Mrs Robb presumed that, in the likelihood of her 
legal advisers opposing the release of her information before she 
was guaranteed the right to be represented, she and the inquiry 
would be at deadlock, and he seemingly a g r e e d . 62 So she put her 
concerns into writing adding her request that all her supporting
^ C o r r e s p o n d e n c e  between Barbara Robb and D.G.A.Lowe, also Mrs. 
Robb's detailed notes on telephone conversations with Mr. Lowe, in 
Robb Files, op.cit.
60Letter Barbara Robb to D.G.A.Lowe, |16.10.67 in Robb Files. 
op.cit, section iv Reference to Circular HM(66)15, para.7 (ii) b
61-Note of telephone conversation on 10.9.67, in Robb Files, 
op.cit.
62ibid
-100-
witness also be legally represented.^ The Chairman's reply was 
the same: there would be no decision on representation until he 
had seen her submission, she was to appear on the 30th, although a 
subsequent appearance might be allowed.^ She next handed the 
correspondence to her solicitors who explained to the chairman 
that there was no prospect of their completing her case by the 
date specified, particularly in the light of new problems which 
had come to light.^5
Mrs Robb had by now discovered that the 'lay' member of the Friern 
committee was the Chairman of the Oxford Regional Hospital 
Board. ^ 6 Now not only was the Oxford RHB itself holding an 
inquiry into the chapter on Cowley Road Hospital, Mrs Robb had 
information that one of its senior officers had condemned Sans 
Everything: as 'sensationalist' at a Board meeting at the time of 
the book's appearance. It seems that the Chairman was not present 
to witness this assessment, however it had gone into the minutes, 
had been reported in the local press**? Hence AEGIS argued
that this person could not be regarded as neither lay, nor 
strictly impartial. Mrs Robb did not evoke a sympathetic reaction 
from the inquiry's chairman when she brought the matter to his 
attention.
So her solicitors wrote to the Minister informing him that AEGIS 
were refusing to cooperate with the inquiry at Friern giving their 
reasons. AEGIS was however, "... anxious to cooperate with a 
newly appointed committee which has a lay member in the true
^Letter Barbara Robb to D.G.A.Lowe, 16.10.67, Robb Files. 
op.cit.
"^Letter D.G.A.Lowe to Barbara Robb 17.10.67 in Robb Files, 
op.cit.
^Letter from Mssrs. Young and Jones dated 19.10.67 to D.G.A. 
Lowe in Robb Files op.cit.
****Mrs i. Graham-Bryce
6?The Oxford Mail 17.6.67
^®Robb Files, Undated, hand-writtten note by Mrs Robb with 
content expressed by her solicitors in letter from Mssrs. Young 
and Jones and Co. to Kenneth Robinson 27.10.67, both documents in 
Robb Files, op.cit.
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sense, and on condition that confidence will be strictly observed 
at every stage, that reasonable time is allowed for the 
preparation of the case, and that permission for representation by 
Council is granted at the outset."^9 This greatly irritated the
Ministry who wrote back refusing to intervene either in the matter
of time allowed for the preparation of the case or to remove the
member objected to. The inference that 'lay' implied no
connection with the hospital service was rejected. Apparently the 
Chairman of the Oxford board had been on holiday when the 
offending remarks had been made and had remained unaware of them 
"...Until your client chose to make an issue of the matter."70 
The reply overlooked the issue of representation.
On the advice of Barbara Robb, her three co-authors also 
withdrew.
The issue of representation arose in the case of the St. 
Lawrence's inquiry together with a second problem of whether 
AEGIS' lawyer was given sufficient time to read transcripts in 
which witnesses were questioned about the book's allegations at a 
session of the inquiry to which he was not invited. The St. 
Lawrence's Inquiry was in two parts. The first part investigated 
allegations of ill-treatment against two members of staff 
sufficiently serious to warrant their suspension from duty from 
June until the committee reached its verdict in November.71 It 
came to light that witnesses were being questioned about the Sans 
Everything contributor at this first p a r t . 72 Having apparently 
raised objections, her lawyer received transcripts of the earlier 
proceedings in a stack some ten inches high. Occupied with the 
day's hearing he was unable to give them the necessary attention 
and was refused any other opportunity to read them. Moreover one
^Letter Mssrs Young and Jones, 19.10.67 to Kenneth Robinson 
op.cit.
'^Letter, V.J.M.Poole, Asst. Secretary, to Mssrs Young and Jones,
29.11.67 in Robb Files op.cit.
71see The Times. The Guardian, and The Daily Telegraph of
4.11.67
72She was seemingly telephoned by a local MP, Peter Bessel, See 
Robb Files. Vol.7B Vol.II
-102-
of the two suspended nurses turned out to be the sister who was 
the subject of the book's allegations. This was confirmed the 
following April by the Secretary of the South Western Regional 
Hospital Board.^3 The exact nature of the other complaint
against the sister [ was never made known as no extracts from the 
first part of the hearings were ever made public.
AEGIS claimed that its author was effectively denied full rights 
to cross-examine witnesses giving relevant testimony at the first 
part. To be fair to the committee, it had probably not intended
this. It had a tight schedule, and the delay caused by AEGIS'
dispute with the Ministry necessitated last-minute adjustments. 
Never-the-less, it did cast a margin of doubt over the fairness of 
the procedure since the right to cross-examination or audi alteram 
partem is one of the fundamental tenets of natural justice in 
English Law.
Unfortunately such technical concerns took no account of the 
politics involved. The book's allegations and the attendant 
publicity was gnawing away at the Ministry and raising serious 
questions about the mental hospital service and the longer the 
delay in answering the charge, the greater the harm done.
Kenneth Robinson presented the White Paper to Parliament on the 
9th of July 1968.7^ Several hours earlier, his Department had 
issued a Press release which seemed a reasonable summary.^5
It will have been gathered that AEGIS had not expected the 
document fully to support the allegations in Sans Everything. 
Hence Mrs Robb immediately set to work compiling a detailed
analysis of the reports using her own evidence and that of her 
fellow authors. Some of this material has appeared in sympathetic 
newspapers in abbreviated form, but the bulk of it has never been 
reproduced. There is no space within the confines of this study
^Letter H.White, Secretary of the South Western Regional 
Hospital Board, 29.4.68 in Robb Files op.cit.
^ Housp. of Commons Official Report Vol. 768. Col.214-5, 9.7.68
^Ministry of Health, Press Release: Cmnd 3687. Notes for lobby 
correspondents. 9.7.68
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to present Mrs.Robb's case in detail. However some brief comments 
on the White Paper are presented since the validity of the White 
Paper Reports are pertinent to an historical judgement on AEGIS 
and Barbara Robb who vehemently rejected them as adequate answers 
to Sans Everything.76
The White Paper consisted of seven reports from six committees: 
the Leeds Regional Hospital Board was responsible for two of the 
hospitals.
Each committee had the same terms of reference:
"(i) to investigate so far as available evidence permitted 
the allegations contained in the relevant sections of Sans 
Everything (emphasis added);
(ii) to examine the current situation in the wards of their 
respective hospitals; and
(iii) to make recommendations."
The Command Paper's foreword indicates an amendment to the 
composition of the committees as originally announced to the 
House.77 Perhaps in response to the dispute with AEGIS over the 
meaning of the word 'lay', the Ministry merely deleted It and 
replaced it by "not professionally qualified in medicine or 
nursing but experienced in the administration of hospitals or 
other public concerns".78 Although these were the reports of
76The most recent discussion of the period makes the following
comment about Sans Everything: "Because the pamphlet contained 
articles by a well-known consultant psychogeriatrician and an
academic, it was given a degree of respectability which later
evidence proved to be unjustified." Korman, N. and Glennester, 
H., Hospital Closure. (Milton Keynes: Oxford University Press,
1990) p.15
77House of Commons Official Report Vol. 750. Col. 441-454
(11.7.67)
7®M0H, Cmnd 3687 op.cit. p.l
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seven inquiries, the entire White Paper comprised a mere 83 
pages.
Friern Barnet hospital was the subject of four contributions to 
the book including that of Barbara Robb herself. The report is 
the longest of the seven and deals with her contribution, The 
Diarv of a Nobody. in particular detail despite the fact that it 
took no evidence from Barbara Robb. Although consistent with its 
brief to "investigate as far as available evidence permits”, it 
was unlikely to produce a balanced appraisal.^9 The report 
stated as early as paragraph three that the authors had refused to 
attend but gives no details of their reasons. It becomes 
difficult not to believe that the protracted and unresolved 
dispute coloured the committee's approach to AEGIS in reading the 
report.
In paragraph 34, Mrs Robb's account is described as "...based 
sometimes on misquotation, misrepresentation and serious 
distortion of facts, and in other instances on almost willful 
disregard of medical opinion”. Noting that the qualifications 
contained in this statement could denote that the great majority 
of the account was accurate, an interpretation not apparently 
intended, the paragraph continued with a personal attack on 
Barbara Robb.
"The Committee accept that for some obscure reason Mrs Robb 
had a genuine desire to help the anonymous patient, who is 
virtually a stranger to her, and that she is possessed of an 
almost fanatical zeal to further the interests of geriatric
^^The Minister took the view in Parliament and in correspondence 
that he could not count the accounts of Sans Everything as 
evidence without full disclosure of both the names of the 
complainants and those complained about. The Friern Committee 
for its part stated that it was "...unprepared to accept that any 
statement by Mrs Robb that has not been admitted or corroborated 
either in evidence given or in documents placed before them. The 
Committee observed, of course, the assertion in the book's preface 
that Mrs Robb's Diary was "true down to the smallest detail" but 
the claimed that the evidence the comm-f t:tee was able to obtain 
established the falsity of this unsubstantiated claim". (Emphasis 
added) MOH, Cmnd 3687 op.cit. Friern Report para.34
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patients in mental hospitals but the Committee deplore the 
flamboyant and exaggerated style in which she presents her 
case in the Diary, a case which - if it has substance -
would be more impressive if stated factually..... " (emphasis
added)
No evidence was offered for the incorrect assertions about the 
relationship between Mrs Robb and Miss Gibbs. Given that Mrs Robb 
made no appearance at the tribunal, its only grounds for 
concluding that her reasons for intervening in the Amy Gibb's case 
were obscure or that she was motivated by near fanaticism in her 
advocacy of the elderly in hospital, were presumably the 
uncontested statements of those evidently hostile to her. The use 
of such language appears to discredit Mrs Robb's allegations by 
casting doubts on her reliability. If the Committee deplored 
'exaggerated and flamboyant' literary style, it should have 
avoided it in its own report. It is also interesting to note how 
the final clause in the extract contains a parenthesis which 
suggests that the Committee were unsure whether the Diary's case 
had 'substance'. This contrasts sharply with a categorical
refutation later in the report "... that none of the allegations
of cruelty towards or ill-treatment of Miss Wills (Gibbs) in
particular of of other identified patients in general is
justified..."®^ The latter was selected for the Ministry's press 
release.
AEGIS' general case against the Friern report was 
put by Rolph when he accused the Committed; of ". • • commenting
confidently on what it had never heard ....full of blind guesses
about the information of which it had stupidly deprived 
itself".
The Committee's attempts to refute the allegations in Sans 
Everything of neglect and maltreatment at Friern, particularly its 
implied criticism of Mrs Robb and her fellow authors would not
®0MOH, Cmnd 3687 Friern Report op.cit. para.90
®lRolph, C.H. Whither the White Paper, New Statesman. 13.7.68
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and indeed did not, as we shall see - command general credence if 
published alone. They appear still more incongruous preceding, as 
they do, what amounted to one of the most complete indictments of 
the general standards of care, staffing arrangements, and other 
aspects of administration of a hospital, to have appeared in 
formal report published on behalf of a Ministry of Health.
In the course of its assault on the Diarv. the Committee had 
stated that although there were patients in Friern who were 
"merely old", they were very few in number, yet in its general 
findings®^ Friern is described as "overburdened with patients who 
ought not to be there ...".®3 The wards were seriously 
overcrowded, providing "substance in a criticism that Friern is a 
"dump for geriatrics"".®4 There was "an acute shortage of 
nurses, particularly trained nurses" on all shifts but so critical 
was the position on nights that "....several of the wards are 
virtually unstaffed save for an hourly visit by a charge nurse or 
sister".®3 This shortage was aggravated in its impact both by 
the overcrowding and by the "serious shortage of domestic staff" 
resulting in even trained nurses doing domestic work on top of all 
their other duties.®® The provision of occupational or 
diversionary therapy was inadequate.®^ Much of the patients' 
clothing was "of poor quality and appearance". ®® There was "no 
satisfactory or adequate social work department".®9 In the 
committee's view, the administration side of the hospital required 
"drastic overhaul".9® The report even admonished the Regional 
Board for discounting if not disregarding the particular needs of 
Friern.
®2m OH, Cmnd 3687 Friern Report op.cit. para.58 
®3Ibid para.105
®4Ibid para.117 
®3Ibid para.121 
®6ibid
®7lbid para.128 
®®Ibid para.113 
®9Ibid para.128 
9®Ibid para.127
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The Report of the Committee of Inquiry at Cowley Road considered 
the complaints of a nurse and a nursing assistant^! who appeared 
with representation paid for by Barbara Robb. The Report contains 
no attacks on the authors however there was once again an apparent 
dismissal of the complaints which is difficult to justify in the 
light of ensuing paragraphs. The substance of the complaints was 
low standards of care rather than ill-treatment or misconduct, 
rough handling of patients, neglect of cleanliness and hygiene, 
rudeness and other symptoms of poor nursing care. Both authors 
argued that inadequate training and supervision of nursing 
assistants and staff shortages were at the root of the problems.
Paragraph 24 of the report begins by asserting that, the
allegations,
"in so far as they are allegations of general or frequent 
unkindness, ill-treatment, cruelty and disrespect, have not 
been established; indeed .... they have been disproved."
This is to be compared with the following:
"...there have been few occasions when patients have been 
treated auxiliary nurse, and sometimes nurse or male
orderly, has spoken crossly, rudely or improperly to a 
recalcitrant or annoying patient':
"... there have been few occasions when patients have been 
treated roughly, but only on two occasions has this been
done deliberately....;
"... The occasional misconduct which has been proved was due 
to either (i) lack of adequate supervision ... (ii) lack of 
training and day-to-day instruction of auxiliary nurses...
(iii) the unsuitability of individual nurses under stress 
and strain....'^2
^ E d . R o b b  R. Sans Everything op.cit. pp.27-37 
92m0H, Cmnd 3687 Cowley Road Report, op.cit. para.24
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Thus the discrepancy between the complaints and the Committee's 
findings seemed to be a matter of degree.
One of the most significant aspects of the Cowley Road Inquiry was 
a reported dispute between the Committee's chairman and the Region 
and Ministry over the nature of the report to be published. 
According to Theo Fitzwalter Butler, who was apparently a friend 
of the Chairman, the Minister directed the committee not to set 
out the evidence alongside its findings. Butler did not think 
that this directive had been general given that the Friern Report 
had included a certain amount of evidence.^3 The Committee's 
review of the evidence was indeed omitted from the report 
producing what the chairman saw as a most unsatisfactory document 
which although rejecting the allegations, lists recommendations 
which appear to establish them.^ The omission of the evidence 
distorted the report and, of course, both conflicted with the 
principle of 'openness' and rendered impossible, judgements about 
'fairness'. Barbara Robb also argued that any committee of 
inquiry which had bowed to Ministerial pressure, had thereby 
compromised its impartiality.
The report of the Committee at St. Lawrence's Bodmin reflects a 
similar but unresolved dispute between the Committee and a 
Ministerial directive on the non-publication of evidence. This 
report is the shortest of the seven and comprises only a list of 
conclusions which do not carry the signatures of the Committee 
members. Here again there was a confrontation between the 
Committee and this time, the regional board presumably acting 
under Ministerial instruction. The Committee was unwilling to 
provide a summary in the form required and what appears in the 
White Paper was presumably written either by the Board or the 
Ministry. It was unsigned but then given qualified approval by
^Letter Barbara Robb to C.H.Rolph, 4.8.68 in Robb Files Sans 
E.Vol. 7C
^ M e m o r a n d u m  from Sir Geoffrey Howe to the Bar Council, NHS 
Commf ttees of Inouirv. March 1969
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the committee in exchange for a concession by the department that 
the full report be shown to certain named people.9^
Both Storthes Hall and St. James were administered by the Leeds 
Regional Hospital Board who accordingly established one committee 
to investigate the allegations against the two hospitals. In the 
case of St. James these were made by a nursing sister and related 
mainly to staff shortages, insufficient and inappropriate 
supplies, unreliability and poor service from ancillary 
departments and irresponsibility, carelessness and incompetence on 
the part of nurse colleagues. The comment on the allegations is 
extremely brief and comprises three brief paragraphs9® which fill 
less than half a page. The first two simply introduce the charges 
and point out that none of them relate to ill-treatment or 
cruelty. The entire article Is judged in one paragraph consisting
i
of ten lines of imprecise, qualified, ambiguity. The third of its
three sentences most warrants careful attention.
"We concluded that if the Nursing Sister who had made the 
allegations had demonstrated a little more determination and 
initiative, the Psychiatric Unit of this hospital would 
never have been pseudonymously referred to in "Sans 
Everything".97
In her account, she described numerous occasions upon which she 
determinedly complained and pressed the hospital's ancillary 
services to provide her with the equipment and supplies necessary 
to run the ward.9® The last clause of the sentence in the above 
comment is particularly enigmatic in its apparent implication that 
the state of affairs described by her contained sufficient truth
to warrant the Unit's inclusion in a book devoted to, amongst
other things, the exposure of intolerably low standards of care in 
mental and geriatric hospitals. Although the Committee had been 
unable to uphold her charges against other members of staff, they
95Ibid
9®MOH, Cmnd 3687 op. cit. para.5-7
97Ibid para 7
9®Ed. Robb, B., Sans Everything, pp.18-27
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had not even challenged the rest of her account. Hence raising 
the question whether, if the Committee felt that the hospital 
warranted inclusion due to her lack of determination and 
initiative, was it also referring to the deficiencies in 
administration which she described and the Report did not
contend?
The allegations against Storthes Hall were made by a nursing 
assistant and included grave charges that staff had cruelly 
assaulted and generally maltreated patients."  These were 
dismissed by the report in only six lines in the absence of any 
documentary or other corroborative evidence. According to the 
AEGIS lawyer at the hearing, the ward book covering the relevant 
period, which could have provided documentary evidence, was
missing: once more, there is no mention of the fact in the
report.100 The complainant had also reported that unqualified 
staff were left in charge of wards of 80 or 90 patients, thus
implying overcrowding and shortages of trained staff. The
committee did not believe him, although it did not indicate why he 
lacked credibility.
The same author wrote the section of the book on Springfields. 
The Committee here found him 'highly emotional' and 'prone to 
exaggeration' . However, it was prepared to believe some of his 
account including an incident in which an elderly patient with a 
colostomy bag had been dragged from his bed and thrown onto the 
floor.101 It also established that around six other incidents of
ill-treatment had occurred between 1962 and 1966, that "...at
least two charge nurses showed themselves prone to outbursts of 
111-temper which expressed itself in violence" and that the HMC's 
disciplinary procedures were inadequate.102
The complaints against Banstead Hospital were brought once more by 
one of the Friern complainants and concerned alleged incidents
during his training at the hospital between 1958 and 1961. These
"Robb,B. (Ed.) op. cit. pp. 43-7 
100<rhe lawyers report to Mrs Robb is in Robb Files. Sans E Vol.7C 
101MOH, Cmnd 3687 Op. cit. Springfields Report para.5.
Continued on following page
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related to physical and verbal cruelty, the improper sale of 
hospital beverages, and his general view that nurses could be 
socialised into accepting brutal methods and exploitation as 
students through fear of victimisation^®3; complaints remarkably 
similar to those subsequently upheld by the Whittingham 
Report.1®^ The Committee made extensive efforts to contact former 
members of staff as well as relevant official bodies and 
organisations.I®3 None of this evidence seems to have 
corroborated the article and the AEGIS author withdrew his 
allegations.
However, the Committee did not reject the allegations but 
restricted itself to finding the case unproved due to inability to 
investigate the truth, adding that it had no reason to doubt the 
complainants good faith.^®^ Mrs Robb's records state that her 
witness had tried unsuccessfully to persuade three former 
colleagues to support him but all three had declined for fear of 
reprisals.^®2 Interestingly, faced with this assessment, the 
Ministry was extremely selective in publishing an extract in its 
press release which excluded the unproven verdict and suggested 
that the allegations were refuted. The White Paper also omitted 
large tracts from the Chairman's original report which drew 
attention to overcrowding and staff shortages on the long-stay 
wards.^ ®®
It was in the preparation of the published reports that the 
fairness, openness and impartiality of these committees seems most 
in question. As Wraith and Lamb put it:
"The point that emerges most strongly from these inquiries 
and from a study of the reports, is not that some committees 
did their work well and others badly, but rather that in
102Ibid para.4
103Ed. Robb, B., op.cit.
l®^See below pp. 241-17
1®%0H, Cmnd 3687 op. cit. Banstead Report, para. 1-9 
106Ibid para.5(a)
^-®^Note by Barbara Robb in Robb Files. Sans E Vol. 7c
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some cases the public has ample opportunity for evaluating 
the worth of the Committee's conclusions and findings 
(although not as full an opportunity as if the evidence, or 
a summary of it, had been published) and in other cases 
virtually none at all."109
They were constrained by the Department in terms of resources, 
procedure, timetable and control over publication. In some cases, 
the committees seem to have reacted to the complainants with a 
degree of hostility. Due to the timetable, some complainants, 
including Mrs Robb, were denied adequate opportunity to arrange 
counsel. It was assumed that the complainants would themselves 
meet their own costs while the hospitals used taxpayers money. 
Some were denied adequate opportunity to cross-examine important 
witnesses. To be fair to the committees, these inquiries were 
unprecedented in the health service and followed a procedure which 
had only recently been laid down by the Ministry. Their nature 
and prescribed function were ambiguous, oscillating between legal 
hearing and administrative review. It is difficult not to
conclude that they were conducted with undue haste demanded by the 
Minister's political needs. Some of these procedural issues were 
addressed in forthcoming years. However, it is fair to assert 
that Mrs Robb's book did not get a thorough and thus fair hearing.
This was to be widely accepted as the battle for public opinion
was fought.
When the White Paper was published in July 1968, the Ely Inquiry 
was preparing its report, and its likely content known to
departmental officials.H O  Barbara Robb had whipped up a 'moral 
panic' in the press since the appearance of Sans Everything^ H . 
Mental hospital scandal had become hot news, sold papers and made 
reputations for journalists. Fleet Street correspondents were 
despatched to all parts of the country looking for them, while 
their colleagues on local papers were only too willing to oblige. 
Appendix 3 lists some of this remarkable coverage. In the midst
108South West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board, Report of a
Committee of Enquiry. Banstead Hospital, 1967
l09yraith and Lamb, op.cit. pp.209-210
HOSee Chapter 5
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of this torrent of adverse publicity, the Ministry learned of the 
death of 24 elderly patients in a fire at Sheldon Psychiatric 
Hospital, near Shrewsbury at the beginning of March. It made 
banner headlines. With the Chairman of the Ely Inquiry making 
known his dissatisfaction with the procedure he was commissioned 
to followll^, with the Council on Tribunals having accepted Mrs 
Robb's complaint, the Minister was obliged to instigate an inquiry 
direct under section 70 of the 1946 NHS Act.
The White Paper's impact was important in three ways. Firstly, it 
was presented by the Government as refutation not just of specific 
allegations but of AEGIS general case. This amplified the
shockwaves created by subsequent inquiry reports. Secondly, and 
relatedly, by mishandling the press, the Ministry infuriated
interested correspondents, set itself up for attack on the issue 
of conditions in psychiatric and mental handicap hospitals and 
motivated journalists to trawl the country for mental hospital 
scandals. Thirdly, it brought the British Medical Association, 
the Medical Protection Society and the Confederation of Health 
Service Employees to countervail pressure for reforms in 
complaints machinery by their advocacy of the status quo.
Kenneth Robinson presented the White Paper to Parliament on the
9th of July. He declared that the book's allegations had been
found to be "....totally unfounded and exaggerated" and that he 
regretted "... the anxieties which have been caused to patients and 
their relatives, to hospital staff and to the public generally by 
the publication, which I believe the whole House will deplore, of 
so many allegations which are now authoritatively discredited. "H3  
He reminded MPs that he had been "very willing and ready to 
investigate thoroughly any allegations of ill-treatment", that "in 
general, the committees did not have a great deal of co-operation 
from the authors of the book", adding that the cost of the 
inquiries had been "not inconsiderable". Most MPs who rose to 
speak shared the Minister's view. Laurence Pavitt "...a member of
113-See Chapter 12 
H^Chapter 5
H^House of Commons Official Report. Vol.768 Col.213-4
H^ibid
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|one of the regional hospital boards... concerned" beseeched the 
Minister to prevent the press running "sensational anti-National 
Health Stories"!!^ while Dr Suxmnerskill asked that the publication 
of similar books be prevented. Another backbencher sounded the 
only note of dissent by pointing out that if most of the
allegations were unfounded, then it followed that some of them 
were not and he felt this justified a re-consideration of the
proposal for some kind of inspectorate. in reply, the Minister 
suggested the matter could be considered when he published his
Green Paper on NHS structure and advised Members to read the White
Paper "in order to get the matter fully into perspective". H-7 
This was indeed sound advice, given that the Ministry had by no 
means offered a balanced view. It scored an initial success by 
dominating the early press reports, all based on the highly 
selective press release which went out several hours before the 
White Paper's publication. H ®
Barbara Robb's reaction was predictable. She told the Sun that 
the reports were a 'shocking whitewash', the Daily Express that 
many of the findings were valueless, and the Evening News that she 
had been expecting a general denial (but was pleasantly surprised 
by the extent to which the reports uncovered faults in the 
s e r v i c e ) . ^ s  the various correspondents had time to read the 
reports, and Barbara Robb had had time to brief them on the AEGIS 
position, the clumsiness of the Minister's attempts at media 
management became apparent and his Press became hostile. Rolph 
described the chain of events in Fleet Street.
"The ministerial hand-out business is getting older, and it 
is no use getting old unless at the same time you get 
artful. Last week when the Minister of Health was ready to 
issue the White Paper .... its press service first put out a 
typed 'summary' and then let several hours go by before 
anyone got sight of the White Paper itself. The newspapers
115Ibid Cols. 214-5
116ibid
117Ibid
H ® Dailv Telegraph and The Guardian 10.7.68 
l^Editions 10.7.68
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and radio men went to town on the typed summary. Everyone, 
after the interval, could see how they had been misled. I 
don't remember hearing pressmen so angry”.120
It was poor press management. Journalists felt that the Ministry
of Health at least failed to appreciate the value and power of the
press and was even contemptuous of them. Hence when confronted by 
the misleading summary, correspondence felt they were being 
deceived or 'conned'. They were resentful and angry.^21
Therefore, within forty-eight hours, their editors were devoting 
enormous column space to AEGIS' objections to the committees' 
procedure and details of its complaint to the Council on
Tribunals.^ 22 j^ rs p0bb told the Daily Telegraph that she intended
to publish a sequel to Sans Everything to "expose the reluctance 
of some hospital authorities to act after they have been given 
evidence of irregularities involving patients in geriatric 
hospitals". 123 *j>he Sunday newspapers launched a corporate attack 
on the Minister, spearhead by Hugo Young who accused him of giving 
a 'totally misleading impression' of the reports whose 
recommendations implied fundamental criticism of the hospitals 
investigated. The Minister ".... has allowed his responsibility 
for the Health Service totally to engulf his duty to the 
public".124 The News of the World disputed the claimed 
independence of the inquiries and accused them of grilling the 
AEGIS authors as if they were on criminal charges. 1^5 The 
Observer reported widespread criticism of the Minister including 
Mary Applebey for the NAMH who felt that he should have been 'very 
disquieted'. The Sunday Telegraph felt the public feared that the 
reports and particularly their presentation by the Ministry were 
part of a 'whitewashing operation'.1^6 ^11 the Sundays listed
l^Rolph, c . H .  Whiter than White Paper, New Statesman. 1 9 . 7 . 6 8  
l^linterview with Hugo Young 
122g<jitions of 1 1 . 7 . 6 9  
l ^ Dailv Telegraph of 1 1 . 7 . 6 8
124The Sunday Times 1 4 . 1 1 . 6 8  
125See Editorial 1 4 . 7 . 6 8  
l^Editions of 1 4 . 7 . 6 8
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AEGIS' disatisfactions with the inquiries and called for an 
inspectorate or a health service commissioner or both.
In the New Statesman. Rolph attacked both the White Paper and its 
presentation and defended the integrity of those responsible for 
the book. ^-27 jn an unsigned editorial by Prof Townsend, New
Society described the Minister as 'shockingly complacent'.128 The 
British Hospital and Social Science Review published a detailed 
analysis of the reports by Brian Watkin. He was especially
critical of the Friern Report for conveying "a sense of bias that 
is out of place in a report that was from the first expected in
some quarters to be a piece of "whitewashing". He viewed the
recommendations in the reports as suspect and supported Prof. 
Abel-Smith's call for reforms in complaints machinery.^29
Opinion amongst the various interest groups was divided. The 
Nursing Mirror supported AEGIS and attacked the Department.^30 
Although the Nursing Times produced the Minister's press release 
virtually verbatim, the RCN were unhappy with the Minister's 
statement to the House.^31 For the NAMH, Mary Applebey was 
shocked at the Minister's attitude, and the President, Lord 
Balniel joined the lobby for an inspectorate. ^ 32 Patients
Association, made a direct appeal to the Prime Minister to 
establish an independent investigation into hospital conditions 
for the elderly given the unsatisfactory nature of the Sans
127New Statesman 2 . 8 . 6 8
l ^ New Society Vol. 1 2  No.3 0 3 ,  1 8 . 7 . 6 8 ,  p.7 5
129yatkin, b., Sans Everything - the White Paper, British Hospital 
and Social Services Review. Vol. 8 8 ,  No. 4 0 8 3 ,  1 9 . 7 . 6 8  pp.1 3 3 8  
13C ? N u r s i n g  Mirror Vol. 1 2 7 .  No. 2 ,  p.1 0 ,  1 2 . 7 . 6 8  and Vol. 1 2 7 ,
No.3 ,  1 9 . 7 . 6 8 ,  pp.1 2 - 1 3
13lNursing Times Vol. 6 4 ,  No. 2 8 ,  1 2 . 7 . 6 8 ,  p. 9 1 8  and p. 9 4 3 ,  and 
report in Nursing Mirror. Vo. 1 2 7 ,  No. 2 2 ,  2 9 . 1 1 . 6 8  p .1 1 , of the 
an address by the Secretary of RCN's Psychiatric Division to the 
Student Nurses Association, Mrs Harrisson: Keith Newstead, who had 
attended AEGIS early meeting with the RCN, was on the Platform. 
(See Chapter 3 )
^32naMH Mental Health. Autumn 1 9 6 8 ,  and Annual Report 1 9 6 7 / 6 8  
"Aims and Achievements" (London: NAMH, 1 9 6 8 )  , which stated that 
"...we cannot accept the Minister's interpretation of the 
reports."
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Everything inquiries and the Minister's 'complacent attitude' to 
their reports.133
The Lancet supported AEGIS and called for a health service 
c o m m i s s i o n e r .134 The publicity and particularly, the demands for
a health service commissioner galvanized the BMA, as the British 
Medical Journal declared two weeks after the publication that "the 
hospitals concerned and their staff have been cleared of 
imputations that should never have been m a d e .  "135 Most
enthusiastic in welcoming the White Paper, the Confederation of
Health Service Employees, who had represented some nurses at the 
inquiries, proclaimed that the book had greatly damaged morale and 
recruitment and asked Barbara Robb to now withdraw her 
allegations.136
When the criticism of the Minister reverberated in Parliament, he 
appeared to have shifted his position a little. He told Maurice 
Macmillan on the 16th of July that the report had made many 
criticisms on such matters as over-crowding, staff shortages and 
antiquated capital stock; matters which were being dealt with 
within 'available resources'. When pressed to establish an 
inspectorate publishing reports, Kenneth Robinson expressed doubt 
that the proposal would provide 'absolute protection' but repeated 
his intention to introduce the matter as part of the discussions
to surround his imminent Green P a p e r .  137 gut it was not all
uphill for the Minister at this stage. The day of this debate the 
BBC staged a programme on the White Paper which was watched by 
Richard Crossman then preparing the new Department of Health and 
Social Security which was shortly to be announced. He records it 
as follows:
"Now I was very anxious to have this programme staged. One 
reason being that I was disgusted by the programme the BBC
133paiiv Telegraph and The Times 3.8.68, Patients Association, 
Bulletin October 1968
13^Lancet(ii) No. 7561, 27.2.68, pp.202-3
135grjtish Medical Journal 1968 Vol. 3, No. 5611, 20.7.68, p. 135 
136R.eported in British Hospital and Social Services Review. Vol. 
88, No. 4083, 19th July 1968, pp.1334
13/House of Commons Official Report. Vol 768 col.1245 16.7.68
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had put on for the 20th anniversary of the Health Service, 
something for nothing. And everybody had panned it as a 
very bad programme and 1 knew there was a chance now that 
Kenneth Robinson would be forced to write to Charles Hill, 
who after all is a doctor and we should get some amends. 
And sure enough we did. On this evening clearly the BBC 
directors were under control from the top to give fair play 
to Kenneth Robinson and fair play to the hospital system. 
And the whole programme was strongly biased in favour of 
the hospitals and very much cut the critics down to tape and 
also gave very small prominence to Mrs Robb and much more
prominence to the Minister It was a splendid programme
from Kenneth's point of view."!®®
The Green Paper appeared on the 23rd of July and its major 
concern was NHS management structure. However, it showed that 
AEGIS had succeeded in shifting the Department's position on 
complaints machinery. The Green Paper outlined a new office of 
Health Service Commissioner. It envisaged that many types of 
complaints would be open to investigation. However, complaints 
involving allegations of negligence which could be pursued by the 
courts, or clinical matters would be excluded.1^9 Even at this 
early stage, some of the major bones of contention were being 
uncovered,
The structural reforms in this document were very quickly confined 
to the shelves of the Ministry of Health when it merged with the 
Ministry of Social Security in October to form the Department of 
Health and Social Security (DHSS). The new Secretary of State for 
Social Services, Richard Crossman had taken a dim view of 
Robinson's insistence on going into print with his proposals just 
before the change. However, the health commissioner idea lived 
on.
138university of Warwick Modern Records Centre, Crossman Diaries 
151/68/SW to 152/68/SW
l^Ministry Qf Health, The Administrative Structure of the Medical 
and Related Services in England and Wales (London:HMS0, 1968)
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CHAPTER FIVE
ELY AND FRIENDS
"Sans Everything will only be a precursor to the explosions 
and implosions that will rock the conscience of the 
community, unless the community becomes alive to the danger 
and takes crash-action to re-think and plan ahead." (jMonica 
Stewart)^
"There is no political capital to be made out of the needs 
of the mentally handicapped, and the goodwill and sincerity 
of those who try to bring about reform is unquestionable." 
(Kathleen Jones)2
I
Crossman was the most senior politician to head up the NHS since 
Aneurin Bevan. As a Cabinet minister he could form allegiances 
with senior colleagues gaining their support for his proposals in 
exchange for his. Moreover, until he was involved in a major row 
over prescription charges, Crossman's standing in the 
Parliamentary Party was such that he was seen by a significant 
number of MPs as the natural successor to Harold Wilson. He was 
also strong willed and personally very forceful. Whereas Robinson 
would negotiate and mediate, Crossman often chose head-on 
confrontation even bullying. He was an adept political operator 
and not averse to manipulating people to serve the desired end; 
earning himself the title 'Tricky Dicky' or as Barbara Robb called 
him 'Double-Crossman'.
His style of working was coloured by his extra-political, 
professional experience as both an academic and a journalist. 
Like other ministers in the Wilson Government he involved 
academics in policy formulation; part of a general suspicion that
^•Stewart, M. Mv Brothers Keener. (London: Tavistock, 1 9 6 8 )  
p.9
^Jones K. et al. Opening the Door. (London:Routledge,1 9 7 5 )  p.1 5
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the Civil Service was conservative and lacking in expert 
knowledge. Crossman enjoyed bringing academics in to work with 
his officials in seminars to examine problems and generate policy 
options. Of enormous importance to AEGIS he appointed Brian Abel- 
Smith as Senior Adviser.
Crossman had also been a journalist and served in the wartime 
Ministry of Propaganda. He had a keen sense of the importance of 
public image and ensuring that his version of events should be 
prominent in the press. He was highly critical of his 
department's existing press management arrangements and determined 
to modernise and overhaul them.
Crossman's main concerns as Secretary of State were the 
introduction of a new plan for pensions intended as a major vote- 
winner, and the reorganisation of the health service. Unlike 
Robinson, he had no special expertise or experience in mental 
health so it was in some ways ironic that at the end of his period
of office, he viewed his mental handicap policy as his major
success.  ^ Throughout his office he toured psychiatric and 
mental subnormality hospitals and his Diaries contain detailed 
accounts of these visits and his reactions to the patients and the 
conditions. He shared the view that the improvement in conditions 
since the war was revolutionary. His attitudes to mental disorder 
and old age were otherwise ill-informed and paradoxical. He was 
disgusted by the degenerations of old age, and despaired at the 
severely mentally subnormal whom he thought beyond hope, but they 
generated great compassion within him. Consequently, he admired 
those who cared for them. Mental illness, or 'mental disease* 
as he often termed it, interested him little and he was content to 
allow his doctors full scope to deal with it. Reading Crossman's 
accounts of his visits one senses a patrician's physical 
repugnance and discomfort rather like that of George Orwell
leading the working class lifestyle among miners in the Lancashire
coalfield in the 1930s.^
•HjWMRC Crossman Diaries CD 250 1970
^ On the elderly: "really old age is ghastly, and old age when
Continued on following page
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David Ennals was originally appointed Minister of State for Health 
but was moved to Social Security when the holder of that office, 
Stephen Swingler died suddenly of a heart attack in February 1969. 
At the PM's suggestion, Baroness Serota came in as Minister of 
State for Health. Baroness Serota was a former neighbour of 
Barbara Robb in Hampstead, and although the two women were only 
vaguely acquainted, Mrs Robb felt she had a second direct access 
to the centre of power. Brian Abel-Smith had already been at the 
Elephant and Castle for some months. These contacts were to prove 
crucial in getting her views across to government.
Hence the climate at Alexander Fleming House changed markedly for 
AEGIS. Having been resisted and obstructed for three years, Mrs 
Robb was to be involved both formally through the official 
consultation process and informally through her contacts. 
Moreover, Crossman's view of the value of exposing deficiencies in
Continued from previous page
you are incapacitated is singularly unpleasant, And reminded me 
of my mother , sitting there in Shepherd's Bush in that dark room, 
Heavens its disgusting. 1 could still almost smell the stale 
smell again, and think how odious it is...." UWMRC Crossman 
Diaries 152/68/SW and
On the profoundly mentally handicapped: "Obviously my main
feelings were "couldn't we find some way of destroying them"
because these were the rock bottom cases these were the people who 
are kept alive year after year and you know that they will get no
better. And there were 50 fully trained nurses looking after
these corpses. They really are more on the level of animals than 
human beings". UWMRC Crossman Diaries JH/68/40-41 see also 
JH/68/40-41, and 249/69 JH
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the services and of persistent, effective campaigners like Mrs 
Robb was very different from his predecessor's.
Crossman came into the job well aware of AEGIS. When making his 
plans in July, he had invited Brian Abel-Smith and Richard Titmuss 
out to dinner with the chairman of the Supplementary Assistance 
Board to discuss reforms to the national pensions scheme. After, 
eating they watched the BBC programme on the Sans Everything White 
Paper.
"there was trouble last year with a book called Sans 
Everything. published by a certain Mrs Robb with a number 
of contributors to it, attacking cruelty in our geriatric 
hospitals. This was indignantly repudiated by Kenneth 
Robinson who immediately told the six regional hospital 
boards concerned to set up an inquiry under an independent 
QC .... and he published the week before last the report of 
the six QCs... together with a brief forward by him. He 
told me the thing would be completely uncontroversial 
because it would simply demolish Mrs Robb. Well he himself 
made a very short statement, very complacent, saying that 
everything was justified, a saying briefly that the six 
reports denied all allegations. This was obviously untrue. 
In fact the reports didn't by any means deny all the 
allegations and if he had had the common sense to say they 
deny all the...gravest and most serious allegations, well 
there are of course a number of criticisms and welcomed 
them and said that of course they were not fully met and he 
was going to meet them, that was right. But he didn't. He 
gave a sense of complacency and complete defending which he 
does as a bureaucratic Minister. So there was a great 
comeback for Mrs Robb in the Sunday press ...."•>
The first ramification for AEGIS of the new political team was Mrs 
Robb's decision to withdraw her campaign on the Sans Everything 
White Paper. It had been her intention to use her dossier as part
^UWMRC Crossman Diaries. 151/68/SW
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of a general campaign to reform the complaints procedure and 
oblige the Ministry to withdraw the offending document. She did 
not release her evidence to the press until the spring of 1970 and 
explained at that time:
"The fact is that shortly after the publication of the 
iniquitous White Paper on the Sans Everything inquiries, 
when Mr Crossman was preparing to take over the health 
service, 1 was asked by on£of his associates to "preserve a 
dignified silence" about the white paper's defects - in the 
interests of the Department's aims to implement vital 
reforms. It seemed a great deal to be asked but the cause 
appeared a good one and I was assured that "friends" would 
look after AEGIS' interests. So it was decided that AEGIS 
should not demand an inquiry into the White Paper until a 
later stage.” ^
The exact nature of this arrangement is not specified in Mrs 
Robb's files but she must have had strong assurances from people 
she trusted. The only likely intermediary whom she would have 
trusted and who was in a position of sufficient influence to give 
such an assurance would appear to have been Prof. Abel-Smith.
Although AEGIS refrained from publicising its disatisfaction with 
the inquiries, it pursued the complaint through the Council on 
Tribunals - submitted in June 1968. Mrs Robb heard from the
Council's Secretary in late July and, as she expected, it was
unable to entertain her complaints about the specific constitution 
or conduct of the inquiries. Nevertheless the Council had noted 
her suggestion that the Minister should have appointed the 
committees directly and thus brought them within the Council's
jurisdiction. Although unable to comment on this suggestion, it
had agreed to take up the general question of hospital complaints 
with the Ministry. The following January, Mrs Robb learned that 
the Council had indeed consulted the Secretary of State and 
expressed the view that statutory inquiries should be the usual
6Robb Files Sans E. Vol.11
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procedure for 'certain types of complaint'. The Council also 
expressed the hope that the health commissioner proposals would be
implemented.^
In its Annual Report for 1968, the Council drew special attention 
its disatisfactions with the Sans Everything inquiries:
"The division of responsibility between the Minister and the 
Regional Hospital Boards clearly made it difficult in some 
cases for him to decide whether or not to hold a statutory 
inquiry under section 70. But the nature of some of the 
complaints which had been made to us about the Sans
Everything inquiries made it, in our view, unfortunate that
we had not the right to consider them. Ve therefore told 
the Secretary of State for Social Services.... that for this 
reason we felt that a procedure which fell within our
jurisdiction would have been more satisfactory , both in the 
interests of the complainants and of the hospital
service''. ®
Soon afterwards David Ennals, when still health minister, 
announced that the idea of a health commissioner raised in the 
Green Paper had been 'well received'.^ The following week, the 
Nursing Mirror observed that the Minister's remarks were being 
interpreted by MPs as an indication that whatever the reaction to 
the main body of the Green Paper, "... . the Ombudsman plan has
received general approval and is likely to be the subject of early 
government action".^
7Correspondence with the Secretary of the Council on Tribunals
13.1.69 to Mrs Robb, 17.1.69 to Mrs Robb, Robb Files Sans E. 
Vol. 9
^Council on Tribunals Annual Report for 1968 (LondonrHMSO, 1969) 
para.52
9Speech by David Ennals to Reigate Labour Party reported in The 
Times 25.1.69
^ Nursing Mirror Vol. 128 No. 5, 31.1.69, p.8, see also Vol. 128 
No.4, of 24.1.69, p.7.
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The Elv Report
Soon after the arrival of Baroness Serota at the DHSS something of 
a crisis arose within the Department which brought the mentally 
disordered and particularly the specific concerns of AEGIS to the 
very top of the Secretary of State's agenda. Indeed, although not 
directly involved, AEGIS had been instrumental in the events which 
gave rise to the crisis.
The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Elv Hospital^-, 
arrived in the Department following protracted negotiations 
between the committee's Chairman, Sir Geoffrey Howe and the Welsh 
Regional Hospital Board. Established by Robinson in September 
1967, the committee's report was not formally submitted until a 
year later. According to Crossman, the Department were aware of 
it in September 1968. It appears not to have been passed to the 
political head until March 1969 when Crossman was told he would 
have to publish the report before the Welsh Office assumed 
responsibility for the NHS in Wales, to be effective from April 
1st. Crossman reported that he was first told that something 
controversial was in the pipeline as early as October 1968. The 
Diaries say that he had been so advised by Prof Abel-Smith, a 
friend and Cambridge contemporary of the inquiry committee's 
chairman.^ The delay was due to the inability of the committee 
and the regional board to agree a publication draft before 
December 1968. The Department's role in these negotiations is 
difficult to ascertain; for its part the committee dealt directly 
with the regional board. However Crossman's Diaries state clearly
Continued from previous page
H dHSS, National Health Service, Report of the Committee of 
Inquiry into Allegations of Ill-treatment of Patients and Other 
Irregularities at Elv Hospital. Cardiff. Cmnd 3975 (London: HMSO, 
1969)
l^Crossman R.H., Diaries of a Cabinet Minister Vol.II. 
(London:Jonathan Cape, 1975) p.408
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that the Department was involved, presumably advising the regional 
board in its deliberations.^  a n y  case, given the
Ministerial interest in the Sans Everything Reports and the 
adverse publicity it faced, it is inconceivable that Ministry 
officials did not take a direct interest.
The Ely committee was established by the Welsh Regional Hospital 
Board acting as the Minister's agents in September 1967. This 
followed the appearance of an article in the News of the World of 
August 20th of reports by two nurses alleging neglect and ill- 
treatment of patients in their hospitals. These and three others 
had been selected by the paper from postal responses to the 
invitation it had published as part of David Roxan's review of 
Sans Everything. The paper had interviewed respondents to check 
the validity of their complaints. Five reports were then 
forwarded to the Minister of Health who judged one, from a nursing 
assistant at Ely Hospital, near Cardiff, sufficiently serious to 
warrant formal investigation.
The complainant had not read Mrs Robb's book, but he had, of 
course, responded to an appeal by the paper precipitated by the 
book. He was encouraged to do so by the favourable publicity 
which her book attracted in the national and the nursing press.^ 
As the report was to affirm, to complain as this individual did 
was a courageous act. The publicity was evidence there were 
others in the service working in similar conditions, facing 
similar difficulties in effecting positive change. The consequent 
moral support was a major factor in 'XY's' decision to put his 
complaints into w r i t i n g . ^
l^crossman R.H. op.cit.
^Interview with Sir Geoffrey Howe
l^The News of the World was also well known as the champion of 
the 'little man' against bureaucracy through the John Hilton 
Bureau which it staffed and financed as legal and welfare rights 
agency.
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The Ely allegations arrived in the Department at the height of the 
controversy over the AEGIS book and the media discussion of the 
issue of independence of inquiries in the health service led by 
The News of the World^*. the original source of the complaint. 
As in the case of the book, the Minister asked the regional board 
to set up the inquiry to be chaired by a barrister with relevant 
expertise from a brief short list prepared by the Lord 
Chancellor's office. Robinson was concerned to avoid any 
suggestion of partiality by the inquiry, and therefore personally 
supervised the final choice of Chairman.^ Geoffrey Howe was a 
distinguished barrister with special expertise in medical 
litigation working with the Medical Defence Union, and, as he 
practised on the 'Welsh Circuit', was professionally known to the 
regional board involved. He was also no stranger to the field of 
mental disorder having written on the subject for the Bow Group 
Study Group. His wife also served on the management committee of 
a large mental handicap hospital in Surrey, having been appointed 
to that position upon recommendation by Prof. Abel-Smith, a member 
of the South-West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board at the 
time. Howe was thus ably qualified.
He had also been emerging as an important figure in the 
Parliamentary Conservative Party, until he lost his seat in the 
1966 Labour landslide. He had served as Opposition spokesman on 
Health and Social Security during the Government's first term. 
From the Minister's point of view, therefore, this appointment 
could not be seen by the public as anything other than independent 
of the Government.
The membership of the committee of inquiry was similar to that of 
the Sans Everything committees. The 'lay' member was on the 
Birmingham Regional Hospital Board, the nursing member was a 
retired nursing officer with the South-Western Regional Hospital 
Board, and the psychiatrist was D. Russell Davis a 'radical' 
Professor of Mental Health at Bristol University and an active
16Editorial 14.7.68 
^Interview with Kenneth Robinson
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campaigner through the NAMH. The quality of the report's analysis 
of conditions, patient care and working relationships at Ely was a 
tribute to the three of them; however the chairman's influence was 
to be crucial both in adopting a rigorous approach to 
investigation and securing full publication of the report.
Howe placed the inquiry firmly on a judicial footing. Without 
specifically mentioning the Franks Report, the Ely committee 
considered the administration of natural justice where personal 
and professional reputations were at stake to be paramount. 
The three principles of openness. fairness and impartiality were 
strictly upheld except where limitations of resources made this 
impossible. In such cases, the committee was at pains to
highlight the limitations on the findings or avoided a judgement 
at all. 19 Not only did it interpret its brief widely, it 
reported on its dissatisfaction with the ordained procedure and 
the resources provided by the Department.2®
The committee was also sensitive to the criticisms currently 
levelled against the Sans Everything Inquiries2 .^ The Ely 
committee asked the regional board if it could announce the
inquiry to the public, and although this was initially refused by 
the Department, direct application to the Minister resulted in his 
authorisation of the necessary announcement.22 This public 
announcement was supplemented by personal invitations to over 
sixty current and former staff and over 250 relatives and friends 
of patients. The Ministry's guidance as to general procedure, 
left the granting of legal representation to the Chairman's 
discretion and Howe exercised it widely. All witnesses who
answered charges or allegations were represented. The committee
disapproved of its inability to compel witnesses to attend and
l^MOH, Cmnd 3975 op. cit. para.8 
19Ibid para.9 
20Ibid paras.6 and 9
2 -^Sir Geoffrey Howe's Memorandum to the Bar Council, National 
Health Service Committees of Inquiry. 1968 
22ibid
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documented examples when unwillingness of corroborating witnesses 
to attend rendered it unable to pursue an allegation. In contrast 
to some of the Sans Everything inquiries, the Ely committee did 
not dismiss allegations which could not be corroborated in this 
way, but merely stated its inability to reach a judgement.
The committee's major disatisfaction was the Ministry's refusal to 
provide a solicitor to sift and prepare the evidence. After the 
inquiry Howe expanded on the summary of the problems this refusal 
generated published in the report.^3 The committee had no 
advance knowledge of testimony. Evidence was given in a random 
order, necessitating the recall of witnesses which was not always 
possible. It proved impossible to warn all those facing 
allegations of their nature. Allegations were examined on 
occasions when the inquiry had no prior knowledge, or it was 
considered unsafe to adjourn as their was no certainty that the 
witness would return for cross-examination. Those bringing 
allegations and those facing them could not always be organised to 
appear together before the committee. Howe was particularly 
unhappy that in his dual role of 'prosecutor and judge', he often 
had to cross-examine witnesses on the basis of premises which 
later proved to be false.
There were other more general criticisms voiced after the inquiry 
but first it is important to look at the report's findings on 
standard's of care. It will be recalled that how some 
Parliamentarians had greeted the Sans Everything allegations with 
disbelief, and that the Minister had refuted AEGIS' case that the 
existing complaints machinery was inadequate. In the light of 
this, and her treatment at the hands of the Ministry - including 
obstruction and repeated denials of her case - Barbara Robb must 
have read the Ely report with great satisfaction and, after the 
attacks upon her in the Friern Report, with a sense of complete 
personal vindication. For here was a formal report from within 
the National Health Service publicly acknowledging so many of her 
contentions.
2^sir Geoffrey Howe's Memorandum op.cit.
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Ely hospital was grossly overcrowded and understaffed. Nursing 
care was often crude, backward and instances of cruelty and 
neglect went far beyond anything alleged in Sans Everything. The 
Hospital Management Committee (HMC) was out of touch, its members 
ill-qualified and ill-informed. Staff were inhibited from 
complainant by realistic fear of victimisation. Lastly, the 
report advocated an independent inspectorate and replacement of 
existing complaints machinery.
Ely Hospital was a designated psychiatric hospital which had come 
to serve as a repository for chronic, incurable cases, living 
bleak lives, crammed into wards of up to 70. 2^ It was
significantly understaffed mostly on the male s i d e . 25 This was
aggravated by acute shortage of domestics so that much of the
cleaning was done by nursing staff aided by 'higher-grade' 
patients. The guidelines issued by Kenneth Robinson in 1965 on 
personal clothing were judged to be beyond the bounds of
possibility by the Ely s t a f f . 26 The laundry service was chaotic 
and foul linen was sluiced on the wards, in one case in the room 
used for sterilising implements. Once again, Ministerial guidance 
was not put into e f f e c t . 2 7
In assessing the character and credibility of the principal 
complainant 'XY' there is a much more dispassionate approach than 
in some of the Sans Everything reports. He was described as a 
'natural outsider' without enthusiasm for hard work and resentful 
of being given low-status work-tasks. Yet the committee believed 
him to be motivated by a genuine concern for patients and the 
public interest whilst understanding the problems facing those 
staff he complained of. The committee was also highly sensitive 
to the process of victimisation,28 and throughout, was disposed
2^M0H, Cmnd 3975 op. cit. paras. 16-17 and 88 
25jbid paras.18-20
26ibid paras. 316-7 Reference to MOH Circular HM(65)104 
27ibid para.324-33 
28jbid paras.24-27
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to give credence to XY's evidence "except where it was
substantially refuted by other e v i d e n c e " . A g a i n  this is 
markedly different from the Sans Everything inquiries where the
prevailing attitude to most of the complainants seems to have
unsympathetic.
When the Ely Report was published, it was single incidents of ill- 
treatment which made banner headlines. Some of these were indeed 
horrifying and profoundly disquieting even to those members of the 
Lords who, three year's earlier, had greeted Lord Strabolgi's 
remarks in the Community Care with outraged disbelief. For
example, one-seven year old boy, removed from the hospital by his 
parents, was discharged in clothes which were wet and covered in 
excrement. His genitals and thighs 'raw and caked with
faeces.' He had been kept on a ward for severely subnormal older 
men which was overcrowded, stinking and dotted about with patients 
in various states of undress. A second boy was discharged at his 
parents' insistence from a ward described by his mother thus:
"Most of the children .... did not have a thing and (my son) 
never seemed to be without bruises and sores and cuts, which 
I was terribly upset about because of the filth that went 
with it."32
Whilst on the ward, the boy was sedated with the major 
tranquilliser chlorpromozine at six times the dosage he had been 
on at home.
In another case, an elderly man, visiting relatives had asked the 
duty-nurse to furnish his dentures to enable him to eat fruit they 
had brought, only for to her to emerge with a bowl of various 
unmarked sets, some of which belonged to dead patients, and 
proceed to fit them by trial and error into the old man's mouth.
29ibid para.28 
^See Chapter 4
31-MOH, Cmnd 3975 op. cit. paras. 147-9
32ibid para.153
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Elsewhere, a complaint by the mother of a middle-aged subnormal 
patient that the hospital provided him with nothing to do was 
judged by the committee to be "symptomatic of the inactive 
monotony of the atmosphere which seemed to to us to characterize 
Ely".33 Failure to provide patients with recreation or 
occupation is a recurrent theme in the critique of standards of 
care.
A crude authoritarian approach survived characterised by verbal 
abuse and rough handling. Furthermore, because of an inter­
professional hierarchy inherited from the 'Poor Law Tradition', 
and the old asylum system of supreme authority vested in the 
senior doctor, there was no multi-professional management and the 
senior nursing staff were not accorded their proper authority or 
appropriate status. Combined with lack of attention to induction 
and in-service training and the amount of cleaning work undertaken 
by nurses, the nursing role was relegated and devalued. The 
outcome was poor standards of nursing care.34
Apart from specific criticisms levelled at clinical decisions, the 
committee judged the medical staff to be concerned almost 
exclusively with the patients physical health and ".... betrayed a 
low order of expertise..." as far as behaviour and training 
requirements were concerned.33 Once more professional isolation 
was the root cause of narrow attitudes to treatment. The 
Physician Superintendent failed to perform his administrative 
duties in particular neglecting to inform the HMC of the 
conditions in his hospital.
It was in its indictment of channels of communication between the 
centre and the hospital service that the Report was most 
embarrassing to the Ministry since it consistently conflicted with 
the Minister's position over AEGIS' critique. For example, 
Robinson's circular, HM(65)104 arrived on the senior doctor's
33Ibid paras.49-57
34Ibid pp.266-71
33Ibid para.386
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desk, but he took no steps to ensure that the HMC saw it, 
leaving the HMC in ignorance of the Minister's policy.38
The committee's placed primary responsibility for the overall 
standards and facilities at Ely squarely on the shoulders
of the Hospital Management Committee.3?
Officers and members each looked to the other for initiatives so 
nothing happened. The HMC was often left in ignorance of 
ministerial guidance often .Specific instances of this included 
the failure of the Medical Staff Advisory Committee to inform the 
HMC of the contents of HM(65)104, and HM(64)45 its predecessor. 
HMCs were required to abide by each of these circulars. Neither 
of the senior nurses, male and female sides, submitted reports to 
the HMC.3® HMC visits were totally inadequate as sources of 
reliable information and major deficiencies such as patient 
inactivity went unnoticed. Importantly, just as Barbara Robb 
contended elsewhere, the visits were crowded out by senior 
staff.
Another acute embarrassment for the Ministry was the committee's 
findings on the victimisation of individual nurses at Ely which 
confirmed the Nursing Mirror's own survey. Two qualified nurses 
made well-intentioned complaints and were driven out of the 
hospital service as a consequence. It is a measure of the 
perpetrators lack of concern for subtlety that in one case this 
happened whilst the inquiry sat. Also, after the publication of 
Mrs Robb's book, the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Health 
had written direct to Group Secretaries to ensure that there were 
no such goings on in their hospitals. The senior medical and 
nursing staff at Ely met to discuss the subject late in October 
and decided that there were no grounds for disquiet on the grounds 
of 'undiscovered inhumanity' at Ely. In this context Nurse 'B'
3®Ibid para.389 
®^Cmnd 3975 paras.400-43
38Ibid paras.425-7
3^Ibid paras.433-438
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who was known to be a corroborating witness of 'XY' was 
dismissed.
More generally the report argued:
"There must be all-round confidence that complaints which 
arise from within "the system" will be fairly handled. 
... In the absence of this confidence the complainant may 
feel obliged - as XY did - to resort to the Press, whose 
important role as a "long stop"...cannot be d e n i e d . " ^ 0
Thus, by inference, it not only substantiated the claims by AEGIS 
that existing complaints procedures were ineffective, it also 
contradicted the Minister's view that it was unnecessary and 
irresponsible to use the press to air grievances.
This was the committee's justification for proceeding beyond its 
brief which restricted findings to the hospital. In making 
recommendations for national policy reform, the Ely committee, 
again by inference, recognised the validity of the case previously 
promoted only by AEGIS (and to some extent the Patients' 
Association). The problems at Ely arose primarily because the 
staff and management committee were unaware of how far Ely had 
lagged behind accepted standards. In this context, the report 
observed:
"It is plain that the Minister, with overall responsibility 
for the standards of service provided at Ely, as at other 
hospitals, cannot be satisfied with the persistence of such 
a gap between the standards allowed and those suggested and 
amplified in many circulars and instructions. It is equally 
plain that the gap is not bridged by the distribution of 
such circulars. Complaints from the patients or staff have 
not been effective to draw attention to deficiencies. And 
the hospitals "customers" are, of course, seldom free to 
provide an unconscious, but automatic, value judgement by
40Ibid para.470 (d)
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transferring their needs to another purveyor of hospital 
services. Standards of performance thus clearly need to be 
checked from time to time by somebody who is not responsible 
for day to day management of a hospital like Ely".^
It therefore concluded that there was a clear need for some system 
of inspection within the service to ensure that the responsible 
management was made aware of what needed to be done to bring 
standards up to ministerial targets. (The proposal advocated by 
Abel-Smith in Sans Everything.  ^ The Ely committee proposed three 
options: the regional board, a body acting on behalf of the
Minister or an independent inspectorate. It further suggested 
that the inspectorate could perform the investigatory function of 
the inquiry and also supported the hospital commissioner 
proposal.
This summary is of course drawn from the published report. It was
published in full under the directive of Richard Crossman, who did
not see it until the 10th of March 1969. Crossman had only two 
days to decide which of three available drafts to publish as his 
Department was scheduled to hand responsibility for health 
services in Wales to the Welsh Office on the 31st. The Regional 
Board had originally instructed the Ely committee to prepare a 
'summary of findings and recommendations' alongside their report. 
However they had unanimously agreedjthatjto recommend publication 
of their full 83,000 word document on the grounds that a 'summary' 
would not explain their reasoning and run the risk of unfair 
treatment of individuals. Howe began liaising with the RHB
Chairman who it appears agreed to consider a slightly shortened 
version. The committee then took out 7000 words and submitted 
again only to have this rejected by the RHB Chairman on the 
grounds that it did not comply with his instruetions.
The members of the committee of inquiry then met with the Regional 
Board in December to try and resolve the disagreement, Howe taking
41Ibid para.461
4^sir Geoffrey Howe's Memorandum op.cit.
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along an amended 'summary' of conclusions and recommendations 
which, at 20,000 words was roughly twice the length of the 
published 'Friern Report'. This seems to have been a difficult 
meeting. Howe had included in the new draft reference to 
editorial pressure on those preparing the report. He and his 
committee made it clear that they were concerned to preserve 
public confidence in the integrity and independence of such 
inquiries. Their experience had persuaded them that there was a 
need for a review of procedure in such inquiries regardless of the 
particulars of the Ely case. They eventually agreed to the 
deletion of the reference to editorial pressure, substituting a 
compromise phrase. The committee then disbanded assuming that the 
three versions were submitted, and that the Secretary of State 
would publish in consultation with the RHB.43
However Geoffrey Howe did not leave it there. He immediately 
submitted a memorandum to the Policy Committee of the Bar Council 
which outlined his procedural dissatisfactions, gave an account of 
the Ely committee's negotiations with the RHB and went on to make 
some pertinent points. The committee felt that abbreviation had 
affected the balance of their report.
He drew the parallels with the Sans Everything inquiries referred 
to in the previous Chapter, and drew the following conclusions:
i) that the existing procedure failed to adequately assure 
the independence and integrity of Committees of Inquiry;
ii) that the public were also doubted this independence and 
integrity (doubtless a reference to the publicity fuelled by 
Barbara Robb);
iii) that his colleagues on the committee had been 
frequently impressed by the fact that some of their opposite 
numbers on the Sans Everything inquiries were regarded as
43Ibid
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having joined the 'white-washing wing of the
Establishment'.
The submission of this Memorandum may well have been a discreet 
way of putting pressure on the DHSS and Crossman not to publish 
the shortened Report. Written by so significant a national
figure, its contents would have filtered through legal channels 
to the Lord Chancellor's Office. There is no evidence that Howe 
intended to go public with his complaints. Indeed, he seems to 
have been motivated purely by a concern to reform future 
procedure. Nevertheless the potential threat was there for
Crossman who could not read Geoffrey Howe's mind, assumed he was 
an ambitious politician and did not take any chances. The
Secretary of State also knew that Barbara Robb, The News of the 
World, and the rest of Fleet Street were waiting in the wings.
In electing to publish the complete version Crossman shocked his 
Civil Servants:
"If I published any less, Geoffrey Howe would be entitled to
go on television and talk about suppression....I think I put
the fear of God into t h e m . "44
Having read the Report he was convinced:
"The report completely vindicated the News of the World
story and I might as well make the best of it by outright
publication. But I was also clear in my mind that I could
only publish and survive politically if in the course of my
statement I announced necessary changes in policy....45"
44crossman R.H.S., The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister. Volume 
Three. Secretary of State for Social Services. (London: Hamilton
and Cape, 1977) p.408
45u w mRC Crossman Diaries CD 250 1970
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Although it appeared that Crossman was making a rod for his own 
back, the decision makes sense in the circumstances and Crossman's 
personal style. He was a dynamic, high profile politician who 
mistrusted civil servants. Indeed he saw them as resistant to 
radical reforming initiatives. He was a journalist and both had 
an 'instinct to publish' and fully appreciated the pressure which 
the media coverage would create. He was a shrewd politician who 
respected Howe both as a lawyer and not least as a potential 
political adversary. Moreover he understood the dangers inherent 
in suppressing the full report with the risk that the truth would 
emerge and do him great damage as the Sans Everything affair had 
damaged his predecessor. He was committed to the cause advocated 
by the Ely Report and surrounded by colleagues who shared that 
commitment. Publication would create shock waves in the 
Department which he would use to carry through reforms in mental 
handicap, thus raising its political importance in health policy.
The publication of the Ely Report was a milestone on the road to 
the Priorities documents of the 1970s and a major impetus to 
changes in hospital complaints machinery. As he formulated his 
embryonic Post-Ely-Policy (PEP) Crossman was also acutely aware of 
the political ramifications. He decided fully to enlist the 
support of Geoffrey Howe. Crossman intended that he and Howe 
would appear on television together to discuss the Report and 
possible policy responses. However, Crossman records that Howe 
refused on the grounds that he wished to avoid any compromise of 
his committee's work. He was not concerned with political 
capital. He was purely motivated to illustrate the defects in the 
health service complaints machinery4** and for this reason had 
widened the brief so that the reverberations would be felt in the 
Ministry. He was, of course, greatly relieved that Crossman was 
publishing in full and rather surprised. He agreed to involve 
himself in reforming measures in the wake of the Report.4  ^
Perhaps he also declined to be too closely associated with
46UNWMRC Crossman Diaries 177/69/SW
4?ibid
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Crossman who was clearly intent on using the Ely Report 
to his own political advantage.
As the tidal wave of publicity flooded the DHSS, Barbara Robb kept 
a discreet low profile. Some commentators have concluded that 
AEGIS 'disappeared' at this time^®; rather AEGIS withdrew from 
public arguments for three reasons. First, they had sensitised 
the press to conditions in long-stay hospitals, laid the 
foundations for the Ely inquiry, raised the issues which were its 
central concerns and at least indirectly influenced the inquiry's 
outcome. Mrs Robb's friends in Fleet Street were now fully 
capitalising on the Report as they would of those which followed 
it. After all they did have a score to settle with the
Department.
Secondly, AEGIS 'disappeared' because Mrs Robb had put aside her 
public campaign in return for consultative status as an 'insider 
group'^9. she now directed her energies to influencing the
policy initiatives, set in train by AEGIS, in the Department of 
Health and then at Westminster. Thirdly, she could now leave the 
scandal-making to the Department of Health under Crossman and his 
successor. AEGIS was to go back onto the public offensive again
in 1972. For the time being, Mrs Robb, upset and disturbed at the
content of the Ely Report, could nonetheless derive satisfaction 
from the irony of the Department doing her 'dirty work' for her!
^®Jones, K. Ideas on Institutions. (London: Routledge, and Kegan 
Paul 1984) p.108 
^^See Chapter 3
CHAPTER SIX
THE END OF THE OSTRICH ERA
Crossman carefully stage-managed his presentation of the Ely 
Report to Parliament. He informed Cabinet on the 23rd of March.
"They thought My God another Bloody scandal, but the only 
real interest to the PM was the fact that it was being 
announced on Thursday the day of the by-elections. It 
appalled him...he thought how was it possible that one could 
ruin the chances of people voting Labour by having all this 
terrible story blurted out on the six o'clock news...."l
Crossman countered that the Government would appear courageous in 
revealing the truth and taking firm action. Less confident, other 
Ministers were anxious to implicate the previous administration. 
So he checked the Ministry's record under Robinson and found 
improvements in the levels both of staffing and capital investment 
in mental handicap hospitals. He next organised pointed 
supplementary questions from the Labour benches for the debate. 
Thirdly he briefed Barbara Robb's close allies Yvonne Cross of the 
Nursing Mirror, and David Roxan of the News of the World, to whom 
he gave an exclusive interview^ He also briefed both the
1-UWMRC Crossman Diaries. 178/69/sw 
^UWMRC Crossman Diaries 160/69/SW Crossman refused to comment to 
other journalists who had picked up the scent.
^This interview took place on the train to Crossman's 
constituency in Coventry the day after the debate (Interview with 
Mr Roxan). Interestingly, Roxan's subsequent article stated that 
the Secretary of State would be proceeding with the Health Service 
Commissioner indicating that Crossman had been more definite with 
the journalist than with the House of Commons. News of the World
30.3.69
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BMJ and The Lancet. in order to reassure the medical lobbies.^ 
Having lastly put the RHB Chairmen on notice^, he went to the 
House on the 27th March.
"I felt a great gulp in my throat when I started because I 
think 1 really do care about this. I do feel righteous and 
indignant about it, and launched it out and read it and 
within 30 seconds I knew I'd gripped the House...
He summarised the main findings. At the broadest level, the
existing procedures for dealing with complaints were inadequate 
and a system of hospital inspection was needed.^
Crossman gave a firm assurance that remedial action would be 
taken. This would include a survey of conditions in all long-stay 
hospitals, the establishment of a special working party to examine
this evidence and its implications, and the creation of a "new
system of regulation and inspection1* independent of the Department 
and reporting directly to him.® Early discussions would also be 
held with the regional boards to begin redistributing of resources 
in favour of hospital services for the mentally subnormal.9
^"...I had to carry them with me and say to them, this
disclosure, this sensational report, this is something which is 
not going to break the morale of the service because the Minister
is on your side, because we are going to keep the professions with
us..." UWMRC Crossman Diaries 180/69/SW
5 At the monthly meeting on the 18th March. UWMRC Crossman
Diaries 159/69/SW
®UWMRC Crossman Diaries 183/69/SW
?House of Commons Official Report Vol. 780. cols.1810-1819
®Ibid.col 1809 and 1812
9Ibid col.1810
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He received a favourable response from MPs on all sides. For the 
Opposition, Lord Balniel welcomed the new inspectorate, called for 
the publication of its reports, and clarification of its role in 
complaints procedures.1® 11 Crossman replied that the new
department for scrutiny would not handle complaints - a function 
which might have to be vested in a Health Service Commissioner. 
Although he would not be drawn on publication, he expressed the 
hope that the independence of the new service from the health 
service would overcome the fear of victimisation amongst nurses.
Putting the lid back on
Crossman stressed that the findings of the Ely inquiry applied 
only to one part of one hospital and were therefore no basis for 
general conclusions.12 However, this was less than extravagant 
with the truth for he had plenty of evidence that the problems 
were not restricted to this hospital. Indeed, at the end of the 
debate, three MPs raised the spectre of events at South Ockendon 
Hospital^ of which the Secretary of State was already fully 
aware. The two most disturbing aspects of this affair to date had 
been an assault on one patient the previous June and the death 
from injuries of another on February 22nd, 1969. The press picked 
up South Ockendon after the debate. The Times of the 29th March 
reported that Norman Atkinson was to ask for a full-scale inquiry 
into the death of patient Robert Robinson and quoted a
10Ibid col 1810-11
11 Mrs Robb's files do not indicate that she briefed opposition 
MPs for this debate, although of course Tory MPs were in regular 
contact with her. 
l^House of Commons Official Report, op.cit. col. 1808. 
l^Ibid cols.1815-1819. Arthur Lewis had put down a written 
question on the fatal incident (House of Commons Official Report. 
Vol.780 Written Answer Col. 16, 17.3.69 ) and had also written to 
him about it.
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Departmental statement to the effect that Crossman was determined 
that there would no attempt to whitewash any hospital but was not 
contemplating a statutory inquiry at South Ockendon.^
Crossman had also been touring mental subnormality hospitals. In 
January he had visited Harperbury following criticism of the 
children's unit by Anne Shearer in The G u a r d i a n ^  and found gross 
overcrowding and staff shortages. In February 1969, the inquiry 
into the fire at Shelton Hospital had reported, and revealed grave 
shortcomings in fire precautions. More widespread evidence 
came to Crossman's attention in March 1969. Pauline Morris had 
recently obtained her Ph.D which comprised an extensive, empirical 
study of half the country's subnormality hospitals. Though not 
published until the following September, it came to Crossman's 
notice early because Brian Abel-Smith had acted as her external 
examiner; her supervisor having been his close associate Prof. 
Peter Townsend.^
Morris' findings also supported Mrs Robb's contentions about the 
quality of management of these hospitals. The Ministry and the 
Regional Boards were remote. The HMCs were inactive, concerned 
only with finance, and effectively dominated by the Physician 
Superintendent, perpetuating the "tradition of personal autocracy 
established before 1948".^-® Members were spoon-fed all their
■^In May, the BMA lobbied the Chief Medical Officer over the 
Department's order that all admissions to South Ockendon be 
suspended: British Medical Journal 1969 Vol. 2, no. 5652,
3rd May 1969, Supplement p.69 
l^UWMRC Crossman Diaries 249/69 JH Crossman notes that Anne 
Shearer was reported to the Press Council over her article, 
presumably by the hospital authorities, however the complaint was 
not upheld giving rise to yet more unfavourable publicity.
1®24 people had died in the fire and the event was front-page 
news in the press. See Appendix 3. 
l ^ M o r r i s ,  p.f Put Awav. (London: Routledge, 1969)
18ibid p.214
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information by the senior staff and only visited on a formal basis 
accompanied by their senior staff "minders". From the point of 
view of the staff on the ground, the central department was a very 
remote entity whose advice comprised abstract thinking with the 
semblance of a pipe dream. ^  Hence it was clear that the mere 
issuing of circulars, however well-intentioned, did not tackle the 
essential problems of hierarchy, lack of communication and
autocratic decision-making.
Over the next few months the catalogue was to grow and maintain 
the pressure for reform. Firstly, in December 1968 the police had 
been called into Farleigh hospital to investigate serious
allegations of ill-treatment. Following completion of the police 
investigations, Crossman set up a Committee of Inquiry into 
conditions at the hospital.^0
The following August, he visited Monyhull, Coleshill and Chelmsley 
hospitals, close to his Coventry constituency, near Birmingham. 
The background to these visits was apparently leaked to the
national press by prominent local Labour politicians who were also 
Members of the RHB. According to Eric Jacobs in the Sunday Times. 
the DHSS published a report on investigations into conditions at 
these hospitals by the RHB which had been edited to take out
recommendations on accommodating the elderly at ground level t^ o 
facilitate evacuation in case of fire, and the Board's estimates 
that nearly £300,000 would have to be spent to raise fire 
precautions to acceptable standards; over three times the amount
^ R e f e r e n c e  to Ministry of Health(MOH) , HM (65) 104 On Improving 
the Effectiveness of the Hospital Service for the Mentally 
Handicapped: ibid p.218 
20UWMRC Crossman Diaries CD 74/69 entry for 4.9.69 The exact date 
that Crossman knew about Farleigh is unclear; this entry was 
precipitated by a lunch date with Lady Serota in which she told 
him that the officials had not made her aware of the report for 
some weeks after they had received it.
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budgeted. The reporter also claimed that the full survey had 
revealed the hospitals to be endemically overcrowded (by up to 
50%), unheated, underspent on food and with staff ratios that were 
even worse than at Ely. At Monyhull hospital there was severe 
overcrowding in an environment of bare, unplastered walls. In 
several wards at Coleshill, beds were so crammed as to be 
touching. At both Chelmsley and Coleshill "...the general 
atmosphere was very depressing. There appeared to be general 
apathy, and inertia amongst the higher grades of staff and there 
was virtually no leadership of any description."21
Crossman's Diaries confirm these reports. At Coleshill he found 
"appalling overcrowding" and at Chelmsley, " ghastly buildings, 
ghastly overcrowding...I have never seen overcrowding like it, 
beds absolutely jammed together...".22 On the 7th of August, the 
day after his visit, he described the conditions to the press and 
promised a five-year programme of development at long-stay 
hospitals. In the meantime he would consider erecting 
prefabricated buildings to relieve o v e r c r o w d i n g . 23
Organising for Change
In the face of all this evidence, it is significant that the 
Secretary of State who had revealed all about Ely was anxious not 
to publicise the scale of the shortcomings throughout the longstay 
hospital sector. Yet, Crossman's guarded remarks to the House of 
Commons were perfectly comprehensible. The Ely Report provided 
sufficient ammunition to sustain internal pressure and browbeat 
officials and the regional boards as required. He could do 
without added scandals which risked worsening morale on the ground 
still further and certainly showed up the Government in a
21Sunday Times 13.7.69 Also Guardian 14.7.69 
22uwMRC Crossman Diaries CD 2/69 Visits took place on 6.8.69 
23The Times 7.8.69. In one ward designed for 36 he found 72 
occupied beds.
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disfavourable light at a time when it was trailing behind in the 
opinion polls.
Whether or not he could be criticised for his attitude to further 
revelations, Crossman could not have been accused of hesitating to 
reform the subnormality service radically. Furthermore, the case 
presented by Barbara Robb, who was now commanding respect at 
Ministerial level, confirmed by the Ely Report and by Put Awav^ . 
demonstrated the need for effective action beyond the hospitals 
themselves.. Crossman wanted wholesale change effected by a high 
profile, sharply politicised approach and he was clear in his mind 
that his permanent officials were not up to the task:
"You can't get thorough impartial analysis followed by a 
striking political statement out of civil servants, they 
can't write it. They can't do anything so polemical, so 
controversial, the whole instinct is to flatten things 
out....
Indeed, the civil servants were in a predicament. Their 
instincts would have been to respond in a way consistent with 
their approach prior to the Ely Report. For the previous three 
years, this had been characterised by defensiveness, public 
assertions through their Minister that there were no serious 
deficiencies in the long-stay hospital sector, that standards were 
monitored through visits by hospital management committees, that 
the complaints procedure was perfectly fair and adequate, and 
that anybody, such as Barbara Robb, who suggested the contrary was 
an irresponsible complainer. Squaring this with the reforms 
Crossman wanted would have overtaxed the most skilful drafter in 
the Department so that a degree of dilution would have been 
inevitable.
^Morris, P., op. cit.
25uvjmRC Crossman Diaries 70/SW/69
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Furthermore, not only did Crossman mistrust his officials, he did 
not rate their competence. He compared them disfavourably to 
those at the Ministry of Housing and Local Government where he 
appears to have spent two years fighting to assert his policy 
against an obstructive Permanent Secretary.26 He reports that he 
was unclear what the four thousand people in DHSS were doing apart 
from sending out endless streams of paper, circulars and other 
guidance which served, so he believed, only to choke the filing 
cabinets of the lower-tier authorities.27 At one stage, Crossman 
wrote to his Permanent Secretary asking him if the hospital 
division was trying to frustrate his policy. He was informed that 
they felt excluded and reduced to relying on the press to learn of 
his intentions. In return, Crossman accepted that he was often 
difficult to approach, however he felt it was they who failed to 
communicate with him: "they don't hear what they don't want to
hear and they try and get a Department view against m i n e .  ”28
This kind of problems arose partly out of a fundamental difference 
between the perspective and operational policy of the new, and 
most recent administrations. Under Kenneth Robinson and Sir 
Arnold France the Ministry's primary role had been to manage the 
NHS by allowing the regional boards considerable discretion in 
policy. Following the debates of the early fifties about the 
future of the service, largely resolved by the Guillebaud Report, 
the continuation of the NHS had become part of the 'welfare 
consensus'. Now it was proven that there were serious faults in 
the system, Crossman judged that the political head, particularly 
a senior Cabinet Minister, had to "get hold" of and politicise the 
Centre thereby to become in his words "the first Minister of 
Health since Aneurin Bevan"(my e m p h a s i s ) . 29 jt was an approach 
which his officials certainly found uncomfortable and probably 
resented.
26u\JMRC Crossman Diaries SW69/1-4 
27uwMRC Crossman Diaries CD 92/69 
28u w mRC Crossman Diaries SH/69/36 
29uwMRC Crossman Diaries CD 1099 1969
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This resentment could only be reinforced by Crossman's ill- 
disguised preference for the views of "outsiders". He had
immediately brought in Brian Abel-Smith to advise on policy; a 
role Crossman described as partly a private secretary and partly a 
permanent secretary (emphasis added).^0 Moreover, Crossman's
academic background made him predisposed to the 'objective'
expert, and persuaded him that ideas could be synthesised from
debate and discussion in seminar-like meetings which he liked to 
chair. Hence when embarking on a reforming campaign in 
subnormality, what better way for him to proceed than to set up a 
working party of expert outsiders, selected both to provide 
political balance and independent advice in fields of expertise 
which corresponded to the policy areas where action was required?
There were six components:
to improve conditions;
to change established spending patterns in the regions 
to ensure that improvements and development were 
sustained;
to change the conventional relationship between the
centre and the regions;
to develop a coherent strategy for mental handicap;
to reverse the policy, established in the late fifties,
of locating the responsibility for visiting and
monitoring conditions in hospitals at local level by 
setting up a central agency to monitor conditions and
proselytise good practice;
^OUWMRC Crossman Diaries SW/69/6
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to reappraise complaints procedure, to produce a code of 
practice, tighten up the procedure for special
inquiries, and introduce legislation to implement the
Health Commissioner proposal.
The Post-Ely Policy Working Party (PEP) involved a number of
people chosen to address these issues and also facilitate
professional and party political support. Firstly there was the 
professional expertise and involvement; an administrative doctor, 
John Revans the Senior Administrative Medical Officer at Wessex 
RHB, an authority advanced in its thinking on mental handicap, who 
was also seconded to the Chief Medical Officer's department and 
impressed Crossman; a psychiatrist, John O'Gorman who had struck 
Crossman as dynamic and innovative on a visit to Borocourt, where 
Gorman was medical superintendent; and the senior nurse at the
Maudesley Hospital, Eileen Skellem, who appears to have been 
Abel-Smith's recommendation. To tackle standards of care and the 
strategy, Pauline Morris and Prof. Townsend were invited in; 
Townsend brought both his academic kudos and his Labour Party 
connections. The party politics were balanced by Geoffrey Howe 
who came in to look at complaints and inquiry procedures. They 
were the core group of PEP, however Crossman also brought in Dr 
Alex Baker, a consultant psychiatrist at Banstead Hospital, and 
then seconded to the Department, and an architect, John Weeks who 
worked on design for temporary buildings to relieve overcrowding 
in the hospitals.31-
Baroness Serota and Crossman himself gave the group its political 
leadership. Part of this function consisted of consulting the
31-The only name on the list of which Barbara Robb fully approved 
was Geoffrey Howe. She was most unhappy to see Prof. Townsend 
involved as she believed him to be prejudiced against her and 
would therefore limit her influence on events. She and her 
immediate advisers were also doubtful whether professionals whom 
ran excellent hospitals would have insight into the function of 
the bad ones.
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lobbyists both professional and otherwise. Crossman's style here 
was fairly informal. He would invite them to his office or to 
lunch, and brief them on his policy. The aim was to allay
unwarranted anxieties, test opinion and, of course, identify
opposition and measure its potential strength. His officials were 
given some tasks which PEP were also engaged on and provided 
secretarial support to the Working Party.
The elements of the Post Ely Policy divide into those aimed 
directly at improving standards and those which would bring 
indirect pressure to bear to ensure that improvement was 
sustained. The latter group, comprising the Hospital Advisory
Service, and complaints procedure, directly involved AEGIS as a
powerful, respected lobby. Work on these policies under Crossman 
is examined in the next chapter. For the time being, the concerns 
are standards of care, resource allocation, centre-periphery 
relations and the mental handicap strategy.
Interim Standards in Hospitals
The aim of this policy was to establish quantitative indices to 
serve as measures of the current position, objectives to be 
achieved and yardsticks for monitoring progress. Of course, this 
approach was not entirely novel; minimum standards were as old as 
the health service itself. These were first issued in 1948 and 
comprised qualitative indices of ward size, and dormitory and 
floor space.^2 The maximum ward size for mental hospitals was 
set at fifty, or 20 for "disturbed and excited" patients. In 
subnormality hospitals, the maximum ward size was set at 60. 
Moreover, subnormality hospitals were to avoid dormitories with 
two rows of beds or more. These crude indicators were 
supplemented in 1964 and 1965 with the two, 'On improving the 
effectiveness of hospitals' circulars.^3
32m 0H, NHS Standards of Accommodation in Mental Hospitals and 
Mental Deficiency Institutions RHB(48)4 (London: MOH, 1948)
3^See above p .66
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Crossman's policy was new in its detail and comprehensiveness, its 
degree of realism and, not least, the ministerial determination to 
ensure that the lower-tier authorities made the necessary finance 
available.
Pauline Morris was the key adviser and Crossman first met her on 
the 25th of April, just prior to a meeting with RHB Chairmen to 
brief them more fully on the Post Ely Policy.34 Morris handed 
him a list of suggestions including improved occupational therapy, 
and a service from GPs and paediatricians to the residents of 
subnormality hospitals. Administrative reforms included the 
recruitment of younger, more vigorous people onto HMCs, and the 
fostering of communication between the Committee and ward levels 
through increased visiting; open communication; changing attitudes
within hospitals to the outside world would encourage voluntary
help through Leagues and friends and relatives. The culture of 
custodial care would be eroded if staff were given in-service 
training, and encouraged to develop links with community-based 
professionals such as social workers. Lastly to combat 
institutionalisation, transfers form admission to long-stay wards 
should become a rarity whilst long-stay residents would be
provided with active rehabilitation programmes.
These suggestions, together with others which had resource 
implications, were presented to the Chairmen on the 30th. 
Crossman asked them to investigate the spending on food, 
overcrowding, personal clothing, lockers, and nurse and domestic 
staffing levels in their own hospitals. He encountered some 
resistance, as Chairmen argued that the size of HMCs was limited 
and prohibited the inclusion of all interested parties; and of 
course, as far as conditions in hospitals were concerned,
earmarked funding would be needed from the centre. Crossman 
reminded them of the Ely Report's comments on management. He 
remained firm that current patterns of spending would have to be
34UWMRC Crossman Diaries CD 1141-42/1969
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reviewed. Privately, he apparently took the view that he would 
have little chance of persuading Cabinet to provide additional 
funds so had no choice but to enforce a redistribution from acute 
hospitals.35
Some Chairmen protested that they were careful how they allocated 
revenue and besides, concentrating resources on existing hospitals 
reduced what was available to build new community services. They
were supported in this by the Chief Medical Officer arguing that
it was important not to lose sight of the main objective of 
changing the pattern of residential care. The Secretary of State
seems to have got quite angry at this point and demanded to know
how they, as the responsible authorities, could defend keeping the 
mentally handicapped in such poverty that they were even fed at a 
lower standard than anybody else.36 There was no intention to 
change policy direction but it had to be recognised that there 
were large numbers of people for whom the hospitals constituted 
home; conditions, standards and the approach of staff had to 
reflect this reality.
It was finally agreed that the Department would issue a list of 
standards to be achieved in the interim as well as those to be met 
in the longer-term. Crossman accepted that they should have the 
status of guidelines and would therefore not be mandatory.37 For 
their part the Chairmen agreed to report back by July on what 
action they thought feasible.
35i owe this point to Prof. Abel-Smith.
36"...i had to impose mv will on them and it was a fascinating
meeting there were 15 Chairmen and 16 members of the
Department plus myself and Serota in the middle of the table and 
this formal confrontation."(emphasis added) UWMRC Crossman Diaries 
CD 1162 1969. Also the personal recollection of Prof. Abel-Smith.
37DHSS RHB Chairmen 3/69
-153-
The work on finalising the indices continued throughout the next
six months. In June, the Department sent out returns which asked
for specific information on overcrowding, day space, number of 
lockers available and the extent of personalised clothing, in both 
psychiatric hospitals and those for the mentally h a n d i c a p p e d . 3 8
Thus the policy was widening. When Chairmen reported back at the 
July meeting, they accepted a standard for expenditure on food 
equal to the current cost per patient in mental illness
h o s p i t a l s . However they pointed out the difficulty of 
recruiting sufficient staff due to the isolation of many 
institutions. The number of patients cared for by supervisory 
staff was linked to their remuneration. Increasing staff ratios 
would financially disadvantage them. Crossman argued that 
overcrowding and physical conditions in a hospital also hindered 
recruitment. The nursing division was working on a system of 
remuneration which broke away from bed numbers, to be incorporated 
into the next pay settlement. On the management side, the
Department would be producing a paper with proposals to amalgamate 
psychiatric and subnormality hospital groups with general 
hospitals, and would be issuing guidance on the recruitment and
training of volunteers.4®
The final list of Interim Standards, which went out for discussion 
at the December meeting, was in three sections.4^ Better care 
and amenities for patients set specific levels of ward capacity, 
(to eliminate those housing more than fifty) day space per
patient, medical, dentistry and chiropody staffing, and spending 
on food and kitchen staffing. It also required the provision of 
personalised clothing on a daily basis, the upgrading of poor 
standard wards to provide a domestic environment, and the
3®DHSS, DS Letter 6.6.69 (from Statistics and Research Division) 
39spending on food in mental subnormality hospitals was 24s 
compared with 29s in mental illness units and 34s in the acute 
sector.
40DHSS, Circular HM(69)58, 1969
41DHSS, RHB Chairmen 10/69
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provision of adequate recreation, occupational therapy, education 
and training and social work support. Improved conditions and 
support for staff specified nurse patient ratios by dependency, 
the level of domestic staff also by dependency, and also covered, 
accommodation, inter-disciplinary working and staff training, to 
include nursing assistants, aimed at ensuring a permanent
commitment to high standards of care. Voluntary Services 
confirmed the list of improvements the Chairmen already had.
The indices were based on the detailed returns on subnormality 
hospitals which RHBs had sent in July. These had confirmed Dr. 
Morris's own findings. Over 34,000 hospital residents had less 
than the required level of bed space; 22,500 had no personalised
clothing; 18,000 had no cupboard space. The Department used
standard costing information to estimate the total cost of
reaching these standards at nearly £13 million capital and £11 
million recurrent revenue. The Secretary of State expected the 
standards on food, kitchen and personal clothing to be achieved 
within two years and for a start to be made on domestic staffing 
and ward space the coming financial year. In order to help meet 
this cost, Crossman had found an additional £3 million in revenue 
to be earmarked for the coming financial year and distributed to 
reflect the number of beds per region. For their part, the 
Regional Boards would be asked to prepare detailed programmes to 
implement these standards and submit them to the Department no 
later than Mid-January 1970.
The only complaint raised by the Chairmen was about Crossman's 
timetable for their reports back. A subsequent letter to Regional 
Board Secretaries put this back to March but now included revenue 
and capital costing estimates. This letter also confirmed the 
success of Crossman's campaign in Cabinet by informing the Boards 
that a further £1 million in capital was to be earmarked on top of 
current allocations for 1970-71.42
42DHSS, DS Letter 10.9.69
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The last practical advice for the improvement of hospital 
conditions arose directly from Crossman's visit to Birmingham RHB 
and the appalling overcrowding he found at Chelmsley. In order to 
relieve this problem, he commissioned a design team headed by John 
Weeks to come up with a scheme for low-cost temporary ward units 
requiring the minimum of planning time. The recommendation in 
Week's Report "Buildings for Mentally Handicapped People" was a 
prefabricated building housing 30 patients at a cost of £25-30,000 
and took only 20 weeks to erect.43 a number of these units were 
built around the country including South Ockendon and Coleshill, 
where they are still known as the "Crossman Huts".
Priorities and Reallocation
The Department estimated that extending minimum standards to the 
psychiatric and geriatric sectors would have cost an extra £40 
million in revenue alone.44 Clearly then, although the centre 
could make very modest additional finance available, the 
Government were restraining public expenditure and therefore, the 
conventional discretion allowed to the regions in allocating money 
had to be challenged to achieve a sustained policy. Now although 
everyone was happy to see extra money coming in, Crossman was to 
encounter resistance to his attempt to shift only 1.25% from the 
rest of the service to the subnormality hospitals.
This began immediately the suggestion was put to senior officials 
in the Department. The Chief Medical Officer warned that as the 
money for long-stay hospitals would have to come from the acute 
sector, Crossman risked a confrontation with the medical lobbies. 
For their part the Regional Chairmen pointed out that in some 
parts of the country acute services were already underfunded and 
further reductions would be impossible. Moreover, they were keen 
to know how far the centrally-funded teaching hospitals had been
43DHSS, DS Letter 8.5.70
44UWMRC Crossman Diaries JH 69/19
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pressed to play their part in the programme.4^ Crossman was 
sympathetic to this last point. After all Boards of Governors 
received three times the per-patient capital allocation given to 
the regions, and teaching hospitals were one and half times as 
expensive to run as ordinary acute hospitals. Because of the 
sensitivity of powerful medical interests, this issue was left 
unaddressed until after NHS Reorganisation.4**
It took four months to get the priorities policy accepted within 
the Department. The regional boards were even slower. At the 
meeting on April 30th 1969 they were asked to report back by the 
following July on the amount of money they could redistribute in 
favour of psychiatric and geriatric hospitals. The total for all 
regions was just £1.8 million, a figure dwarfed by the extent of 
the need and described by the Accountant General as 
"disappointing". Crossman then seems to have decided to leave 
these sectors and settle for establishing the precedent in the 
subnormality hospitals.4^
By the December meeting, the Chairmen accepted that the finance 
needed fully to meet minimum standards in subnormality hospitals 
over and above the earmarked funds, would have to come from 
reallocation within existing budgets. It was to need further
scandals and considerable effort by Crossman's successor to extend 
the policy throughout the long-stay hospital sector.4® 49
Relationship between the centre and the regions
Crossman's campaign to assert the political control of the centre 
over the NHS, of which the priorities policy was but one element,
4^DHSS, RHB Chairmen, Report of Pre-Meeting 2.6.69
46UWMRC Crossman Diaries CD 39-40/69
4?UWMRC Crossman Diaries JH 69/19
4®RHB Chairmen 10/69
49DS Letter 10.12.69
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necessitated a more interventionist approach to the regions. This 
required reorganisation of the central department to establish a 
clear and identifiable chain of command and accountability. 
Crossman not only concluded that DHSS was a vast amorphous 
bureaucracy, he believed that the Regional Boards were "self- 
perpetuating oligarchies"50 who had grown accustomed, under the 
previous Minister, to running things their own w a y . His first 
encroachments into the power base of the Boards was to Chair the 
monthly meetings with RHB Chairmen at Alexander Fleming House, on 
a regular basis, and to establish periodic reviews of their 
performance on agreed objectives.
"Here is a great floppy department, which is there in a 
vaguely advisory capacity, which is constantly issuing 
bumf...I am not just content to issue some bumf about 
subnormality, I am going to get out and see that the 
programme is actually carried out and 1 have done that 
conscientiously through monthly meetings with the RHB
Chairmen....They used to see the Minister two or three times
a year, now they know I am taking over direct personal
responsibility of contact with them, teaching them the 
policy."52
At the first Post-Ely meeting on April 3rd, it had been agreed 
that the relationship, as the Secretary of State saw it, should be 
clarified formally. Hence Pink Circular HM(69)59 emphasised that 
the role of RHBs was as agents of the Secretary of State, directly 
responsible to him for administration and standards of care in 
hospitals. Moreover, during Crossman's Office, the nuance of
5<>u w mRC Crossman Diaries CD 92/69
51interestingly, a view apparently shared by Barbara Robb's old 
adversary, the Chairmen of the North West Metropolitan RHB, 
Maurice Hackett (also George Brown's brother-in-law): UWMRC
Crossman Diaries SW/69/132 
52u w mRC Crossman Diaries SW 69/5
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drafting In Ministerial guidance began to change from polite 
requests to firm expectations of action.
Establishing the precedent of a centrally-directed priorities 
policy was another important step forward. Yet Crossman feared 
that the situation would slip back once he left the Department, an 
eventuality which appeared likely given the Government's standing 
in the opinion polls throughout 1969. Therefore, his view that 
the regions were oligarchic was reflected in his proposals for NHS 
reoganisation which aimed to break up their power-base. The idea 
was to replace them with much smaller Regional Councils mainly 
limited to advisory functions and responsible to a Central 
Advisory Council. Some of the RHBs' functions would transfer to 
90 new Area Health Authorities, coterminous with proposed new 
local authorities, and directly accountable to the Secretary of 
State for policy, priorities and efficiency. They would have 
effective authority for budgeting planning and running an 
integrated health service which included the teaching 
hospitals.53
The Regional Councils would comprise nominees from the AHAs, 
(including some professionals), and universities, and from the 
Secretary of State. They would retain some executive functions 
such as running the Blood Transfusion and Ambulance services, 
deploying medical and dental staff, organizing postgraduate 
teaching, and would be responsible for service planning of the 
hospital and other specialist services. Importantly, they were to 
have no direct authority over the Areas.
The Central Department, reorganised into strengthened regional 
offices, would take over the remaining functions of the Regional 
Boards; including the planning, design and implementation of major 
building schemes within a national programme. The responsibility
53 DHSS Green Paper: National Health Service: The Future Structure 
of the NHS (London: HMSO,1970)
54Ibid Paras 83-89
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for minor schemes including health centres would rest with the 
AHAs. The Secretary of State would be directly responsible for 
these functions and be advised in carrying them out by the Central 
Advisory Council with a membership from within and outside the 
professions.^5
Much of the motivation and thinking behind this Green Paper 
originated in Crossman's frustrations with both the Department and 
the Boards as he pushed through his Post-Ely Policy. The 
proposals for the replacement of the RHBs by much weaker advisory 
councils and to locate the major management functions with 
authorities coterminous with local government aroused firm 
opposition from the medical profession. Doctors were thus both 
reiterating the profession's longstanding determination to avoid 
greater local government involvement in the NHS and voicing 
misgivings about the demise of the regional professional advisory 
committee structure; a source of professional influence.^6 
Clearly Crossman, or more probably his Labour successor^?, would 
have had a battle on his hands to convert the Green Paper into 
legislation had not the defeat of the Labour Government in June 
confined its ideas for ending the reign of the Regions to the 
dusty shelves of the DHSS.
^DHSS, NHS, The Future Structure of the National Health Service 
in England. (London: HMSO, 1969)
^Leading Article:British Medical Journal 1970 Vol. 1 no. 5693, 
14th February 1970 p. 379 
^ C r o s s m a n  signed up to become editor of the New Statesman in 
February 1970. At the time, Labour were trailing in the opinion 
polls, however, later in the year, when the party's prospects 
appeared more favourable, he remained resolved not to accept 
another Cabinet post and recommended to Wilson that Barbara Castle 
should succeed him at DHSS. UWMRC Crossman Diaries JH/69/3, 
CD/206/70
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A Strategy for Mental Handicap
The development of community care had been central to policy for 
mental handicap since the consensus established by the 
recommendations of the Percy Commission in 1957.^® Although 
reforms of the late fifties and early sixties had established a 
philosophy for service development, they did not constitute a 
coordinated strategy for the mentally disordered as a whole. 
Services were delivered by the NHS and by two separate departments 
within local authorities. The 1962 Hospital Plan had forecast a 
marginal increase in hospital beds for the mentally handicapped, 
which, it was stated, should be in units of no more than 200 
beds.59 Otherwise the care group was passed over as unsuitable 
for sharing the campus of the new-style district general 
hospitals. Within the NHS at least, the emphasis remained on 
separate provision.
The 1963 White Paper Health and Welfare®^ purported to give 
substance to the assumptions of developing community services 
within the Hospital Plan. It envisaged that these services would 
comprise, social work support, training, residential and day care, 
all to be provided by local authorities. The document 
contained detailed listings of the ten-year plans submitted by 
local authorities. However, it conceded that without precise 
knowledge of the incidence of mental disorder "any estimate of the 
proportion of the population likely to need these services in the 
future must be extremely tentative".®2 These plans had been 
revised twice, most recently in 1966 under the previous Minister,
5®See Chapter 2
^National Health Service A Hospital Plan for England and Wales 
Cmnd 1604 (London: HMSO,1962) para.42 and Appendix B Col. 12.
®^Minstry of Health, Health and Welfare. The Development of 
Community Care. Cmnd 1973, (London: HMSO, 1963)
61-MOH, Health and Welfare: The Development of Community Care Cmnd 
1973 (London: HMSO,1963) paras. 83-99 
62ibid para 81
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when a steady increase in service levels was reported, but the 
policy lacked focus.^
The only other central government initiative in mental handicap 
prior to Crossman's administration was the 1965 Circular**4 , which 
gave advice on the location of hospitals within a future pattern 
of service for the mentally subnormal in the community. Although 
a step forward, there were no quantitative guidelines for staffing 
levels, or number of places per head of population of the kind 
included in its earlier equivalent on mental i l l n e s s . * * ^  Then as 
the Post-Ely Policy developed, the Department published the Report 
of the Bonham-Carter Committee on the functions of the District 
General Hospital. Reversing the conclusions of the Hospital Plan 
this Report argued in favour of subnormality assessment wards on 
the DGH campus. This would be part of a three-tier system which 
included community care and the large hospitals. The earlier 
optimism about the demise of the large hospitals was beginning to 
give way to recognition that they would be required for some years
to come.^
What was evidently lacking, therefore, was a coordinated and 
systematic plan for mental handicap, based on a considered 
philosophy which identified the likely extent of need, clarified 
the respective roles of the health service and local authority 
health and welfare departments which were soon to merged into 
social services departments, and set realistic objectives for the 
quantity and level of provision in each sector. As Townsend 
commented at the time:
^MOH Health and Welfare The Development of Community Care:Cmnd 
3022 (London: HMSO,1966)
64M0H, HM(65)104
65MOH, HM (64) 45
66dhsS Central Health Services Council The Functions of a 
District General Hospital Report of the Committee (London: HMSO, 
1969)
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"The Ministry's tentative excursion into planning in 1962 
seems to have been regarded as too daring by Ministry 
officials and subsequent Ministers. When one hoped for 
intelligent development of the general ideas expressed in 
1962.... there was only an embarrassed silence."^7
Crossman, advised by leading figures in empirical social 
administration, was seeking to reverse this tendency and produce a 
national plan, tailored to the needs of mentally handicapped 
people and their families, which carried the authority of a 
Government White Paper.88
Although Crossman did not wish to decelerate what was somewhat 
optimistically referred to as the "closure programme", a major 
element in the strategy was the recognition of the role of large 
hospitals for the conceivable future. He regarded proposals for a 
service based entirely in the community as futuristic. The 
establishment of the care group as a priority for spending was 
another central component. A third was an open presentation of 
the facts and political developments leading up to p o l i c y . T h e  
omission of this appears to have been the main reason for his 
rejection of the Department's draft white paper and his decision 
to ask Abel-Smith to rewrite it.
"She doesn't even mention the Ely Report, it doesn't mention 
Pauline Morris Book, all the evidence about the scandals, the
terrible things..... She has not put it into the report. All
flattened out so there is no crisis really. Just smooth 
civil service o f f i c i a l s . " ^
^ T o w n s e n d  p. t New structures; a critical review; needs and 
leadership in the planning of the Mental Health Services. NAMH 
Report of the Annual Conference. (London: NAMH, 1969)
68UWMRC Crossman Diaries JH 64/70
8^House of Commons Official Report Vol. 795 Written Answers 
Col.888-9
^The draft prepared by the head of the hospital division 
Continued on following page
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A fourth was to encourage the Regions to plan jointly with local 
authorities. At the time there were wide variations across the 
country with the regular joint discussions in the Manchester RHB 
at one end of the spectrum and no dialogue whatsoever in some 
areas at the o t h e r . T h e  final element was funding for research 
into alternative patterns of care whose findings would be built 
into the strategy. Firstly, Alex Baker and John Weeks were 
commissioned to weigh the relative advantages of putting the money 
into local authority building or relieving overcrowding in 
hospitals.72 The second strand was the epidemiological work of 
Dr. Albert Kushlick, John Revan's colleague at Wessex RHB. 
Thirdly the Department set up pilot projects such as the 
development of alternative services to Powick hospital in 
Worcester, and the Sheffield Mental Health Service aimed at 
reassessing the division of responsibility between the hospital 
service and local a u t h o r i t i e s .
Of course, the resulting white paper never appeared in Crossman's 
time. Abel-Smith presented the draft to Crossman just before 
Harold Wilson called the June election.7^ As he cleared his desk 
on the 19th of June, Crossman asked his officials to put the 
document before his successor.7-* He described it as 
"magnificent" suggesting that once he was gone, the officials
Continued from previous page 
UMWMRC Crossman Diaries CD 70/SW/53
71DHSS, RHB Chairmen 6/69
7^UWMRC Crossman Diaries 70/SW/195
7^UWMRC Crossman Diaries CD 59/69 Finance also went to the 
project to build up local mental illness services to replace 
Powick Hospital (still open 21 years later) and to build up mental 
handicap services in Sheffield.
7^UWMRC Crossman Diaries JH 70-34 entry for 5.5.70
7 ^ U W M R C  Crossman Diaries CD 1264 1970
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succeeded in "flattening out" the draft of the White Paper 
published the following year.^6
Crossman must have left office with a sense of enormous 
frustration at seeing so much work left at the pre-White-Paper or 
pre-legislative stages. Yet his was a most intellectually 
fruitful period of office which largely established the ideas 
which were to structure policy for the next fifteen years. As the 
procession of scandals continued unabated in the 1970s, minimum 
standards, priorities, care group strategies and, eventually, 
closer central supervision of the regions emerged as key issues in 
health policy.
76DHSS Better Services for the Mentally Handicapped Cmnd 4683 
(London: HMSO, 1971). The sections referring to the HAS, the
priorities policy, interim standards and history service 
development to the White Paper all make no mention of the Ely 
Report.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SCRUTINEERS. COMPLAINANTS AND INVESTIGATORS
Crossman's administration was to be only partially successful in 
implementing measures to monitor standards and reform the 
complaints machinery, although the groundwork was laid for future 
developments. In these fields, AEGIS figured as one of the most 
important lobbies by maintaining external pressure, and feeding 
ideas directly into the centre of power as an 'insider' pressure 
group.
Crossman's Eves and Ears
The 1957 Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness 
and Mental Deficiency resulted in the abolition of the Board of 
Control as an inspectorate. The debate had then pivoted on the 
ability or otherwise of the Minister and his agents to adopt a 
critical stance towards the standards of a service for which they 
were directly accountable. The Royal Commission had been 
confident both that there was no conflict of interest and, 
additionally, that this authority, as the controller of resource 
allocation, was the best agency for the job.^ However, Crossman 
now had ample evidence that this confidence had been misplaced.
The Ely Report identified a "clear need" for a system of 
inspection to ensure that those responsible for management were 
aware of what was needed to bring a hospital up to the Ministerial 
minimum standards. ^  Together with Put Away, it had also 
demonstrated both that the distribution of circulars was no
1-House of Commons, The Roval Commission on the Law Relating to 
Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency. 1954-57, Cmnd 169 (London: 
HMSO, 1957) paras.37-42
^Ministry of Health (MOH), NHS Report of thft Committee of 
Inquiry into Allegations of Ill-Treatment of Patients and other 
Irregularities at Elv Hospital Cardiff: Cmnd 3975 (London: HMSO 
1969) para.467
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safeguard, and that HMCs were often poorly informed in mental 
health, visited rarely and, when they did, were frequently crowded 
out by senior hospital staff. Crossman was also clear in his own 
mind, that the objectivity of the Department had been called into 
question by its wrangling with the Ely Committee over the 
published version of its Report. This too was reinforced by his 
belief that the inquiries into Sans Everything had verged on a 
"whitewashing" exercise.^
The Diaries indicate that Crossman was convinced by the case for 
separating inspection, from management and accountability.
"The key to the inspectorate in my mind is that it is an 
organisation completely separate from the policy-making, the
administrative organisation of the Ministry it is an
independent group of people inspecting and reporting directly
to me......the only way we ever got anything working in the
war, was to keep intelligence and inspection independent of 
policy.
Opinion amongst his officials mirrored the debate in the Percy 
Commission; the medical division supported him and the 
administrators were vehemently opposed.^ Once again he used the 
Ely Report as "an exposure of their failure" to "get the whip 
hand" over the internal opposition.^ Uncharacteristically
3 A view possibly reinforced in a general sense by Abel-Smith as 
one of Mrs Robb's advisers, and by Geoffrey Howe whose criticisms 
of the procedure of those inquiries and account of the pressure 
brought to bear on their Chairmen, as they prepared reports, had 
been made known in legal circles.
^TJWMRC Crossman Diaries 158/69/SW
^UWMRC Crossman Diaries 158/69/SW
6Although when Crossman was given his pre-prepared answers for 
questions prior to the Ely Debate, it appeared that the 
Administrators had not given up hope. "I noticed something 
interesting which was in the supplementaries on the nature of the 
new advisory service. It was said to be mostly in the regions, 
there was no mention of a director directly responsible to me. I 
rang up Brian Abel-Smith. And he said, very interesting, I was 
present at the meeting and (a senior official) said that in view 
of what you said to the regional hospital board Chairmen she said 
Continued on following page
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anxious to appear mindful of his officials' advice, he conceded 
the term inspectorate in favour of advisory service and also 
agreed to a two-tier system comprising a central service reporting 
directly to him and a similar one at regional level.
Otherwise, the new Hospital Advisory Service (HAS), was to 
function as a direct communication line between the hospital 
service and the Secretary of State or, as the catch phrase termed 
it, his "eyes and ears". Crossman was keen to play down the 
inspectorial function of the service, and emphasised its role in 
offering constructive criticism and the proselytisation of good 
practice. Importantly, and conflicting with what Crossman had 
told the House of Commons, the initial consultation proposals 
envisaged that as a safeguard against victimisation, a staff 
member with problems and complaints would bring them to the 
attention of a visiting team.^
When Crossman outlined the policy to the RHB Chairmen, they 
accepted the need for a centralised service to keep the Secretary 
of State informed, provided firstly that the reports were made 
available to them and secondly that they should not be published. 
This was agreed once the RHB Chairmen had given an undertaking to 
cooperate fully with advisory service visits.® For their part 
they saw no need for further local machinery and would rely on 
existing arrangements.
Continued from previous page
that she thought your enthusiasm for a director responsible to you 
had waned and we could put the emphasis back in the regions where
it belonged. Now this is the kind of way civil servants work.
She still had hopes of getting a blunting at the edge of what I
did. So I had her in at the briefing and said; There is some
mistake here. Oh yes, she said, a little mistake. I must have 
got it wrongly phrased and I said; Well, let me assure you that 
when I answer the supplementaries on that the key point will be 
Directors responsible to me, as an independent service not mixed 
up with the administration either at regional or national level." 
UWMRC Crossman Diaries 179-180/69/SW
^DHSS, Paper 69/12 Proposals for a new National Health Service 
Advisory Service
8DHSS, RHB Chairmen 3/69
-168-
Having cleared the policy with the regions, Crossman then tested
it out on the lobbies. Although they all supported the general
thrust, most of them criticised the de-emphasis of inspection and 
the apparent inability to enforce recommendations. He began with
the Joint Consultants Committee whose membership included the
Chairmen of the Royal Colleges, whom he met on the 29th April. 
According to the Diaries, they came with the impression that the 
new service would be staffed by ill-qualified civil servants 
interfering in areas of professional practice.^ The consultants 
argued that the new service should be completely independent of 
the DHSS, and that the Director should be a doctor with a minimum 
status equal to that of a deputy chief medical officer. They went 
away reassured firstly that the Secretary of State would fully 
consult the profession in formulating the policy^ and secondly 
that staff would be seconded on a short-term basis directly from 
the NHS. Other medical opinion, also felt that Crossman's 
proposals did not go far enough.H The psychiatrists' body, the 
Royal Medico-Psychological Association, contended that in 
preference to an "information service" for the Secretary of State 
and RHBs, the function should be that of a pressure group to 
ensure that action was taken and therefore that standards 
improved. ^-2
The RCN was concerned about victimisation. It held that when 
teams visited, any staff member should be free to raise matters of 
concern with them without any member of staff present. Nurses 
should also have direct access to the central authority, when the 
local complaints machinery failed to give s a t i s f a c t i o n . ^
^UWMRC Crossman Diaries CD 1153 1969
^Report of the Meeting of the Central Committee for Hospital 
Medical Services BMJ 1969 Vol. 2, 5th July 1969 Supplement 5.7.69 
p.5
11The one exception was the Society of Clinical Psychiatrists, a 
body very secondary to the RPMA, who argued that the Board of 
Control had not guaranteed high standards in mental hospitals and 
that the function of inspection was best carried out by RHBs. 
Nursing Mirror Vol. 128 No. 25, 20th June 1969, pp.8-9
l2Ibid
13This meeting had taken place on May 15th 1969. Nursing Standard 
July/August 1969
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The National Association for Mental Health supported a still 
tougher policy in a paper by Russell Davies who had served on the 
Ely Committee. It advocated an inspectorate, whose independence 
was assured by separate administration through the Lord 
Chancellor's Office. It would also serve as a complaints channel 
to reflect the fact that conditions of work were often inseparable 
from the incidents giving rise to complaints.^
AEGIS was not directly consulted prior to the appointment of the 
first director of the HAS. However Mrs Robb made known her views 
in the national press, having first informally consulted Abel- 
Smith on the draft proposals. She feared that if the service was 
attached to the Secretary of State rather than to a hospital 
commissioner's office, its independence would be compromised. She 
was also appalled to learn that the reports would be unpublished 
yet fully available to the regional boards; thereby, in her view, 
removing any chance of the HAS preventing victimisation. She felt 
that "only a fool or an office seeker" would take the 
directorship, that the whole thing was a complete sell-out and she 
would so inform the Council on Tribunals.^
Abel-Smith seemingly did his best to allay her concerns. He 
countered that if attached to the Secretary of State, the HAS 
would be more effective in getting its views across. He felt that 
the HM Inspectorate of Schools was an exact analogy, in that its 
reports were not published. The HAS could make it known that it 
had submitted an unfavourable report and that the Minister had 
given an assurance that certain action would be taken. Thirdly 
the function of the service was to "prosecute" and not "decide": 
these should be kept separate and the latter was the legitimate
^Andrews, J., Psychiatric nursing: Today and tomorrow, Nursing 
Mirror. Vol. 129, No.16, 17th October 1969, pp.19-20 
l^Nursing Mirror Vol. 128 no. 25 20th June 1969 pp. 8-9 
1 6 R o b b , B . N o t e  of a telephone conversation with B.Abel-Smith, 
6.5.69 in Robb Files Sans E V0I.6A
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concern for an ombudsman. The teams could then collect evidence 
on which they could decide whether referral to the ombudsman was 
appropriate. Fourthly, the HAS could proceed immediately to 
hospitals about where allegations had been made and directly brief 
Ministers. Its Director was to be expert in the functioning of 
hospitals; Russell Barton's name had even been suggested.
Barton's name did not appease Barbara Robb. She saw no reason why 
attachment to the ombudsman's office need give rise to delay. She 
did not accept that the schools inspectorates were analogous given 
that the Secretary of State for Education has a supervisory role 
with regard to local authority provided schools, whereas the 
Social Services Secretary was under statutory responsibility to 
provide the hospital service. She also stressed that in order to 
overcome the fear of victimisation, complainants initially 
required a confidential, informal channel to make their grievances 
known. Fourthly, she was aware that the Ministry already knew 
that conditions in many of its hospitals did it little credit. It 
would therefore be surprising if it did not have strong views on 
the extent of publication. This was an issue to be decided by an 
impartial body. Lastly, in her view, there was little chance of 
anyone of Barton's calibre accepting the post in such 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Her press article reiterated these points, 
however it was more conciliatory with regard to Crossman himself. 
Direct attachment was acceptable so long as he was in office, 
however, she feared the future under a "lesser man".l®
The following October, Mrs Robb submitted a formal view to 
D H S S .  1 9  This was the outcome of two meetings convened by Mrs 
Robb to discuss her principal concerns at that time: the H A S ,  the 
health service commissioner proposal and South Ockendon. The
l7Ibid
l^Robb.B., Detecting those sins of the Health Service Daily 
Telegraph 18.6.69
Mrs Robb had been invited to write this article by a senior 
reporter on the paper, Colin Welch 
l^The document was sent to Prof .Abel-Smith with a copy to 
Baroness Serota. Letter B.Robb to B.Abel-SMith in Robb Files 
Op.Cit.
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first meeting was held over dinner on the 30th September, at Abel- 
Smith's house and comprised Mrs Robb, the Professor and Russell 
Barton. According to Mrs Robb's account, Prof Abel-Smith 
explained that it was too late to change course on plans for the 
HAS, although Crossman was looking at the possibility of keeping 
certain confidential information from the Regional Boards. Abel- 
Smith also reported that the administration had run up against 
"obstacles" in developing a policy to protect nurse complainants 
from victimisation, and that there had not been enough suitable 
applicants for the director's job, which partly confirmed Mrs 
Robb's expectations. She then advised that the HAS teams should 
restrict their investigations to general conditions, and leave the 
investigation of complaints to teams attached to a health service 
commissioner.20
The theme of the complaints procedure was the major item of 
discussion at the second meeting on October 7th this time held 
over lunch at the Royal Society of Medicine; the participants on 
this occasion being, Mrs Robb, Dr.Barton and Dr.Whitehead.21 The 
major recommendation to emerge was in the area of terms of 
organisation and relevant expertise. The teams should comprise 
practising professionals and administrators served by a small core 
of full-time staff; they would thus have clear ideas about what 
could replace malpractice and malfunctioning administration. This 
proposal had been put to the Department by Dr. Barton and Mrs 
Robb. Finally, they agreed that whatever happened it was 
essential, in order to keep up the pressure for reform, that the 
series of scandals should be continued.22
The discussion at these meetings was sythesised into a brief 
document which Barbara Robb forwarded to Baroness Serota on the 
14th of O c t o b e r . 23 AEGIS had concluded that the proposed 
attachment of the service to the Secretary of State rendered it 
most unsuitable for the reception of complaints and believed that
2^Note of this meeting in Robb Files Sans E.Vol 6A
21-Transcript of this meeting in Robb Files Op.Cit.
22ibid
2^Mrs Robb's favourite pseudonymous reference to Abel-Smith
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this would be remedied by dividing the advisory service into two 
sections:
(1) An "advisory section" existing to help hospitals 
with their problems...Apart from very exceptional 
circumstances it would act with the approval of the 
hospital authorities concerned and often we would hope 
by their invitation. When desirable it would stay to 
support a hospital in its attempts to introduce 
improvements.
(2) An "inquiry section" which would, on request, obtain 
information from within a hospital for either the 
"advisory Section" or for the Commissioner and his 
representatives....
Each section would have a semi-permanent nucleus of staff engaged 
for two to three years assisted by others brought in for special 
circumstances. Complaints would be dealt with by the 
Commissioner.^ 25 26
As AEGIS continued lobbying and feeding ideas into the Department 
at the highest level, Crossman proceeded with his plans. Having 
tried unsuccessfully to persuade John Revans to accept the 
director's post, he eventually appointed Dr. Alex B a k e r . 27 28
As AEGIS had recommended, the other members of the service would
2^AEGIS, the Hospital Advisory Service, and the Hospital 
Commissioner, Robb Files. Sans E Vol.9
2^Mrs Robb received a prompt reply to her letter form the 
Minister of State thanking her for her proposals and assuring her 
that the Department were searching for a solution to the problem 
of victimisation. Letter B.Serota to B.Robb 24.10.69 in Robb 
Files in Sans E Vol.9
“ZSihe same document was also sent to the Secretary of the Council 
on Tribunals who duly promised to circulate it amongst members 
particularly interested in NHS matters. Letter B.Robb to 
A.MacDonald 14.10.69 and his reply 15.10.69 in Robb Files Sans E 
Vol. 6A
27u\jmRC Crossman Diaries CD 76/69 and SW/69/46
28or Baker's connection with Banstead, a hospital featured in 
Sans Everything, did little to assuage Mrs Robb's anxieties about 
the HAS.
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be recruited from NHS working professionals and it was not to 
serve as a complaints mechanism for patients. Inquiries were to 
be discreet and private. The teams would initially concentrate on 
long-stay and mental subnormality hospitals. However, 
disappointingly for Mrs Robb, the service was still intended at 
this stage to serve as the channel for nurses to raise their own 
grievances.29
In the weeks leading up to this announcement, Crossman had 
developed increasing awareness of and respect for Barbara Robb as 
a lobbyist. In so doing, he recorded that he was following Lady 
Serota's lead, who had also been liaising directly with Mrs. Robb 
about her evidence on events at South Ockendon.3® As the press 
carried the announcement of Dr.Baker's appointment, Crossman 
invited him and Mrs Robb to lunch at the House of Lords on the
12th of November.3^ At first Mrs Robb, by now convinced that the
new service would be ineffective, felt disinclined to meet its 
Director. She changed her mind, for reasons explained in her 
account:
"But I now heard that (consequent of my letter of 14th
October) he (Dr.Baker) would not after all be receiving any
complaints (David Roxan of the News of the World, told me 
that Dr.Baker was pleased with me for getting him off the 
hook) ."32
Hence she accepted the invitation for the 12th of November.33 
According to Mrs.Robb's account of this luncheon, she hardly spoke 
to Crossman and spent most of the time in conversation with Alex
29The Times 16.11.69 It was also reported that Dr.Baker had 
signed a three-year contract on £7,500 per year.
3^UWMRC Crossman Diaries JH/69/39
31-Mrs Robb had already accepted an invitation from Lady Serota to 
be her guest at the mental health debate to take place on that 
afternoon.
32Note in Robb Files Sans E V0I.6A. Mrs Robb does not disclose 
her source for this information, however, when the details of the 
HAS were formally published, there had indeed been a change in the 
original intention.
33Ibid
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Baker. He tried unsuccessfully to persuade her to reveal the 
names of the hospitals about which AEGIS had complaints so that he 
"would know where to start". Mrs. Robb could not make this 
information available. Anxious not to criticise the service 
directly on this polite occasion she explained that she always 
respected the confidentiality of her informants, and besides she 
felt that there was no reason to suppose that those against which 
she had had complaints were any worse than others. She had known 
nothing about Farleigh, for example, prior to the story breaking 
in the press. Dr.Baker seemingly accepted this and spoke of his 
plans for the HAS. Mrs Robb congratulated him on his work so far 
and proceeded to give him some advice:
"I said I was sure he realised how important it is that
however painstaking the preparations, theory should always 
give way to experience wherever that shows it to have been 
wrong. The HAS is pioneering. It can't hope to get all its 
planning right from the very start. As I see it, whether it
sinks or swims will largely depend on its ability to make
adjustments in its plans wherever practice is proving this to 
be necessary.
Crossman's account of this meeting is somewhat more colourful:
"Mrs Robb...has always been a terrible danger to us because 
Kenneth Robinson mishandled her....Kenneth Robinson set up 
some .... committees of investigation into her charges, and 
then published the White Paper as a non-controversial 
document which was supposed to answer Mrs Robb and it didn't. 
And it left a very dirty impression. Since then she has 
become a kind of clearing house for all complaints about 
cruelty and torture in the hospitals and she is always 
collecting ammunition for an attack on us. And I knew I must 
try and defuse this time bomb. There is no doubt what we 
have been doing has helped. This setting up of an advisory 
service, the Ely Report.... But this lunch was partly
•^Report in Robb Files Sans E Vol 6A
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important because there I got her to meet Alex Baker and to 
meet me....She was gratified at seeing us and then she spent 
a whole day in the House of Lords hearing...the debate on ... 
mental health and I think we have taken some of the danger 
out of Mrs Robb by that meeting."35
Certainly, AEGIS and Mrs Robb had come along way politically in 
only four y e a r s . 36 Indeed, when details of the plan of operation 
of the HAS were published in March 1970, it was clear that some 
AEGIS ideas had found favour. Teams comprising a consultant, a 
senior nurse, a ward sister, an administrator and social worker 
would be drawn from staff on secondment for periods of one or two 
years. The service would not investigate complaints but would 
advise on deficiencies of management, organisation, and resources 
that gave rise to them. Any member of staff wishing to see teams 
in private could do so, if necessary away from the hospital. 
Emergency teams would also be formed for urgent visits.
At first, the HAS's programme was restricted to longstay 
hospitals. Teams would consider how far a given hospital 
conformed to norms or minimum standards and other national 
policies, and in so doing be as much concerned with human 
relations as physical conditions. The Director would report to 
the Secretary of State and produce an annual report for 
p u b l i c a t i o n . Crossman's policy was that the submission of the 
report would be high profile Ministerial concern; the Secretary of 
State or his deputy, meeting with the RHB Chairman involved to 
discuss the report and reach agreement on action to follow from 
it^S; another policy imposed against the advice of o f f i c i a l s . 39 
Interestingly, and confirming Mrs Robb's fears, almost immediately
35oiaries JH/69/39.
36see also Appendix 2 on the second meeting between Barbara Robb 
and Crossman
37DHSS, Circular HM(70)17, National Health Service Advisory 
Service: Initial Plan of Operation. March 1970
38LetterH.M.Hedley to Sir Desmond Bonham-Carter 16.3.70 SWTRHA 
Archives
39"The hospital division wanted to send the recommendations out 
individually to the RHBs for comment. Crossman wanted "direct 
confrontation" between the top , the RHB chairman and the SAMO.
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on taking office, Keith Joseph delegated this to senior officials 
in the department; although Boards were still required to send in 
reports on action within three months of the meeting in the 
Department.
Handling Hospital Complaints
The Ely Report had listed four criteria for a satisfactory 
complaints procedure: fairness and promptitude; the identification 
of deficiencies of organisation and in individuals; confidence of 
staff; and absence of victimisation. The report felt that the 
existing system denied the likelihood of an organisation resisting 
complaints made against it.^ The object of this critique was 
HM(66)15 which had prescribed a hierarchy of procedures working up 
to regional level and left the hospital authorities and Regional 
Boards to ensure that this was effectively administered.
The lack of preventive measures against victimisation was a 
principal concern for AEGIS. Crossman's Diaries indicate he was 
of a similar mind. There was also other external pressure for 
reform in this area, in which Mrs Robb had had a hand.
In April 1969, the Council on Tribunals published its Annual 
Report for 1968 including criticism of the previous Minister
for failing to use section 70 of the 1948 NHS Act as the mechanism 
for establishing the Sans Everything Inquiries: thereby taking 
them out of the Council's jurisdiction.4-^ The Report also called 
for radical improvements in the machinery for investigating 
complaints against hospitals and medical professionals, arguing 
that any investigation conducted within an organisation could not 
be satisfactory unless it was "clearly seen to bring an 
independent mind to bear on the matter."44 As things stood,
40DS Letter 24.7.70
41NHS:Cmnd 3975, Paras. 469-470
42see above pp.
^ C o u n c i l  on Tribunals, Annual Report for 1968 (London: HMSO,
1969) paras.48-52. Also see chapter 4.
Continued on following page
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those complained against were backed by a competent, closely knit 
organisation, with "a strong sense of solidarity",4  ^
Recommendations for change included standard rules of procedure 
and assistance to applicants to prepare their cases.4*> The 
Council also asked the DHSS to bring these comments to the 
attention of the Working Party4  ^ engaged on drawing up a 
complaints procedure and it was assured that this would be 
done.4®
Medical opinion disliked these proposals, as the BMJ explained:
"... certainly independence is an essential feature of natural 
justice, but the Council on Tribunals seems to have missed 
the point of investigations within a service like the NHS. 
No member of the public is deprived of his rights by the 
present regulations. If he is dissatisfied by the 
investigation of his complaint he can still sue his doctor or 
the hospital in the civil courts, and he can also complain to 
the General Medical Council. The medical profession has a 
long tradition of strict surveillance of the professional 
standards of its members. "4^
Evidence available to the NAMH did not support this confidence. A 
paper by Russell Davis, which was sent in to Crossman, reported a 
constant stream of letters from patients and relatives complaining 
of neglect or lack of consideration in particular hospitals at a 
rate which had increased since the publication of Sans 
Everything.^0 That nursing staff needed better protection was 
accepted throughout the profession.
44ibid para.38
45Ibid para 38
46Ibid paras.43-46
4?PEP and thus, Geoffrey Howe
4®Council on Tribunals, Annual Report for 1969. para.17 
^Editorial BMJ 1969 Vol. 3 no. 5661 p.3 and Supplement p.2 
^ Nursin^ Mirror Vol. 128 no. 25, 20th June 1969 pp.8-9
-178-
Crossman assigned the task of drawing up a more satisfactory
procedure to one of his senior officials. PEP was not happy with 
the first draft submitted in July:
"Just the kind of routine stuff departments put forward. 
Howe thought it was so frightful he was thinking of
resigning".
The official was sent off to think again and reported back in 
October recommending the setting up of working party to re-draft
this. Crossman overruled this suggestion and decided to submit
the second document for consultation with a view to introducing a 
procedure as soon as possible.52 This second effort was largely 
based on a report published by the Scottish Office the previous 
J u l y .53 its components were similar to those of HM(66)15 but 
included the provision of information booklets on procedures for 
relatives and patients.5^
When Crossman made it known that the ideas in the report were 
contained in the document he too was consulting on55f the BMJ 
marginally shifted its position. Although it accepted the need 
for some provision, it dismissed the proposals as a "bureaucratic 
edifice" and "..little more than a placebo for the public and a 
source of irritation and anxiety to doctors and nurses in the
hospital service".56
The document went out on limited circulation in January 1970.57 
It stressed that many complainants had little confidence in the
51-Diaries CD 697 1969
52Diaries SW/69/81
53oisclosed by Crossman the following February, House of Commons
Official Report Vol.796. Written Answers Col.24
5^Scottish Home and Health Department, Report of the Working
Party on Suggestions and Complaints in Hospitals (Edinburgh: HMSO,
1969
55Hnusft of Commons Official Report Vol. 796. Written Answers.
Col.24
56BMJ 1970 Vol. 1 No. 5693 pp.380-1
57rh b 70/3
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ability of hospital management to take an impartial view of a 
complaint, and that this "crisis of confidence" was the motivation 
for a more uniform and better publicised m a c h i n e r y . ^8 For the 
first time, it was announced that a Code of Practice was to be 
drawn up which would include the main principles in the memorandum 
now being issued as an interim measure.^9
Unfortunately, the recommendations which followed were hardly 
commensurate or even consistent with this laudable analysis of the 
problem area. The major responsibility for the initial 
investigation was to remain with hospital authorities through a 
Member designated as "Adviser". This "adviser" would see copies 
of all complaints received, offer advice on procedure and 
participate in investigating any requiring special attention. He 
would ensure that answers given to complainants dealt adequately 
with all the points raised and that serious complaints were made 
known to the C h a i r m a n . T h e  document then constructed the by- 
now familiar hierarchy of channels through which a complainant 
would proceed; from ward sister, to Group Secretary, to the 
adviser, thence to the "higher authority"; envisaged as the 
Regional Board or the Department at least until such time as a 
health service commissioner was appointed.
It conceded that the fear of victimisation should not be 
underestimated, but effectively denied such fears were real and 
rational and asserted that the widespread belief that hospital 
staff closed ranks against criticism was unfounded (emphasis 
added).^2 Hence, it followed that any member of the nursing 
staff wishing to complain could confidently approach his direct 
superior, or, if nervous of this, a nurse manager. This 
complacent document finally performed a complete volte-face by 
addressing itself to possible cases of victimisation when a staff 
member might approach the HAS. However, in such cases, it was to
58Ibid para. 4 
S^Ibid para.4 
60lbid para.8-14 
^llbid paras.19-22 
62jbid para.23
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be made clear that nothing could be done if the complainant 
insisted on anonymity; the involvement of the HAS was assumed to 
act as a safeguard against possible victimisation. Otherwise the 
principles of HM(66)15 were to apply.
There was very little in this document which would have given 
comfort to Barbara Robb and it is therefore, perhaps 
understandable that the Department refused to send her a c o p y . 63 
She therefore relied on a detailed summary published by Chapman 
Pincher, in the Daily Express, to whom a copy had evidently been 
leaked, in preparing her comments for the Department.64 Although 
welcoming the recognition of the present "crisis of confidence" 
AEGIS politely dismissed the interim guidance pointing out that in 
those hospitals where complaints were badly handled, the mere 
existence of an officer designated to deal with them would not 
encourage staff who were fearful of victimisation. A solution to 
this problem lay outside the sphere of the hospital 
authorities.65
Apart from the odd logistical suggestion, and some cosmetic 
drafting which paid lip-service to the findings and 
recommendations of the Ely Report, the memorandum was largely a 
repetition of existing Departmental guidance and machinery. As an 
answer to critics of the existing system, therefore, it was hardly 
adequate.
63nrs Robb approached Abel-Smith and was told that the paper was 
confidential. However she did learn that it was interim guidance 
in advance of the preparation of a Code of Practice. Abel-Smith 
also informed her that the Secretary to the Council on Tribunals 
had had a hand in its preparation. Robb Files: Letter B.Abel- 
Smith to Barbara Robb 13.3.70. in Sans E Vol.5
64pailv Express 31.1.70
65Aegis's comments on the Secretary of State's proposed Guidance 
on Principles and and Code of Practice for Hearing Complaints". 
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The Conduct of Special Inquiries
The Ely Committee and its Chairman had gone on record with a
number of criticisms of the procedure they been obliged to adopt
in conducting their inquiry. These were the denial to the
Chairman of the services of a solicitor, and the practice of the
health authority or the Ministry to edit a Committee's report - 
thus calling into question the independence and integrity of the 
Committee and thereby eroding public confidence in its findings.
Other criticisms now before the Department included those from the 
Council on Tribunals, and Mrs Robb's own catalogue of 
dissatisfactions with the Sans Everything inquiries. Added to this 
was the transparent unfairness of hospital authorities employing 
lawyers from public funds, whilst complainants were obliged to 
meet their own legal fees. As the Royal Commission on Tribunals
of Inquiry had said:
"It is a great hardship that a witness should be left to bear 
the very heavy expenses often incurred in being legally
represented before the Tribunal. After all, the inquiry is
in the public interest, the witness is the Tribunal's 
witness, it is usually just that the witness should be
represented, and his solicitor or counsel are assisting the 
inquiry at arriving at the truth. It is manifestly unfair
that such a witness should be left to face what in a long
inquiry is sometimes a crippling bill of costs."66
Crossman's decision to publish the complete Ely Report arose, in
part from his preference, as a journalist, for full disclosure
following a high profile event such as an Inquiry. Secondly, the 
very fact that he asked Howe to assist in developing a better 
alternative is also evidence that he was impressed by some of the 
other criticisms.
6^House of Commons, Report of the Roval Commission on Tribunals 
of Inquiry. Cmnd 3121, (London: HMSO, 1966) para.60.
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Support for a more formal, legalistic approach to the 
investigation of serious complaints was also voiced by the 
Chairman of the Welsh Regional Hospital Board in a memorandum 
which was widely circulated. This document listed a number of 
dissatisfactions with inquiries at HMC level. Firstly, they 
lacked thoroughness. Secondly, the Committee of Inquiry often 
failed to follow up allegations made at the hearing during the 
course of the inquiry. Thirdly, and perhaps most disturbingly, 
the findings conveyed to the RHB did not always reflect the 
transcript of the evidence. The document then made a number of 
recommendations. All complaints should go directly to the RHB as 
the procedure under HM (66)15 gave too much discretion to the HMC 
and Group Secretary to decide what constituted a serious 
complaint. Investigating committees were currently crammed with 
representatives of all major departments and would operate more 
effectively if restricted to three, one of whom should be a lawyer 
who could bring an impartial mind to bear and avoid the criticism 
that findings favourable to a hospital were a "whitewash". This 
committee should not be specially convened to consider a 
particular complaint but should be more or less a permanent 
standing committee. The final representation related to the 
standard of proof, which, as has been shown, was a point of 
controversy in some of the Sans Everything Committees. The 
document recommended that a strict requirement to prove 
allegations should be applied only in cases where complaints, if 
established, would lead to disciplinary proceedings. In all other 
cases, complaints were to be accepted on the balance of 
probability.^
Despite all this pressure the Department once again succeeded in 
passing a document which made only cosmetic proposals.**®
^ Investigation of Complaints memorandum by the Chairman of the 
Welsh Regional Hospital Board, June 1969
68The status of this document is somewhat ambiguous. It was 
evidently intended both to give guidance, and stimulate discussion 
to inform the drafting of the code of practice. It was therefore 
not a consultation document as such. Indeed, the only follow-up 
arising from it was a brief Dear Secretary Letter issued in June. 
Continued on following page
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Firstly, the procedure in HM(66)15 was largely unchanged. 
Committees of inquiry into serious allegations would remain at 
Regional Board level and comprise "authoritative persons" not 
themselves members of the Board, under an independent chairman. 
Decisions on procedure would be matters of chairman's discretion. 
Included in this was the granting of rights to be represented. It 
claimed that informality, rather than a more legalistic approach, 
was "suited" to hospital inquiries and that Section 70 inquires 
would only be invoked "exceptionally", when powers of subpoena 
were needed. Finally, it was stated that guidance on matters 
such as witnesses' expenses and participants' legal costs would be 
given in the code of practice, "in due course".^9
This document and the memorandum on handling hospital complaints 
have all the marks of drafts by Ministry officials struggling to 
maintain the appearance of consistency in policy. It is therefore 
curious that the Secretary of State allowed them to go out. 
Perhaps this was merely a political expedient which, although 
unsatisfactory would at least diffuse the mounting pressure on the 
administration to be seen to be doing something. Alternatively, 
Crossman himself may not have taken a keen direct interest in 
either document. As they contain only two references to the code 
of practice, and none to the procedure of inquiries, his Diaries 
would support the latter explanation. However, it was
significant, that having decided that the misdemeanors committed 
by individual nurses at Farleigh warranted a inquiry into 
conditions throughout the hospital, Crossman was not prepared to 
put his trust in the much vaunted existing procedure, and invoked 
Section 70 of the NHS Act - a decision which met all the
criticisms. Other committees of inquiry were to become
increasingly formal. For the time being, however, those amongst
Departmental officials whom Mrs. Robb called the "ostriches with
Continued from previous page
This letter once more endorsed HM (66) 15, adding only a request 
that charge nurses should familiarise themselves with the circular 
and that booklets be made available to patients and relatives 
giving details of persons to whom written complaints should be 
addresses. DS Letter RHB Secretaries 70/23, June 1970.
6^A familiar civil servants term to convey lack of urgency.
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their heads buried deep in the s a n d " 70 had won a temporary 
victory.
A Health Service Commissioner
The Ely Report added its voice to the established campaign to 
secure this office originally launched by Abel-Smith in Sans 
Everything. 71 ihe Professor had informally secured Barbara
Robb's agreement that she should lie low for a period in exchange 
for assurances that an effective health commissioner would be 
established and that the Sans Everything Inquiry Reports would be 
reviewed. The Secretary of State told David Roxan in March 1 9 6 9  
that the Government would be proceeding to legislation on it.72 
The Minister of State for Health was a strong s u p p o r t e r . 7 3  
Indeed, the Prime Minister himself was e n t h u s i a s t i c 7 4  and told 
Mrs Robb's principal ally in Parliament in July that Health 
Ministers were ironing out the remaining problems prior to going 
a h e a d . 7 5  Now the likely form of this office had been apparent 
for some time. Firstly the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration (PCA) had been appointed in 1 9 6 7  to deal with 
complaints against central government departments. A complaint 
was handled only if referred through a member of Parliament or "MP 
filter". Evidently, on the evidence of the Department's documents 
on complaints procedure, a parallel role was envisaged for a 
health ombudsman who would not intervene unless the complainant 
had failed to gain satisfactory redress through other channels.
70Robb B., Detecting those sins of the health service. Daily 
Telegraph June 1 3  1 9 6 9  
71cmnd 3 9 7 5  para.4 8 0  
72News of the World 3 0 . 3 . 6 9
73interview with Lady Serota. She was of course subsequently 
appointed Commissioner for Local Government.
7^Crossman warned Wilson that he could not expect to appoint an 
ombudsman for the NHS without running up against medical and 
nursing opinion and therefore advised the PM to reserve his 
position. However Wilson saw it as part of the Government's 
preparation for the Election. UWMRC Crossman Diaries CD 6 7 3  1 9 6 9  
7^Reply to Ben Whittaker MP for Hampstead, House of Commons 
Official Report Vol.7 8 7 . Written Answers 2 2 . 6 . 6 9
- 1 8 5 -
Of course, one of the primary functions anticipated for the office 
by AEGIS was to prevent victimisation by providing a confidential 
channel for complaints for staff and patients alike. This was the 
major theme of a document which Barbara Robb had forwarded to 
Baroness Serota in October 1969.76 It argued the case for the 
ombudsman to handle all complaints which the complainants 
preferred to be heard independently of the hospital concerned. To 
render the Office readily accessible, the central office would 
need regional representatives. These posts required individuals 
who could be trusted implicitly to respect confidence amongst 
nursing staff. This trust would not be forthcoming at first but 
would develop provided experience demonstrated that cases were 
dealt with impartially, and without undue formality. In the case 
of numerous less serious complaints against the same hospital, the 
Commissioner should have discretion to institute a general inquiry 
if judged advisable.
In his announcement to the Commons in July, Harold Wilson had 
disclosed that the final form of the new office would be so 
devised as to complement the functions of the HAS, protect the 
clinical freedom of doctors and fit in with the future structure 
of the health service. Hence, the Government waited until the 
beginning of March 1970, when the full reorganisation proposals 
were ready, before going out to consultation on the health service 
commissioner.77
This time AEGIS received a copy of the consultation document and 
an invitation to comment.78 As expected, it was intended that 
the great majority of complaints in the hospital service would 
continue to be dealt with by the responsible hospital authority. 
The Commissioner would be there as an independent person to whom a 
complaint of maladministration could be taken if - and only if
76a e GIS, The Hospital Advisory Service and the Hospital 
Commissioner Robb Files: Sans E Vol.9 
77n h s The Future Structure of the National Health Service: DHSS
1970 paras 95-98
7®DHSS Proposals for a Health Commissioner Enclosure with DS 
Letter 26.2.70
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satisfaction had no been obtained from the health authority 
itself. This "filter" would, it was argued, both recognise the 
the authority's responsibility for dealing with complaints as an 
integral function of management, and avoid grievances going to the 
Commissioner unnecessarily. As with the Parliamentary 
Commissioner, complainants with the right of appeal to a tribunal 
or remedy through the courts would not be eligible except in 
circumstances where it was unreasonable to expect the complainant 
to have resorted to it.
Again echoing the terms of reference of the PCA, investigations 
would be conducted into allegations that maladministration had 
caused hardship or injustice" to those using the NHS79: this
function would be widely interpreted, but generalised complaints 
about alleged deficiencies would not be included. The 
Commissioner would work mainly through correspondence and 
interview, but would be given the power to arrange hearings and 
compel anyone with evidence to attend. Findings would be 
presented as reports to the complainant and the authority which 
would be published on the Commissioner's discretion.®® 
Complainants would be patients, or individuals such as staff, 
relatives and friends acting on their behalf.
It was also proposed that the Commissioner should review some 
aspects of the work of doctors, not their clinical judgement as 
such but ".... in so far as it was necessary for him to form a view 
on whether the professional person concerned had put himself in a 
position to make a reasonable judgement and had acted upon it". 
In such cases the Commissioner would seek the opinion of a 
professional adviser or panel of advisers. Finally the 
appointment would be for a fixed term "to provide the necessary 
measure of independence". Some of AEGIS' suggestions had 
evidently found favour. Firstly local offices and, possibly, 
regional assistants, were envisaged.8^ More importantly, the
79Ibid para.6
80Ibid para 9
81Ibid para.4
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HAS was to be empowered to refer cases N.. since it is not 
intended that the Advisory Service should itself investigate 
individual complaints and the reference of a complaint to the 
health authority might sometimes be inappropriate".(emphasis
added)82
The proposal to give the Commissioner jurisdiction over aspects of 
the conduct of doctors might have been expected to run into a 
united opposition front from the profession. In fact, medical 
opinion was divided. The BMA's Central Committee for Hospital 
Medical Services (CCHMS) rejected the idea out of hand.83
However, the Association's primary policy-making body, the Central 
Council, introduced a note of qualification into its otherwise 
hostile reaction to the scheme; a reaction at least partly
precipitated by anger at the Government's failure to involve it at 
an earlier stage.
"As with the extensions of the advisory service , a decision 
appears to have been taken on undisclosed grounds. The only 
information the Council had received is that contained in 
outline of the Secretary of State's proposals...which
...nowhere states the grounds upon which such an appointment 
is considered necessary. Reference is made in the outline to 
relatively trivial matters... (which) can perfectly well be 
dealt with by other means. In more serious matters the 
present system already provides for an independent inquiry to 
be held..." 84
Despite the document's clear exemption of matters of clinical 
judgement, the Committee sensed a veiled threat. If the proposals 
were adopted:
82Ibid para 10
83Lancet (i), no. 7650, 10.4.70, p.759
84The first annual report of the HAS revealed that it may visit 
general hospitals once It had covered the longstay sector. NHS 
Hospital Advisory Service Op.Cit. The Council made known its 
strong opposition to this without full discussion and consultation 
in the light of experience of the Service. BMJ 1970, Vol. 2, No. 
3402, 11.4.70, Supplement p.14
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"... the trust respect and mutual rapport which should
characterise doctor/patient understanding will be damaged. 
Working under suspicion can be destructive of the best effort 
and when tragic and irrecoverable illness is ascribed to 
medical incompetence, the doctor's work becomes 
impossible...
" For all these reasons, the Council ...cannot accept the
proposal unless and until stronger arguments are 
forthcoming."®^
This view was attacked as "occupational obscurantism" by The 
Lancet and as "the usual biased, illogical and eccentric claims" 
in a letter from Dr .Whitehead, published in the same edition.®** 
Another leading voice of hospital doctors accused the Central 
Committee of alarming the public and reinforcing reliance on ".. 
their unofficial ombudsman, the press and television..".®^ The 
press also cited an unnamed SAMO to the effect that Regions would 
cooperate provided the doctor's role was not undermined.®®
The Royal College of Nursing declared itself firmly in favour in a
report to the Secretary of State which, although supporting the 
proposed authority filter, argued strongly that the Commissioner 
should be as available to staff as to patients.®^ The Institute 
of Hospital Administrators, although not altogether enthusiastic, 
nevertheless informed Crossman that it would not specifically 
oppose the proposals.^0
®^British Medical Journal 1970 Vol. 2 No. 5701, 11th April 1970 
Supplement p. 28
8®Lancet 1970 (i) No. 7550, 11th April 1970 p.759. Whitehead's 
letter in same edition p. 774
®^Medical News Tribune Editorial 17.4.70
®®The Daily Telegraph (4.4.70) argued that the resistance of 
organised medicine would seriously impede the government, whereas 
The Observer (19.4.70) took the view that with the representatives 
of nursing and hospital administration cooperating, Crossman could 
easily override the doctors.
®9pbserver 19.4.70
^Report of their annual conference in British Hospital Journal 
Continued on following page
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Mrs Robb decided to call together her close advisers. On this 
occasion, Barton and Whitehead were joined by Theo Fitzwalter
Butler once more at the Royal Society of Medicine. Mrs Robb then 
drafted the response and Fitzwalter Butler amended it before it 
was submitted on April 14th 1970. To ensure that their 
suggestions were public knowledge, Mrs Robb again secured space 
for an lengthy article in the Daily Telegraph.91 Although 
gratified that regional offices were being contemplated, there 
was really only one issue for AEGIS.
Direct Access for complainants was essential. Otherwise many 
would not come forward, as they would have no grounds for 
expecting anything better than the familiar "whitewash". Many 
complainants did not have the means to employ legal advice and 
would therefore not risk the serious consequences of complaining. 
Equally importantly, giving hospital authorities the effective 
right to deal with all initial complaints carried the risk that 
the "wrong sort of hospital" would tamper with the evidence 
relating to serious grievances before the Commissioner had access 
to it. No, the Commissioner was the proper agent for the 
reception of all complaints; there was after all, nothing to 
prevent there being a registrar attached to the office to to 
filter out the more frivolous or less serious allegations.
If the Secretary of State refused to recognise this and went ahead 
as proposed he would bring disaster down onto the whole project. 
Experience had by now amply demonstrated:
"...that when hospital authorities act as their own judges 
and juries in respect of complaints about the hospitals for 
which they are responsible, too often they find that the
Continued from previous page
and Social Service Review. Vol.80 No. 4173, 10.44.70 p.653
9lRobb R., Crossman's Ombudsman Daily Telegraph 29.5.70
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cheapest and easiest solution is to sweep the complaint under 
the carpet."92
It also reminded the Crossman administration that the author of 
the relevant chapter in Sans Everything was now the Secretary of 
State's Special Adviser.9^
With the evident isolation of and division within medical opinion 
the press debated whether or not the Government could proceed with 
confidence. According to The Observer, the BMA had decided to 
review its position with a view to adopting a more cooperative 
line and the paper believed that with the support of the regions, 
hospital administrators as a whole, and the nurses would allow it 
to proceed with confidence. In contrast, The Daily Telegraph 
argued that the resistance of the medical profession would 
successfully obstruct the Government. This seemed more reliable 
after Crossman told the Commons in February that he had promised 
the doctors that he would not finalise the health commissioner 
proposals until experience had been gained in the working of the 
advisory service and the complaints procedure.9^ However, such 
speculations became academic since, as in the case of other policy 
initiatives instigated by Crossman, the June election curtailed 
consultation on the health commissioner and it was to require 
further scandals to precipitate the "stronger arguments" called 
for by the BMA, before the office became a reality. Even so, it 
was clear at this stage, that Mrs Robb and her AEGIS advisers 
faced a dogged, uphill struggle if they were to gain acceptance of 
their proposals.
92AEGIS' comments on the Secretary of State's "Proposals for a 
Health Commissioner in the Reorganised National Health Service" 
Robb Files Sans E Vol.6A 
9^Ibid
9 H^ouse of Commons Official Report. Vol 750 Col. 1360-1361. 
debate on mental health 11.2.70
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CHAPTER EIGHT
A PARTIAL VICTORY
"Most hospital patients are not ill-treated or abused. 
But when poor conditions prevail it is very likely to 
happen. Poor conditions still do prevail at most 
mental hospitals and it is very difficult for nurses 
to give sympathy if they themselves are being pushed 
to physical and mental limits. 1 don't think most 
people realise how desperate the situation is."
An unnamed nurse at Whittingham Hospital quoted in the 
Nursing Times of 17th February 1972.
Labour lost the General Election of June 1970, but the issues 
which AEGIS had championed remained high on the political agenda 
at DHSS not least because Sir Keith Joseph demonstrated as much 
commitment to reform as his more publicity-conscious predecessor. 
This was initially reflected in the endorsement and further 
development of the priorities and minimum standards policies and 
the publication of the mental handicap strategy which Crossman had 
initiated. At the same time, the Hospital Advisory Service turned 
its attention to services for the mentally ill and the elderly. 
These developments are documented to 1974, in the first section of 
this chapter.
Though the campaign for improved complaints machinery, 
particularly for the health service commissioner, still faced an 
unenthusiastic medical establishment in 1970, it was reinforced by 
more official revelations about maltreatment and neglect in 
Farleigh and Whittingham hospitals, published over the following 
two years. The procedures of the committees of inquiry in the 
next phase demonstrated significant success for Howe's campaign to 
establish due process in procedure. Moreover, the reports were to 
identify further deficiencies in national policy and expand the 
debate outside the concerns originally identified by AEGIS. The
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second section of this chapter documents these further scandals 
which led to AEGIS' partial victory when the Secretary of State 
presented proposed legislation to Parliament to establish a health 
service commissioner as part of the 1973 NHS Reorganisation Bill.
Priorities, the mental handicap strategy, interim standards and 
the Hospital Advisory Service
In November 1970, AEGIS was able to welcome the announcement of 
additional funding earmarked for mental handicap, mental illness 
and elderly services. The Secretary of State had obtained 
Treasury approval for accelerating the growth in spending on the
health and social services over and above that planned by the
previous government from 4.7% to 6% at constant pay and 
prices.^
The extra resources complemented the strategy, largely drafted by 
Abel-Smith, which Crossman's successor committed himself to 
publish in the early Spring of 1971^ - although it finally
appeared in June. The significant difference from the earlier 
draft was apparently the omission of any reference to the
scandals. The White Paper Better Services for the Mentally
Handicapped simply ignored the Ely Report and presented the new 
policy in seamless DHSS drafting as the natural progression from 
the 1959 reforms.^
1-DHSS, Letter A.B. Marre (Second Permanent Under-Secretary) to 
RHB Chairman, 16.11.70
^Repy to Richard Crossman, House of Commons Official Report Vol. 
791. 4.11.70, col. 1106
^DHSS, Better Services for the Mentally Handicapped. Cmnd 4681, 
(London: HMSO, 1971)
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Better Services was the first systematic care group strategy 
formulated for the NHS. For the first time, DHSS provided health 
and local authorities with a policy framework which listed 
criteria for a satisfactory service, beginning with prevention and 
early detection and moving across a range of support services 
through to local residential and hospital provision. Services 
were to be based on aggregated assessments of the needs of 
individuals and jointly planned by health and local authorities. 
Finally targets for places in education, day care, residential 
care and NHS hospital beds were set and compared with existing 
provision. These targets envisaged a huge expansion in day care 
in the community, and a reduction by half of that provided in 
hospitals. The level of residential care across the two sectors 
was to increase marginally, with a parallel shift from hospital to 
community.
Significantly, the document set no timetable for the achievement 
of targets. However, the Government was confident that its 
revised revenue and capital plans would both support the policy to 
the end of the financial year 1974 and also achieve the minimum 
standards set by Crossman (although to do so entailed further 
marginal increase to the mental handicap budget).4
The extra money for the mentally ill was linked to supplementary 
policy guidance issued in December 1971. The Government also 
extended the minimum standards policy into this and the geriatric 
sectors. The circular Hospital Services for the Mentally 111 was 
mainly concerned with administrative arrangements in the large 
hospitals to facilitate the change to local services and the type 
of service envisaged in the increasing numbers of district general 
hospital psychiatric departments both open and planned.^ 
Although these developments were widely perceived as the more 
progressive element in mental health policy, the policy was then 
entirely devoted to short-stay, acute psychiatric services.
4Ibid pp.205-7 and 230
5DHSS, Circular HM(71)97
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This guidance was diversified by recommendations on the needs of 
the elderly mentally ill, issued the following year. Firstly, a 
DS letter criticised the operational policy in some mental illness 
hospitals of designating wards occupied by elderly patients as
geriatric contrary to departmental policy.** The Memorandum on
Services for Mental Illness Related to Old Age, issued as a Pink 
Circular, followed with recommendations for levels of bed and day 
places for people with dementia.7
The close monitoring of RHBs' progress towards achieving 
Crossman's interim standards continued under Joseph as RHBs were
asked to submit their plans up to year-end 1973.® The policy
was also extended when minimum standards for mental illness and 
geriatric hospitals were sent out in March 1972, despite 
complaints in advance from RHB Secretaries that there would be 
difficulties in finding the resources to meet them.^ The 
accompanying letters stressed that these were not optimum desired 
standards but rather the minimum tolerable. Regions were asked to 
achieve domestic staffing levels within a year in order to reduce 
the burden on nurses and allow them more time for direct patient 
care. All others were to be met by the end of 1974.
The impetus to extend minimum standards into these sectors came 
from the succession of reports submitted by the Hospital Advisory 
Service (HAS) during its first two years. In his second Annual 
Report as D i r e c t o r , ^  Dr Baker singled out geriatric hospital 
services as requiring the greatest concentration of effort and
6DHSS, Circular, DS/F/G54/48 dated 7.3.72 
^DHSS, Circular HM(72)71 issued October 1972 
^Circular, DS 65/71 dated 28.12.71
^DHSS, Notes of the Meeting of RHB Secretaries 31.1.72 and 
Circular DS Letter 95/72 dated 29.3.72 
10DHSS, NHS Hospital Advisory Service, Annual Report for the Year 
1971. (London: HMSO, 1971)
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resources. Conditions in geriatric hospitals were often poor and 
thousands of patients were blocking beds in general hospitals. 
Specialist geriatricians were hampered by enormous caseloads and 
inadequate nurse staffing levels.
The HAS completed a survey of all mental handicap hospitals in 
October 1971, and reported its findings in its second Annual 
Report which observed that although there was widespread evidence 
of good practice, conditions in some hospitals remained 
"appallingly bad". More protracted comment was reserved for the 
mental illness and geriatric sectors. This deplored the practice 
in many large psychiatric hospitals of "dumping" chronic and 
other longstay patients on hospital back wards, whilst the units 
in general hospitals creamed off the more easily managed 
patients.
Interestingly, during the HAS' first two years, both the 
Department and the regional boards became dissatisfied with 
Crossman's procedure for handling reports. As a consequence, in 
the spring of 1972, its Director and the senior civil servants 
agreed some changes which by accident or design seemed likely to 
blunt the impact of the HAS. Originally, the reports were 
submitted to the Secretary of State and a meeting held at DHSS 
between the Department and the Regional Board in which the 
report's main principles were discussed and decisions reached on 
responsibility for further action. Crossman had intended senior 
Ministerial representation at these meetings. The Department now 
argued that the workload deriving from Advisory Service visits was 
too excessive to permit involvement of the Secretary of State in 
the follow-up to every visit. In future, therefore, the 
Department would restrict its role to writing to RHBs for follow- 
up reports on specific issues arising from visits, as it 
considered appropriate. Moreover any strong criticism of HMCs and 
senior hospital staff was to be forwarded separately to the main 
report and circulated far less widely.^ Although it may have
H-SWTRHA Archives, RHB Secretaries Agenda for Meeting on 11.4.72 
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been impractical for a busy Minister to be personally involved in 
every report, it nevertheless appeared in April 1972 that his 
"eyes and ears" would henceforth have to function at two or more 
paces removed, mediated through DHSS officials.
Complaints Machinery
As noted in the previous chapter, Crossman had in 1970 used 
section 70 of the NHS Act to establish a committee of inquiry into 
allegations of ill treatment at Farleigh Hospital in Somerset. 
The report was submitted to the Department in November 1970, but 
failed to appear until April 1971. The Secretary of State took 
advantage of the delay to appoint a committee to review the one 
policy field where Crossman's initiatives had run into the ground: 
complaints machinery. It is difficult not to deduce that this 
announcement in February 1971^ was intended to cushion the 
predictable response to the overdue publication of the Farleigh 
Report.
This conclusion seemed still more plausible when it was announced 
that Mary Applebey, a member of the Farleigh inquiry, was also to 
serve on this new "independent and authoritative" committee. The 
Chairman was Michael Davies, a prominent, senior barrister, 
Recorder of Derby and Chairman of the Birmingham Mental Health 
Review Tribunal. This was a clear signal that the review was 
intended to assess NHS complaints procedure on legal criteria. 
Although the Department reassured regional boards that the 
Secretary of States wished to achieve "a balanced membership"^ ,
Continued from previous page
^ House of Commons. Official Report Vol.810. Written Answers. 
Col.308, 3.2.71,
l^DHSS Circular, DS letter headed "Hospital Complaints Procedure" 
dated 3.2.71
-197-
other appointees evidenced that the committee was constructed to 
produce a sympathetic view of the need for reform. They included 
included John Revans from Wessex RHA and former member of 
Crossman's Post-Ely Policy group, Prof. Kathleen Bell, a member 
of the Council on Tribunals and two prominent campaigning 
journalists, Anne Shearer, of The Guardian, and Barry Askew the 
editor of The Lancashire Evening Post who was playing a prominent 
role in the Whittingham Hospital Inquiry, of which more later. 
Although there were also six members or senior officers of health 
authorities, any conservative coalition they might have wished to 
form was unlikely to dominate the 15-strong committee.
Evidence was collected from all RHBs, Boards of Governors, HMCs, 
and 57 interested organisations and individuals of the 117 
selected by the committee. Printed alphabetically, the list was 
headed by Brian Abel-Smith and AEGIS, and also included the 
Chairmen of the Whittingham Inquiry, and the Sans Everything 
Inquiry at F r i e m . ^  There was no direct approach made to Sir 
Geoffrey Howe, now Solicitor General, however he gave his 
permission for the Council on Tribunals to forward a copy of the 
memorandum listing his dissatisfactions with the Department's 
arrangements for the Ely Inquiry and his recommendations for 
reform. ^  In addition, the committee commissioned its own 
surveys of 455 former in-patients and 550 former outpatients, 
interviewed in their homes by questionnaire, and case studies of a 
mental handicap, a psychiatric, a geriatric, a district general 
and a teaching hospital. These employed questionnaires and 
unstructured interviews, to measure the views of staff, patients 
and relatives on attitudes, procedures, and practices, relating to
l^DHSS, Report of the Committee on Complaints Procedure. (London: 
DHSS, 1973) Appendix 3, pp.112-13
l^Ibid, para. 9.32
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complaints.^  Davies also took oral evidence from Sir Alan Marre 
as designate Health Service Commissioner and Dr. Alex Baker as 
outgoing Director of the HAS.U
For once AEGIS and Abel-Smith submitted separate comments, 
subsequently exchanging copies.Understandably, there was much 
common ground. Mrs Robb prepared the AEGIS evidence with 
Dr.Whitehead and Fitzwalter-Butler. It took three months to 
compile, comprised 3,500 words plus appendix, and was finally 
submitted in August 1971.^ She enclosed with it a copy of her 
survey of the findings of the Sans Everything White Paper to 
reinforce her case against the existing procedure which made up 
the greater part of AEGIS' evidence.
AEGIS was highly dissatisfied with the procedures for special 
inquiries laid down under the extant Circular, HM(66)15 and argued 
that serious complaints in need of special investigation should be 
the subject of a Section 70 inquiry and that the decision on 
whether such a course was taken should rest not with the health 
authority, but with a health service commissioner, when and if one 
was appointed.
Assuming a commissioner with adequate powers and whom the 
dissatisfied complainant could approach directly, AEGIS was 
content for hospital authorities to handle the less serious 
complaints and felt that the first point of contact should be the 
senior ward nurse; patients and relatives having been supplied 
with literature on how a complaint should be made including 
instructions for approaching the commissioner.
16Ibid para. 5.3
l^Dr Baker was succeded by Dr E. Woodford-Williams in September 
1973
^ C o r r e s p o n d e n c e  in Robb Files Sans E. Vol. 6b Section 8 
l^Robb, b., Aegis replies to the Davies Committee Proforma in 
Robb Files Sans E. Vol. 6B Section 8
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Abel-Smith's emphasis on this issue was less hostile to hospital 
authorities. He argued that they should have primary 
responsibility for the initial handling of complaints, but that 
complainants should have free access to the commissioner if still 
dissatisfied. Moreover the commissioner would need powers to 
override this in certain instances to avoid the 'judge and jury' 
problem. These included cases when the complainant feared 
victimisation, where the complaint was sufficiently serious, 
where the hospital complained against had been the subject of an 
abnormal number of grievances, and, lastly, where the HAS had a 
low opinion of the hospital authority or had reported adversely on 
its standards of care. Submitted prior to the passage of the 
reorganisation bill, both AEGIS and Abel-Smith set out their 
criteria for an effective ombudsman.^0
The Davies Report, published in December 1973. was the first 
comprehensive review of the entire policy area since AEGIS had 
brought it to the political fore eight years earlier. Although 
Davies' criticisms of the existing system and recommendations for 
change in every sphere did not wholly concur with those promoted 
by AEGIS, they came as close to so doing as Mrs Robb could have 
dared expect. As such the Davies proposals were a major 
development over and above internal thinking in DHSS under the 
previous government and, ironically, rather vindicated those 
officials brushed aside by Crossman for advising him that the 
issue was best referred to a special working party.
The Davies Report was wide-ranging and radical both in its 
critique of existing arrangements and proposals for change, and 
was not well received in key centres of influence. It appeared in 
the midst of the miner's strike and the three-day week which 
contributed to the defeat of the Heath Government in the election 
of February 1974. Sir Keith told the Commons that his department
^Abel-Smith, B. Hospital Complaints Procedure Committee 
(unpublished), Copy in Robb Files Sans E Vol. 6B.
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would need to consult widely on the recommendations, some of which 
were "controversial" and in need of "considerable thought".21 
However he hoped to be able to announce guidance for health 
authorities soon. Of course the February election of 1974 put an 
end to any such aspirations.
His successor Mrs Barbara Castle was not destined to introduce 
speedy reforms. In April 1974, the Council of the BMA told the 
Secretary of State that although it accepted Davies as a basis for 
discussion, it needed more time to produce a considered 
r e s p o n s e . 22 With such unsupportive reactions from medical
lobbies, it is hardly surprising that even in November, the 
Secretary of State was still unable to make a statement.In June 
1975, the national conference of Hospital Medical Staffs, passed a 
motion rejecting the report as a "discriminatory document" which 
would, if implemented, "turn the hospital service into a 
complaints-oriented o r g a n i s a t i o n " .23 Indeed, the emergence of 
proposals arising from the report's appearance had to wait until 
1976; by which time, most of the more radical recommendations had 
disappeared without trace. The content of the Davies Report and 
its destiny are discussed in detail in Chapter 11.
The momentum of scandal
Early in its administration, the Heath Government had appeared to 
show little enthusiasm for the health service commissioner 
proposal. As shown earlier, the medical establishment was firmly 
opposed. However, the pressure which mounted between 1970 and
2lHouse of Commons, Official Report. Written Answers Vol.866 Col. 
272, 17.12.72
22gMJ 1974 Vol. 2 No. 5911, 20.4.74 Supplement p.21 and No. 5912 
27.4.74, Supplement p.38 
23National Conference of Hospital Medical Staffs report in BMJ 
1974 Vol. 2, No. 5291, Supplement 29.6.74, p.133
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1972 pushed both the government and the BMA into accepting the 
case for the proposed new office.
The Farleigh Report, published in 1971, was the first case in the 
second wave of major scandals. Farleigh in Somerset was part of 
a group of hospitals which housed some 900 mentally handicapped 
patients, located 42 miles from the headquarters of its management 
committee. Problems at the hospital first emerged in the public 
sphere in January 1969, when the local press reported that police 
were investigating irregularities at the hospital.^ With Fleet 
Street hot on the trail of scandal stories, detailed reports 
appeared in most of the national dailies in February and March. 
A former policeman, who was by then a student nurse at the 
hospital, had complained that he had seen patients punched and 
ducked in cold water baths. Following initial investigations, the 
HMC had called in the police. The complainant, Mr Saunders, was 
suspended on full pay and his wife, a state enrolled nurse, who 
had also been working at the hospital since the previous August, 
was dismissed.
In an article in April 1970, The Sunday Times had contrasted the 
suspension of Mr Saunders with the fact that a nurse whom he had 
complained against and had since landed in jail was allowed to 
continue to work until the time of the inquest. A senior member 
of the hospital staff then wrote to the paper protesting that Mr 
Saunders' suspension had nothing to do with his complaint but was 
due to his having "failed to comply with instructions, used bad 
language, and was generally insubordinate". Having consulted 
Russell Barton, Mrs Robb sent the Paper a statement arguing that 
if these allegations had substance and action was needed, 
Mr Saunders should have been sacked and not suspended on full pay 
at the taxpayer's expense.
Indeed the Guardian had reported on the 12th August 1969 that Mr 
Saunders had been awarded an exemplary conduct certificate on
2^Western Evening News 29.1.69
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leaving the police. As Mrs Robb noted at the time, this was 
hardly consistent with the hospital's assertion that he was 
predisposed to insubordination. Moreover, the events at Farleigh 
having persuaded him against pursuing a nursing career, he was re­
employed by the police without any hesitation.25
They continued to live in hospital accommodation and made further 
complaints of intimidation and threats, including having stones 
thrown at them by local children.26 Mrs Saunders then alleged 
brutality by nursing staff against patients. The Deputy Secretary 
of the RHB referred her to the Chief Nursing Officer who offered 
her reinstatement on condition that she withheld her allegations. 
She refused and complained of unfair dismissal but her grievance 
was not investigated. Following an approach to the Group 
Secretary, the couple made an official complaint and the police 
were brought in. 2?
The police ordered the exhumation of the bodies and an inquest 
into the deaths. The proceedings were closely followed by the 
press particularly attracted by evidence given by Mr.Saunders that 
patients were 'used as punchballs'. It made good headline 
copy.28 As a result, nine nurses were charged and appeared at
25see also The Times. The Daily Telepraph of 25.8.69 and The 
Daily Telegraph 28.8.69
26see particularly the Reports in The Sunday Mirror 2.2.69 and 
The Daily Express of 31.3.69; also 20.3.69 editions of The Times. 
The Guardian. The Daily Mail and The Daily Mirror
27dHSS, Report of the Farleigh Hospital Inouirv. Cmnd 4567 
(London: HMSO, 1971) para.137
2®See The Times. Guardian. Daily Telegraph. Daily Mail. Daily 
Mirror. Daily Sketch. Daily Expresss. editions of 12th, 13th, 
14th, 15th, 16th and 18th March 1970 and Observer and Sunday Times 
of 17th March 1970
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Potishead Magistrates Court, where three were cleared and six 
referred for trial at Somerset A s s i z e s . 29 During March, detailed 
daily reports of proceedings were carried in the national press.
Of the six nurses tried, three were jailed on manslaughter
charges. Meanwhile, nursing staff at the hospital wrote to 
Crossman, protesting at the suspicion cast over them by these 
events.3®
When the trial was over, Crossman established a Section 70
inquiry.3^ By so doing, he satisfied the criticisms lodged
against previous inquiries by AEGIS, Geoffrey Howe (a member of 
his PEP working party) and the Council on Tribunals. A Section 70 
inquiry had powers to subpoena witnesses, was fully serviced by 
the Treasury Solicitor and of course, was subject to the scrutiny 
of the Council on Tribunals. Furthermore, the inquiry was held in 
public and therefore followed in great detail by the press. 
Chaired by Tasker Watkins QC, the Committee had included Mary 
Applebey, General Secretary of the NAMH.
In the first of a what was to become a succession of similar 
cases, the specific incidents of ill-treatment took place on the 
hospital's secure w a r d . ^2 These incidents were only symptoms of
a much deeper malaise at Farleigh.33
The Report provided further evidence in support of the case for 
granting direct access to a health commissioner. Many of the
29ihe Times. Guardian, and Daily Telegraph of 11.12.69 
30The Times. Daily Telegraph of 6.9.69
31-There had of course been Section 70 inquiries into other issues 
such as the Sheldon Hospital Fire (see Appendix 3)
32d hSS, Cmnd 4567, op.cit. Chapter 2
33Ibid paras. 17-34
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interests who supported the general proposal argued that a 
hospital authority should first be given the chance to investigate 
a complaint. However, the Farleigh Report documented further 
examples of senior hospital staff resisting complaints by their 
juniors. The hospital's internal procedure was little more than 
cosmetic given that the CNO decided whether serious complaints 
should be handled at hospital level (and thus by himself) or 
referred to the Group Secretary. The system therefore both 
deterred staff complaints and militated against participation by 
members of the HMC. Attempts by junior staff to register 
complaints were brushed aside by their seniors and the CNO who 
used intimidation and victimisation particularly against those 
whose complaints eventually led to the police charges.34
It was this kind of incident which led the Committee of Inquiry to 
interpret its brief widely and to make recommendations about 
national policy:
"...the history of complaints made at Farleigh, and the 
manner in which they were handled, demonstrates to our mind 
the need for an independent authority to which the 
unsatisfied complaints by or against staff can be taken. 
The authority should be armed with the widest possible 
powers...."35
34In 1968 an SEN who had been dismissed from her post complained 
to the Deputy Secretary of the RHB of staff brutality against 
patients on North Ward. The RHA referred her to the CNO who 
offered to her reinstatement on condition that she withheld her 
allegations. She refused and then complained of unfair dismissal 
but her complaint was not investigated. In November that year, 
her husband, a student at Farleigh, was suspended, allegedly for 
bad language. Following an approach to the Group Secretary the 
couple made an official complaint and the police were brought in. 
Ibid para. 137
35Ibid para. 150
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In the same context the Report called for an urgent decision on 
the appointment of an independent health commissioner.3**
When he presented the Report to Parliament in early April 1971, 
the Secretary of State attempted a low-key response through the 
medium of a Written Answer which promised consideration of the 
health commissioner proposal3^, and he was criticised for this 
tactic across the floor of the House.3® However, the press and 
professional journals were by now highly tuned to the issue; AEGIS 
supporters figuring strongly amongst those contributing articles 
and correspondence.
As with the Ely Report, the coverage of the findings of the 
Farleigh Inquiry was enormous. The national dailies were firmly 
on the side of AEGIS and unanimous in their call for a health 
ombudsman.3  ^ The Sunday Times was typical in pointing out that 
the case for an independent complaints machinery dated back to the 
publication of Sans Everything and that if the Farleigh Report did 
not give rise to it then it was difficult to envisage 
circumstances that w o u l d . P r o f e s s i o n a l  opinion was somewhat 
diverse. The Lancet supported the Committee's recommendations.4^ 
The Royal Society of Health also came out strongly in favour at
36Ibid para. 151
^ House of Commons Official Report Vol. 815. Written Answers col. 
1873
^ House of Commons Official Report Vol. 815 cols. 181-2 (7.4.71)
3^See reports, leaders and parliamentary pages of editions of 6th 
April 1871, The Times. The Daily Telegraph. The Guardian and Daily 
Mail editions of The Sunday Times and Observer of 11th April 1971
^ The Sunday Times 11.4.71
41The Lancet. 1971 (i) no. 7703, 17th April 1971 pp.790-1
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its Annual Congress later in April.4  ^ Similarly, the official 
journal of the Institute of Health Service Administrators, The 
Hospital. drawing parallels between Farleigh and Put Away,
strongly supported the health commissioner proposal, although its 
reaction to the report's other recommendations was rather
lukewarm.4^ The Ren welcomed the Report and called for more 
staff and better facilities.44 In its editorial the Nursing Times 
called for an ombudsman with sufficient powers.4^
The BMA led the opposition. The BMJ acknowledged that the
report's views warranted a thorough airing, however it failed to 
see what purpose could be served by the appointment of a Health 
Commissioner.
"This is a politician's way of remedying defects. If
something goes wrong appoint an official. But it will not 
heal the wound itself, and that is public indifference... It 
is tempting to shut away a mentally defective person, forget 
about him, and appoint a Health Commissioner to see he is 
all right."46
In the summer, at the Association's annual representative 
conference, the Chairman of the General Council dismissed the 
proposal as a "natural sequence to obsession with lay 
management".4  ^ The main argument against was the need to
4^Royal Society of Health Annual Congress at Eastbourne, 21.4.71 
as reported in The Daily Telegraph 22.4.71
4^The Hospital. May 1971 Vol. 67 No. 5 p.144
44Nursin^ Times Vol.67 no. 16, 22.4.71, p.466
45Ibid. p. 463
46BMJ 1971 Vol. 2 no. 5754, 17.4.71, p.119
4^Held 21 to 24.7.71, BMJ Supplement 31.7.71 no. 3471 p.45-6
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maintain the influence of doctors, already subject to four 
separate complaints procedures (the HAS now having been added to 
those previously listed). Naturally, the profession maintained it 
was protecting that influence not for its own sake but for the 
welfare of patients.
As the world received the Farleigh Report, another committee of 
inquiry was sitting at Whittingham Hospital, near Preston. To 
maintain the impetus of the debate until its report was published, 
both Prof. Abel-Smith and Barbara Robb published articles, 
prepared after mutual consultation, pressing for a health 
commissioner. Abel-Smith chose the columns of New Society^land 
Barbara Robb those of the Daily Telegraph^  - nQw a more 
appropriate outlet for pressure on the government given the change 
in ruling party.
Fleet Street kept up the pressure by hunting down 'scandal 
hospital' stories. In May 1971, the Morning Star got in on the 
act by reporting allegations of neglect and ill-treatment at 
Calderstones Hospital, near the Blackburn constituency of the 
Opposition spokesman on social services, Barbara Castle.^0 
Members of the hospital staff had alleged poor standards of 
patient care, and specific incidents including patients having 
their teeth extracted without anaesthetic and still more serious 
neglect leading to the death of a patient. The Manchester RHB,
^®Abel-Smith, B.A. A Hospital Ombudsman, New Society. Vol.17 No. 
447, 22.4.71 pp. 672-74
In a subsequent article, Abel-Smith advocated widening the powers 
of the HAS, renamed the Health Advisory Service, to include giving 
advice on management and all aspects of the services provided by 
heatlh authorities. Abel-Smith, B., Managing the Health Service, 
New Society Vol. 17 No. 448 29.4.71, pp.721-22 
^Robb, b ., The aged in care, quid custodiet, Daily Telegraph. 
May 26th, 1971 
^ Morning Star 19.5.71
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already embroiled in the Whittingham affair, held a day-long 
inquiry and published an edited version of the committee's report. 
Dr Whitehead sent it to Mrs Robb who enlisted the support of David 
Roxan of the News of the World. Between them they made life most 
uncomfortable for the Regional Board for some weeks until 
uncharacteristically, they allowed the issue to d r o p . ^ l
The following October, with the publication of the Whittingham 
Report imminent, other journalists maintained the momentum. A 
Daily Mail reporter related his experiences as a nursing assistant 
at Friern Hospital having being appointed to the post without 
revealing his true identity to the hospital authorities.^ 2 His 
graphic description of the "mental health problem" mobilised the 
Nursing Times to abandon its usual reticence and attack the "the 
monstrous inhumanity of authorities and administrators, not only 
to their patients but to their nurses as well, in allowing the 
disgraceful conditions to p e r s i s t " . I t  was indicative of 
current editorial policies on this kind of story that any attempt 
the North-West Metropolitan RHB may have made to deny the 
substance of the report went unreported as the press merely 
carried the RHB's complaint about the methods through which the 
reporter had "deliberately entered the hospital under false 
pretences with the apparent object of finding grounds for 
criticism".^
51correspondance in Robb Files Some Events Vol. C Section A 
52Pailv Mail 19.10.71
5^Nursing Times Editorial Vol 67 No.43 29.10.71 p.1357 
^Following up this story, a reporter from The Observer followed 
in Mrs Robb's footsteps down the main corridor at Friern, This 
time with the approval of the HMC and accompanied by its Chairman 
since the Sans Everything Inquiry, Mrs Peggy Jay. She conceded 
that the publicity engendered by the book had bought extra 
resources albeit in her judgement at the expense of staff morale. 
The Observer nevertheless found enough in her replies to accuse 
her of a recalcitrant attitude to criticism. Observer 6.2.71
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The inquiry at Farleigh did not end the troubles of this hospital. 
In early January 1972, the press reported that a wheelchair-bound 
patient in the hospital had sustained two black eyes and that two 
nurses had been suspended as a result. A report was again sent up 
to the DPP and the nurses were charged and found guilty of assault 
and given sentences of six and nine months. Although this 
judgement was subsequently overturned on appeal, the damage of the 
adverse publicity was done. Even 'wrongful detention', a 
preoccupation of late Victorian Lunacy reform, emerged as an issue 
in the press following the discharge from St.Catherine's hospital, 
near Doncaster, of two elderly ladies. The papers were captured 
by the tragedy of their lives. They had been in-patients for 
fifty years, having been admitted as moral defectives in the 1920s 
having each had babies outside marriage. The cases led to the 
NAMH arguing that half the 50,000 residents of mental handicapped 
hospitals were leading similar "lost l i v e s " . ^5
Facing this tidal wave of bad publicity, the Secretary of State 
informed the House of Commons in January 1972 that the Government 
was resolved to appoint a health commissioner. After further 
consultation, the medical profession had come to accept 'the
55ihe cases were brought to the attention of the press by the 
Director of Social Services for Dewsbury. See Daily Mail. Daily 
Telegraph. Daily Express, and The Times 20.3.72. Also articles 
"The Legion of the Lost" in The Sun 22.5.72, and "How many Lost 
Lives" in The Guardian of 23.5.72
Interestingly, The Guardian of the 26.5.72 quoted Prof. Kathleen 
Jones positing an optimistic view of the development of large 
institutions for the mentally disorded. She argued that under the 
1913 Mental Deficiency Act the moral defective was a protective 
rather than a punitive classification. This seemed to be rather 
over-stretching the concept of beneficience as the press began 
unearthing other cases of unmarried mothers whose lives had been 
similarly ruined by incarceration. Daily Telegraph of 27.5.72
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arguments in favour'.^6 it is hardly a coincidence that this 
announcement was followed swiftly by the publication of the Payne 
Report on Whittingham Hospital.^7 Again any attempt to de-fuse 
the backlash overlooked the determination of Barbara Robb to 
maximise the advantage it gave to AEGIS. Moreover, the content of 
the Report was so disturbing that it created profound shock waves 
even in a political climate already somewhat desensitised by Ely 
and Farleigh.
The precipitating events at Whittingham, near Preston had first 
surfaced in 1970, when Crossman was still Secretary of State. 
With 2000 beds, it was the largest psychiatric hospital in the 
Manchester Regional Hospital Board, widely recognised as one of 
the most progressive in its mental illness policy, having 
pioneered the establishment of psychiatric units within general 
hospitals and inspired departmental policy. It must have been 
with a degree of dismay therefore that DHSS officials received 
allegations by the hospital's assistant psychiatrist, Dr Masters, 
of ill-treatment of patients, fraudulent dealings with their 
monies and maladministration which included the suppression of 
complaints. The Department initially sent out a team of 
auditors who uncovered financial irregularities in the hospital's 
accounts and also evidence in support of the other allegations. 
The police were brought in and two nurses were charged with 
theft.59 Soon after, a male nurse at the hospital assaulted two
56The Times 27.1.72
S^DHSS, National Health Service, Report of the Committee of 
Inquiry into Whittingham Hospital. Cmnd 4861, (London: HMSO,
1971)
5®The reports first appeared in the national press in February 
1970 having been picked up from investigations by the Lancashire 
Evening Post. 7.2.70. See also Daily Telegraph 9.2.70 and Nursing 
Times. Vol. 66, no.8 20.2.70, p.227
59pailv Telegraph 23.6.70. According to this report, one at 
least was cleared
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patients, one fatally; charged with murder, he was found guilty of 
manslaughter.60
By the time his trial was concluded in 1971, there had been a 
change of Government and Sir Keith Joseph used his powers under 
section 70 to set up a committee of inquiry and appointed Sir 
Robert Payne QC to chair it. 61 A firm of solicitors was
appointed to collect and prepare the evidence. All witnesses were 
given full rights of cross-examination; some were summoned to 
appear. As at Farleigh, the entire hearing was conducted in 
public, despite the vehement protests of the Hospital Secretary.
Once more the open hearings provided the papers with an abundance 
of good copy, especially when the specific incidents of abuse were 
examined.62 Loyal to Barbara Robb, The Daily Telegraph led off 
with a report on the hospital's failure to act on the Permanent 
Secretary's letter following Sans Everything.63 in the midst of 
this publicity, Counsel for NALGO at the inquiry complained at the 
legal emphasis in the proceedings on the grounds that even those 
individuals who might be exonerated by the tribunal would not 
emerge with their characters cleared: "Some of the mud has been
thrown and it is bound to stick".6^ The Daily Telegraph leader
writer disagreed with the implication in this complaint that
60see The Times. The Guardian. Daily Telegraph and The Sun 
5.12.70
^First announced in the press of 5.12.70
62see The Times. Telegraph and Guardian of April 15th, 16th,
17th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 27th, 28th, 29th, May 11th, 12th, 13th,
27th, 29th and June 8th and 10th 1971.
The Wet Towel Treatment incidents made headline news in The 
Evening Standard of the 10th May, and the national dailies on 11th 
May 1971 
63pailv Telegraph 15.4.71 
64pailv Telegraph 10.6.71
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inquiries should be in camera. Again the copy was firmly 
consistent with the AEGIS 'party-line':
"It has to be admitted that there are disadvantages and 
possible unfairness in the procedure of any such tribunal of
inquiry. Though not a court of law, the need is
nevertheless there to ensure that justice is seen to be 
done. The question is what use would it be to hold an 
inquiry in private. True, witnesses at a public inquiry may 
not have the same protection as in a court of law. But at 
least anyone against whom aspersions are made can give his 
own version of events. What the tribunal is concerned with 
is misdemeanours in the human if not legal sense. And it is 
right that any public institution should be put under proper 
scrutiny in such circumstances."65
What then were the report's findings when it appeared in February 
1972 the following year? Formally the hospital provided a 
comprehensive service. Yet over the two decades prior to the 
complaints, the regional board's policy of transferring acute 
patients to general hospitals had changed the hospital's effective 
role to an institution for longstay patients. 86% of in-patients 
had been resident for more than two years and 45% were aged 65 or 
more. Most of this longstay population was housed in three-decker 
pavilion wards of 80 or more. The wards had not benefited from
upgrading and provided grossly inadequate sanitary and other
facilities. Their inhabitants were left unoccupied and vegetating 
under a regimen which the Report notes was largely untouched by 
any 'revolutions' in care which may have taken place elsewhere.
The complaint to Crossman had arrived at the height of the Ely 
publicity and in the wake of Sans Everything. Again the added 
courage this gave to the complainants cannot be underestimated. 
However, Sans Everything played a still more direct role in events 
leading to the Whittingham inquiry. Discontent with conditions
^ E d i t o r i a l ,  Daily Telegraph of 10.6.71
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had first been voiced by members of staff in a hospital magazine 
as early as 1965. Neither the HMC nor the nursing administration 
responded appropriately and the unrest simmered until the summer 
of 1967, coinciding with the publication of the book and the 
attendant press publicity. The report attributes no direct role 
to the book, yet clearly its appearance gave rise to two important 
events in the lead-up to the complaint. Firstly in mid-June 1967 
and at the height of the book's publicity, student nurses met the 
Matron and Principal Nurse Tutor and made a number of profoundly 
disturbing allegations.^
Secondly, as mentioned earlier the Permanent Secretary at the 
Ministry of Health responded to the book's appearance by sending 
out a Dear Chairman letter asking each RHB to satisfy itself that 
there were no grounds for complaint in any of its hospitals. At 
Whittingham this was discussed at a meeting convened by the HMC 
and attended by both these senior nurses, which took place the day 
after they had received the students. They each kept quiet about 
the complaints and in July 1967 the Chairman of the HMC wrote to 
the RHB to reassure it that he had every reason to believe 
Whittingham free of incident. Once more Kenneth Robinson's 
satisfaction with existing machinery was shown to have been 
misplaced and AEGIS proved to have been right. Indeed the 
Whittingham Report politely censured the former Permanent 
Secretary for sending out a letter which 'indicated the 
expectation of a reassuring response'.
The hospital's managers dogged resistance to the complainants is 
all the more disturbing when placed in the context of the 
allegations which the Whittingham Committee upheld. The culture 
of the hospital was steeped in the 1930s. Patients were handled 
roughly, given little or no occupational therapy and poorly fed. 
Doors between and within wards were locked and controlled by 
nurses brandishing large bunches of keys. Airing courts still 
fulfilled their asylum purpose to air patients in conditions of
66dhsS, Cmnd 4861 op.cit. Appendix II
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maximum containment, and a flourishing parole system had survived 
complete with its variously coloured cards issued to patients to 
designate the hierarchy of privileges accorded to them for 
compliant behaviour. The fact that such findings astounded the 
Committee of Inquiry underlines the extent to which Whittingham 
challenged the conventional wisdom about 'revolutions' in British 
Mental Hospitals.
The Report argued that the region's policy of developing acute 
psychiatric units on general hospital sites had created a two-tier 
system of psychiatric care which offered only poor conditions in 
isolated large hospitals for the longstay and elderly. The 
relative poverty of the latter care groups was aggravated at 
Whittingham by low staff morale caused partly by the removal of 
acute services from the hospital and the consequent deprivation of 
a therapeutic philosophy and momentum.
This was the Committee of Inquiry's only foray into national 
policy issues. There were no specific recommendations on 
complaints or monitoring standards. Indeed this was no longer 
necessary as central government initiatives were at an advanced 
stage by the time the report was written in 1972 and of course, 
its appearance reinforced the momentum to the campaign for reforms 
in these areas.
The impact of Whittingham in the media was as big as any of the 
hospital inquiries; although as will be seen, it by no means 
marked the peak of the press interest in mental hospital 
conditions which Barbara Robb and her supporters sparked off in 
1965 and subsequently developed. The post-Whittingham publicity 
was indeed spearheaded by Mrs.Robb and one of her advisers. In 
January 1972, this individual received an advance "confidential" 
copy of the report seemingly sent by an official in the 
Department. However, it would have taken an extremely naive civil 
servant not to have assumed that this was merely an indirect route 
to the press. Mrs.Robb produced her own briefing paper on the
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Report linking its findings to a call for an effective health 
commissioner, and sent it both to the Sunday Times and to Brian 
Abel-Smith, now advising the Labour Party Front bench spokesmen, 
Mrs.Barbara Castle and Dr.Shirley Summerskill. Interestingly, 
editorial staff on the Sunday Times. New Society and even 
Crossman, by then on the New Statesman, were nervous to carry the 
leak, and therefore Mrs Robb sent her brief to Pulse. a GP's 
weekly. ^ 7 It had no such reservations and published the 
substance of Mrs.Robb's brief on February 12th 1972, three days 
before the Secretary of State had planned to present the report to 
the House.88 With the story due to break, the national press 
jumped on the bandwagon; although the Telegraph. Times, and 
Guardian were careful to attribute the source. The Sun led its 
front page with the banner headline "Horror Hospital Guilty".89
Hence there was little point in Joseph attempting a low-key 
response to Whittingham Report for when he rose to make his 
statement to the House, in February 1972, most of Fleet Street and 
interested MPs knew exactly what was in it. He accepted the 
Report's recommendations and conceded that in previous years the 
Department might have failed to recognise the danger of dual 
standards of care inherent in its policy. He had now asked all 
regional boards to review their services for the longstay mentally 
ill, paying particular attention to outmoded attitudes and 
practices. He was committed to his predecessor's policy of 
improving conditions in longstay hospitals until their eventual 
closure. Although he refused to make any further announcement on 
the health ombudsman, he confirmed his intention to remove the 
large hospitals altogether. To achieve this end, each RHB would 
be discussing its proposals for the restructuring of its mental
^Correspondence between Barabara Robb and respectively Hugo 
Young, P. Watson (New Society). R.H.S. Crossman, and C.H. Rolph 
and Peter Heard (Pulse) in Robb Files Record 10b Some Events 
Section C
68Pulse Vol 24 No.5
69A11 editions of 10.2.72
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illness services to ensure a smooth transition to services in 
general hospitals. Nothing in the report could detract from this 
objective.7®
The theme of complaints and the health ombudsman was common to the 
press reports. Thus The Guardian described the report as "a 
classic textbook study of how complaints can be suppressed..." 
and, mixing its metaphors, as "the final straw that clinches the 
argument for an ombudsman.." The Daily Telegraph recognised "a 
picture that has become so depressingly familiar since the 
publication of Mrs.Robb's book Sans Everything..." Keith Joseph 
was widely quoted, and at one stage promised an inquiry at any 
British mental hospital if there was any hint of a scandal of the 
Whittingham type.
The calls for reforms echoing through the nursing press included 
the voice of another of Mrs.Robb's contacts, John Andrews formerly 
Chairman of the RCN Psychiatric Sub-committee now grappling with a 
deteriorating situation as chief nursing officer at South Ockendon 
Hospital.71 The Nursing Times castigated the managing 
authorities:
"It is no excuse that the 'authorities' were unaware of what 
was going on. That was the excuse in Nazi Germany. It is 
the responsibility of the the 'authorities' to know what the 
situation is at ward level. The patients for whom the 
hospital exists are in the wards. They are not in the 
committee rooms and they are not in the conference 
halls."72
7QHouse of Commons Official Report Vol. 831 cols. 246-254. Debate 
on Whittingham 15.2.72 
^Andrews, J., Less ignored - but still impoverished, Nursing 
Times, Vol. 68, no.7, 17th February 1972, pp.217-19
72Nursing Times. Vol. 68 no.7 17th February 1972, pp.214-15
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Mrs Robb's close ally, Yvonne Cross, was particularly generous to 
her in the Nursing Mirror's editorial on Whittingham.
"Barbara Robb, with the publication of the book Sans 
Everything, lit the fire, and Nursing Mirror and the general 
press, radio and television fanned it into a flame which 
illuminated the full horror of the situation. .. Thousands 
of nurses felt new hope for the future. Thousands more 
resented the situation saying that Sans Everything was a 
hotch-potch of improvable accusations and downright lies. 
They were unable to see that it was a catalyst which was 
inevitable if anything was to be done to remove a terrible 
blot from the nation's escutcheon.
"A long-stay hospital is a breeding ground for many 
undesirable things. Victimisation is high on the list. 
Hopefully, one day, such hospitals will be no more than bad 
memories."7^
The BMJ was by now resigned to the inevitable, however there 
remained much to fight for in the debate over the final form of 
the commissioner. It therefore stated the profession's strong 
opposition to any involvement by the office in matters of clinical 
judgement and proposed the job title of "Commissioner for NHS 
Administration". It also expressed concern about the possibility 
of increasing the number of litigation cases by allowing the 
ombudsman to function as a "dry run" and warned that the 
Government would have to reach an agreement with the BMA.74
AEGIS' campaign for a health commissioner had succeeded. The 
battle for an effective office was about to begin. For the time 
being, however, Mrs.Robb had won a partial victory.
73*rhe Nursing Mirror Vol. 134 No.6 and 7 18th and 25th February 
1972 pp.14-15
74BMJ 1972, Vol. 1, No. 5795, 12.2.72, pp. 383-4
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CHAPTER NINE
A 92% VICTORY
Having won the first battle largely in the press, AEGIS' campaign 
for an effective Health Commissioner moved to Westminster. On 
February 22nd 1972. Sir Keith Joseph informed the Commons that the 
Government was proposing to invest the current Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Administration (PCA) with the three additional 
and separate posts of Health Commissioner for England, Scotland 
and Wales, with powers which largely paralleled those of the PCA. 
Health authorities would retain responsibility for initial 
investigation and right of access to the Commissioner would be 
restricted to those complainants who remained unsatisfied after 
this stage. Aggrieved persons with recourse to tribunals or 
litigation would be precluded unless the Commissioner was 
satisfied that it was unreasonable for the complainants to have 
thus sought redress. There would be no right of direct access^ 
for complainants.
The remit of the new office would differ from the PCA's in two 
respects. Firstly, although, MPs could act as the channel to the 
Commissioner, eligible persons2 would have direct access. 
Secondly, in addition to actions where it was claimed that an 
individual had suffered injustice through maladministration, the 
health ombudsman was empowered to investigate complaints arising 
through alleged 'failure to provide necessary care and treatment' 
in hospital-based services. Following investigation, the 
Commissioner would be required to send a report to complainants, 
any persons complained against, and to the managing authorities. 
He or she would also be required to submit statutory annual
1-NB direct access throughout used to mean complaining direct to 
the Commissioner without first approaching the health authority 
subject to complaint.
2The term "eligible persons" refers to those who had first 
exhausted the internal NHS procedures.
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reports to the Secretary of State and also ad hoc reports on 
special topics according to the Commissioner's discretion.^ To 
obtain the agreement of the medical profession, a compromise had 
been drawn up which simply excluded complaints in cases of 
clinical judgement and was the principal departure from Crossman's 
proposals.
For Barbara Robb, the key deficiency was the requirement of an 
initial investigation by the hospital authority. There was thus 
no guarantee against victimisation and intimidation of nurse 
complainants and no safeguard against authorities who were so- 
minded 'laundering' evidence before the Commissioner became 
involved.
Prior to the Secretary of State's Common's statement, she sent a 
paper to Brian Abel-Smith, now advising the Opposition Frontbench, 
who forwarded it to Mrs Barbara Castle the Social Services 
Spokesman.^ Henceforth Barbara Robb became closely allied with 
the Opposition during the passage of the proposals, as she was in 
the course of simultaneous events leading to the South Ockendon 
inquiry.^
In her reply to Joseph's statement, Mrs Castle** proposed direct 
access as a safeguard against victimisation, declared the 
Opposition's hostility to the proposed merger of the offices of 
PCA and Health Commissioner and criticised the exclusion of 
clinical judgement.^ in reply, Sir Keith was confident that the
^House of Commons Qffical Report Vol.831. Col.1104-1106
^Robb Files Record 10B some Events Section C.
^See Chapter 10
**It will be recalled from an earlier Chapter that Crossman had 
recommended her for this portfolio to Harold Wilson. She was of 
course to retain it into Government, apart from a six month period 
following a defeat in the elections to the shadow cabinet in 
autumn 1972.
^House of Commons Official Report Vol. 831. Cols.1106-7 
Continued on following page
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availability of recourse to the Commissioner would deter the 
suppression of complaints. But when it came to clinical 
complaints, informed commentators might have been forgiven for 
believing that the Secretary of State's brief had been written by 
the BMJ editorial staff; as he argued that it would be intolerable 
for doctors to face another procedure in addition to hearings 
before the General Medical Council and litigation.®
Barbara Robb also consulted her other advisers on tactics and 
there was some debate over the extent of direct access which could 
realistically be achieved as the legislation was finalised. AEGIS 
decided to limit its demands to cases of complaint about ill- 
treatment or neglect of patients, and to achieve this by using the 
pressure created by the exposed, and potential, scandal 
hospitals.^
There was strong support in the press for direct access; as usual 
the copy echoed Barbara Robb's case and strategy.^ ^  ^  One
notable exception, the BMJ reflected the medical profession's 
evident satisfaction with its agreement with Sir Keith, and gave 
the proposals a cautious welcome.
When the NHS (Scotland Bill) appeared in May, The Times reported 
that the Government was considering appointing Sir Alan Marre,
Continued from previous page
A similar announcement was made in the Lords by Lord Aberdare, 
Minister of State for Health. Baroness Serota confirmed the 
Opposition's commitment to direct access. House of Lords Official 
Report Vol. 328. Cols. 419-425 
® House of Commons Official Report, op.cit. ibid col.1107-8 
^Correspondence between Barbara Robb, Theo Fitzwalter Butler and 
Brian Abel-Smith in Robb Files Sans E. Vol 6C section 19
10The Times 22.3.72
11Nursing Times Vol. 68, No. 9, 2.3.72, p.252
l^Gould,D. Semi Ombudsman New Statesman 25.2.72
13BMJ. 1972, Vol. 1, No. 5797, pp.393-94
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former senior civil servant at DHSS and then PCA, as Health 
Commissioner at least for an initial period.^ Mrs Robb was 
appalled by the prospect of the job going to a former senior DHSS 
official.
Firm Government proposals on NHS reorganisation for England and 
Wales were published at the beginning of August, traditionally the 
time of departure on holiday of the British establishment - often 
chosen by government for initiatives which it wants to remain low- 
profile and uncontroversial. Whatever her commonality with
establishment figures in some respects, Mrs.Robb took her holiday 
in September and certainly did not consider the White Paper's
proposals to be uncontroversial.
The Government's reorganisation package was based on a three-
tiered management structure with two higher levels of authority, 
Regional and Area Health Authorities (RHAs and AHAs), each with 
its team of officers, and one lower-level district management team 
responsible for running the hospitals. Although the rhetoric of 
NHS reorganisation in the 1960s and 1970s emphasised integration 
of the then existing three sectors, general practitioners were to 
retain their autonomy in Joseph's proposals through the new Family 
Practitioner Committees. Some post-graduate teaching hospitals 
also stayed out and became Special Health Authorities, but most 
were incorporated within teaching areas where they were to 
maintain a powerful influence on AHA policy and resource
allocation. Apart from a third tier of management, the major 
difference between the new and Crossman's proposals lay in the
l^The Times 13.5.72
l^Memo from Mrs.Robb to Abel-Smith telephoned 4th December 1972 
in Robb Files Sans E Vol 5D.Sect 1. Barbara Robb had strong 
suspicions that Sir Alan had been involved in the Department's 
handling of the Sans Everything Inquiries, a suspicion she reports 
to have derived from press correspondents. See AEGIS first 
contact with the Health Ombudsman's office. 27.9.73 in Robb Files 
Sans E Vol 6E section 10
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power of the regions. Joseph intended to increase their power 
over the lower tiers by introducing, a system of strategic 
planning, alongside the new structure.
The NHS Reorganisation Bill had its first reading on the 15th of 
November 1972. It was introduced in the Lords partly as a means 
of managing a heavy legislative programme and partly to appease 
Peers who had been forced to sit late into the evenings not only 
during August but also into September of that year.
To brief Opposition front-bench spokesmen on health and social 
services, Abel-Smith organised a Fabian Society symposium on 
issues in the Bill. It took place on December 2nd, two days 
before the Second Reading Debate. Barbara Robb spoke on 
complaints. Anxious to avoid too close an association with the 
Opposition, she subsequently sent a slightly amended version to 
Peers from other parties who had been prominent in the debate on 
the second reading; and received supportive replies from some of 
them including the former Professor of Medicine, Lord Platt.^
l ^ C o p i e s  forwarded on 12.12.72 to two former senior doctors Lord 
Amulree and Lord Platt (formerly Professor of Medicine at 
Manchester University) as well as Baroness Vhite, Lord Cottisloe 
Lord Lichfield, Lord Beaumont, Lord Marysham, Lord Hayter (later
to become chairman of the King Edward Hospital Fund) Baroness
Summerskill, and Lord Cobbold. See AEGIS' Paper "The NHS 
Reorganisation Bill and Hospital Complaints" and correspondence in 
Robb Files Sans E.Vol 6D sect.2
In his speech, Lord Amulree had expressed his support for doctors 
investigating complaints against their colleagues and expressed 
his confidence in "his old friend" Sir Alan Marre. House of Lords
Official Report Vol.337 Cols 27-32.
In a memo to Brian Abel-Smith, delivered by telephone on the 
evening of the second reading debate she had this to say of him. 
"Lord Amulree was just hopeless. He said he's a friend of Sir 
Continued on following page
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Her paper reaffirmed AEGIS' four primary objections to the 
Government's proposals and were to structure much of the 
Parliamentary debate that followed.
AEGIS was dismayed at the omission of direct access. Secondly, Mrs 
Robb dismissed the decision to appoint Sir Alan Marre as an insult 
to the public's intelligence. Thirdly AEGIS had no confidence in 
MPs forwarding complaints as many of them sat on authorities, or 
had relatives and friends who served in that capacity. Fourthly, 
AEGIS felt it wrong that availability of redress through a court 
or other tribunal should preclude access to the Commissioner, 
again given the prohibitive legal costs. Lastly, AEGIS supported 
a return to Crossman's proposals on cases involving clinical 
judgement. As things stood the Government was offering an 
ombudsman in name o n l y .
Mrs Robb sat in the Strangers' Gallery throughout the passage of 
clauses 31-39 establishing and prescribing the authority of the 
Commissioner.!® Schedule Three of the Bill set out those areas 
not subject to investigation:
"1. Actions taken in connection with the diagnosis of illness or 
the care or treatment of a patient, being action which, in 
the opinion of the Commissioner in question, was taken solely 
in consequence of the exercise of clinical judgement ...
Continued from previous page
Alan Marre's. Did Marre perhaps nobble him (charmingly as 
"Mr.Crossman" would say) re the Sans Everything Inquiry into 
Banstead Hospital - on the committee for which Amulree was the 
medical member?" Robb Files Sans E.V0I.6D Sect 1.
l^Rpbb Files Sans E Vol 6D Sect 2 The NHS Reorganisation Bill and 
Hospital Complaints 
1®NHS Reorganisation Bill Pre-Amendment: H.L. Sessional Papers 
1972 Vol. IV
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2. Action taken by an Executive C o u n c i l ^  or Family 
Practitioner Committee...
3. Action taken in respect of appointments or removals, pay 
discipline, superannuation or other personnel matters in 
relation to service under the NHS Acts;
4. Action taken in matters relating to contracting or other 
commercial transactions;
5. Action that has been or is the subject of an inquiry under 
section 70 of the principal Act."20
In moving this section of the Bill, Lord Aberdare confirmed the 
press rumour that Sir Alan Marre would initially add both posts to 
his current one.
The Lords gave the proposals a mixed reception. Although some 
Tory Peers sided with the Government, there was strong criticism 
from all benches. Summing up for the Opposition, Baroness White 
drew these themes together and highlighted the issues which her 
party would be raising in the course of the bill's passage. 
Echoing Mrs Robb's paper, she attacked the investiture of Sir Alan 
Marre with the post and criticised the proposed office for failing 
to take account of the position of staff in longstay hospitals who 
identified a need to complain.21 The Minister did little to 
allay Mrs Robb's misgivings when he listed the kinds of complaint 
which the Government anticipated the Commissioner would 
investigate. Cases such as "..excessive waiting times., bad 
food...and., the failure of an ambulance to arrive on t i m e . . " 2 2
l^The existing management authority for GPs, dentists, and 
opticians 
20Ref.to 1946 NHS Act
2lHouse of Lords Official Report Vol. 337. Cols. 121-2 
22ibid Col 130-3
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were hardly commensurate with the serious failings which 
preoccupied AEGIS.
By the 23rd of January 1973, the Lords was taking amendments to 
Clauses 31-39 in Committee. Prior to this debate, AEGIS had been 
lobbying to change one of the Opposition's tabled amendments to 
the Clause 35. As noted earlier Mrs.Robb and her advisers had 
been concentrating their efforts on the Labour Front Bench. They 
had so far succeeded in gaining Opposition support for three major 
objectives:
1. to ensure that the office would be separately established and 
not appended to that of the PCA;
2. to bring cases of clinical judgement into its remit;
3. to obtain direct access.
The amendment tabled to achieve the third aim, was too wide in 
scope in Mrs Robb's view. It would have given the Commissioner 
power to accept a direct complaint from any member of the public, 
reserving to them the discretionary power to refer it to the 
hospital authority complained against.23 Mrs Robb's was 
convinced that the Government would never agree to this, as it was 
unlikely to provide the new office with sufficient resources to 
cope with the large number of complaints which would be inevitably 
f o r t h c o m i n g . ^  Equally important, she was anxious that the 
wording of the amendment should maintain the pressure by 
association with the hospital scandals. She therefore drafted a 
compromise amendment which restricted direct access to hospital 
staff wishing to complain about ill-treatment or neglect of 
patients: the formula which she and her advisers had earlier
devised.
^Amendment 114 :1st Marshalled List of Amendments, House of 
Lords Sessional Papers 1972/3 Vol.IV 
^Annotation in Robb Files Sans E.Vol 6D Sect 5
-226-
Mrs Robb's files contain the following account of events. As 
President of AEGIS, Lord Strabolgi agreed to table her draft and 
canvassed for support.23 Firstly, he and Mrs Robb obtained that 
of Lord Beaumont who was himself moving two amendments to the Bill 
and therefore looking for reinforcements.2** Having got him on 
their side, they decided to approach Lord Stow Hill, Strabolgi's 
colleague on the Labour benches and Lord Platt. Fitzwalter 
Butler was a close friend of the former and approached him 
informally only to discover that Stow Hill was the author of the 
original wide draft and would not entertain any changes. So 
Strabolgi approached Baroness White who agreed to adopt it on 
behalf of the Opposition Front Bench. The amendment was then 
worked up by the Opposition's lawyers and appeared in the final 
list under the names of of the Opposition Spokeswomen - Baroness 
Serota, Baroness White, Baroness Summerskill and Lord 
Beaumont.2^
Debate moved onto amendments to the Health Service Commissioner 
clauses. Opposition attempts to prevent the Government vesting 
the the job in the PCA2®, and to reverse the Government's stance 
on clinical complaints both failed.29 However, in withdrawing, 
Baroness White gave notice that the issue would be taken up again 
in the Commons.^ The House was more sympathetic when she moved 
the "AEGIS" amendment, 114A, together with the original as drafted 
by Lord Stow Hill, making it plain that she favoured the narrower 
version restricting direct access to hospital staff. This tactic
25ibid
2** Annotation in Robb Files Sans E Vol 6D Sect.4 
Amendment 114A to Clause 35 subsection 4 granting direct access to 
"members of staff employed by or under contract to the relevant 
body". NHS Reorganisation Bill 3rd Marshalled list of Amendments
House of Lords Sessional Papers 1972/3 Vol IV
2^House of Lords. Official Report. Vol. 338 Cols. 229-232
29Ibid Col. 370
30Cols. 375-376.
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of presenting a desired change as a partial retreat gives the 
Government some manoeuvering space in that it appeared to be 
conceding less. The themes of Mrs Robb's briefing were well to 
the fore in Baroness White's argument:
"The Commissioner may for example have reason to believe that 
in a certain hospital, conditions are unsatisfactory and he 
may have apprehensions that if there is not an early 
investigation what is politely called "erosion" of evidence 
will take place."3!
It was crucial that hospital staff should be free from the threat 
of victimisation which the Ely Report had documented. Lord 
Strabolgi followed her and immediately declared his interest as 
President of AEGIS.
"I think it is highly undesirable that hospital boards should 
act as judges and juries in their own cases. There will also 
be great difficulties of staff members if they make 
complaints to their own employers. Many of these staff 
members are shy nervous people; I think it would be a great 
ordeal for them. They would be confronted by a high-powered 
tribunal. Sometimes they would have to undergo cross- 
examination by skilled lawyers retained by the hospital board 
without the benefit of legal representation because they will 
not be entitled to this. But most important of all, there 
will be fears of victimisation."32
Adding to the catalogue of pressure he cited the Farleigh Report 
as an example. Support from the Government Benches came from 
Lady Ruthven of Freeland who recalled an incident whose themes 
were familiar to Barbara Robb. As a former HMC member she had 
served on an inquiry into complaints by junior nursing officers 
against their seniors which had duly reported to the HMC.
^ House of Lords Official Report Vol. 338 Col.352
32Ibid Col. 354
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"One of the three people who were sent from our management 
committee on this inquiry was a retired civil servant and by 
chance he met an ex-colleague of his who was then in the 
Health Ministry. Unfortunately, he talked to this ex­
colleague, who went straight to the Minister or whoever it 
was; and down from the Ministry, as it then was, came a 
complaint to the Regional Board, and then from the Regional 
Board to the Hospital Management Committee. The report of 
our inquiry was absolutely slammed down, and the Ministry 
instructed the Regional Board to have an inquiry. I, having 
been on the Hospital Management Committee naturally could not 
be a member of the inquiry. I protested and said that I knew 
that these things had been happening.
"When the Regional Board inquiry went down, they never saw 
any of the junior people. They were told that everything was 
all right, there was nothing to complain about and that none 
of these things had happened, although I knew myself that 
they had happened. If that can happen to a Hospital 
Management Committee how much more difficult is it going to 
be for a junior person employed in the hospital to make a 
complaint against his seniors? Of course it will not go 
further, i think it will be terrible if these juniors have 
not the possibility of going direct to the Ombudsman or 
Health Commissioner."3334
33Ibid Col. 354-355
^According to Mrs. Robb's files, she knew about these events.
"I suspect that the retired civil servant mentioned by Lady
Ruthven in her speech is ....  a retired under-Secretary at
the Ministry of Pensions, and member of mid-Sussex HMC. He 
came to see me on 22.12.67. He brought with him a report on 
poor care and ill-treatment in one of his HMC's hospitals 
(Pouchlands). He consulted me as to how the faults described 
in the report could be remedied. He planned to table a 
Continued on following page
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In his initial reply, the Minister of State resisted on the 
grounds that considerable changes had taken place since Ely and 
Farleigh, including the establishment of HAS, the appointment of 
the Davies Committee. Secondly, he echoed the Secretary of 
State's contention that the Commissioner would act as a last 
resort and thus deter victimisation. Thirdly he foresaw 
"practical difficulties" to direct access. It would be resented 
by staff and probably lead to a flood of complaints from patients. 
Pressure of work would ensure that most complaints would be 
referred to the hospital authority thus reflecting badly on the 
office. He objected to the "AEGIS" amendment on the grounds that 
it would create an anomaly since complaints from patients and 
relatives were transmitted in the usual way, while those made by 
staff, perhaps about the same matters, could be dealt with by the 
Commissioner.
These arguments were not well received. Lord Hayter felt that 
victimisation warranted exceptional measures since it could finish 
a nurse's career. The Earl of Onslow and Lady Ruthven pointed out 
that nursing staff were responsible, intelligent and loyal and
Continued from previous page
report presently to [a senior official] at the Ministry. The
whole exercise had been carried out in response to Kenneth
Robinson's request to HMC's (made subsequent to the
publication of Sans Everything) to investigate the care of
elderly patients in their hospitals.
"[He] subsequently notfified me that [the senior official) 
had passed him over to an under-Secretary .... and that from 
then onwards (just as I had forecast) the report was 
supressed."
Note in Mrs Robb's hand in Robb Files Sans E vol 6D sect.5a.
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"...not completely made up of barrack-room lawyers and 
complainers" .33 If the principle of the ombudsman was right, any 
practical difficulties could be overcome. For the Opposition, 
Baroness Serota played the third trump card. At Whittingham five 
years had elapsed between the students' original complaints and 
the approach to the Department by Dr.Masters. For all they knew 
there could be similar situations developing while they spoke. 
She rejected the flood of complaints argument. Even if the 
Commissioner did refer complaints back to the authority, the 
complainant would have derived added protection from the knowledge 
on the part of the authority that the office had been notified of 
the complaint. All four peers urged acceptance of the "AEGIS" 
amendment.3^
In the face of this cross-party disfavour, Lord Aberdare had 
little choice but to acknowledge the feeling of the Committee. He 
therefore asked that the amendments be withdrawn to give him the 
opportunity to reconsider.37 Although the Labour Bench was 
unwilling to withdraw the "AEGIS" amendment, it was in a 
vulnerable position. Clearly it had won the argument, but the 
Government was evidently prepared to use the Whips to avoid a 
defeat. Hence, the Earl of Onslow pressed Labour to withdraw 
arguing that it was preferable to give the Minister a chance and 
reserve the right to re-table the amendment at the Report Stage 
(if this response was unsatisfactory) than to lose it altogether 
on a division. A compromise proposal to adjourn the committee 
until the beginning of the following week was rejected by the 
Leader of the House. Baroness White therefore reluctantly 
withdrew hoping that the Minister's offer had substance.3®
^ House of Lords Official Report, op.cit. Col. 360. Other
speeches cols. 359-360
36Ibid Cols. 360-363
37Ibid Col. 364
3®Ibid Cols. 364-367. Compromise suggested by Lord Shepherd and 
rejected by Lord Jellicoe, Leader of the Lords, ibid Col.366
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Naturally AEGIS was delighted to meet with such a favourable 
response and set about trying to ensure that the amendment was 
accepted on Report. Mrs Robb's record gives the following account 
of events leading up to the Report Stage debate. In his attempt 
to counter the arguments in favour of direct access, Lord Aberdare 
had implied that policy initiatives since the Ely, Farleigh and 
Whittingham inquiries had rendered the victimisation of nurses a 
thing of the past. To demonstrate otherwise, Mrs Robb gave
Baroness Serota some current case material from her own files - 
having first obtained the permission of the nurses involved. 
Should the Minister again have tried the same argument, Lady 
Serota would have been able to inform him that she had contrary 
evidence in her possession. Just before she despatched the
documents, Mrs Robb heard from Brian Abel-Smith that the
Government was "conceding about a 92% victory to AEGIS". Lord 
Aberdare had himself tabled an amendment which gave members of 
hospital staffs direct access to the Commissioner when making a
complaint on behalf of an individual who is unable to make it for
himself.^9
The next day, she received a copy of the amendment, number 91, 
from Lord Strabolgi and immediately noted that It granted direct 
access only to "an officer of the relevant body in question".
As the word officer was not defined in the Bill it appeared
unclear if the term applied to members of nursing staff. She
referred the matter to her advisers who agreed that although
things may have been in order, they could not assume so and the 
Minister would have to be more specific. Moreover, Lord Strabolgi 
pointed out that in Part II of the Bill, the section dealing with
■^Annotations in Robb Files Sans E Vol 6D section 5a subsection
ii and iii
^0 nhs Reorganisation Bill Marshalled List of Amendments to be 
moved on Report House of Lords Sessional Paper !972/4 Vol IV. 
"Relevant Bodies" was the term used in the Bill to refer to 
health service authorities in the NHS Reorganisation Bill, Clause 
34. subsection 1
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the Health Commissioner, the term seemed to imply a member of the 
relevant body. Lord Aberdare would therefore have to insert his 
definition in Clause 39 of the Bill, the Interpreting of Part III, 
and Baroness Serota should be advised to lose no time in asking 
Lord Aberdare to table another amendment accordingly. Brian 
Abel-Smith therefore wrote to Lady Serota who, again according to 
Mrs Robb's files, rang her to ask if AEGIS' legal advisers could 
interpret Lord Aberdare's amendment. Mrs Robb explained that they 
could not and also raised Strabolgi's point about further 
amendment to Part III. Baroness Serota seemingly undertook to 
consult an expert in Parliamentary drafting.^
However, when Mrs Robb arrived at the Lords on the 13th of 
February, for the Report Stage, no amendment of Clause 39 had been 
tabled and it appeared that Lady Serota had got no further. 
According to Mrs Robb's files, when the two women met Lady Serota 
explained that she had indeed notified Lord Aberdare that she 
would be seeking definition of the term "relevant officer of the 
body in question". He was taken by surprise, but suggested that 
another amendment he had moved earlier that day would clarify 
things. Lady Serota asked Mrs. Robb if she had any idea which one 
he was referring to. Mrs Robb was in no doubt that he meant one 
relating to Schedule One of the Bill in which he had replaced the 
term "employee" with "officer". However, in her view, it was 
nonsense to suggest that this had any bearing on Part III of the 
Bill and amendment 91. He would indeed have to be pressed for the 
definition.^2
The ensuing debate was consistent with this version of events. 
When he rose to move the amendment, Lord Aberdare made sure that 
the Government's intentions were clear:
^Annotation and Letter from Barbara Robb to Lord Beaumont 
13.2.73 in Robb Files Sans E V0I.6D section 5a subsection iii
42ibid
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"The amendment gives the Health Service Commissioner
discretion to investigate complaints made to them direct by 
members of the staff of Health Service Authorities on behalf 
of aggrieved persons who are unable to act for themselves, 
without such complaint having first been brought to the
notice of the responsible health authority and without the 
authority have been given an opportunity to investigate and 
reply to the complaint....It will enable a member of the
staff of whatever status or grade__to go direct__ £o__£he
commissioner with a complaint made on behalf of a patient 
unable to act for himself. I should expect that such 
patients would be predominantly in the long stay hospitals 
which is the group of hospitals about which most anxiety was 
expressed."^  (emphasis added)
The Labour Bench thanked the Minister. Lord Strabolgi then raised 
the matter of amending the interpreting of Clause 39 to include 
the definition of "officer". Members of the public, or for that 
matter the legal profession, could not be expected to search 
through Hansard to discover what an Act of Parliament was intended 
to mean. This could be done during the Bill's passage through the 
Commons, so for the moment the Amendment was agreed to.^
Opposition attempts to strengthen the Commissioner's powers in 
respect of complaints arising from clinical judgement in hospitals 
and complaints against the general medical services were again 
unsuccessful. Although Labour achieved minor successes in 
persuading the Government to remove the restriction imposed on 
Voluntary bodies and CHCs from making complaints on behalf of
^ House of Lords Official Report Vol.338 Cols. 1524-1526 
^Baroness White also sought clarification as to whether this 
implied that a Doctor would be able to go direct to the
Commissioner in respect of some grievance. In reply, Lord
Aberdare confirmed that the right would be granted to all NHS
Staff who were directly employed and therefore GPs were excluded
Ibid Col 1526-7
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aggrieved persons^, and ensuring that the Commissioner for Wales 
had sufficient number of welsh-speaking officials.^®
Mrs Robb wrote to thank the Peers who had been involved and her 
attention now switched to the Commons. Four days before the 
Report Stage, Rolph published a piece on the Bill in the New 
S t a t e s m a n providing the opportunity for Baroness White to give 
notice, in the correspondence columns of the next edition, that 
the Opposition would continue the fight on clinical judgement.^®
Meanwhile, Mrs.Robb was reflecting on what she perceived, perhaps 
unfairly, as the Opposition's 'muted protest' to the plans to vest 
the post in Sir Alan Marre.^ She was also busy preparing a
brief for the Labour Front Bench, a copy of which she also sent 
to the Liberal Sponsor for Health, John Pardoe. The brief 
advocated separating the posts and focussed on the need to define 
"officer" in the Bill. The term had had several meanings in 
company law and the courts rarely looked beyond an Act of
^Th e  1973 NHS Reorganisation Act introduced community health 
councils and their was some debate about their role in complaints 
which has been omitted as these bodies were not promoted by AEGIS 
and also partly due to space constraints.
^Debate on Amendments 88,89, 90 and 92 (Marshalled list of 
Amendments to be moved on Report, Sessional Papers 1972/3 Vol IV) 
House of Lords Official Report Vol. 338 cols 1510-1524 
^Rolph, c.H. Obudsmouse New Statesman 9.2.73 
Mrs Robb noted at the time that she pointed out to Rolph that he 
should have either used language close to AEGIS briefing paper for 
the Lords, or at least given AEGIS a credit. Robb Files Sans E Vol 
5D Sect.5 
^®Letters New Statesman 16.2.73
She notes in her files that a journalist on her local paper, 
the Hampstead and Highgate Express, had suggested to her that this 
might be because Lady Marre and Lady Serota were close friends. 
Robb Files Sans E Vol 6D section 5 c.
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Parliament and might indeed refuse to examine Ministerial 
statements of clarification made in the course of a Bill's 
p a s s a g e .50 She also noted her intention to attend as many 
sessions of the Commons as she could, As she wrote at the time:
"I can't help feeling it's a pity that other organisations 
concerned don't follow such debates in the same way. I'm in 
no doubt that if they did, Governments would get away with 
fewer of their cons."51
Hence, when the Commons began its second reading on the 26th 
March, Barbara Robb was seated in the Public Gallery. Shirley 
Summerskill set the Opposition's agenda for amendments to the 
Commissioner provisions:
1 it was unacceptable to vest the post in the PCA not least
since the current holder of the office, Sir Alan Marre, had 
recently been a second Permanent Secretary at DHSS;
2 the requirement for complainants to approach the health
authority first was a deterrent to complainants, and an 
encouragement for victimisation and suppression of 
grievances;
3 the office should be able to investigate complaints against
general medical services;
4 the office should not be precluded from complaints arising
from clinical j u d g e m e n t .52
Following the debate, Mrs.Robb sent further briefing papers to 
Lord Strabolgi and Brian Abel-Smith. She understood from
50Annotation in Robb Files Sans E.Vol 6D section 5c 
51-Letter to "Mary" dated 2.4.73 in Robb Files Sans E Vol 6 E 
section ii.
52House of Lords Official Report Vol. 853 Col. 1030
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Dr.Summerskill's speech that the Opposition was making another 
attempt at gaining direct access for all complaints. Given that 
it was doubtful that this could be achieved, it was crucial to 
that the word "officer" should be defined in Clause 39.^3 She 
wrote to Dr.Summerskill on these lines, adding her opinion that 
the Opposition in the Lords had not been particularly effective on 
the issue of clinical judgement and hoping that the matter would 
be raised again during the Lords Committee Stage.^ This last 
issue was already on the agenda, of course. However, AEGIS' 
principal concern was to be swamped at the Committee Stage by the 
Opposition's other priorities.
Standing Committee G on the NHS Reorganisation Bill began work on 
April 5th^5 and reached the Health Service Commissioner Clauses 
on May 22nd. In moving the Opposition's first amendment, designed 
to prevent the two posts being vested in the PCA, Dr Summerskill
^Letters Barbara Robb to Lord Strabolgi 10.4.73 and Brian Abel- 
Smith 10.4.73 in Robb Files Sans E Vol 6E section 3 
S^Robb Files Sans E Vol 6E section 3
^Composition
Conservative Labour
Bryant Godman Irvine (Chair)
Michael Alison
Kenneth Clarke
Patrick Cormack
David Gibson-Watt
Joseph Hiley
Sir Keith Joseph
David Knox
John Leveridge
Timothy Raison
Wyn Roberts
Michael Sherby
Roger White
Ernest Armstrong 
Arthur Blenkinsop 
Brynmor John 
Alec Jones 
Harry Lamborn 
James Lamond 
Elyston Morgan 
Eric Ogdon 
Laurence Pavitt 
John Silkin 
Shirley Summerskill 
George Thomas
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condemned the decision to appoint prior to the appearance of the 
Davies Report. The Secretary of State accepted that the timing 
could have been better, but rejected the case overall. He had 
every confidence in Sir Alan Marre to cover the workload. 56
Attempts to give the Commissioner power to investigate complaints 
where recourse to a tribunal or the courts existed, made no 
progress.57 Similarly, Sir Keith refused to give ground on the 
exclusion of complaints against the general medical services.58
The Opposition was more successful in tightening up provision to 
allow health authority officers direct access to complain on 
behalf of patients. The existing wording left it to the
discretion of the Commissioner to disregard the general obligation
on complaints to go through the health authority provided two
conditions were m e t . Firstly the Commissioner was to be 
satisfied that the officer was authorised to make the complaint. 
Secondly, the circumstances needed to justify the complaint; thus, 
they were required to be exceptional. Sir Keith Joseph agreed to 
delete the discretionary element.
"The health authorities will know that in the narrow range of 
cases with which we are now dealing, the Commissioner, once 
he has decided that the staff member has an exceptional case, 
would have no discretion but to take that c a s e . " 8 ®
Now although the Secretary of State was again making it clear that 
the word officer referred to members of staff, the Opposition did 
not press for definition to be written into the bill. On this 
issue at least, AEGIS seems to have made no headway with the 
Labour Front Bench.
56Ibid cols. 830-33
57ibid cols. 836-857
58ibid cols. 863-873
59ibid col. 883 ref to amendment 225
80ibid col. 885
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Finally, the Opposition's attempt to change the provisions 
regarding clinical judgement, although unsuccessful, gave rise to 
revealing discussions. Similar to Crossman's original proposal, 
the aim was to require the Commissioner to examine the facts of a 
case before deciding that clinical judgement ruled out an 
examination. 61 At the same time, the Chairman took two 
amendments moved by Michael Shersby, but promoted by the BMA^, 
which sought to stiffen the existing provision by prohibiting the 
Commissioner from investigating any professional judgement whether 
clinical or administrative; a move which served to meet the 
counter-pressure for incursions into this sacred territory. In 
defending the existing provisions, Sir Keith demonstrated
admirable candidness by reporting how closely the BMA had been 
involved in drawing them up:
"The Government had long discussions with the medical
profession about the phrase "clinical judgement". The 
medical profession would have preferred.... to have all 
medical decisions excluded from the Commissioner's remit, and 
understandably because it feared that if there were anything 
other than total exclusion of medical decisions, clinical 
judgement would be shackled. But the profession was most 
willing to discuss the Government's concern that medical 
decisions should not rest solely upon clinical judgement - 
administrative medical decisions - and after long
discussions, a formula was reached which is embodied, as best 
we can, in the first paragraph of Schedule 3."(emphasis 
added)63
The Commissioner was therefore limited to deciding whether a
decision involved elements other than clinical judgement, and then
61Ibid col. 889
62 BMA Letter to the Profession: Progress Report on NHS
Reorganisation: BMJ 1970 Vol. 1, No.3540 3rd February 1973
Supplement. page 29 
63House of Lords Official Report op.cit. col. 893
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to decide whether to take the complaint; access to expert advice 
would be available for such contingencies.
Although pressed from both sides for a strict definition of 
"clinical judgement", Sir Keith would not give ground. This was 
hardly surprising given that he had given the BMA Council his 
personal assurance that the Commissioner would not investigate 
decisions taken solely in consequence of the exercise of clinical 
judgement.^ Even the spectre of Ely, summoned by Brynmor John 
was to no effect.^5 it is academic to speculate, but the efforts 
to revive Crossman's proposals may have met with more success had 
the timing been such that they could refer, for supporting 
evidence, to the reports of the further committees of inquiry (at 
South Ockendon, St.Augustines and Normansfield) that were to 
follow over the next five years.
Three weeks later the Commons dealt with the Report Stage, when 
the Opposition failed in a last ditch attempt to amend the 
Commissioner clauses.^6 Hence, as the NHS Reorganisation Bill 
received the Royal Assent, somewhat belatedly, in August 1973 ^  t 
AEGIS' long, and hard-fought battle was over and the Health 
Service Commissioner was on the Statute Book.
^^B.M.A.Letter to Profession: Progress Report on NHS
Reorganisation: BMJ Supplement op.cit. p.29
^^House of Commons Official Report, op.cit. Col. 895-6 
^Under clause 34, Labour sought to place a responsibility on the 
Commissioner to investigate a complaint unless he is satisfied 
that the complainant had other means for redress and could avail 
himself of them. This was a change of emphasis which would have 
given the Commissioner discretion to refuse such complaints in 
place of the discretion to accept them in the provisions. House 
of Commons Official Report Vol.857 col.1435-1438
^There was some delay due to a row between the two Houses of 
Parliament about charging for contraception prescriptions. The 
House of Lords did not climb down until mid-July.
-240-
Mrs Robb issued a press statement bemoaning the new Act's failure 
to define officer. This was carried in the Times in the form of 
a letter from her, and in the Nursing Times. which gave AEGIS full 
credit for achieving direct access for staff members. However, 
her doubts over whether the intention of Parliament with regard to 
the meaning of the term officer had been made sufficiently clear, 
were not lifted even when the Department sent health authorities 
official notice of the responsibilities of the new office in 
September. This stated that the term did indeed apply to hospital 
staff.68
Sir Alan Marre took up his additional post as Health Commissioner 
on October 1st, 1973 in advance of implementation of the main 
reorganisation measures, effective from April 1st 1974. He held a 
press conference in September, where he gave notice that his 
office had produced a leaflet, describing his functions, to be 
made available to the public at outlets such as Citizens Advice 
Bureaux.
This turned out to be a verbatim reproduction of the document also 
sent out to health authorities by the department.69 Mrs. Robb 
had four principal objections to it. Firstly, it omitted the 
office's telephone number which could not be found in the 
directory. She was unhappy with this aspect because the great 
majority of dissatisfied nurses who approached her did so by 
t e l e p h o n e . 70 Secondly, she felt the presentation was confusing, 
and the official language liable to deter rather than encourage
68DHSS, HM(73)52 para.2 of accompanying paper Health Service 
Commissioner for England. It was repeated in the guidance sent 
out on the eve of the commencement of the office DHSS, HSC(1S)10 
March 1974
69Ibid
7®Her files report that she engaged Sir Alan's deputy, the 
Hon.John Scarlett, in a long discussion of this issue. See Memo 
AEGIS first contact with the Health Ombudsman's office 27.9.73 in 
Robb Files Sans E Vol 6E Section 10b.
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complaints. Thirdly, there was no explanation that the
motivation behind Parliament's decision to grant direct access to 
nursing staff was to protect them against possible victimisation. 
Fourthly and most importantly, the Commissioner was to have 
discretion both to decide whether legal representation was 
appropriate and if so who was to pay the costs, the complainant or 
his office. For AEGIS, unless complainants were guaranteed 
representation with costs paid from public funds, many would be 
d e t e r r e d . F o r  the time being, however, debate over the powers 
and nature of the office was at an end. Its subsequent 
effectiveness is reviewed in Chapter Eleven.
7lRobb, R. "Bad things come from poor beginnings." In Robb 
Files. Sans E. V0I.6E section 10b. It was also contrary to the 
recommendations of the 1966 Royal Commission on Tribunals of 
Inquiry which had held that given that a witness was participating 
in an investigation in the public interest, it was only fair for 
the public purse to met the costs. See, House of Commons, Report 
of the Roval Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry. Cmnd 3121, 
(London: HMSO, 1966), These recommendations were accepted by the 
Government and DHSS, NHS, Report of the Committee on Hospital 
Complaints Procedure. (London: DHSS, 1973) para. 9.26
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CHAPTER TEN
EVALUATING THE REFORMS
The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into South Ockendon 
Hospital^ was the last national mental hospital scandal to emerge 
during Barbara Robb's active years. It was published in May 1974 
by the DHSS under Barbara Castle who, in presenting the South 
Ockendon Report to Parliament, told MPs that the Inquiry would never 
have taken place had it not been for the tenacity and sheer hard 
work of Barbara Robb.
"I should acknowledge the work of Barbara Robb of AEGIS who 
made such strenuous and successful efforts to ensure that the 
events which had occurred were not swept under the 
carpet.
One would search the Report itself in vain for this kind of 
acknowledgement of AEGIS's role, but Mrs Castle was entirely 
correct. Indeed her point could have been equally well made about 
publication itself which was delayed by more than a year after the 
Committee submitted its report to the DHSS; Mrs Robb attributing 
this hiatus to the previous Secretary of State's anxiety to get the 
Health Service Commissioner on the statute book before publishing 
more ammunition for those campaigning for more extensive powers for 
this Office.
The story of the South Ockendon Inquiry began in June 1968, when 
Barbara Robb was approached by two nurses from the hospital, 
apparently acting independently. They each made disturbing 
allegations about the circumstances surrounding an assault, with a 
ward bath brush, on a patient in the hospital's secure ward, Cypress 
Villa. This attack was to be one of series of violent incidents
1-House of Commons, The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
South Ockendon Hospital. Cmnd 124, (London:HMSO, 1974)
^House of Commons Official Report Vol. 873 Col.1294, (15.5.74)
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which included two deaths and one manslaughter charge brought 
against a patient who was subsequently acquitted when Geoffrey Howe 
was persuaded to act for him on appeal and the police offered no 
evidence.
Mrs Robb's three-year campaign began soon after The Yorkshire Post 
of the 7th of June 1968 carried a statement by thel Ministerof Health 
given at a press conference held at Storthes Hall Hospital; a 
significant choice of venue as it had featured in Sans Everything. 
The press conference concluded his nationwide tour of health 
services and he declared he had found "no serious deficiencies" in 
the hospital service - unfortunate timing since the first attack 
took place at South Ockendon, three days later.
The history of the campaign for the inquiry would be slightly 
tangential to the major direction of this study, even if space 
limitations allowed its inclusion in anything like the detail needed 
to do justice to the story. Suffice it to say that the report 
continued the sad catalogue of findings during this period when the 
reality of the Victorian legacy of large-scale institutional care 
was revealed to a shocked and outraged public by Mrs Robb and her 
associates. If the volume of press coverage the report received is 
a measure of that outrage, there was no evidence of desensitisation 
by 1974 despite the seven-year interval since Sans Everything and 
the unremitting barrage of press publicity on mental hospitals which 
had followed in the book's wake.^
Had it been available to the Opposition Front Bench, during the 
passage of the NHS Reorganisation Bill in 1973, the South Ockendon 
Report would have added powerful support to the case for involving 
the Health Service Commissioner in matters of clinical judgement. 
Unfortunately it came twelve months too late. The context of the 
Secretary of State's assurances to the BMA on this issue may 
contribute to an understanding of the excessive delay in publishing 
the report beyond its arrival in the department in March 1973.
^See Appendix 3
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In common with Ely, Farleigh and Whittingham, an atmosphere of fear 
and intimidation prevailed at South Ockendon. The report lists a 
number of specific complaints by staff, patients and parents which 
were handled so as to deter others.^ In the long run, of course 
such tactics proved wholly counter-productive because the glaring 
deficiencies they created only served to turn some of the more 
determined nursing staff and parents towards Mrs.Robb.
Despite this the Committee's findings deeply disappointed Barbara 
Robb, who suspected that the deaths were not accidental and that the 
police could have done more find out who was responsible. The 
report's political implications are reviewed below.
Continued reverberations
South Ockendon was not the last hospital inquiry whose national 
impact was considerable - there were two others. The first was a 
non-statutory enquiry established under HM(66)15 by the South East 
Thames Regional Health Authority into allegations of neglect and 
ill-treatment at St. Augustine's mental illness hospital in 
Kent.^ it was marked for the seniority and experience of some of 
the committee's membership: notably its Chairman Hampden Inskip who 
had chaired the South Ockendon Inquiry, and Alex Baker the first 
Director of the HAS. With certain qualifications, the Report, 
published in 1976, largely vindicated the case and particularly 
indicted the hospital's management for having no clear effective 
complaints procedure.^ The significance of the report for AEGIS 
concerns was largely to sustain the pressure to maintain and develop 
the priorities policy. Its major impact was to fuel an established 
campaign to reform the 1959 Mental Health Act led largely by the
^House of Commons, Cmnd 124 op.cit. paras. 569-570 
^Report of the Committee of Enquiry into St. Augustine's Hospital. 
Chartham. Canterbury. (London: SETRHA, 1976)
^House of Commons, Cmnd 124 op.cit. paras.77-80
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National Association for Mental Health. By the mid-1970s MIND as it 
was now known had become a more radical lobby strongly influenced by 
concerns about civil and legal rights of hospital patients emanating 
from the United States.7
The second inquiry followed a strike by nursing staff at 
Normansfield mental handicap hospital® which took place two months 
after the St.Augustine's report was published; although the two 
events appear unconnected. Normansfield was probably the most 
elaborate, and costly inquiry of any whose reports appeared as 
parliamentary papers. Its report is the longest and most detailed. 
However, the primary significance for the concerns of this study is 
its procedure which are dealt with in more detail in the next 
chapter. Although there were some government initiatives in the 
wake of the report, its impact was largely localised. There were 
major changes in management, staff, and injections of resources 
which hauled the hospital near to the top of the league of average 
spend for mental handicap hospitals.^ As with St. Augustine's, 
the national impact of Normansfield was to demonstrate that 
substantial scope for improvement remained and thereby sustained the 
priorities policy through the change of government in 1979.
?See Gostin L, A Human Condition (Vol 1), London: MIND, 1975, DHSS 
A Review of the Mental Health Act 1959. London, HMSO:1976 (the 
consultative document), and DHSS, Review of the Mental Health Act 
1959. Cmnd 7320, (LondonrHMSO, 1978) (The White Paper)
®NHS, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Normansfield 
Hospital. Cmnd 7357 (London:HMSO, 1978)
^For example in 1982, the cost per inpatient week at Normansfield 
was £284 compared to a national average of £173. This put it well 
ahead of the field with notably Ely in second place and South 
Ockendon in fifth each around £220 per week. Two hospitals in the 
same RHA as Normansfield, Botley's Park and St. Lawrence's had 
weekly costs of under £150. DHSS, National NHS Cost Accounts 1983 
(London: DHSS, 1984)
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Policy developments after AEGIS
The publication of the South Ockendon Report in 1974 effectively 
marked the end of Barbara Robb's career as a political lobbyist in 
health care. There were two reasons for this. First she resolved 
at this point that AEGIS had largely served its useful purpose and 
that she would take up another cause. Second, a year after the 
report appeared, she began to suffer the symptoms of liver cancer 
which finally killed her in 1976. Doubtless the lot of the objects 
of her chosen new crusade, young offenders, is so much the poorer 
for her early death.
There is little point in dwelling on the months of her demise, since 
to the extent that this study is biographical it should focus on her 
political activity. It suffices to record that the strength of 
character which had sustained her campaign was manifest during her 
illness. She kept it from all but her most intimate friends and 
fought the crippling pain and debilitation without recourse to 
chemical relief which would have blurred her intellect and dimmed 
her awareness. Her profound mistrust of hospital authorities 
deterred her even from entering hospital until she simply could no 
longer cope at home. She passed the time cataloguing and annotating 
her immense collection of papers, correspondence and notes; a task 
she left largely uncompleted.
However, the story of the reforms the campaign set in train still 
unfolds in 1990. In order to review the effectiveness of AEGIS as a 
lobby, and proceed to develop an analysis of the policy process in 
mental health, the outcome of the reforms needs to be evaluated to 
the present day. Four broad categories of reform have been 
identified in this study:
(a) the development of policy in mental health and the extent 
to which it has been influenced by the concerns of AEGIS and 
the numerous hospital inquiries;
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(b) the evolution of the priorities policy and its impact on 
standards of care in mental illness and mental handicap 
hospitals. This has two elements; the extent to which real 
spending on these care groups has risen both as an absolute 
proportion of hospital spending and relative to other sectors; 
the way standards of care have reflected changing patterns of 
expenditure.
(c) the impact of monitoring agencies;
(d) the extent to which reforms in complaints procedure have 
met the criticisms voiced by AEGIS and by the Davies
Committee. This has three elements: the procedure adopted by 
health authorities; the role and impact of the health service
commissioner; the evolution of the procedure for special
inquiries.
Since evaluative research is not the primary aim in this study, the 
treatment of each will be relatively brief though the intention is 
to raise and discuss the major issues under each category. The
analysis is presented in two parts with the following chapter 
dealing with complaints procedures.
Policy developments
The Castle administration began its contribution to policy reform 
with the publication of Better Services for the Mentally 111 in
1975.10 The White Paper was noteworthy for its acknowledgement 
that the movement away from dependence on large Victorian hospitals 
had not been achieved at the pace anticipated by the 1962 Hospital
Plan. In the period immediately after the oil crisis of 1973, it
was clear that the necessary capital resources would not be
available in the volume needed substantially to accelerate the
l^DHSS, Better Services for the Mentally 111. Cmnd 6233, 
(London:HMS0, 1975)
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programme. Indeed according to the document's own estimates, an 
annual investment of £100 million (at 1984/5 prices) was required to 
develop local services and upgrade the large hospitals.H
The main objective of Better Services was to provide health and 
social services authorities with an ambitious blueprint for 
comprehensive local mental illness services. In so doing, it wove 
together the strands of policy guidance which had been evolving in 
the light of the Whittingham Report and the work of the Hospital 
Advisory Service to the effect that community-based psychiatry 
needed to include adequate provision for the elderly mentally ill, 
and sufferers from chronic mental illness: groups largely overlooked 
in the plans of the 1960s. ^  Better Services took this one stage 
further and made recommendations for day care, housing and hostel 
accommodation as well as guidance on more specialist services for 
alcoholism, drug misuse, forensic psychiatry and child and 
adolescent care. As in its sister document on mental handicap, 
quantitative indices of service and staffing levels were cited.
The second major initiative during this period was the consultative 
document, Priorities for Health and Social Services, which appeared 
in 1976. This was the first attempt systematically to set out the 
priorities policy which had been evolving since 1969 and was part of 
the Castle administration's strategy to redistribute health care 
spending more fairly both geographically and functionally. To 
achieve the latter objective, Priorities introduced the mechanism of 
programme budgets, inaugurated in the USA, which divide the total 
revenue budget into major care group categories which structure 
future shifts in spending.^ Unlike the RAWP formula^, programme
^ Better Services cites a figure of £30 million at 1974 prices, 
ibid para. 11.8, which has been reflated here using the NHS/GDP 
multiplier in Table 5 in Appendix 4.
l^See Chapter 6
l^Banks, G.T., Programme budgeting in the DHSS, in Ed. Booth, T.A., 
Planning for Welfare. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979)
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budgets were not an attempt to establish needs-based criteria for 
allocating revenue. Indeed had it been feasible to calculate 
targets on this basis (which given the complexity of the task, seems 
doubtful) and the established patterns of spending proved to be 
widely at variance with them, then the Government may well have had 
to tramp across a political minefield in trying to move towards 
targets. Instead, it took the safer route of beginning with the 
historically established pattern of spending and adopted a policy of 
moving incrementally from that base. Within an overall projected 
annual growth rate of 2% in revenue for the three financial years 
beginning 1977/78, Priorities set differential targets for the major 
care groups in health and personal social service spending. 
Services for the elderly, the mentally ill, the mentally handicapped 
and children were to grow at a significantly faster rate than acute 
and general services.^
In the next major review of the policy, the 1979 Royal Commission 
Report endorsed a recent Public Expenditure Committee report which 
implied that the established planning system and the Department's 
resource allocation process were uncoordinated and thereby an 
impediment to the implementation of priorities. ^  In the face of 
this type of criticism and its own ideological commitment to 
squeezing the maximum value out of public services, it was perhaps 
unsurprising that the new Conservative administration embarked upon 
major restructuring of the planning system and introduced systematic
l^DHSS, Sharing Resources for Health in England. (London: HMSO,
1976)
l^DHSS: Priorities for Health and Social Services. (London:HMSO,
1976) para. 11. Acute services were to grow by 1.2% per year. These 
figures compare to the Government's own estimate that 1% growth was 
required merely to allow for demographic changes and to make some 
allowance for medical advances: see House of Commons, The Report of 
the Roval Commission on the National Health Service. Cmnd 7615 
(London:HMSO, 1979) para.6.11 
16Ibid para.6.17
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procedures to monitor and review the performance of health 
authorities against national policy.
In 1982, the Government Implemented the recommendations of the 1979 
Royal Commission and combined districts and areas into new District 
Health Authorities. At the same time it revised the planning system 
by establishing two phases of the cycle.^ Every five years, 
regions and districts were to produce strategic plans for the coming 
ten years based on given revenue and capital assumptions over the 
period. Within this framework, they were to publish annual plans 
which detailed the service and resource changes in the forthcoming 
financial year needed to move towards strategic objectives. In 
1983, systematic monitoring of regions and districts was introduced 
to complement the planning system and provide the feedback mechanism 
required to review progress and make appropriate adjustments to 
existing plans as they rolled forward. The review process has 
become increasingly quantitative and standardised over the last five 
years as Ministers and more recently the NHS Management Executive 
have sought to establish a uniform basis for performance targets and 
monitoring.
The evolving system of Ministerial and management reviews and 
quantitative measures of performance such as performance indicators 
and the Management Accounting Framework have been designed to ensure 
that health authorities implement Government policy and priorities. 
They represent a logical development in an age of relatively cheap 
and accessible information technology, of Crossman's original 
attempts to assert the supremacy of Ministerial policy over the 
periphery. In its early days, the Thatcher Government published 
Care in Action which fully endorsed its predecessor's priorities 
policy. Through the review process, it has put pressure on health 
authorities to accelerate the development of local services for
l^Glennerster points out that this was partly motivated by the 
irrelevance of 10-year plans in an era of cash limits, Glennerster, 
H., From containment to conflict? Social planning in the seventies, 
Journal of Social Policy. Vol. 10 No.l, January 1981, pp.31-51
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people with a mental handicap or illness and develop costed 
proposals for closing the large hospitals. At the same time, during 
a period when management resources might otherwise have been 
channelled into acute services, the Government introduced four major 
incentives for health authorities to keep mental illness and mental 
handicap at the top of the agenda.
(a) The 1982 restructuring created district health authorities 
ostensibly to provide comprehensive health services within 
their boundaries to their own populations which implied the 
demise of distant large hospitals serving multi-district 
catchment areas;
(b) In 1983, the Care in the Community initiative was launched 
to extend existing joint finance arrangements and more 
potently, introduced mechanisms for transferring revenue and 
capital from the NHS to social services and allied 
agencies^-®;
(c) The 1983 Report of the Enquiry into Underused and Surplus 
Property in the NHS reminded health authorities that property 
was an important resource in strategic planning. The 
following year, legislative changes allowed health authorities 
to seek planning consent for developing redundant sites before 
disposal thereby greatly increasing their value
(d) The NHS Land Transaction Handbook which regulates the 
acquisition and disposal of property by health authorities was 
revised to require health authorities to re-invest proceeds
1®DHSS, Care in the Community- A Consultative Document on Moving 
Resources for Care in England, (LondomDHSS, 1983) and DHSS circular 
HC (83) 5. Health Service Development, Care in the Community and 
Joint Finance
l^DHSS t NHS, Report of the Enquiry into Underused and Surplus 
Property in the NHS. (London: DHSS, 1983)
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from the disposal of mental illness and mental handicap 
hospitals into the development of new services in those 
sectors.20
Given the strategic location of many of the country's large 
hospitals, there was substantial potential for regional health 
authorities to supplement their central capital allocations, 
provided sites could be vacated and planning consent for development 
obtained. With the number of old longstay patients in the hospitals 
finally dwindling to the levels projected for 1962 Hospital Plan, 
albeit ten years late, it appeared that the long-standing "closure 
programme" would finally come to fruition. The priority care groups 
had at last achieved a high profile within the NHS. Even Ramon, a 
severe critic of the Conservative Government^was obliged to concede 
that by the mid-1980s it had been more effective in implementing the 
policy than any since 1948.21
It was this precise moment that the House of Commons Social Services 
C o m m i t t e e 22 and the Audit C o m m i s s i o n 23 chose to launch highly
20DHSS, NHS Land Transactions Handbook. (London: DHSS, produced
annually)
2lRamon, S., Psychiatry in Transition. (London: Croom Helm, 1989), 
pp.261-287
22"it is only now that many people are waking up to the legacy of a 
policy of hospital run-down which began over 20 years ago. Many of 
the horror stories of mentally ill people living on the streets or 
miserably in board and lodging are the results of an earlier 
era....Putting pressure on authorities to close or run down 
hospitals without similar incentives of resources to develop 
alternative services is putting the care before the horse." Second 
Report from the Social Services Committee HC 13-1, 
(London:HMSO,1985) para.31
23"There are serious grounds for concern about the lack of progress 
in shifting the balance of services towards community care. 
Continued on following page
-253-
publicised critiques of the implementation of the hospital closure 
programme. The former provided ammunition to pressure groups and 
interests who nurtured grave doubts about the entire de- 
institutionalisation policy. Adverse press publicity began to play 
new roles. Media attention in mental illness and mental handicap 
has switched from conditions in the large hospitals, towards the lot 
of those discharged from them. With the assistance of orchestrated 
campaigns by new pressure groups such as the National Schizophrenia 
Society, and RESCARE, perceived inadequacies in community care 
became the mental health scandals of the 1980s.^
The Audit Commission launched a lobby for major structural change 
aimed at a substantial expansion in responsibility and resources of 
local government largely at the expense of the health service. A 
Government dissatisfied with Royal Commissions as mechanisms for 
defusing pressure, asked the architect of General Management, Sir 
Roy Griffiths to review the position and make recommendations.
Griffiths took the critiques of the Social Services Committee and 
the Audit Commission as his starting point for proposals for change. 
His report recommended that local authority social service 
departments should be made responsible for coordinating residential 
care for those elderly, mentally ill and mentally handicapped people 
who do not need intensive medical and nursing c a r e . The fact
Continued from previous page
progress has been slow and uneven across the country; and in the 
near-term prospects are not promising. In short, the community care 
policy is in danger of failing to achieve its potential." Audit 
Commission, Making a reality of community care: A Report bv the 
Audit Commission. (London:HMSO, 1986)
2^See National Schizophrenia Fellowship, Slipping through the Net. 
(Surbiton: NSS, 1989) and Wallace, M. , Did Edward have to die,
Sunday Times Magazine. July 24th, 1988
^^There are thematic parallels between the Griffiths Report and the 
Continued on following page
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that it was published with minimum ceremony, the day after the 
budget led observers to assume that the government were 
unenthusiastic about the prescribed increase in local authority 
budgets and responsibilities.
Pre-election adverse publicity about acute services grew to a 
crescendo in the winter of 1987/8 and was taken by the Prime 
Minister as justification for a review of the entire structure of 
the NHS. Proposing the most radical structural reform to hospital 
services since the 1946 NHS Act, the 1989 White Paper is aimed at 
introducing an internal market in health care with the separation of 
the service provider and service purchaser roles. At the time of 
writing, 66 hospitals have been short-listed by their regions as 
candidates for self-governance and their proposals currently subject 
to Departmental scrutiny now that a new Act of Parliament is on the 
statute book. The first wave of National Health Service Trusts 
should be in place by April 1991.26 A number of regions are 
supporting proposals from mental illness and mental handicap units.
At the same time, the Government has revived interest in priorities, 
with long awaited developments on the Griffiths Report. The White 
Paper, Caring for People was published in the Autumn of 1989.27 it
Continued from previous page
earlier Report of the Committee of Enouirv into Mental Handicap 
Nursing and Care. Cmnd 7468 (London:HMSO, 1979) established by 
Barbara Castle as one by-product of the South Ockendon Report. The 
Jay Report proposed shifting the philosophy of caring for mental 
handicap from a medical and nursing model to a social model and also 
advocated administrative reform to vest major responsibility for 
care with social services departments. At the time of the 1982 
restructuring of the health service, there were widespread 
expectations that the Government was intent on implementing this 
recommendation. However, opposition from within mental handicap 
nursing and nervousness about the resource implications for local 
authorities caused Ministers to withdraw.
26flHS and Community Care Act 1990
27dOH, Caring for People. Cm 849, (London: HMSO, 1989)
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has three major objectives. Firstly, health and social service 
authorities are required to define their respective roles by 
distinguishing between health and social care. Secondly, social 
services are to become commissioning agencies of social care based 
on an individual assessment of need. Thirdly, there would be some 
simplification of income support for people in residential care by 
transferring the care element of board and lodgings payment to the 
budgets of local authorities through the Revenue Support Grant. 
This measure has proved the most controversial as the NHS and 
Community Care Act has passed through Parliament, not least since 
Ministers have opposed "ring-fencing" to ensure that the funds would 
be earmarked for spending on social services for the client groups 
concerned. In a recent decision to phase implementation of the new 
social service responsibilities, the transfer of income support 
responsibilities from DSS has been put back to 1993 amongst rumours 
that Ministers may not do it at all. Moreover, NHS Trusts will be 
empowered to offer social care provided the social services 
authorities will place the contracts. This blurs the distinction 
between health and social care which Griffiths was keen to draw 
cleanly and with the delay in implementation appears another in a 
series of moves which dilute his proposals.
Whilst the Secretary of State for Health was fighting the public 
relations battle with the BMA and RCN over the merits of the major 
NHS reforms, one of his junior Ministers was keen that health 
authorities should not lose the momentum on hospital closures.2® A 
new capital loans fund has been created from which regions can 
borrow to finance capital schemes needed to close large hospitals 
and free up sites for disposal to generate proceeds, part of which 
then pay off the loan. The scheme is limited in the first year but 
will be expanded in subsequent years, but seems unlikely to have a 
major impact on hospital closure programmes. In the meantime a 
collapse in property prices in the south-east has halted the capital 
programmes of the four Thames Regions who between them manage about
2®See Department of Health Press Releases 89/298 dated 12 July 1989 
and 89/301, dated 13 July 1989.
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30% of the country's large hospitals. Any slowdown effect that this 
might have could be more than counterbalanced once contracting 
becomes effective from April 1991. Provider hospitals are required 
to charge at full cost, and districts with responsibility to pay for 
the care of longstay residents will have a greater incentive to 
resettle them given the rising unit costs in many of these 
institutions.
Finally, the lessons of the inquiries have also influenced more 
detailed management policies. There have been major innovations in 
nurse training and practice.29 jn mental illness, these have 
included the Nursing Process, greater autonomy for nurses through 
the Nurse Therapist innovation, individual patient care programmes 
and increased sensitivity to the difficulties of managing patients 
with behavioural difficulties.^
Priorities
The campaign spearheaded by the National Schizophrenia Society and 
RESCARE to review the closure programme has been in harmony with 
changes in the emphasis in central policy towards slowing the pace 
of change in mental illness and mental handicap. This appears to 
support the suspicion now abroad that the priorities policy has been
29xhese are described in detail in Martin, J.P. Hospitals in 
Trouble (London: Blackwell 1984) op.cit pp.226-240 
30DHSS circular HC(76)11 The management of violent or potentially 
violent hospital patients is another example of the Department 
resisting a proposal until events overtook it. It appeared after 
both the South Ockendon and St. Augustine's Reports. However, the 
idea originated in the 1973 report of a working party set up by the 
National Association for Mental Health after the Farleigh Report: 
Guidelines for the Care of Patients who Exhibit Violent Behaviour in 
Mental and Mental Subnormalitv Hospitals: A consultative document, 
(London: NAMH, 1973)
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phased out. For the time being, however, it remains formally in 
place and is the legitimate object of evaluative analysis.
Given the range of services for people with mental illness and 
mental handicap in the health and social service sectors, a 
comprehensive analysis of the priorities policy since the 1960s 
would constitute a substantial empirical investigation. The primary 
subject matter of this study is the longstay hospital sector and 
this is therefore the major focus of the empirical evaluation. 
Evidence on the development of services in the non-hospital services 
is briefly reviewed later in the chapter.
When the 1976 Priorities document was launched it was greeted with 
some scepticism. Brown argued that it betrayed a lack of commitment 
to improving services for the mentally ill and mentally handicapped 
and was merely another in "a long history of fine policy statements 
in this area of service area and an equally long history of slow 
progress in implementing t h e m ."31 Wilding suggested that the 
initiative has proved largely futile due to opposition from the 
medical profession.32 At a superficial level, the evidence supports 
this pessimism.
The objective of the priorities policy was to improve standards of 
care in the longstay sector by shifting resources across functional
^Brown, M. "Priorities for health and personal social services" in 
Ed. Jones K. , and Brown M. , in The Year Book of Social Policy in 
Britain 1976. (London:Routledge, 1977) p.29. For a similar 
pessimistic interpretation, see also, Creese, A., The National 
Health Service, in Glennester, H. , Ed. Labour's Social Priorities. 
(London: Fabian Society, 1976) pp.18-21
32wilding, P. Professions and Social Welfare. (London:Routledge, 
1982) pp.39-40, Klein also viewed the policy as a failure, though 
for different reasons. See Klein, R., Policy Perceptions and 
Problems in the NHS, in Policy and Politics. No. 2, Vol. 3, pp.226-
7
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boundaries within health authority budgets. The policy was first 
formalised in 1969 after the publication of the Ely Report and
subsequently endorsed by successive Secretaries of State. Any
worthwhile evaluative analysis must therefore examine trends in 
relevant indicators in years leading up to the policy as well as 
those beyond it to ascertain whether it has had an impact. The
evidence presented below is drawn from standard DoH returns on
revenue spending and staffing from 1964 to the mid-1980s or two 
decades after Barbara Robb launched AEGIS. Of potential indicators 
of the success of the priorities policy, such as minimum standards, 
the revenue and staffing data are the only objective measures which 
can be standardised for the periods before the policy initiatives of 
Crossman and the rest. Some discussion of the Department's minimum 
standards and other quantitative indicators of standards of care is 
included at the end of the section.
Financial data by hospital service sector was collated from 
published Ministry of Health and DoH returns and then restructured 
and analysed using standard computer-based spreadsheet and graphics 
software. In order to make valid comparisons, the figures were 
reflated to a 1984/5 price base. This is by no means a 
straightforward exercise. Since 1971/2, the DoH has published its 
hospital and community services price index. Prior to then only the 
standard Treasury GDP deflator is available. The two indices are 
not consistent on a year to year basis either with each other or in 
the direction of the variation. Thus in one year the NHS price 
index exceeds the GDP deflator. In another it is smaller. In a 
third the two are equal. In order to mitigate if not to solve these 
problems, a multiplier for each year of spend was calculated using 
the GDP deflator to 1970/71 and the NHS price index thereafter. 
Since the aim of the analysis is comparative and the object is 
expenditure between sectors within a public service, no adjustment 
has been made to the GDP deflator for relative price effect.
3-^ For a further justification of this approach see Gould F. , and 
Roweth, B., Public Spending and Social Policy, in Journal of Social 
Policy. Vol.9, No.3, (1980) p.344
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Table 5 in Appendix 4 gives the two indicators and the resultant 
GDP/NHS multiplier.
Costs in the acute sector are compared with those in mental illness 
and handicap and those in the remaining longstay hospitals which 
largely care for the elderly. Direct comparison between service 
sectors is complicated by differential rates of inflation in acute 
and longstay hospital costs which arise from the higher diagnostic 
and treatment episodes per case and greater equipment and 
maintenance costs in acute care. With this qualification, the 
figures presented below allow reasonably reliable conclusions to be 
drawn about the success of the priorities policy. No attempt has 
been made to consider the list of priority acute services which 
first emerged in the mid 1980s and which Ministers seem content to 
increase every year, since these were considered to be outside the 
scope of this review.
Evaluating the implementation of a policy to shift resources from 
acute services to the main priority care groups is also problematic. 
Figure 1 compares the distribution of spend by service sector in 
1964 with 1985. Full figures for the period given in Table 2
in Appendix 4 show the percentage distribution of total spend by 
service sector. By 1975, after six years, the policy had achieved a 
1% increase in the share of mental handicap services. Thereafter 
relative spend on the sector fell back and following a brief period 
of expansion after the Normansfield report, stabilised at 5.9% or 
half a percentage higher than in the 1960s. Over the same period 
mental illness hospitals lost out in absolute terms and show a 
steady decline until Ministers reasserted the policy in the early 
1980s with Care in Action.
In the following charts, the word "spend" denotes recurrent revenue 
expenditure.
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Figure 1: Spend by sector 1964 & 1985
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Source:Table 2 In Appendix 3
Figure 2 traces the growth in spending during the period to 1985, 
taking 1964, the year before Barbara Robb launched the AEGIS 
campaign, as the base year. Total real spending on hospitals 
increased by a multiple of 2.65 across all sectors. The acute 
sector increased the fastest and again in absolute terms, absorbed 
most of the additional resources; the respective figures for acute, 
mental illness and mental handicap were 3.25, 1.99 and 2.86.
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Figure 2: Net spend by hospital sector 1
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A simple comparison of total net spending by care group leads to the 
conclusion that the priorities policy has made only a marginal 
impact on established patterns of spending and failed to affect the 
dominance of acpte services in spending decisions.
However, absolute comparisons are often misleading and particularly 
so in this field. Further probing is therefore required to do full 
justice to the policy since there are a number of objective reasons 
why acute services should have maintained their dominant position. 
Part of the explanation lies in changes in the number of available 
beds by sector.3^ Although the number of acute beds has fallen it 
has grown as a proportion of total hospital beds over the period. 
The number of mental illness beds fell by 42% and mental handicap 
beds by 25%; the number of acute beds by only 18%. 35 The 
difference between the rate of decline in mental illness and mental 
handicap beds is largely explained by the relative age profiles of 
the old long stay residents in each type of hospital. They are 
significantly older in mental illness hospitals since the policy of 
long-term institutionalisation began to decline in the late 1940s in 
that sector but continued well into the 1960s in mental handicap.
Moreover, it is not simply a matter of beds since workload (the 
total number of cases treated), and throughput (the number of annual 
cases moving through a bed) have a proportionate impact on cost; 
since a large proportion of acute case cost is incurred during the 
first few days of a hospital stay in that sector. Acute workload 
has accounted for 90% of total hospital workload throughout the 
period and although throughput has increased in all sectors, it has 
done so far more rapidly in acute s e r v i c e s .  36 N o t  least, case 
costs in acute services are considerably higher for equivalent 
lengths of stay, due to higher consultant and other medical
3^At the same time there has been a steadily increasing shift of 
workload in acute services from inpatient care to daycases.
35see Appendix 4 Table 9.
36see Appendix 4 table 10.
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"episodes" and the higher levels of diagnostic investigations and 
treatment procedures.
Hence higher case costs and the sheer volume of work undertaken by 
acute hospitals, cloud the issue of the success or failure of the 
priorities policy if simple comparisons are made between net total 
spend. Indeed that treatment did and should cost more in acute 
medicine was never contended by AEGIS, Crossman or anyone else. 
Their concern was to tackle the relative poverty of the long-stay 
sectors by improving staffing ratios, access to occupational and 
rehabilitative therapies and not least hotel services such as the 
quality of catering.
To investigate whether this has been achieved, evidence is required 
that spending in the longstay hospitals has accelerated in line with 
central government policy initiatives. Table 6 in Appendix 4 shows 
the costs per inpatient week by specialty at 1984/5 prices. It 
shows how in both the mental handicap and mental illness sectors, 
spending has been increasing at a faster rate relative to acute 
spending from the early seventies onwards: following a period of
contraction in the mid-to late-1960s. It also illustrates that the 
1980s initiative launched with Care in Action and reinforced 
through the review process has been particularly effective. Over 
the whole period mental illness and mental handicap costs have grown 
as a proportion of acute costs from 30% to 40% and from 25% to 36% 
respectively. Further supportive evidence is provided in table 7 in 
Appendix 4. which gives the annual percentage increase in each 
sector, again showing how spending per patient accelerated in the 
mental illness and mental handicap sectors relative to acute from 
1969/70 onwards. Finally, Figure 3 shows the cost per inpatient 
week by sector standardised with 1964 levels set at 100. Whereas 
acute spending has increased by a factor of 2.88, mental illness had 
increased by 3.7 and mental handicap by 3.84.
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Figure 3:Cost per inpatient week 1964-86
Standardised with 1964-100
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It is quite clear then that significantly more money has been 
channelled into the mental illness and mental handicap hospitals 
relative to acute hospitals since Crossman launched the priorities 
policy. Even during periods when the acute sector has experienced 
nil or so-called negative growth, mental illness and handicap 
spending has accelerated. This trend has been particularly marked 
during the first five years of the 1980s and indicates the 
effectiveness of the review process in securing the implementation 
of ministerial policy.
In this context, more recent commentators such as Allsop-^ and 
Lee f^J wh0 are critical of the failure to move towards equalisation 
of total net spend by programme have expected more from the policy 
than it was designed to deliver. Generally, politicians, 
administrators and academics alike, have tended to underestimate 
both the cost and more fundamentally the historical span of 
transferring all services from the network of large hospitals which 
took 140 years to create.^9
^Allsop, J., Health Policy and the NHS. (London: Longman, 1984), 
concludes that there is no definitive evidence of a resource shift.
3®Lee, k . Public expenditure, health services and health, in 
Walker, A., Ed. Public Expenditure and social policy. (London: 
Heineman, 1982) p. 87
3^Cost estimates of reproviding the services in one large hospital, 
Darenth Park, are given in Korman, N. and Glennester, H. , Hospital 
Closure. (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1989) pp.152-175. To 
date, Darenth is the only large hospital which South-East Thames RHA 
has been able to afford to close.
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These shifts in resources within the hospital services have been 
paralleled by substantial developments in the community services. 
The Department of Health last undertook a 10-year analysis of 
progress in the late 1980s. This reported an 80% increase in the 
number of local authority community residential places for people 
with a mental handicap and over 180% growth in places in the 
voluntary and private sectors.41 Equivalent figures in mental 
illness were 85% and 143%. 42 Increases In the number of day and 
training places were of similar orders of magnitude.
Standards of care
To what extent have these additional resources been reflected in 
standards of care? Since manpower accounts for between two-thirds 
and three-quarters of hospital costs, these trends in expenditure 
should reflect increased staffing levels in mental illness and 
handicap hospitals. To investigate this, data from the Ministry of 
Health and DHSS statistical reports on the facilities and services 
in mental illness and mental handicap hospitals has been collated, 
and restructured on a common basis of the number in major staff 
group per 100 patients resident. The returns were first published 
in 1964 allowing the entire period to be represented, however they 
did not begin appearing annually until 1969. It has not been 
possible therefore to compile a complete data set for the 1960s, 
since data for 1964, 1967, the year Sans Everything appeared, and 
1969 is not available in the returns. However the trend remains 
apparent.
41'Personal Social Services: Provision for Mentally Handicapped
People in England, 1976-86', Statistical Bulletin. (DoH, London: 
October 1988) pp.15-27
42•Personal Social Services: Provision for Mentally 111 People in 
England 1977-87, Statistical Bulletin (DoH:London, April 1989) 
pp.11-17
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As Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate, the entire period shows sustained 
improvements in staffing ratios and, for nursing staff, reductions 
in the dependency on untrained staff.
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Figure 4: Nurses per 100 pats. 1964-85 
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Figure 5: Nurses per 100 pats. 1964-85 
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Minimum Standards
The Department began collating annual returns on compliance with 
minimum standards in 1970 as part of the Post Ely Policy. The 
categories included were staffing levels for consultant 
psychiatrists, nurses and domestics, and patients amenities 
including minimum provisions of night and day space, of personalised 
clothing and cupboard space. They have been summarised annually in 
the statistical reports series headed "The facilities and services 
of mental illness and handicap hospitals". From 197243 onwards, 
the Department followed the practice of including in the published 
summaries only those hospitals where 25% or more patients are 
without the amenity. Given the wide variation in the size of large 
hospitals, this appears somewhat anomalous since if care for 20% of 
patients in a 1000 bed hospital does not comply it appears
satisfactory despite the fact that twice as many patients are 
involved than in the case of 400 bed hospital with 25% non- 
compliance .
In 197344 78 large mental illness and 65 large mental handicap 
hospitals failed to comply with at least one standard: the
respective figures for two or more were 41 and 48. By 1982, only 8 
mental illness hospitals failed to meet one standard only and 8 RHAs 
had attained minimum standards in all such hospitals. Progress in 
the mental handicap hospitals has been slower. By 1982, 47 of the 
65 hospitals with 200 or more beds failed to comply with one
indicator (which in all but one case was levels of ward orderly and
domestic staff) and eleven with two or more. The collection of this 
data was ceased in 1986 when the NHS moved over to the Korner 
information definitions.
43DHSS, DS 86/72
44This is taken as the base year since the figures were presented 
slightly differently from 1973 onwards.
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John Yates Indicators
Further evidence that the relative poverty of the mental handicap 
hospitals should still cause concern has been provided in the data 
complied by the University of Birmingham Health Services Management 
Centre on all the country's mental illness and mental handicap 
hospitals with 100 beds or m o r e . Between 1975 and 1985 John 
Yates and his colleagues monitored hospital performance against nine 
quantitative indicators and developed a particular interest in 
factors which they argued could inform authorities that certain 
hospitals in their management might be at risk of being subject to 
enquiry. Yates' work has illustrated that the scandal hospitals 
were relatively unexceptional in performing poorly on the indicators 
he has selected. Table 1 includes information covering hospital 
size, staffing and other indicators relating to performance drawn 
from the "Facilities and Services" report published for 1967; the 
year that Sans Everything appeared. Those hospitals which were to 
be subject to inquiry are included and compared with others which 
escaped the trauma despite the fact that they were performing as 
badly or even worse.
^•^See Yates, J.M. Just Visiting - Long-Stay hospitals: Challenge 
for Health Authorities, University of Birmingham , 1985, Yates J.M 
and Vickerstaff, Inter hospital comparisons in mental handicap, 
Mental Handicap. 1982, 10:2, pp.45-47 and Staff-patient ratios and 
hospital inquiries, Nursing Times Vol 71 No.50 9.12.81, pp.2143- 
2145
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Table 1 Quantitative indicators of performance of large mental 
illness and handicap hospitals in 1967 (figures for staff show 
ratios all staff per hundred residents)
Mental No % in % Cons­ Qual'd Other Total Dome­
Illness pat­ wards wor­ ultant Nurses Nurses Nurses stics
Hospital ients 50+ king
Hospitals featured in inquiries
Banstead 1275 16 77 0.22 13.0 28.0 41.0 5.8
Friern 1948 27 46 0.21 9.5 11.6 21.1 4.7
Storthes 1713 43 65 0.38 7.8 17.0 24.9 4.5
Hall
St.Augustine 1325 62 61 0.33 12.0 19.9 31.9 3.7
St.Lawrences 1154 18 56 0.44 10.6 18.3 28.9 4.3
Whittingham 2110 43 72 0.13 7.9 16.9 24.8 2.6
Other selected comparisons
Bexley 1877 72 62 0.28 11.7 18.2 29.9 5.0
Prestwich 2039 70 79 0.15 8.3 12.0 22.7 1.7
Rainhill 2471 70 52 0.42 15.1 16.5 31.6 4.3
Warley 1695 67 67 0.53 14.0 23.5 37.5 3.8
West Park 1877 55 57 0.28 9.3 11.6 20.9 1.8
Mental No % in % Cons. Qual'd Other Total Dome­
handicap pat­ wards wor­ Nurses Nurs. Nurses stics
hospitals ients 50+ king
Hospitals featured in inquiries
Sth Ockendon 1210 52 43 0.17 7.7 18.5 26.2 5.9
Ely 459 98 37 0.15 7.2 22.7 29.8 5.6
Sandhill 854 38 61 0.16 9.4 18.1 27.5 4.0
Park Group*
Other Selected comparisons
St.Lawrences 2063 76 50 0.15 7.8 L2.2 19.9 1.9
St.Margarets 1397 67 48 0.21 7.4 12.5 19.9 1.1
Brockhall 1971 76 44 0.15 7.3 16.7 24.0 2.5
* included Farleigh Hospital
* included Farleigh Hospital 
Source:DHSS Statistical Report Series No.9 
The Facilities and Services of Psychiatric 
Hospitals in England and Wales HMSO 1967
-274-
This data supports the view widely held amongst NHS managers that 
the inquiry hospitals were, in some respects, unlucky to be singled 
out.
Agents of scrutiny
Soon after she published the South Ockendon Inquiry Report, Barbara 
Castle reinforced the existing provision for advising and 
scrutinising management in the longstay hospital sectors by creating 
separate agencies for the mental handicap sector leaving the 
Hospital Advisory Service to concentrate on services for the elderly 
and mentally ill. In 1975, she established the National Development 
Group for the mentally handicapped to provide a national policy 
advisory role and the following year set up the National Development 
Team (NDT) to visit hospitals and advise individual authorities. 
The National Development Group lasted only four years before it was 
wound up as an 'unnecessary QUANGO'. In order to de-emphasise the 
inspectorial role, the NDT differs from the HAS in a number of 
respects. When first established, the NDT could visit by invitation 
only, although after the Normansfield report, this was revised to 
allow uninvited visits according to the Minister's discretion. Over 
the period, leaks to the press of confidential reports, and advice 
to authorities which seemed somewhat unrealistic in the light of 
their resource constraints have led to criticisms of the NDT and to 
a certain erosion of its authority within the service.
In contrast, the HAS has maintained a central role in advising 
Ministers on policy, pressurising authorities to act on unacceptably 
low standards of care in hospitals and proselytizing good practice 
throughout the service. There have been two major changes since 
1969. First in recognition of the importance of joint planning and 
collaboration, the services provided by social service authorities 
were brought within its remit and it was renamed the Health Advisory 
Service. Secondly, beginning with a highly critical report of the 
services provided at Brookwood Hospital by North West Surrey Health 
Authority in 1985 its reports are now published in full.
-275-
The HAS has expanded its role in policy advice and produced a number 
of major reviews whose findings have been adopted as Ministerial 
p o l i c y . V i s i t s  to authorities can vary in their impact. Team 
members from the major disciplines of psychiatry (or geriatrics), 
nursing, occupational therapy, social work and administration 
(usually planning) spend two weeks in an district not merely 
reviewing standards of care and monitoring professional practice, 
but they also scrutinise local planning relationships between health 
and social services and established strategies for service 
development. The impact and helpfulness of HAS visits depends to a 
large degree on the experience and knowledge of the teams, both 
objectively and as it is perceived by the authority visited;^ 
although the Secretariat will seek to ensure that teams are drawn 
from professionals whose philosophy of care is known to accord with 
central policy.
There was understandable apprehension amongst health authorities at 
the prospect of the HAS publishing its reports in case the media 
focussed on the more critical aspects. These fears have largely 
proved unfounded, since ironically the press seems to have shown 
less interest in HAS reports now that they are freely available than 
it did when reliant on leaked documents. There has been some 
perception that the HAS has begun to adopt a more pro-active role 
and critical position viz-a-viz district health authorities. 
Certainly its first few published reports have adopted a critical 
stance with authorities managing large hospitals if standards of 
care are found not to be good or plans for future services have 
seemed institutional and unimaginative. For an agency criticised 
for lacking teeth^®, this is probably a healthy development.
^Health Advisory Service (HAS), The Rising Tide: Developing
Services for Mental Illness in Old Age, (London: HAS, 1982)
4^See Henkel, M, Kogan, M., Packwood, T., Whitaker, T., And Youll, 
P. The Health Advisory Service. (London: Kings Fund, 11989) pp.68- 
71
^®Parker P., 'Faithful Watchdog Barking in the dark', Times Health 
Continued on following page
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A critical approach has always been in the character of the HAS 
since successive directors have not recoiled from using dramatic 
descriptive language in annual reports to focus attention at 
national level on inadequate standards of care. Over the years, 
this has made an important contribution to sustaining pressure on 
Ministers to maintain the priorities policy. There is a case for 
greater subtlety with district health authorities. The HAS has no 
brief to consider the resource implications of its recommendations. 
There are therefore dangers in adopting too critical a stance since 
if health authorities judge its recommendations to be unrealistic, 
the HAS could lose some of the credibility it has built up over the 
years. Although to be fair to the HAS, some authorities so far 
singled out for strong criticism have responded with major reviews 
of operational policies and plans for future services.
The Mental Health Act Commission (MHAC)
Established by the 1983 Mental Health Act, which owed something to 
the South Ockendon and Farleigh Inquiries on the use of seclusion 
and confusion over dealing with violent patients, the MHAC is 
empowered to ensure that the Act's provisions on the rights of 
detained patients are observed. It vets their care and treatment in 
NHS and special hospitals, including ensuring that second opinions 
are available for patients who object to treatment, and a right of 
veto over proposals by clinicians to perform psychosurgery. It was 
innovative in including lay members and granting them an equal role 
as Commissioners as professionals. The Commission has more 
overriding powers than the HAS. Authorities are obliged to 
implement its recommendations and, like the Health Service 
Commissioner, it is obliged to produce two-yearly reports which are 
put before Parliament. It can visit without notice, require that 
all relevant case notes and files are made available and staff and
Continued from previous page 
Supplement. 11 December 1988.
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patients can request confidential interviews with members of 
visiting teams and Commissioners can select individual patients for 
interview. In its powers the MHAC comes much closer to the type of 
inspectorate which Barbara Robb envisaged for the service as a 
whole. At the time of writing, the Commission has been subject to 
some press publicity about differences of view amongst Members as to 
its role, and its relationship to the executive and the 
legislature.
The future
With the implementation of NHS Trusts, the role of statutory 
agencies of scrutiny seems set to grow. Recent proposals include 
the extension of the powers of the Audit Commission to the NHS in 
England and Wales. More widely, the growing interest in quality 
assurance, medical audit, and resource management, together with the 
need to ensure that that Trusts meet standards of care for which the 
Secretary of State is answerable to Parliament, should expand the 
role of statutory agencies of scrutiny, monitoring and 
inspection.^
It is crucial that they should develop and be given the powers and 
resources necessary to be effective. The large hospitals will be 
closed over the next 10-15 years. Stiff powers will be therefore be 
needed to ensure that capital and revenue currently devoted to these 
hospitals stay in the mental illness and mental handicap sectors, 
whether spent by social services, the private sector, voluntary 
organisations or the NHS itself. Otherwise it may prove all too 
tempting for health authorities to divert resources released from 
closing mental hospitals into the ever-hungry acute hospital
4^See Sketris, I., Health Service Accreditation - An international 
overview. (London: Kings Fund, 1988)
Also the NHS and Community Care Act requires Social Services 
Authorities to establish inspection of facilties to which they 
contract for care, including those under their own management.
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services. Similarly, as local authorities receive additional 
resources as a result of the NHS and Community Care Act, monitoring 
will be necessary to ensure they are spent on Community Care and not 
the roads, refuge collection and education.
Authorities not mindful of this may be storing up trouble. Neglect, 
insitutionalisation and ill-treatment can develop in small-scale 
residential facilities. The history of AEGIS suggests, that when 
officialdom allows this to go on, it is sitting on a political time- 
bomb.
Summary
The impact of the reforms set in train and promoted by AEGIS in 
standards of care have been substantial. Certainly the move away 
from large hospitals towards more localised services has been 
reinforced by the negative image of the mental hospital presented in 
the scandals. However public perception of this was already low and 
it is debatable whether the publicity aggravated or merely confirmed 
the reputation. By turning the spotlight onto conditions on the 
longstay wards, the closure programme has proceeded alongside an 
impetus to improve standards of care in the large hospitals during 
the transition period. Consequently, there has been a sustained 
trend of resource shifts into the mental handicap and mental illness 
hospitals compared to workload and relative to the acute service 
sector which ostensibly is more politically powerful. The HAS has 
added its contribution by sustaining pressure on Ministers. The 
jury is now out on how the most recent reforms will impact on this 
trend.
The large hospitals have not been the only gainers since the 
scandals have had a major impact on policy in all fields of mental 
health, raising its profile and hauling its concerns up the 
political agenda. As a result the planning of community-based 
services became substantially more sophisticated. Care group 
planning was established and the detail of policy focussed on the
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previously forgotten needs of chronic, elderly and other patients 
with special needs such as the behaviourally disturbed. Also, the 
inquiries at South Ockendon and St. Augustine's in particular have 
provided formidable ammunition to the civil rights movement in 
mental health which lobbied for the 1983 legislative reforms. 
Beyond mental health, there have reverberations in planning, in the 
accountability of health authorities and their relationship between 
Ministers and the central department.
Whether claims of parallel victories can justifiably be made for the 
campaign on Mrs Robb's second front, complaints, is the subject of 
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
COMPLAINTS MACHINERY
"...the first essential in the delivery of good health care 
is to listen to the complaint of the patient..." (Sir Cecil 
Clothier)1
"The number of statutes which pass the legislature, or the 
number of decrees which are handed down by the executive, 
but which change nothing in the permanent politics of 
society, is a rough index of the role of magic in 
politics."(Edelman)^
The machinery for the redress of grievances against the hospital 
services now has three components; the procedures laid down for 
internal investigation by health authorities; the provisions for 
special inquiry into serious complaints; the Health Service 
Commissioner. The activities of AEGIS influenced all three areas 
and particularly the last two.
Of all the post-Ely reforms, the formulation of an adequate 
hospital complaints procedure has proved the most problematic. 
During Crossman's period of office a number of attempts were made 
by officials but rejected as inadequate by him and his PEP 
advisers.  ^ After the Farleigh Report, Sir Keith Joseph 
established the Davies Committee to try and resolve the issue. 
Since it reported in 1973, the saga has continued and the holy 
grail continues to prove elusive. There have been five attempts, 
including Davies, and their history can be characterised as a
^■Clothier, C., The Patient's Dilemma. (London: Nuffield 
Provincial Hospitals Trust, 1988)
^Edelman D. , The Symbolic Use of Politics. (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1964), p.195
^See Chapter 7
-281-
gradual but purposeful retreat from the principles set out in his 
report.
As befits a Recorder and senior barrister, Davies's approach was 
legalistic and his report endorses clearly defined and standard 
procedures Junderpinned by independent review in preference to 
administrative discretion.^ His major objection to the extant 
procedures in HM(66)15 was that they were almost entirely internal 
and largely subject to the discretion of individual authorities. 
Firstly, senior staff over-emphasised the more formal aspects of 
procedure; most would not consider oral complaints and there was 
no uniformity across authorities for dealing with similar 
situations. Secondly, the official procedures were perceived by 
staff as imposed from above, out of touch with their conditions of 
work, and therefore Informal procedures evolved. Thirdly, there 
were no clear guidelines as to when Regions should be involved 
following investigation by the lower-tier authority. Similarly, 
the question of how and to what extent authority members should be 
brought into or informed about the investigation of complaints was 
left uncertain. Fourthly, the guidance did not deal with 
complaints by members of staff on behalf of patients "or with the 
related problem of possible victimisation of staff or suppression 
of complaints".-*
By implication, at least the report was equally critical of the 
central Department. According to the circular**, the DHSS was to 
act as the convener of complaints and determine the method of 
investigating the more serious amongst them. The power vested in 
Ministers to investigate complaints was rarely exercised. 
Responsibility was fragmented across several branches and no one 
section to deal with investigation of individual complaints as a 
specialist subject. When a complaint came in, it was immediately
^DHSS, NHS, Report of the Committee on Hospital Complaints 
Procedure. (London: DHSS, 1973)
5Ibid para. 2.6
^Ministry of Health, Circular HM(66)15 para.9
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referred to the hospital authority's senior officer and therefore 
there was no effective independent review.
Davies' prescribed 6 major principles for a fairer and more 
effective procedure:
(a) It should be well known, easily accessible, 
comprehensible, and seen to be fair and just;7
(b) It should allow the free flow of suggestions and 
complaints;®
(c) Patients should be assisted to complain by providing 
them with appropriate information;^
(d) Oral and written complaints should have the same 
status^® and all be recorded;H
(e) The various parts of the system should be 
interrelated;*-2
(f) A standardised system for dealing with complaints to do 
with medical care and treatment was required;
To achieve the first five, the report set out a code of practice 
with three main objectives: to reassure patients and others that 
proper provision had been made; to make it clear to staff dealing 
with complaints what is expected of them; and to set standards for 
those reviewing and monitoring the system. The code had three 
principal characteristics. Firstly it was hierarchical. 
Complainants who remained dissatisfied with the response at one
7 ibid para.6.4
® ibid para.6.4
9 ibid para. 1.10
10ibid para. 1.10
n ibid para. 1.16
12ibid para. 6.6
13ibid para. 1.16
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tier of management, moved up the structure finally reaching 
Members in serious cases (but not sufficiently serious to warrant 
an independent inquiry) before moving to external review.^ 
Davies anticipated that the great majority of complaints would be 
satisfied at officer-level and regarded the Members' role as the 
first independent check in the s y s t e m ^ .  Secondly, it was based 
on the provision of adequate information and assistance to 
complainants, through booklets and prominent notices which 
specified the recourse open to the dissatisfied. Similarly staff 
members were to be informed how to complain on their patients' 
behalf. Thirdly the fairness and openness of the system depended 
on the existence of effective independent review.
Davies found that investigation of clinical complaints was 
seriously inhibited by an unwillingness amongst doctors to 
criticise colleagues.^  As a result complainants who did not 
wish to were often obliged to go to law. 17 Davies therefore 
recommended a system of standing 'Investigating Panels' to be 
appointed by RHAs, and composed of both professional and lay 
members, unconnected with the RHA, under a legally-qualified and 
permanent Chairman. The Panels would assist in the investigation 
of any complaint which could be the subject of litigation, 
clinical or otherwise.1® The Chairman would be a senior 
barrister or solicitor from a list compiled by the Lord 
Chancellor. It would be at the panels' discretion whether a 
hearing was held, in which case it would be in private and without 
legal representation. In the case of sufficiently complex and 
serious complaints, the Chairman would ask the RHA to constitute a 
panel as an independent inquiry.^
l^ibid para. 7.23
15ibid para 7.40
This view was not shared by Barbara Robb and her advisers who felt 
that authority members could be considered independent in 
reviewing complaints against their own hospitals. 
l®ibid para. 7.29
17ibid para. 8.9
18ibid para. 8.9 
l^ibid para. 8.22
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In February 1976, Barbara Castle told Parliament that she accepted 
the Davies proposals for a uniform, written code of practice and 
issued a consultation draft. The timing of Mrs Castle's 
announcement could not have been Insignificant since it took place 
just six weeks after the St. Augustine's Report hit the headlines. 
Despite the clinical aspects of the St. Augustine's complaints, 
Davies' proposals to introduce an external review of clinical 
complaints remained contentious. Therefore as she launched the 
consultation on the Code of Practice, she also announced that she 
had asked the Select Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner 
to review the jurisdiction of the Health Service Commissioner 
having regard to Davies' recommendations about investigating 
panels.20 Of course this was a convenient means of clearing the 
political path for the less contentious recommendations in the 
Davies Report. The answer indicated that Mrs Castle both accepted 
the case for some mechanism of independent review of clinical 
complaints other than the courts and believed that an extension of 
the Commissioner's jurisdiction was preferable to Davies' 
proposals. This was unsurprising since she had led the Opposition 
attempt to include clinical complaints in the Commissioner's 
jurisdiction when the 1973 Reorganisation Bill passed through the 
Commons; not least, as her record as Secretary of State was to 
demonstrate, she was unabashed by the prospect of taking on the 
profession.
The draft code of practice produced by her Department, alone 
amongst the several which appeared after Davies, met most of the 
principles he set out. Authorities were to provide detailed 
information to complainants through readily available booklets 
which included advice on taking a complaint further if local 
investigations were considered unsatisfactory. Staff were to have 
equal access to this information and be informed of their right to 
approach the Health Service Commissioner direct if complaining on 
behalf of patients. Oral and written complaints were to be given 
equal status and recorded. Like Davies' recommendations the code
20House of Commons Official Report Vol 905. Written Answers Cols. 
85-6, 9.2.76
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was hierarchical beginning at ward level but reserving the right 
of complainants to approach either the district or area 
administrator at any stage. They were to bring any serious 
complaint or untoward occurrence to the attention of the area 
health authority who could take one of four channels: it could
leave the investigation to senior officers, set up a member level 
investigation, refer the complaint to the Health Service 
Commissioner or establish a formal inquiry.21
The draft code placed the responsibility for investigating 
complaints on health authority officers and members and vested in 
them considerable discretion over whether to refer complaints to 
independent review. In any authority less inclined to do this, 
the onus was left on the complainant to exhaust the channels prior 
to appeal to the Commissioner. In the light of AEGIS's 
contentions that authorities could not be trusted with such wide 
discretion, and that many complainants would never reach the 
Commissioner since they would exhaust themselves before reaching 
the end point of local procedures, it is difficult to consider the 
draft code as a radical document.
Even so, the proposals were criticised by health authorities and 
the Medical Defence U n i o n . 22 when subsequently the Report of the 
Select Committee of the Parliamentary Commissioner raised its 
voice against the draft code, it became inevitable that it would 
be interred. The Select Committee rejected the judicial 
preference for standard procedure and argued that the draft code 
sought to replace the fragmentation of existing arrangements with 
an unduly complex and formalised s y s t e m . 23 The DHSS withdrew and
21nHS, Code of Practice for Handling Suggestions and Complaints 
(other than those about Family Practitioner Services), attached to 
DHSS Circular HN(76)107, Health Services Management: Health
Services Complaints Procedure, June 1976
22Brooke Barnett, J.W., 'Standing the test of time, Health and 
Social Service Journal. Vol. 87, No. 4535, 8th April 1977 p.623. 
The author wrote in his capacity of Secretary of the Medical 
Defence Union.
23House of Commons, First Report from the Select Committee on the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration. Independent Review 
Continued on following page
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issued a new draft in 1978 with three major changes. Firstly, it 
was substantially shorter and less detailed in its prescriptions 
for procedures which answered the Select Committee's call for 
simplification. However, it increased the implied discretion of 
authorities and therefore ran the risk of generating wide 
variations in procedure and simply reproducing many of the 
difficulties which Davies had found in existing arrangements. 
Secondly, it required a complaint to be put in writing before it 
could be referred to senior officers or members, risking deterring 
the less literate or staff fearing victimization. Thirdly the 
emphasis which the original draft had placed on the need to inform 
members of staff of their rights to complain on behalf of patients 
was taken out.
With the 1979 Election there was yet another hiatus until in 1981 
the new administration published what seemed to be final proposals 
in Circular HC(81)5. Its provisions for non-clinical complaints 
were largely in line with the Labour Government's second draft 
document. In one minor divergence it re-emphasised the status of 
oral complaints as formal if the complainant sought an 
investigation by senior staff.
Its major departure from the previous two documents was its 
inclusion of guidance on handling clinical complaints. This issue 
had come to a head when the Select Committee on the PCA 
recommended that the Health Commissioner's jurisdiction should be 
extended to cover this field.24. However the new Secretary of 
State rejected this and instead, asked the BMA to devise a 
procedure which was then transferred virtually verbatim into the 
circular and remains in force in 1990.2^
Continued from previous page
of Hospital Complaints in the National Health Service, HC 45 
(London:HMS0,1978) paras. 16 and 41
24Ibid
25bMA Joint Consultants Committee, draft procedure for hospitals, 
British Medical Journal. Vol.281, No. 6252, 22nd November 1980, 
pp.1442-3,
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There is no further review available to complainants who remain 
dissatisfied apart from the Courts. Whether or not this is 
adequate is discussed below in the context of the powers of the 
Health Commissioner. However the 1981 guidance did not end the 
saga of the fate of the Davies proposals for other types of 
complaint. In 1986 personal experience of hospitalisation 
motivated Michael McNair Wilson MP to introduce a private members 
bill to oblige the Secretary of State to introduce direction to 
health authorities about a new complaints procedure for the 
hospital service. There is no prescription on procedure in the 
resultant two-page act which simply makes the discretionary power 
in section 17 of the 1977 NHS Act, mandatory.^6
The Secretary of State duly responded in November 1986 with yet 
another consultation draft procedure whose provisions were less 
detailed yet at once more formalised than any of its predecessors. 
Each health authority would designate an officer to be the
recipient of complaints. These were to be made in writing and
should the patient be unable to do this, a designated officer 
would make a record of the complaint which the complainant would 
be required to sign. Information on making complaints was to be 
made freely available, however as in the HM(81)5, there was no 
reference to complaints by staff on their patient's behalf. The
draft was confirmed in 1988.^7
Davies's objections to the situation he reviewed apply to the 
current draft. It lacks detail. There is no indication of when 
complaints should be referred to different tiers of the authority, 
and in what circumstances senior officers or members should be 
involved. Neither is there any detailed guidance as to the
^^The Secretary of State, is required to give health authorities 
directions to ensure: "(a) such arrangements are made for dealing 
with complaints made by or on behalf of persons who are or have 
been patients at that hospital; and (b) such steps are taken for 
publicising the arrangements so made" Eliz.II c.42, Hospital 
Complaints Procedure Act 1985. section 1 (1)
27j)HSS Circular D A (86)14, and attached booklet, DHSS:Hospital 
Complaints Procedure Act 1985, Consultation Document, DHSS 
Circular HC(88)37
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circumstances under which a complaint should be referred for 
special investigation under HM(66)15. As a consequence, it leaves 
authorities with considerable discretion and in all probability is 
producing a diversity of local procedures. Those authorities who 
currently handle complaints fairly and justly will continue to do 
so and those who are less concerned would remain so. There is no 
provision for assisting complainants other than the publicity, 
although CHCs can offer advice.
The absence of any specific guidance on staff complaints is a 
serious omission given the findings of a survey by the National 
Association of Health Authorities which reviewed complaints 
procedures in 80% of district health authorities. There was 
little evidence either of uniformity of content or widescale 
comprehensiveness and procedures varied in quality. Significantly 
only a quarter of the authorities surveyed provided guidance to 
staff on how to make complaints on behalf of patients.29 Lastly, 
discretion is left either with health authorities or the Secretary 
of State to refer serious complaints to independent inquiry.
As Davies emphasised, the adequacy of a hospital complaints 
procedure which gives health authorities the first opportunity to 
review the case, relies on the existence of adequate external 
checks and channels for complainants to seek alternative redress 
if dissatisfied with the local response. Since authorities are 
responsible for the service against which the complaint has been 
made, a legal perspective sees independent review as the only 
means of maintaining public confidence in the system by ensuring 
that 'justice is seen to be done'. The available channels are the
^Although not a agencies for the redress of grievances and 
therefore a primary focus of this study, community health councils 
have a statutory responsibility to assist patients pursue 
complaints. Indeed many chairmen see it a primary role to 
encourage as well assist people with grievances to pursue through 
the formal channels.
^National Association of Health Authorities, Protecting 
Patients: Guidelines for Handling Staff Complaints about Patient 
Care, (London:NAHA,1985)
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provisions for special inquiry and the Health Service 
Commiss ioner.
Special Inquiries
None of the guidance issued since 1976 indicates when health 
authorities should refer complainants to independent inquiry. As 
this study has shown, the road to an inquiry has proved long and 
difficult and required dogged persistence on the part of the 
complainant. Although this may be expected to have had a limiting 
effect, the growth in the use of formal inquiries has been one of 
the most marked developments arising directly from the AEGIS 
c a m p a i g n . it is difficult to be precise about the total, but 
Davies reported that between 1967 and 1971 there were 11 Section 
70 inquiries, plus 16 "independent Inquiries" set up by hospital 
authorities and Martin lists a further 19 in both categories 
between 1972 and 1981.31 Since the great majority of these 46 
inquiries have been into allegations about care in mental illness 
and mental handicap hospitals, it is a remarkable tally of up to 
20% of all such hospitals.
Since the six committees which considered the allegations in Sans 
Everything reported in 1968, these inquiries have similarly become 
increasingly judicialized. This trend has been driven by 
criticisms of the approach adopted in the Sans Everything and Ely 
inquiries. The guidelines which applied were issued by the 
Ministry of Health in 1966 when already under severe pressure from 
AEGIS and the press over standards of care in mental hospitals and 
allegations of cover-up and obstruction to complaints.
The Department then introduced a new type of NHS inquiry as an 
alternative to the statutory inquiries which section 70 of the 
1946 NHS Act (or 84 of the 1977 Act) empowered the Minister of
30Harlow,C. and Rawlings,R., Law and Administration. (London: 
Weildenfield and Nicolson, 1984) p.64
31-Martin, J . P. Hospitals in Trouble. (London: Blackwell, 1984)
pp.256-257
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Health (and subsequently Secretary of State) to appoint at his or 
her discretion. Since they were not appointed directly by the 
Minister, HM(66)15 inquiries were non-statutory. According to the 
circular, complaints serious enough to require independent inquiry 
at Regional level were to be investigated by a specially-appointed 
committee chaired by a lawyer 'or other competent person from 
outside the hospital service' and comprising professional and 
technical experts. The complainant or any persons subject of the 
complaint was to be present throughout the hearing. There were to 
be rights of cross-examination, although legal representation was 
permitted provided it was arranged personally by those 
appearing.^2 Following the dispute between AEGIS and the 
Minister of Health over whether or not Barbara Robb would 
cooperate with inquiries into the Sans Everything allegations, the 
Minister conceded that the chairman of the committees would be 
barristers nominated from a list prepared by the Lord Chancellor. 
The detail procedural guidance was not published at the time but 
there is no reason to suppose that it was not identical to that 
provided to Sir Geoffrey Howe in conducting the inquiry into Ely 
Hospital and sharply criticised in his report. The hearings were 
held in private. There was no power to summon witnesses. 
Considerable discretion was vested in the Chairman to decide who 
would be legally represented.-^
The Sans Everything inquiries were widely criticised by the press 
and by the legal profession in the persons of senior barristers 
such as Geoffrey Howe, Theo Fitzwalter Butler, as an advisor to 
AEGIS, Sir Michael Davies and his committee, and the Council on 
Tribunals. Adding their criticisms and recommendations for 
change to those of the 1957 Franks Report, and the Report of the 
1966 Roval Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry (the Salmon
^circular HM (66) 15 op.cit. para.7.(iii)b 
•^See Chapter 5
-291-
Re port)produces a package of seven components for the 'ideal 
type' of judicial inquiry into serious hospital complaints.
First they should adhere to the two major principles of natural 
justice. There should be full rights of cross examination. This 
is the rule of audl alternem partem which prescribes that not only 
should both parties be heard but also that each should have the 
opportunity to question the o t h e r . 35 There also should be no 
possibility that the body complained against could be cast in the 
role of both judge and jury in its own case.36
Since the Sans Everything and Ely inquiries were appointed by the 
Regional boards involved Wraith and Lamb politely censured them on 
this point:
"The major responsibility for administration lies with the 
hospital boards, of course, but it remains to be doubted 
whether they are the appropriate bodies for organising 
inquiries in situations where if allegations are found 
proven, they will be seen to have failed in at least one 
aspect of their administrative d u t y . " 3 7
Second, they should be conducted according to standardised and 
explicit procedural rules. Imperviousness to review is the 
principle objection to this means of decision-making raised by 
senior lawyers38 and again the Sans Everything inquiries were
3^House of Commons, Report of the Comirdttee on Administrative 
Tribunals and Inquiries. Cmnd 218, (London: HMSO, 1957) and Report 
of the Roval Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry. Cmnd 3121 
(London: HMSO, 1966)
35see Elcock, H.J. Administrative Justice. London:Longman's 1969, 
p. 47
3*>See Gregory R. , and Hutcheson, P., The Parliamentary Obudsman. 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975) p.32
3?Wraith R.E. and Lamb G.B. Public Inquiries as an Instrument of 
Government. (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1971) pp.210-11
38see for example, Griffiths, J.A.G. and Street H., Principles of 
Administrative Law, pp.155-159. Harlow and Rawlings argue that 
this distinction is misconceived since administrators prefer to 
operate by the rulebook. op.cit p.118
-292-
criticised for a lack of uniformity of p r o c e d u r e ^ .  Third, the 
inquiry should be open in two respects. The hearings should be 
held in public and both a comprehensive summary of the evidence 
and the full findings of the committee should be published. It is 
noteworthy that statutory Section 70 inquiries do not meet this 
principle since they impose no obligation for a public hearing or 
publication either of the evidence or the report submitted to the 
Secretary of State. Fourth, the chairman should have the right to 
subpoena witnesses. Fifth, all parties should be legally 
represented either out of the public purse or as a minimum, legal 
aid should be available to those without the means to employ 
counsel. Again this was a bone of contention between AEGIS and 
certain of the committees of inquiry into the Sans Everything 
hospitals. Sixth, the committees of inquiry should be adequately 
serviced. This was the subject of one of Howe's principal 
criticisms of his given procedure since the absence of a solicitor 
to collate and marshall and sift the evidence severely restricted 
his committee's ability to investigate some of the allegations 
which were left unproven as a consequence.
Lastly, inquiry procedure should be subject to external check or 
scrutiny. This was the role envisaged by the Franks Report for 
the Council on Tribunals established by the 1958 Tribunals and 
Inquiries Act. Initially, and contrary to the recommendations of 
Franks, all non-statutory inquiries were excluded from the 
Council's jurisdiction. This was remedied to some extent by the 
1966 Tribunal and Inquiries act which vested power in the Lord 
Chancellor to redesignate non-statutory inquiries as statutory; 
indeed it was following an Order made under this act that Section 
70 inquiries became statutory in the first place.
The role and impact of the Council on Tribunals has been the 
subject of much discussion by writers on administrative law. On 
paper it has a wide remit. It scrutinises procedure of all 
statutory inquiries and tribunals both on its own initiative and 
by receiving and investigating complaints. It also has an 
inspectorial role and may visit tribunals to make 'spot checks'.
^Wraith and Lamb op.cit. p.209
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In addition it produces special reports on topics as it thinks 
fit, and advises and is consulted on proposals for legislative 
change.
However, most writers agree that the Council is ill-equipped to 
encompass such a wide brief across the myriad tribunals and 
inquiries which now adjudicate in virtually all fields of public 
administration. Its impact is constrained by the limitations and 
ambiguity of its powers, its predominantly lay membership 
(though its concerns are matters of law) and the limited resources 
it its disposal. As a consequence Harlow and Rawlings argue that 
it has come to perform a "firefighting" rather than a 
"firewatching" role.^0 In reality, therefore any scrutiny role 
it could perform in hospital inquiries would in all probability be 
confined to responding to specific complaints rather than actively 
monitoring procedures.
When Barbara Robb made her complaint to the Council, it criticised 
the way the Minister had used his discretion not to appoint the 
Sans Everything committees directly under section 70.^ Although 
expressing surprise that the Council should have been concerned at 
this, the Ministry informally agreed to conform to this practice 
in future and so it did at Farleigh, Whittingham, South Ockendon 
and Normansfield. At Normansfield, Michael Sherrard QC conducted 
the most in-depth and procedurally rigorous investigation of all 
the committees which sat over the period. He stuck by the letter 
of the principles in the Salmon Report including meeting legal 
costs from the public purse and did not 'for one moment regret 
having done so'.^2
The majority of committees of inquiry since 1968 have been 
established by health authorities and therefore remained beyond 
the Council's scrutiny. They have nevertheless been strongly 
influenced by the trend towards due process. Indeed this was
^Harlow and Rawlings Op.cit. pp.170-191, also Wraith and Lamb 
pp.225-6, Street, H. Op.Cit pp.62-4
^ Council on Tribunals Annual Report for 1968 paras. 45-52
^House of Commons, Cmnd 7357 op.cit.paras. 13-14
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reflected In Appendix 7 of the draft guidance on complaints issued 
by Barbara Castle in 1976 which contained guidelines for committee 
chairmen.43 As noted above, the presumption underlying the trend 
is that reliance on judicial procedure is the most satisfactory 
means of reviewing the validity of complaints and allegations and 
protecting the interests of all concerned. But this understanding 
should not go unchallenged since evaluative analysis must examine 
the arguments for and against the appropriateness of judicial 
procedure for the issues in question.
What are the advantages? To begin with a clear set of procedures 
mitigates arbitrariness and clarifies the rights of all parties. 
Second, all allegations are made explicit and known to all sides. 
Inquiries of this type appear thorough and independent to the 
general public and therefore their recommendations carry 
considerable authority and legitimacy. Thirdly, many of the 
issues involved seemed appropriate for adjudication. There were 
factual questions of whether specific incidents took place, 
whether disputed conditions were present, and whether formal 
responsibilities had been fulfilled. For the individuals 
involved, there were questions of personal reputation and future 
career prospects and the need to guarantee protection against 
recriminations. Not least inquiries have sought to identify 
causation and attribute blame to individuals in order to prevent 
future occurrence. For management they have helped resolve known 
problems involving personalities and entrenched attitudes which 
were otherwise proving intractable. They have also attracted 
resources. For the public the inquisitorial approach has 
undoubtedly opened up the closed worlds of mental hospitals, 
revealed their relative poverty and related neglect by 
politicians, and administrators. The importance of these aspects 
cannot be over-stated.
43DHSS, HN(76)107 op.cit.
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But it has not been without cost. Inquiries have been a traumatic 
experience for individuals and the hospital as a whole which 
neither will ever forget. Individuals particularly those 
volunteering evidence out of a sense of public duty, unused to the 
adversarial approach of counsel were shocked at the treatment 
meeted out to them in the gladiatorial exchanges. ^  The 
St.Augustine's Inquiry seems to have generated particular 
resentment, as the Kent Area Health Authority put it:
"No one was obliged to give evidence. Those who did so were 
motivated by a genuine desire to help the Committee discover 
the truth about the allegations.... and thus restore the 
good name and reputation that St. Augustine's has hitherto 
enjoyed. Many of them regrettably came away from the 
Inquiry with the feeling, not that they had been willing 
parties to a fact-finding exercise, but rather as having 
been looked upon as guilty until proven innocent. The 
feeling could only have been reinforced by some of the 
questioning to which they had been subject, which more than 
once was described as hostile.
In his own defence, the inquiry Chairman, Hampden Inskip, saw this 
as unavoidable:
"A thorough inquiry will inevitably upset and anger some
witnesses  One of the saddest but cruel and unavoidable
features of inquiries is the exposure of inadequacy in a 
nice sincere person. The fact that witnesses in a court of 
law are often much more ruthlessly treated is little 
consolation.
^Swaffield, L. St Augustine's - a breath of fresh air, Nursing 
Times, Vol 77, no.48 pp.2062-63
Area Health Authority, St. Augustine's Committee of 
Inouirv. Report of an Emergency Panel. January 1977 para.2.02
^ H a m p d e n  Inskip, J., and Guy Edwards, J., Mental Hospital 
Inquiries, The Lancet. 1979, (i), No. 8117, 24 March 1979, p.658
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Staff have also felt a deep sense of injustice at being subject to 
severe criticism since they believed they were doing their best in 
adverse and often extreme circumstances. The clearest example was 
the petition to the Secretary of State by staff nursing the 
behaviourally disturbed patients at Farleigh which manifests the 
insecurity and apprehension caused by the inquiry to staff 
struggling to provide some kind of service to people otherwise 
written off by society under conditions which would strain anyone 
to the limits of patience and endurance.^ The hospitals may 
also have inflicted serious blows to staff morale which can 
reverberate throughout the service. This became a particular 
danger under the media spotlight and its focus on the sensational 
and the blameworthy. The hospitals concerned certainly got a bad 
name, and a blanket image of longstay institutions was created. 
This could well have aggravated staff recruitment problems. It 
could have done little to reduce the stigma for those admitted and 
may have deterred people needing the service from seeking help. 
On the other hand, the public esteem for the hospitals was already 
low and the stigma deeply rooted in the days of the asylum. 
Similarly it is difficult to imagine that the morale at 
Normansfield could have sunk any lower than it was in 1976. Not 
least there is substance to the argument that the recognition of 
problems previously swept under the carpet restores flagging 
morale.
Undoubtedly inquiries are protracted and extremely costly. Their 
approach has also been criticised as inflexible and lacking 
capacity for compromise on a contentious issue. Allegations are 
either proven or not proven. In the case of the Sans Everything 
Inquiries, a not proven verdict was used by the Minister to try 
and discredit AEGIS and, by association, its general case against 
conditions in the hospitals. Adjudication may be inappropriate to 
the more subtle problems. It is one thing to find for or against 
a specific allegation, it is quite another to adjudicate on the
^DHSS, Report of teh Farleigh Hospital Committee of Inquiry. 
Cmnd 4557, (London: HMSO, 1971)
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culture of custodial care. It is significant that in reading most 
of the reports, one oscillates between rational weighing of the 
evidence and ill-disguised value judgements.
It is largely because the technique of adjudicating on specific 
allegations was too tight an approach to encompass the multi­
variate problems of the longstay hospitals that the early 
committees of inquiry felt justified to go beyond their strict 
briefs and make recommendations for national policy. Politicians 
found themselves reacting to these policy proposals in the context 
of a press primed by AEGIS and anxious for stories and it is 
questionable whether this is a desirable means of making policy. 
The high public profile can create resource demands which 
politicians are unable to deliver.
Ultimately the test of the appropriateness of the committees of 
inquiry is their impact. This has been substantial for the
individual hospitals which have variously experienced complete 
changes of management and authority and benefitted from extra 
resources, and upgrading.
The Health Service Commissioner
If any one individual could justifiably have taken much although 
not all of the credit for the establishment of the office of
Health Service Commissioner in 1973, it was Barbara Robb. As this 
study has shown she was both the architect of the 1960s and 1970s 
hospital scandal era, and also a formidable lobbyist to provide 
countervailing pressure to the might of the BMA both in getting 
government agreement to proceed and also in the battle for an 
effective office.
Barbara Robb believed that the nurses on the ground responsible 
for delivering care were amongst the best judges of standards and 
that if only they could be freed from the fear of victimization,
the lot of the longstay patient would be greatly improved. She
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also placed great store by the mechanism of complaints from the 
public as a source of constant pressure on government and health 
authorities to improve standards of care; indeed there can have 
been no better exponent than she. She campaigned hard for a 
Health Commissioner to act as the channel for the concerns which 
nurses raised with her about care in their hospitals, and also to 
remove the kinds of obstacles to furthering complaints by members 
of the public which she had encountered at the very beginning and 
which had motivated her to embark on her campaign.
Her major victory was achieving direct access for nurses 
complaining on behalf of their patients. Her two major defeats 
lay in failing to persuade Parliament to bring clinical complaints 
within the office's jurisdiction from and to allow all 
complainants direct access, although complainants were spared the 
further hurdle of the 'MP filter' (obligatory for investigations 
by the PCA).
The primary concern of academic administrative law has been with 
the role of the Parliamentary Commissioner and with the exception 
of Stacey^®, the subject has paid little attention to its younger 
sibling. Similarly, few commentators on social policy have 
considered it worthy of attention. These facts alone indicate 
that the office has made no great impression on expert opinion and 
to the extent that experts influence the consciousness of the 
wider public, its impact may well have been limited.
In the one major study of the hospital inquiries to date, Martin 
is not encouraging about the record of the Health Commissioner as 
a champion of the longstay hospital s e r v i c e . I n  reviewing the 
cases discussed in the first five annual reports, he concluded 
that only a small proportion of complaints were about standards of 
care in the longstay h o s p i t a l s .  ^  The results of a content
^®Stacey F. , Ombudsmen Compared. (Oxford:Clarendon, 1978) pp. 
176-195
^Martin J.p. op.cit. pp.154-156
50ibid p.161
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analysis of all the published cases in the annual reports from 
1975 to 1980 seems to confirm this since the mental illness and 
mental handicap sectors accounted for no more than 16% of all 
upheld complaints in any year.
Table 1
Complaints upheld : Care Group Analysis
Year Elderly MI/MH Acute Other Total
end
Net Figures
1975 4 8 30 7 49
1976 0 9 32 14 55
1977 6 7 69 18 100
1978 8 13 61 15 97
1979 11 5 70 19 105
1980 11 8 44 10 73
(information not published in these years)
1986 6 9 19 16 50
1987 3 14 27 12 56
1988 9 7 14 19 49
Distribution
1975 8.2 16.3 61.2 14.3 100
1976 0.0 16.4 58.2 25.5 100
1977 6.0 7.0 69.0 18.0 100
1978 8.2 13.4 62.9 15.5 100
1979 10.5 4.8 66.7 18.1 100
1980 15.1 11.0 60.3 13.7 100
(information not published in these years)
1986 12 18 38 32 100
1987 5 27 54 23 56
1988 18 15 28 39 49
Source: Total selected cases reported in HSC Reports 1975/6 
to 1980/1 and 1986/8851
5lThe successive holders of the office have followed different 
policies on the degree of publicity given to cases upheld in their 
reports to the House of Commons; hence the variation in the 
proportion of cases discused in detail as shown in table 2. of
the total number concluded and upheld between years as shotfn in 
table 2, .. Between 1977 and 1979, when the commissioner published 
a report every four months including all the cases up held during 
Continued on following page
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Yet it is not surprising that complaints in acute services should 
dominate the commissioner's work when the care-group analysis 
figures are compared with the caseload statistics in Table 10 in 
Appendix 4. The fact that the longstay hospitals account for 20% 
of complaints compared with only 10% of caseload suggests that the 
Commissioner has enjoyed some success in targeting these sectors.
However there is no cause for complacency, since in global terms 
the use made of the Commissioner is limited. According to the 
figures supplied by DHSS to the Davies Report, between eight and 
nine thousand written complaints were received annually about the 
hospital services.52 gy 1986 this had risen to 22,000.53 
Extrapolating from Davies estimate of the numbers who were 
dissatisfied but did not formally complain, the pool of potential 
complainants could be over 10 times that number who put pen to 
paper.5^ in contrast, table 2 shows the number of cases handled 
by the Commissioner over the ten year period beginning 1975, 
analysed by course of action taken. Although the figures show a 
steady increase, by 1985 less than 1000 new grievances were 
arriving on the Commissioner's desk every year.
Continued from previous page 
the year.
In more recent years some of the complaints in mental handicap and 
illness have been from outraged local residents objecting to group 
homes being established in their neighbourhood. See Editorial, 
Nursing Times. July 13 1988, vol.84, no.28 p.60 
52d hSS Report of the Committee on Hospital Complaints Procedure, 
op.cit. para. 2.2.
53dHSS, Circular DA(86)14
5^DHSS, Report of the Committee on Hospital Complaints Procedure, 
op.cit. paras. 5.6 - 5.9
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Table 2: Analysis of complaints by action taken 1974-85
Year
end
New
Comp­
laints
From Total 
prev Consid- 
year ered
Rejected Refer- 
/Discon- red 
tinued
Reports
Issued
Cases
Conc­
luded
Carried 
to next 
year
1974 361 361 201 18 23 242 119
1975 493 119 612 293 85 128 506 106
1976 504 106 610 308 69 128 505 105
1977 582 105 687 341 85 120 547 140
1978 584 140 724 319 70 109 499 225
1979 712 225 937 508 88 116 712 225
1980 562 225 787 391 73 106 570 217
1981 647 217 864 462 101 113 676 188
1982 686 188 874 484 114 101 699 175
1983 798 175 973 559 112 115 786 187
1984 895 187 1082 592 178 119 889 193
1985 815 193 1008 446 227 125 798 210
Source: Annual Reports, 1975-1986
Clearly then, the cases investigated by the commissioner comprise 
the very small tip of a substantial i c e b e r g ^  and support 
another of Martin's observations that "complaints .... only got as 
far as the Commissioner if they were pursued by rather determined 
and well-informed complainants".^
On this kind of evidence, Barbara Robb's own aspirations for the 
office as a complaints channel which is both free and freely 
flowing cannot be said to have been realised in practice; although 
once the battle in Parliament had been fought and the office was 
on the statute book, she did not expect that they would. There 
are two major reasons for this. Firstly, the restrictions on the 
Office's jurisdiction oblige the holder to reject the majority 
referred. Secondly, and less tangibly, there is an inevitable 
limitation on the possible impact of ombudsmen by virtue of what 
they are and where they stand in British public administration.
S^The iceberg analogy is borrowed from Klein's study of the 
complaints machinery for GP services. Klein, R., Complaints 
against doctors. (London: Charles Knight, 1973), pp. 104-120 
-^Martin, J.p., Op.Cit. p.161
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The jurisdiction of the Health Service Commissioner is wider than 
that of the Parliamentary Commissioner since it encompasses 
complaints that result from 'failure to provide a service', 
'failure in a service' as well as those involving
maladministration. However the remit is nonetheless restricted as 
follows:
(a) the Commissioner cannot consider a complaint unless the 
authority complained against has first been given the 
opportunity to investigate it, except where a member of a 
hospital's staff submits a complaint on behalf of an 
aggrieved person whom the commissioner is satisfied cannot 
act on his or her own behalf (the provision secured by 
AEGIS).
(b) All complaints involving clinical judgement are excluded 
as are;
(c) cases where redress is available through the courts or a 
tribunal unless the commissioner thinks it unreasonable for 
the complainant to have sought redress in this way;
(d) complaints against doctors, dentists, opticians 
contracted to Family Practitioner Committees;
(e) and complaints involving NHS staff personnel issues.
(f) The commissioner cannot investigate a complaint that 
does not involve "hardship or injustice through 
maladministration".
The effect of these limitations is illustrated in table 3 which 
shows, that between 50 and 70% of referred cases are rejected as 
outside the office's jurisdiction.
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Table 3: Rejection Analysis - net figures
Year
end
Clinical
Judgement
Authority
n.g.c.t.a.**
FPCs Body o/s 
remit
Others Total
Rejec­
tions
%
of
total
consi­
dered
1974 36 18 27 54 88 223 61.8
1975 60 85 76 39 94 354 57.8
1976 63 69 81 41 106 360 59.0
1977 91 85 83 30 134 423 61.6
1978 120 70 32 25 117 364 50.3
1979 184 88 73 38 179 562 60.0
1980 115 73 50 32 148 418 53.1
1981 128 101 59 43 186 517 59.8
1982 145 114 70 40 192 561 64.2
1983 220 112 87 49 103 571 58.7
1984 222 176 96 46 230 770 71.2
Distribution of total rejections
Year Clinical Authority FPCs Body o/s Others
end Judgement n .g .c .t.a .** remit ***
1974 16.1 8.1 12.1 24.2 39.5
1975 16.9 24.0 21.5 11.0 26.6
1976 17.5 19.2 22.5 11.4 29.4
1977 21.5 20.1 19.6 7.1 31.7
1978 33.0 19.2 8.8 6.9 32.1
1979 32.7 15.7 13.0 6.8 31.9
1980 27.5 17.5 12.0 7.7 35.4
1981 24.8 19.5 11.4 8.3 36.0
1982 25.8 20.3 12.5 7.1 34.2
1983 38.5 19.6 15.2 8.6 18.0
1984 28.8 22.9 12.5 6.0 29.9
* excludes "discontinued" in table 2 (above)
** "not given chance to answer"
*** mainly FPC and personnel issues 
Source as Table 1
Complaints involving clinical judgement comprise the single 
largest category of rejections. The case for and against 
inclusion has been a recurring theme of the debate surrounding the 
office since the passage of the bill. It is an example of the 
conflicting perspectives of two of the most powerful professional 
groups in Britain, the law and medicine. Administrative
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lawyers^?, legally-trained holders of the Office, Members of the 
Select Committee on the PCA (which includes lawyers) and the 
Council on Tribunals have argued that the exclusion of clinical 
complaints imposes an unreasonable restriction on the office, not 
least because it is often difficult to draw a distinct boundary 
between clinical and administrative aspects of hospital 
services^®.
The BMA has opposed extending the Commissioner's jurisdiction to 
include clinical complaints on three grounds. Firstly it has 
argued that it would place doctors in 'double jeopardy' since 
complainants already have the option of litigation. It has 
suggested that complainants would use the office as a test of the 
likely success of any court action and thereby encourage more 
people to proceed and this in turn would erode public confidence 
in the profession. Secondly, it has pointed out that doctors 
often have to make rapid decisions on the basis of the balance of 
probabilities, particularly in emergency, life-threatening cases. 
Inevitably they are bound to be wrong occasionally. If a climate 
is created which encourages aggrieved patients or relatives to 
take legal action, doctors would be forced to practise defensive 
medicine to the detriment of patient care. Thirdly, the 
profession has vehemently opposed vesting authority for a final 
decision about a clinical issue in a lay-person (non-medical).
The last argument is the weakest since a judge in a litigation 
suit is equally lay on this definition and adjudicates on the 
evidence of expert witnesses. The Commissioner could similarly 
seek the advice of an expert panel nominated in consultation with
5?See Stacey, F. The British Ombudsman. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971) 
p.78, Stacey F.,(1978) op.cit., and Street, H. op.cit. The latter 
argues that including clinical judgement in the list of standard 
exceptions to the PCA made the Health Commissioner's office 
unimportant.
5®1he argument that the PCA investigates complaints against 
clinical judgement in hospitals managed directly by central 
government departments, including the special secure hospitals and 
military hospitals, is also often cited by administrative 
lawyers.
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the profession. The remaining issues are more complex. When the 
Select Committee on the PCA reviewed the question in 1977, it 
accepted the need to avoid any system of complaints which caused 
doctors to think first of how to avoid criticism and to place the 
best interest of patients second. However it could not accept
that the courts should be the sole independent review available to 
any individual worried about care and treatment. It therefore 
rejected the profession's case in favour of evidence submitted by 
the Council on Tribunals, the RCN, the National Association of 
Health Authorities, and RHA Chairmen who all supported the 
inclusion of clinical complaints in the Commissioner's
jurisdiction. The Chairmen argued that once a patient makes a 
complaint about professional judgement, his confidence in the 
doctor has already been undermined and that the willingness of 
doctors to open their decisions to more easily accessible 
independent review could only strengthen public confidence in 
their decisions.^9
When Sir Cecil Clothier reviewed the issue in 1983, he accepted 
that there could be no guarantee against his office being used as 
a dry run for the courts. Although it was his practice to obtain 
a statement from any complainant to whom access to the courts was 
available to the effect that it was not his or her intention to 
proceed to litigation, any undertaking given at this stage was not 
binding in perpetuity. Nevertheless Sir Cecil did not accept that 
this possibility would place an unreasonable burden on the 
profession and argued that providing people with an alternative
avenue for clinical complaints might indeed prevent some people
from suing at all.
Much of the argument rests on the adequacy of the 1981 procedure. 
It is undoubtedly elaborate and controlled by doctors. It vests 
responsibility for reviewing clinical complaints with the Regional 
Medical Officer. There is a three stage procedure. At the first
S^House of Commons, First Report from the Select Committee on The 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration. Session 1977/78, HC 
45, London: (London: HMSO, 1977) paras. 26-31
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stage, the consultant in charge is responsible for investigating 
the clinical aspects of the complaint and referring any non* 
clinical element to the district administrator. Where a 
complainant remains dissatisfied with the reply received at the 
first stage, the complaint has to be renewed and referred to the 
consultant or the authority who then bring it to the attention of 
the Regional Medical Officer (RMO). It is up to the RMO to decide 
in consultation with the complainant and the responsible 
consultant whether a second opinion is appropriate. This third 
stage applies only to complaints of a "substantial nature" which 
do not seem likely to lead to litigation. The RMO arranges for 
all aspects of the case to be considered by two other consultants 
in active practice in the specialty or specialties involved, at 
least one of whom should be working in a similar hospital in 
another region. This involves a medical consultation with the 
complainant who may be accompanied by a relative, friends or 
general practitioner.
The guidance, emphasises the importance of resolving the complaint 
at this stage. If the second opinion review finds that the 
clinical judgement of medical staff concerned has been exercised 
responsibly, then they are to endeavour to resolve the 
complainant's anxieties. In "other cases", presumably where there 
is some doubt about the wisdom of the clinical decision, the 
second opinions are advised to talk to the doctors concerned to 
avoid recurrence, and explain to the complainant how it is hoped 
to overcome the problems identified. They are also to report to 
the Regional Medical Officer, on any non-clinical elements or 
circumstances in the case which contributed to the problem. The 
district administrator makes a formal report to the complainant on 
behalf of the authority following the advice of the RMO. The 
matter would remain confidential as far as the authority is 
concerned, unless it had otherwise had become the subject of 
publicity.
Clearly there is substantial discretion vested in the RMO. What 
is more the third stage procedure seems somewhat forbidding.
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According to the Department's own figures for the first two years 
of the system, it was not being widely used. Although 44% of all 
written complaints are clinical, or about 6,500 in 1982. in the 
same year only 100 were referred to RMOs, and of these, only 32 
were reviewed by second opinions.60 In contrast the Medical 
Defence Union paid out compensation to over 300 patients in 
1982.61
Nobody would wish to see litigation cases mushroom and defensive 
medicine flourish. Yet, despite the formidable financial barriers 
to the courts facing potential complainants who do not qualify for 
legal aid, the number of litigation suits is on the increase; no 
doubt partly motivated by augmenting damage awards in successful 
cases.62 Views differ over whether this trend is giving rise to 
defensive medical practice. Doctors argued that it is and lawyers 
that the evidence is ambiguous. 63 The BMA has called for a 
system of no-fault compensation^ where patients who suffer 
medical injury could claim compensation from the state, outside 
the law of t o r t . 65 Schemes of this kind operate in New Zealand 
and Scandanavia.66
60DHSS, Report on the Operation of Procedure for Independent 
Review of Complaints Involving the Clinical Judgement of Hospital 
Doctors and Dentists. (London:DHSS,1983) p.8
61CIPFA (1984) op.cit.
62nam, C., Dingwall, R., Fenn, P., and Harris,D., Medical 
Negligence. Compensation and Accountability, (London:Kings Fund,
1988) pp.6-12 and Trainor, J., and Appleby, J., 'Health care data 
briefing: medical negligence', The Health Service Journal.
Vol.100, no. 5207, 28th June 1990, p.959 
63contrast Fletcher, D. , Protection money is the practise, The 
Times. 18th August 1988, with Ham et al. op.cit. p. 14. whe argue 
that "there is little hard evidence that defensive medicine is on 
the increase."
6^See Editorial, Journal of the Roval Society of Medicine. Vol. 
82, No. 5, May 1989 p.249-251 and The Times. 5.7.88.
65xhe law of Tort covers ".. wrongful acts and omissions, other 
than breaches of contract, in respect of which damages can be 
claimed by the victim from the wrongdoer.." Report of the Roval 
Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal 
Injury, Cmnd 7054, (London:HMS0, 1978) para.45 p.17 
66see Brahams, D. , The Swedish medial insurance schemes; the way 
ahead for the United Kingdom? Lancet. 1988 (i) No. 8573, 2nd 
January 1988, pp.43-47, and Brahams, D, No-Fault Compensation 
Finnish Style, Lancet. 1988 (ii), No, 8613, 24th September 1988, 
Continued on following page
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Making public money available in this way could mitigate any 
growth in litigation suits and not least, avoid spiralling 
insurance costs for d o c t o r s ® ^  and inflationary pressure on their 
remuneration which the American experience suggests can add 
substantially to the cost of health care®®. It would make it 
simpler for the victims of medical accidents whether due to 
negligence or not, to get compensation.
But no-fault compensation could be problematic. Firstly, it is 
questionable that the public would wish to see the separation of 
damage and fault. As Clothier observes:
"'Fault' and 'liability for fault' go hand in hand in the 
estimation of right-thinking people. 'No liability without 
fault' has as righteous a ring as 'No taxation without 
representation'....This is no lawyer's subtlety....It comes 
naturally to think that those who hurt others by their fault 
should make good the damage, just as it seems unjust that an 
innocent person should have to pay for injuries caused 
through no fault of his. This is because both 'fault' and 
'liability' have fundamental moral connotations; remove them
Continued from previous page
pp.733-736, Smith R. , The world's best system for compensating
injury? B&L Vol.284, No. 6324, 24th April 1982, pp.1243-5, and 
Ham et. al. op.cit. pp.21-25
®^Carson records that subscriptions to the Medical Defence Union
increased by 60% in 1986, See Carson, D., Complaints Procedure Act
that was a waste of parliamentary time, Social Work Today. Vol 18, 
no. 11, 10 Nov. 1986 p.25. This trend is well established. See 
also, Ed. Harrison, A. and Gretton, J., Health Care UK 1984. and 
economic, social and policy audit, London: Chartered Institute of 
Public Finance and Accountancy, 1984 p.119
®®Although his evidence is 20 years old, Titmuss's case that 
there is a correlation between the level of litigation suits, the 
cost of insurance cover for doctors, and the cost of health 
insurance and the global acute health care budget in the United 
States is at the heart of this argument. See, Titmuss, R.M. The 
Gift Relationship (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970) pp.165- 
172. However, once again, Ham et al. dispute this claim op.cit., 
pp.19-20.
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and you remove the moral basis for this part of our civil 
law. "69
Secondly, the use of public money involves accountability and 
monitoring to ensure that it is being used appropriately. It is 
difficult to see how these considerations would avoid review of 
the validity of the grievance and therefore its cause. Thirdly, 
the proposal would simply transfer the cost of compensation to 
health authorities which would add to the cost of health care 
anyway.
Fourthly, it would be administratively complex since it would 
require a hearing before a standing tribunal acting under medical 
advice, and rules would need to be devised to fix the levels of
compensation for similar types of case.^O It is difficult to
estimate how much of the savings in legal fees would be offset by
fees charged by doctors giving professional advice at no-fault
hearings. Fifthly, it may prove difficult to differentiate 
between injury and inevitable disappointing outcomes of medical 
treatment. The Report of the 1978 Roval Commission on Civil 
Liability and Compensation for Personal Iniurv debated the Idea 
but came down against on the grounds that it would be difficult to 
discriminate between medical accidents and disappointing outcomes 
due to acceptable risks in medical treatment and inevitable 
variations in individual recovery p a t t e r n s . I f ,  to overcome 
this, this category of injury were excluded, the Royal Commission 
held that this would little more than "..convert the negligence of 
tort into a statutory formula...". Sixthly, the system of tort 
through the civil courts with all its implications for the career 
of those found negligent and the costs incurred by the 
unsuccessful litigant, is believed to act as deterrent both to 
acts of negligence and frivolous litigation. By removing the
69Clothier, C., (1988) op.cit. p.57
70see Clothier C. Medical Negligence and No-fault liability, 
Lancet, (i) no.8638, March 18th 1989 pp.603-605 
71Cmnd 7054 op.cit. para. 1304-71
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deterrent, a no-fault scheme could give rise to a proliferation of 
claims which would escalate the costs of administration still 
further.
No only do senior lawyers have doubts about no-fault schemes, some 
of them also stand on the other side of the debate about reforms 
to clinical complaints in advocating increasing access to 
litigation by introducing the type of contingency-fee arrangements 
which exist in the United States, wherein lawyers agree to 
represent plaintiffs with prima facie cases and accept a
proportion of any damages as payment (thus running the risk of no
fees at all). A pressure group, with Lord Scarman as its
President, has been launched to campaign for legislation which 
amongst other things would introduce a limited contingency-fee 
scheme. For his part, Sir Cecil Clothier has condemned 
contingency-fee arrangements for encouraging dishonest lawyers and 
witnesses, encouraging courts to inflate damages to cover the
lawyer's share of the award, inflating insurance premiums, 
increasing the cost of health care to the public and mitigating 
against innovative practise by doctors.72 However, Ham et al. 
are sceptical on this point on the grounds that there are other 
aspects of the US health care and legal systems which encourage 
litigation. Also, since they are understandably anxious to 
maintain profitability, American lawyers who take contingency fee 
cases first consult medical advisers and thus filter out 85% of 
prospective cases.7^
The Department of Health has responded recently to the pressure 
for reform in this area by consulting on a range of options 
including no-fault compensation. Since subscriptions to medical 
defence societies are largely reimbursed by the Treasury, the 
Department has decided to indemnify doctors it employs for 
successful claims against them; thus removing the direct cost of 
subscriptions to the practitioner. It is currently reviewing the 
details of the scheme having agreed the principle. However, as
72Clothier (1988) op.cit. pp.50-55
7^Ham et al. op.cit. pp.19-21
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Ham points out, this does solve not the real problems in clinical 
complaints and negligence.
How can this be resolved? To begin with, not every complainant is 
seeking financial gain. The Davies Report argued that the great 
majority simply wish to obtain the satisfaction that a legitimate 
grievance has been recognised and brought to the attention of the 
responsible authorities so that they can take action to prevent 
future occurrence.^  Although Sir Cecil Clothier was less 
confident about this^, he has suggested two mechanisms for 
people in this group. Firstly, his experience convinces him that 
many complaints would never arise if an unfortunate double-bind 
was overcome. In his view, doctors are unwilling to apologise to 
patients because of an erroneous belief that to do so amounts to a 
concession of liability which contravenes their contracts with 
their insurers.^6 For their part, complainants often interpret 
unwillingness to apologise as evidence that the doctor has 
something to hide. To resolve this, Clothier proposes that a 
consultation between doctor and patient or a close relative at the 
time of an unexpected disappointing outcome, should become a 
'privileged occasion' so that any 'unguarded or over-generous 
concession' made by a doctor to give comfort and reassurance would 
be inadmissible as evidence in any subsequent litigation.^7 
Secondly, where a complaint does arise but no monetary gain is 
sought, the ombudsman could take the grievance but to avoid the 
risk of "double jeopardy" for the clinician complained against, a 
legal bar would be placed on the complainant against proceeding to
litigation.78
7^Op.cit. Chapter 5 
^^Clothier op.cit. p.40
7^The Medical Defence Union has been at pains to reassure 
clinicians on this point. See Allsopp, K.M., Saying Sorry, 
Journal of the Medical Defence Union. 1986, summer p.2.
77ciothier op.cit. pp.46-48
7^House of Commons, Health Service Commissioner Annual Report for 
1979-80. (London HMSO 1980) para.33
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This would present the public with a choice of avenues and if the 
majority is genuinely uninterested in monetary compensation would 
offer a compromise solution, albeit not an uncontroversial one 
since, according to Harlow, the Courts could be expected to resist 
any attempt to make what they would see as administrative 
decisions u n c h a l l e n g e a b l e . ^  However, the system would have a 
number of advantages over the Investigating Panels advocated by 
Davies. It would be procedurally less cumbersome and protracted 
and not least minimise the distress caused to those involved. 
Those with good cases who sought monetary compensation would 
proceed to the courts with access improved either through 
extending legal aid or through contingency-fee arrangements.
Although the profession has so far staved off the measure, the 
proposal will not go away.®® Medical opinion is not unanimously 
opposed. As a Chairman of the Conservative Medical Association 
has put it: "as long as we adopt a protective attitude, the public 
will believe we have a lot to hide and the clamour for 
investigation will continue".®! The Health Commissioner may be 
the best channel for providing a respected, but relatively cheap 
and rapid form of independent review.
AEGIS's original demand for the general public to have direct 
access to the Commissioner on the model of the Scandinavian 
office®^ has also surfaced from time to time. This restriction 
is partly due to the fact that the Health Commissioner grew out of
7^See Harlow, C and Rawlings, R. op. cit. p.98. Also Stacey 
views the Swedish system where the reports of ombudsmen can be 
used as evidence in court cases as a "sensible arrangement". 
Stacey, F.,(1978) op.cit. p.10.
®®See Debate on the 1987 Parliamentary and Health Service 
Commissioners Bill, House of Commons Official Report. Vol. 109, 
Cols.1059-1066, 4.2.87, where there was all party support for
including clinical complaints. The Act itself was limited and 
made some minor procedural amendments to the Office.
®lLyall, J, "Widening the Ombudsman's role", General 
Practitioner. 29.2.1980, p.20
®^See Stacey (1978) op.cit. Chapters 1-3
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the PCA; indeed the same individual still holds both offices. The 
PCA can only proceed on complaints referred by an MP and this 
largely reflects the constitutional position of the office as a 
mechanism for parliamentary scrutiny of the executive®®. The 
argument in favour of the restriction is that most complaints can 
be dealt with satisfactorily at authority level. Not surprisingly 
successive Health Commissioners have been largely content to leave 
the arrangement as it stands subject to reforms to the hospital 
complaints procedure.®^ There is no hard evidence either way. 
Certainly, the great majority of complaints rejected by the 
Commissioner on these grounds are not subsequently referred back; 
although this does not mean that the complainant was eventually 
satisfied since the procedure at health authority level may in 
some cases deter complainants with a genuine grievance from 
proceeding further.
The Commissioners have found it difficult to investigate 
complaints about neglect and Ill-treatment in longstay hospitals 
if the cases are referred a long time after the alleged incidents 
took place. Since the time-lag between raising a complaint with 
an authority and exhausting all its procedures can be 
considerable, this would seem to support the case for allowing all 
such complaints to be referred direct, such as those brought 
forward by staff on behalf of patients.
There has been wide criticism of the limitation imposed on British 
ombudsmen not to investigate complaints which do not involve 
maladministration on the grounds that this limits concern to 
procedural issues at the expense of substantive considerations or 
the quality of decisions. This argument applies less to the 
health commissioner than to the PCA because of the 1974 NHS 
Reorganisation Act's precise definitions about failure to provide, 
or failure in, a service. The cases in the reports also indicate 
that successive Commissioners have interpreted the term
®®See Gregory, and Hutcheson, op.cit. pp. 624-650 
®^DHSS, HC 537 Health Service Commissioner A.R. 1983-4 op.cit 
para.4
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maladministration flexibly. They cover a wide range; AEGIS-type 
complaints of inadequate care in the longstay hospital sector is a 
recurrent theme.
The second major category of restrictions on the impact of the 
Office is its nature. To begin with, it is not in practice 
equally accessible to all members of the public for two reasons. 
People have a variety of expectations for a service and therefore 
vary in their propensity to complain. Second, the NHS enjoys a 
high regard from the general public and more specifically those 
treated which may or may not reflect the standard of service 
provided.85 Many people, therefore, may simply not appreciate 
when a service is sub-standard.
Secondly Barbara Robb's faith in a Health Commissioner as an agent 
of control and change may have been unrealistic. This argument 
has two aspects. First, much depends on people's ability to 
complain when they do have a grievance to voice. Thus, Gwyn has 
argued that the "benefits of an ombudsman reached only on the
initiative of the complainant are bound to be enjoyed
disproportionately by the affluent and well-educated".88 He also 
cites survey evidence that less than 10% of the public would know 
how to proceed with a complaint through one of the various
commissioners and that the likelihood of anyone having that
knowledge was proportional to his or her socio-economic status.87 
The "iceberg" effect described earlier indicates that this 
phenomenon may be widespread.
^^Davies P. , The public speaks out, The Health Service Journal. 
Vol. 98, no. 510, May 19 th 1988, pp. 556-7 A report of the 
findings of a Marplan poll on the NHS which found that nearly 70% 
of people thought the service in their area was very good. 
However, in June of the same year, a Gallup Poll compared results 
with earlier surveys and noted a substantial decline in public 
satisfaction over time. See The Daily Telegraph. 4.7.88
88Gwyn, G.B., The British Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration: Ombudsman or Ombudsmouse?, Journal of Politics.
Vol. 35, No. 1 (1973), pp. 45-69 
87Ibid
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Second, and still more fundamental, the efficiency of complaints 
procedures as agents for improving public services is 
questionable. As Gregory and Hutcheson observe:
"A system of control in which complaints and complaint 
handling procedures play an important part can never be 
wholly effective. If, though timidity, alienation or sheer 
ignorance of what action they should take, large numbers of
people with grievances do nothing about them it may very
well be that the problem of alienated or submerged non­
complaint is in any case one that will never be completely 
solved by institutional innovations without far more 
fundamental changes in society itself."®®
On the credit side, the commissioners have argued that not only 
can they improve standards in departments and authorities subject 
to complaint, they have also claimed that the presence of their 
Office and its reports have a "tonic effect". Thus authorities 
and hospitals are toned up and made more vigilant. In their 
research into the impact of the PCA on attitudes amongst civil 
servants, Gregory and Hutcheson found inconclusive evidence. 
Selective perception operated so that the the PCA and his staff 
found evidence of improvement. For their part civil servants were 
unwilling to concede that the PCA had changed departmental 
practices for the better since this was to accept that there was 
room for improvement in the first place.®9 Both Klein and Harlow 
and Rawlings are little more positive9®, however, in the absence 
of any hard evidence on this aspect of the health commissioner's 
work, the balance of probabilities is that the tonic impact of the 
Office has been marginal at most.
Finally what of Mrs Robb's great triumph to allow nurse 
complainants direct access to prevent victimization? The
®®Gregory and Hutchinson, op.cit. p. 622 
®9ibid pp.395-397
9®Klein, R. The Health Commissioner: no cause for complaint, BMJ. 
1977, Vol. 1, No. 6055, 22 January 1977, p. 248, and Harlow and 
Rawlings Op.cit p.209
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available evidence is not encouraging. Only a handful of such 
cases appear in the annual reports. In her study of this area, 
Beardshaw found that reluctance amongst nursing staff to complain 
about poor standards of care for fear of prejudicing their career 
prospects remained widespread after seven years of the Office's 
existence. Those who did complain faced the familiar problems of 
victimization by managers, harassment by colleagues and hostility 
from local union branches. Moreover, few nurses were even aware 
of the Health Commissioner's jurisdiction in this field^l. 
Although more recent evidence is more encouraging about the 
willingness of nursing staff to proceed with complaints about 
standards of care, the Commissioner remains relatively uninvolved 
in this process.^2
In conclusion, it is only in the case of committees of inquiry 
where the legal profession has maintained a primary interest that 
the reforms promoted by AEGIS in complaints machinery have enjoyed 
notable success. Where the medical profession has felt its 
autonomy to be seriously under threat, progress has been slower. 
The changes to hospital complaints machinery and the powers and 
impact of the Health Service Commissioner are substantially below 
the hopes and aspirations of Barbara Robb.
However, the relative weakness of the channels for the redress of 
grievances in the NHS is not surprising if viewed in perspective. 
They reflect the relative closed nature of British government 
institutions. Thus the Health Service Commissioner's limited 
impact is characteristic of the British Ombudsman system. When 
Barbara Robb first embraced the proposal she was inspired by the 
work of the Scandinavian Ombudsmen. The Swedish Ombudsmen in
91-Beardshaw,v., Conscientious Objectors at Work. London: Social 
Audit Limited, 1981 See also The Association for the Protection 
of Patients and Staff (APPS) Vulnerable People (author not 
attributed), (APPS: London, 1985) which makes the same point
somewhat more polemically and graphically.
^^Nurses are rather turning to the Statutory professional 
advisory and monitoring body, the United Kingdom Central Council 
on nursing and midwifery. See Hicks, C. How to betray a 
profession, The Guardian 16 July 1986
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particular have had a major impact across all sectors of public 
administration including legislation and the courts. Their area 
of jurisdiction, powers to investigate (and initiate) complaints 
far exceed their counterparts in Britain, and consequently, the 
Swedish people use them far more frequently. The Swedish 
Ombudsmen investigate ten times more complaints from a population 
of only 8 million. The degree of openness is best illustrated by 
the fact that journalists have full access to the files!9-* in 
contrast British institutions are preoccupied with discretion, 
confidentiality and secrecy and the British people at best accept 
it or at worst are resigned to it. So why should the health 
service be any different? Stacey's comparative study illustrates 
how parochial the debate surrounding the British Ombudsman system 
has tended to be.94 This and the relative power of the 
professions is a major concern of the two concluding chapters.
9^See Stacey, F. (1978) Chapter 1
94ibid
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CHAPTER 12
POLICY CHANGE IN MENTAL HEALTH: INPUT POLITICS
The framework constructed in chapter one, was a three-stage 
analysis of policy change. The case study represented the 
primary level. The next stage is to take its major conclusions, 
incorporate the findings of the policy evaluation in Chapters Ten 
and Eleven and to construct the remaining horizontal tiers of the 
framework and draw the vertical links between all three levels.
The intermediate level examines how the major theories of state 
activity, understand 'input politics' or the demands acting on the 
state from the outside. There are five models, drawn largely from 
Dunleavy and O'Leary's typology which distinguishes pluralism, new 
right theories. elite theories. Marxist theories and neo- 
pluralism^. Dunleavy and O'Leary's typology is selected because 
it provides as comprehensive an exposition and categorisation of 
the immense, relevant literature on public administration in 
political science and political sociology as is currently 
available. It has the further advantages of including 
discriminating, penetrating comment in the course of exposition, 
whilst avoiding judgements about the validity of a given approach, 
save those which concern commonality between the models and which 
arise from the modicum of comparative analysis in the book's final 
chapter.
The major demands on the state in the AEGIS case study can be 
summarised under three headings; pressure group activity 
(including the professions in their role as interest groups), the 
mass media, and, less significantly, Parliament which is here seen 
as a force exterior to the state (and thus excludes the Executive 
which is contained within the state). The approach will be to set
^Dunleavy P. and O'Leary B. Theories of the State. (London: 
Macmillan, 1987)
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the material from the case study against the explanatory 
approaches in each model to test appropriateness.
The conclusions about the nature of input politics in the case 
study are carried forward into the tertiary level analysis, which 
examines how each macro theory of the state both describes and 
interprets the responses and outputs of the various administrative 
and political arms of government and peripheral, quasi- 
governmental agencies and delineates the determining parameters. 
This will allow an evaluation of the appropriateness of the 
five models to policy change in mental health using the results 
from the case study. This tertiary analysis is the subject of the 
next chapter.
Pressure groups
Pluralist accounts consider liberal polyarchy to be both necessary 
and desirable.^ Central features are a free and competitive 
media and pressure groups which have a central role in promoting 
the interests of citizens to government.^ This optimism about 
the democratic role of pressure groups stems from two contentions. 
First, governments assess the relative importance of a preference 
on the basis of the size of the groups which promote it, their 
rate of mobilization and the intensity of its expression. Second, 
interests groups are seen as particularly valuable where interests 
are difficult to organise formally (for example, the poor or 
elderly)
2Ibid pp.20-22
^Dunleavy, P. Alternative Theories of Liberal Democratic 
Politics; the Pluralist Marxist Debate in the 1980s; in D.Potter, 
Society and the Social Sciences. (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1981)
^Dunleavy op.cit. pp.33-37
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A small minority participate in group activity at any one time, so 
that the pattern of activity and influence in the group universe 
is unstable. Equally central to pluralist theory is the view that 
the universe is permeable by any interests. So that "...the 
interest group process in polyarchy generates a continual flux in 
the make-up for the winning coalitions of interests which 
influence policy." ^
The evidence from the AEGIS study supports the pluralist model in 
part only. Certainly groups like AEGIS, and the Patients 
Association promoted the causes of people who at the beginning of 
the campaign were amongst the most deprived and neglected in 
Britain. Whether the public was apathetic is difficult to assess 
since it was conspicuous by its absence as a participant in the 
process of input politics in these reforms. The promotional 
groups and the interest groups such as the medical and nursing 
professions, together with the mass media as primed by AEGIS, 
constantly invoked the public interest in support of their
demands. But only a handful of non-professional, non-experts who 
could claim to be members of the lay public, were directly 
involved. Similarly, debates in the press and in Parliament were 
largely the articulation of conflicting, professional vested 
interests. Even where letters columns widened the field of
participation in these debates, the correspondence printed came 
from prominent representatives of the same interests or
professionals and other staff working in the service. In
response, pluralists would be inclined to infer from the enormous 
press coverage that the public was interested because otherwise 
competitive commercial newspapers would not have allocated the 
column space, a contention challenged in the section on the media 
below.
There is no doubt that successive governments were responsive to 
the intensity of demand expression and mobilization which AEGIS 
achieved. There were also plenty of examples of Ministers and
^Dunleavy P., and O'Leary, B., Op.cit. p.37
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civil servants responding, and weighting a variety of pressures. 
But it would be simplistic to interpret their political responses 
as the net balance of all demands expressed.
More fundamentally, the AEGIS campaign strongly contra-indicates 
that the government is permeable by all potential interests. 
AEGIS rapidly achieved the transition from an illegitimate to an 
insider group.^ Even during the transition period, when 
Robinson was Minister of Health, the social position and contacts 
of Barbara Robb, and the tentacles of influence which grew out of 
her initial small core of advisers, served as a network of 
privileged access to the decision-making process. They are 
indicative of a policy community which included people in key 
positions with direct access to the political head. At close 
quarters, the perimeters of the 'pressure group universe' in 
mental health were fixed by a score of streets in Hampstead, 
Westminster, South Kensington and Chelsea. Since access to the 
arena of debate and to the centre of decision-making was so 
circumscribed, the idea of policy-making inexorably serving the 
public interest remains speculative. As Peters observes:
"So long as access is a scarce and regulated commodity, the 
possibility of finding the 'public interest' among a set of 
conflicting pressure groups is remote if not non­
existent. "7
Secondly, Barbara Robb had personal characteristics necessary to 
found and run AEGIS successfully which were specific to her and 
not generally available. Her background gave her self-confidence 
and a sense of belonging in the elite spheres in which she had to 
move. She therefore perceived the higher echelons of political
^These concepts are discussed in Chapter 3.
7 Guy Peters, B., Insiders and outsiders, the politics of 
pressure group influences on bureaucracy, in Macgrew, A.G., and 
Wilson, M.J., Decision-Making: Approaches and Analysis.
(Manchester: University Press, 1982) p.272
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power as accessible and saw herself as a legitimate person to gain 
that access. This perception was shared by all the key 
participants. She was the 'right type of person'. This is not to 
deny the importance of her enormous personal talents, her 
compassion, her persistence and tireless energy which she brought 
to the task. It is simply to contend that the fact that she was 
born and raised in a social stratum similar to that from which the 
majority of the policy community was drawn was material to her 
success. Not least, the time and financial resources she needed 
in her work of AEGIS demanded that she was economically 
independent, that she had no family-ties, apart from her 
understanding and supportive husband, and, to meet her legal and 
administrative costs, that she had a sufficient private income.
Public choice theory interprets input politics from the concept of 
the political market which parallels the economic market in neo­
classical economic theory. Interest groups are seen as playing an 
important but generally pernicious role. Firstly, two or more 
groups which have separate interests which do not contradict, can 
trade support - a process know as 'log-rolling'. Interest groups 
in this role are seen as organised attempts to exploit the system 
for purely sectional interests whilst sheltering behind a 'public 
interest' ethic. Hence the policy process becomes dominated by 
winning coalitions of interest groups. Second, since it is argued 
that MPs put their own interests first, their primary concern is 
to secure local electoral popularity; known as 'pork barrel 
politics'. Hence national policy is biased in favour of those 
issues which reflect the local interests of those politicians with 
the most power or those interest groups who are best able to 
threaten politicians and government security. Thirdly, and 
relatedly, elected officials become biased towards the demands of 
interest groups, particularly if they are able to attract media 
attention which reflects badly on the government; a process called 
'atavism'. Neither politicians nor interest groups leaders are 
seen as having anything to gain by longer-term, coordinated 
policies and instead are preoccupied with making symbolic gestures
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which generate votes for politicians and convince members of the 
group that it is an effective lobby.
There is some resonance between these contentions and the AEGIS 
campaign but on balance the evidence is contra-indicative. It is 
difficult to interpret AEGIS activity on behalf of longstay 
hospital residents as pursuant of material vested interest since 
the actors involved cannot be seen as rational economic beings 
since they extracted no material gain. It is certainly arguable 
that the legal, medical, nursing and administrative interests 
involved have fought their own sectional concerns, at least to 
some extent. But as a generalisation, 'log rolling' cannot be 
applied to AEGIS.
There was undoubtedly an element of pork barrel politics since 
Crossman particularly was concerned about the impact of the 
hospital scandals and media coverage on the Government's standing 
when behind in the opinion polls in 1969. In general though, 
mental health is not an issue which determines the future of 
governments. Although the constant torrent of adverse publicity 
can reflect badly on individual Ministers, senior cabinet 
Ministers such as Crossman, Joseph and Castle were too experienced 
to let the mud stick and simply turned the scandals to their own 
departmental advantages.
What of atavism? Certainly politicians reacted to the adverse 
publicity and looked for short-term political gain. But this 
objective need not be inconsistent with longer-term programmes. 
The Better Services programmes, and functional redistributive 
initiatives in health resources were rational, coordinated, long­
term programmes, sustained and developed by the Crossman, Joseph 
and Castle administrations alike.
Elite theories developed after the war as a critique of pluralism. 
They argued that the areas of state activity which could be 
controlled by representative input politics were dwindling, in the 
face of the rapid growth of the state apparatus. Two principal 
means of exercising power are elite groups (with similar social
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backgrounds, education, socialisation and networks) and control of 
the political agenda which excludes some issues and thus creates 
the need in analysis for questions about why some decisions are 
excluded.
Elite theorists argue that there are gross inequalities of 
political influence between interest groups or that "...the flaw 
in the pluralist heaven is that the chorus sings with an upper 
class accent and the voice of the poor are barely audible."®
Second, the attitude of government differs towards different 
groups. Governments opt in selected interests. Also, coopting 
groups is aimed at compliance to create 'corporatist'
institutions. These are coalitions struck between a core of key
major interests, such as business, the trade union movement and 
government, managed and coordinated from within the policy machine 
to develop mutually convenient outputs. Elite theorists are
consequently cynical about consultation with groups as a channel
of information to politicians.
The evidence in the AEGIS campaign strongly supports the 
components of elite theory representations of pressure groups 
activity. If policy outcomes reflect the demands of groups 
differentially, then it indicates that in their approach to the 
various interests, governments are adopting varying positions to 
different lobbies. In the case of the AEGIS reforms, government 
attitude has varied within and between administrations both to 
AEGIS and relatively between AEGIS, other small groups such as the 
Patients Association, and major professional interests.
There is also plenty of evidence of groups being coopted into 
compliance. This is intrinsic to the insider group/executive 
relationship. Mutual interest results in compromise. On the 
other hand all the group pressures exercised their discretion to 
dissent publicly from executive proposals at various times. Thus
®Dunleavy P., and O'Leary B., op.cit. p.159
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organised medicine came out to fight the Davies Committee 
proposals and the ideas of Crossman's PEP to bring a health 
commissioner office into the realm of clinical autonomy. Even 
when consulted directly through both formal and informal channels, 
AEGIS went to the media when it perceived that progress was slow 
and the radicalism of policy ideas was being diluted. Thus 
insider groups establish their private bargaining position partly 
by the constant threat of recourse to the public offensive.
What of corporatism? Well clearly there were no direct or
apparent corporate business interests in the developing policy for 
the care of longstay patients during the period under review.^ 
However there is clear evidence of a small, exclusive, policy 
community constructed of inter-connected, smaller spheres of 
influence. For example, during the Crossman administration these 
were; AEGIS, the NAMH, key journalists, a core group of QCs 
practising in medical negligence, and the Bar, a group of 
empiricist social administrators, the Department of Health 
officials, organised medicine, and organised nursing. This issue 
is revisited in the next chapter.
Marxists adopt a distinct methodological approach which poses 
problems in fitting their perspectives within the thematic 
framework identified earlier. As outlined in Chapter One, they 
contend that external objective reality cannot be grasped from 
empirical observation. Rather it is the role of the analyst 
seeking to explain the workings of society to abstract fundamental 
causal processes from the bewildering variety of observable 
phenomena. Second and relatedly Marxists adopt a structuralist 
approach to analysis. Therefore analysis of input politics and 
interpretations of decision-making processes take place within 
broader constructs about the state and have one basic contention 
in common, according to which all political mobilization is class 
based.
^If AEGIS had been fighting in 1990, this element may well have 
been prominent.
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Differing models of Marxism place differing emphases on the role 
of pressure groups. Either they are acting from a position of
class consciousness and therefore representing their objective 
economic and political interests, or their view of the world is
structured by the pro-capitalist dominant ideology. Their access 
to the legitimated policy process is therefore determined by the 
extent to which their demands are consistent with the objectives 
of the state. They will either be excluded or incorporated.
Incorporation may simply amount to a legitimation of the state's 
claim to be pluralist or so-called repressive tolerance wherein 
interests are involved in decision-making to provide a flow of 
information on the spheres of opposition and where possible, 
emasculate them.
In general, the mechanics of access and incorporation are of less 
concern and interest to Marxists who are relatively unrepresented 
in the pressure group literature. Two broad themes can be
identified nonetheless. Marxists differentiate the processes of 
inclusion and exclusion in terms of the policy elite's perception 
of the legitimacy of the group. This is defined by the extent to 
which a group's demands correspond to the elite's interests and 
related construction of appropriate policy outputs.
During its career, AEGIS oscillated between insider and outsider 
status. Once the Labour Government was out of office in 1970, 
AEGIS gradually perceived that the new political administration 
was more sympathetic to the views of organised medicine than its 
predecessor. The group reverted to aiding the media pressure 
(which had by now developed a powerful momentum of its own 
throughout the Ely, Farleigh, Whittingham and South Ockendon 
reports). It also became much more closely associated with the 
Parliamentary Labour Party and abandoned its ostensive political 
neutrality. Although for her part, Mrs Robb relied on Abel-Smith 
to do the direct liaison and continued her input to the Tory press 
to keep the pressure on the government from its own 
'constituency'.
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The wider issue is the extent to which a demand accords with the 
conventional wisdom about the nature of the social problem which 
policy is directed at. An acceptance by the policy communities of 
two primary assumptions is relevant here. Firstly, the nature of 
policy outcomes for the psychiatric services are largely 
consistent with a medical model of mental illness. The solutions 
in mental handicap are more socially-oriented. The debate in 
complaints machinery pivots around the legitimacy of clinical 
autonomy and belief that only doctors can assess the performance 
of other doctors. These issues are explored in more depth in the 
next chapter.
Neo-pluralist accounts have elaborated conventional pluralist 
theory in the face of criticism from elite, public choice and 
Marxist theorists to explain the increasing role of corporate 
business interests and other powerful interests in policy-making.
Firstly neo-pluralist argue that there has been a marked shift 
away from class-based politics due to three developments. The 
growth in the non-manual workforce is perceived as reducing class 
polarisation. Trade union power is diminished as multi-national 
corporations have developed and both caused unions to involve 
themselves in class compromise and not least introduced non­
unionised workplaces. Class disalignment, or the association of 
socio-economic status and voting behaviour has been on the 
decrease. Secondly, the growth of the state has reduced the 
significance of representative politics as a means of controlling 
public policy. This gives rise to a shift of power to the 
Executive which focuses on strategic issues and is less concerned 
with the details of policy and its implementation. Thirdly, neo- 
pluralists concede that business occupies the position of special 
importance which more orthodox pluralists deny; the polyarchy is 
thus deformed. Fourthly, and particularly in social welfare 
agencies, the state has become 'professionalised'.
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Any tendency for the policy-process outputs to be distorted by 
vested-interest is countervailed by two factors. Firstly, it is 
argued that liberal, caring and public interest values are now 
widely socialised within the middle-classes and therefore 
penetrated the managers of large corporations and of course 
professional organisations. Secondly, along with conventional 
pluralism, the mass media is seen as promoting the public interest 
by scrutinising the activity of politicians and business interests 
alike.
Neo-pluralists also share elite and Marxist perspectives on the 
limitations of pressure groups to guarantee representation to all 
citizens. Neo-pluralist accord a key role to professions both as 
pressure groups but also as central components of the government 
machine. Professionals occupy privileged positions in input 
politics. There was certainly evidence of distorted polyarchy in 
in the outcome of the reforms in the AEGIS campaign, although the 
distorting influence was not the corporate business sector. 
Rather, policy outputs, such as the Health Service Commissioner 
and reform of health service inquiry procedure indicate that the 
demands from the organised medical profession and senior figures 
in the legal profession have emerged as predominant. Similarly, 
in the early days of AEGIS, when the critique was radically at 
variance with the conventional wisdom about the psychiatric 
services and policy outputs of the Ministry of Health, AEGIS was 
not allowed access. It took Sans Everything and particularly the 
Ely Report to change the conventional wisdom and legitimise the 
group.
Their role as implementors gives professionals substantial 
discretion over the real impact of policy and therefore renders 
policy-makers highly dependent upon them. On key issues, policy­
makers preferred professional opinions over those of the 
'amateurs' such as Barbara Robb. Equally, the AEGIS case also 
highlights a tension within medicine, between psychiatry and the 
rest of the profession over complaints and the priorities policy, 
and between medicine and the law over the scope of an effective
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complaints machinery. The way policy outputs reflect these multi­
dimensional professional cleavages implies support for the neo- 
pluralist 'professionalised state' thesis. This is considered in 
more detail in the next chapter.
The mass media
The AEGIS campaign was fought against a background of enormous 
press and media interest which was generated from the moment Lord 
Strabolgi spoke in the Lords debate in July 1965.10 ^he press 
was critical to the ability of AEGIS to extract a recognition of 
its case and relevant policy initiatives from civil servants and 
Ministers whose early reaction was denial and obstruction. The 
role of the press in the AEGIS campaign is one of its most 
striking features. The volume of press coverage, the duration of 
the period when this was at its height, and the closeness of 
Barbara Robb's working relationship with so many and such diverse 
journalists was exceptional. Therefore detailed attention needs 
to be devoted to this issue in order to explain why.
The questions are both general to the politics of change and 
specific to the issues in the AEGIS campaign. These two 
categories are of course inter-related, but it is important to 
draw the distinction to ensure that general conclusions are not 
drawn from highly specific evidence. A framework for analysis can 
be distilled into three questions.
What determined press interest in AEGIS concerns and
sustained it over a 10-year period?
l^See Chapter Three
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What was the impact of press coverage on public opinion?
What was the impact of press coverage on politicians?
A free and competitive news media is a major component of 
pluralist input politics. Pluralists argue that a source of full 
and accurate information to voters is essential if polyarchic 
competition is to control decision-making. Further, in the period 
between elections the press is seen in the role of guardian of the 
public interest directing public attention to issues and 
scrutinizing government against corruption, incompetence and 
despotism. To fulfil this role, the press needs to be a reliable 
source and act with both neutrality and a sense of responsibility. 
In a free market under capitalism, reliability, responsibility and 
neutrality are guaranteed by competition. The rule of consumer 
choice should ensure that diversity of opinion in the electorate 
is translated into demand preferences resulting in a diversity of 
editorial opinion addressing the full range of the market. Also, 
entry into the supply side of this market would need to be 
relatively easy to ensure that large groups of less affluent 
citizens could get their opinions into the press. Neutrality is 
guaranteed in the broadcast media by public regulation to prevent 
monopoly, enforce neutrality and countervail any imbalances in the 
press. A further critical assumption underlying this liberal 
democratic model is that the readership is discerning in these 
areas and actually uses the press as a source of relevant 
information.
Similarly, neo-pluralist theorists see the media "...as an 
increasingly specialist and distinct social interest whose 
structures and market make it serve a key overview function".^ 
It is an ample source of information on political issues which 
increases the sophistication of the voter.^
11-Dunleavy and O'Leary, op.cit. p.297 
l^ibid p.290
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A characteristic of the literature on the mass media is the almost 
unanimous rejection of this model to explain the role of the press 
in political life. This is not to say that there is not fierce 
competition between newspapers and broadcasting channels. Even 
with the trend of increasing concentration of ownership and 
reducing number of titles since the second world war, which has 
been identified as a possible threat to alleged press neutrality, 
the two broad coalitions of political interest in British society 
have continued to be represented in national newspapers with mass 
circulations. Indeed, as Seymour-Ure contends, so long as people 
are free to make choices in the newsagents, there need only be two 
newspapers of opposing political perspectives to guarantee 
c o m p e t i t i o n . Not least, the extensive empirical evidence 
collated by Seymour-Ure indicates that the press is valued more 
for its entertainment value than for its contribution to healthy 
democracy.I4
Elite theorists point to the dominance of corporate interests both
in the ownership of the press, and through advertising, as one of
its primary sources of revenue. Moreover the mass media now play 
a crucial role in politics both in setting the political agenda 
and, increasingly, selecting politicians since a favourable media 
profile is fast becoming essential for advancement. Consequent 
collusion between the mass media and politicians leads to the 
exclusion of issues termed the mobilisation of bias.
"In any liberal democracy a mobilization of bias is
cumulatively created by the outcomes of political and social 
conflicts. Victors accumulate new resources for use in 
future battles. The scope of debate is limited or shifted 
over time in particular directions, but always in a 
direction which consolidates power into more permanent 
forms, which in time may become almost invisible to
13Seymour-Ure, C., The Press. Politics and the Public. 
(London:Methuen, 1968), p.23
14ibid pp.26-94
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citizens, accepted as uncontroversial, 'natural' features of 
the landscape.”^
It is a point of agreement amongst analysts that the press plays a 
crucial role in selecting issues and setting the agenda. To begin 
with constraints on news content are set by newspapers' 
organisational routines or bureaucratic procedures. Rock 
identifies two primary constraints, column space and time.l^
The criterion governing selection is newsworthiness. At one level 
this can be defined through content analysis of press coverage of 
a given issue into recurrent themes. Thus in her analysis of 
media coverage of health issues, Karpf, herself a journalist,
singles out 'the medical breakthrough', 'the disaster', 'the 
ethical controversy', 'the scandal','the epidemic', 'the official 
view' as commonly occurring themes.U
More fundamentally there are a range of criteria or news values 
routinely used by journalists to decide newsworthiness and the 
relative importance of stories. They are shared by all
journalists and editors, although differently clustered by the 
latter according to the paper's editorial policy. They are part 
of the tools of the trade. Journalists will tend to highlight 
news values in a story to raise its newsworthiness and improve its 
chances of selection by the editor. Hence aspects of stories 
become highlighted and exaggerated. Similarly, events which score
highly on a number of news values in a given story, are more
likely to be covered.
l ^ D u n l e a v y  p. an<i o' Leary B.,op.cit. p. 158
l ^ R o c k ,  p .  News as eternal recurrence, in Ed. Cohen S. and Young 
J., The manufacture of news (London: Constable, 1981) pp.64-69 
l ^ K a r p f ,  a. Doctoring the Media. (London:Rout1edge, 1988) p p . 28- 
29
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This analysis begs the question of why certain themes reoccur and 
relatedly why they have passed into professional journalistic 
practise as news values. As noted above, elite theorists would 
anticipate that the press is bound to be biased due to 
proprietorial interest (argument employed to explain the latter- 
day dominance of right-wing perspectives across the national 
press) and that there are coalitions between politicians and 
journalists. The evidence from the AEGIS campaign supports 
neither of these two contentions. Firstly, apart from selling 
newspapers, the proposition that one could abstract a wider, 
material proprietorial interest from the wholesale support by 
newspapers of mental health reforms is improbable. Moreover, the 
strongest allegiances that existed between AEGIS and the press 
were largely hostile to politicians.
Ironically, it is a prominent school of Marxist sociologists who 
have been most concerned to discount such conspiracy theories. In 
so doing they have developed the idea that the scope of debate is 
circumscribed by selected issues, which in time may become 
accepted as uncontroversial, 'natural' features of the landscape.
The approach derives from a conceptualisation of the press as the 
major channel for communicating ideas which serve the interests of 
'dominant classes'. A major problem for Marxists is the continued 
compliance of the working class, under universal suffrage, with 
its objective exploiters, as manifested in the mass support for 
liberal democratic forms of political organisation. How have the 
dominant classes managed to restrict 'class consciousness' to safe 
levels?^® There are two answers offered to this dilemma: one
materialist and one ideological. The former argues that the 
short-term material interests of the workers are too closely
!®Class consciousness is awareness of 'objective' exploitative 
relationships and determination in the proletariat to overthrow 
the exploiters. It is contrasted with 'false consciouness' which 
does not recognise this objective position.
-334-
linked to those of the capitalists. In short, capitalists have 
been successful in buying off key groups of workers.
The second is founded in Gramsci's concept of hegemony.^ Just 
as Marxist theory interprets capitalist society as characterised 
by economic and political cleavages, so Marxist cultural theorists 
contend that differing cultures and respective ideologies exist 
and conflict with each other. Pro-capitalist parties therefore 
preserve their power-base because sufficient members of the 
working-class accept and share the 'dominant' ideology.
The dominant ideology is " a  set of ideas about political and 
social questions which privileges capitalist interests and 
insulates the status quo from criticism by making existing social 
arrangements appear 'natural' or 'inevitable'".20 Marxist sub­
cultural theories of the media have developed from this
idea.
Detailed studies of media coverage of two social policy areas have 
been undertaken from this perspective. The work of Hall et a l . 2 2  
on 'mugging' (robbery of the person) and Golding and 
M i d d l e t o n ' s 2 ^  study of social security fraud concerned issues
19See Chapter One
2^Dunleavy and 0' Leary op.cit p.232
2lciarke, J. et al, Subcultures, cultures and class , in Ed. Hall 
S., and Jefferson T., Resistance Through Rituals. 
(London:Hutchinson, 1976) p.2. See also, Hall S., et al., 
Politics and Ideology: Gramsci, in On Ideology. (authorship
unattributed), (London:Hutchinson, 1977) pp.9-32 and Parkin F., 
Class. Inequality and Political Order. (London:Granada, 1978) 
pp.79-97
22Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J., Roberts, B., 
Policing the Crisis: Mugging the State and Law and Order. (London: 
Macmillan, 1978)
^^Golding, P., and Middleton, S., Images of Welfare. (London: 
Continued on following page
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which like psychiatric hospital scandals, attracted intense 
coverage. They also focus on the early to mid-1970s and are 
contemporaneous with the later years of the AEGIS campaign.
The type of intense media fixation with an issue, such as that 
seen during the late-1960s and early-1970s in mental health press 
coverage, and the reaction engendered in public opinion and in 
decision makers are symptomatic of a 'moral panic'. Cohen defines 
it as follows:
" A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges 
to become defined as a threat to societal values and 
interests, its nature is presented in a stylized and 
stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral 
barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and 
other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts 
pronounce their diagnosis and solutions; ways of coping are 
evolved (or more often) resorted to; the condition then 
disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more 
visible....Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, 
except in folk-lore and collective memory, at other times, 
it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might 
produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or 
even in the way society conceives itself."24-
Hall adds:
"When the initial reaction to a person, group of persons or 
series of events is out of all proportion to the actual
threat offered....... when the media representations
universally stress 'sudden and dramatic' increases (in 
numbers involved or events) and 'novelty' above and beyond
Continued from previous page 
Basil Blackwell, 1982)
2^Cohen S., Folk Devils and Moral Panics. (London:MacGibbon and
Kee, 1978) p.9
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that which a sober, realistic appraisal could sustain, the 
we believe it is appropriate to speak of the beginnings of a 
moral panic."25
For Hall and also for Golding, selection of issues with news value 
goes beyond professional judgement and is part of a more 
fundamental process of structuring events for inclusion and 
presentation, according to "a socially constructed set of 
categories.w.2** The social construction has its foundations in a 
'consensual' view of society based in the dominant ideology.27
The components of this consensual view are a set of paradigms, 
themes, premises, assumptions, questions presuming answers within 
a coherent matrix of ideas. Hall terms these 'image clusters', or 
'core images' of society which add up to a sense of Englishness 
which he contends is fundamental to the consensus view. Firstly, 
there is the notion of respectability defined by thrift, decency, 
self-reliance and conformity to social standards set and embodied 
by those high up in the social hierarchy. Secondly there is the 
centrality of work which on the one hand allows the middle-classes 
the material lifestyle which befits respectability and on the 
other protects the working-class from poverty which brings with 
it a descent from respectability. Third there is the need for 
social discipline defined as the aggregate effect of individual 
self-discipline. Hierarchy and authority are two further related 
values. Society is seen as naturally hierarchical and therefore 
presupposes deference to authority. Discipline is engendered in 
the family, which therefore becomes the focus for social anxieties 
about the supposed breakdown of discipline in society which 
'mugging' is identified to be symptomatic of. A seventh important
25Hall, S. et al., op.cit. p.16
2^Hall et al. op.cit.p.53 See also, Molotch H. and Lester, M, 
'News as purposive behaviour', in Ed. Cohen, S. and Young, J. The 
Manufacture of News (London:Constable, 1981) pp.118-34
27Hall et al. p.55
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value is the image of England or 'being English' which has two 
themes. First, the English are seen as tolerant, decent, moderate 
and prefer common sense solutions to problems. Second, it carries 
with it an 'imperialist myth' which believes that everything 
English is superior to anything originating from abroad.2®
According to Hall's study, mugging provided a focus for the 
middle-classes to roll back the tide of liberalism and 
permissiveness in the 1960s and early 70s, and reassert the 
preeminence of the 'ideology of englishness'. For the working- 
classes, the mugger became what Cohen terms a 'folk devil' or a 
focus for anxieties which arise from the material experience of a 
way of life under threat from economic and social change during 
the 1960s and 1970s.29 A moral panic erupted when these social 
anxieties and traditionalist views were connected and mobilised by 
the media. Dominant ideology and subordinate images were moulded 
together into moral indignation and outrage. The 'devils were 
summoned' by ideological work carried out by the media.
In summary, Hall's thesis is that in approaching the problem of 
why an issue becomes the subject of a moral panic, the analyst 
needs to uncover its ideological roots and locate the 
orchestration of public opinion in pre-existing systems of 
thought. There are 6 principal themes in the press coverage of 
mental hospitals which fuelled the moral panic; the antithesis of 
civilisation; the deserving poor; the image of the Victorian 
gothic madhouse; violence and theft; corrupted bureaucracy; and 
relatedly, the struggle of the individual against the system.
2®Ibid pp.140-49
^Examples include changes to the occupational structure with the 
disappearance of traditional industries and work roles, urban 
renewal and the demolition of traditional working-class 
communities. Hall's argument is that anxieties are the outward 
presentation of internalised frustrated urge to engage in overt 
class struggle against the changes. See Ibid. pp.161-2
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At the very beginning of the AEGIS campaign a schism opened up
between the case the group were presenting and the assumed image
of the British mental health services as 'the envy of the world';
a view consistent with Hall's conception of 'Englishness'.
Strabolgi and Barbara Robb were surprised by the coverage 
generated by his speech in the Lords in July 1965. However the 
speech directly challenged this assumption of the superiority of 
the British hospital service and not least affronted conceptions 
of British decency by comparing the English treatment of the 
elderly disfourably with that of primitive tribes. Once 
established the continued outrage against conditions reflected a 
consensual belief that services should be improved to harmonise 
the dissonance between the belief and reality.
An important second feature of the mentally ill and handicapped is 
their status as part of the 'deserving poor' . They are on the 
inside of 'the boundaries of citizenship' which excludes the 
social security claimants studied by Golding and M i d d l e t o n . ^ 0  
The re-emergence of the deserving:non-deserving distinction in the 
'scroungerphobia' episode, was an invocation, in the late 1960s 
and 1970s, of the Benthamite utilitarian concept of less- 
eligibility which produced the workhouse, corrupted the early 
nineteenth century asylum, and gave birth to the modern welfare 
state. The residents of mental hospitals were on the opposite 
side of public esteem from social security scroungers. It was 
thus as outrageous to have the deserving living in relative 
squallor as it was to have the 'work-shy' living in the 'lap of 
luxury'. The corruption of asylum and the close association of 
these institutions with the poor law^l, is an antecedent of the 
third theme in the manufacture of mental hospital scandal, that of 
the 'loony bin'. Whilst the reality of neglect and ill-treatment 
conflicted with assumptions about English superiority, it chimed 
with a popular image of the mental hospitals as the stuff of 
gothic horror. In the second half of the nineteenth century,
■^Golding and Middleton, op.cit.
31-See Scull A.T. Museums of Madness. (London: Allen Lane, 1979)
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largely working-class experiences of incarceration, often for 
'morally reprehensible' actions, and entry via the workhouse, had 
turned the benign late-seventeenth century concept of asylum into 
an object of public fear, loathing and stigma. It was an 
attitude still widely abroad in the early 1960s. The case AEGIS 
made to the press, and individual incidents at Ely, Farleigh and 
particularly Whittingham, simply confirmed the image.
For Hall, violence represents the ultimate violation against the 
person and against property and thus "marks the distinction 
between those who are fundamentally of society and those who are 
outside i t " . T h e f t  and corruption are its less extreme bed­
fellows. Sadly, once certain hospitals were subject to detailed
public inquiry, they provided rich sources of copy under these
headings. Relatedly Barbara Robb or the individual complainants 
at Ely, Farleigh, Whittingham and St.Augustine's emerge as 
'little' people championing the power of the individual against a 
'system' which pursued its vested and perverse interests, stifled 
legitimate dissent, and when found out resorted to 'cover up' and 
recrimination. Thus the triumph of Mrs Robb and her fellow
complainants resonated with libertarian ideological constructs 
such as individualism, self-reliance and corrupt state
bureaucracy. For Golding, journalists' self-image as self-made 
people makes them prone to this view and as they attribute their
own values to the wider public and thus reinforce the
33process.
It is also probable that the image presented in the press and was 
consistent with the experience of those members of the public who 
as patients or relatives were consumers of the mental health 
services.
To summarise so far, there is an inevitable process of selection 
of events for inclusion in the press. This selection process is 
structured from within a consensual framework whose ideological
32Hall et al.op. cit. p.68 
Continued on following page
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elements are invoked to generate moral panics whose central issues 
serve as a focus for social anxieties (which in Hall and Golding's 
perspectives, originate in antagonistic, class-based, power 
relations). The next stage in the analysis is to examine the 
mechanics of issue definition, influencing public opinion and the 
impact of the press on politicians.
Golding identifies a three-stage process. First, "..precipitating 
events sensitise the media so that surveillance procedures and 
journalistic categories are sharpened to capture similar 
subsequent events and give them considerable p r o m inence" .^  This 
was one of the most critical roles played by AEGIS in the process 
of change which produced the reforms. By generating its support 
in Fleet Street, priming strategically-placed journalists, 
publishing Sans Everything, and skilfully, out-manoeuvering the 
Ministry of Health over the subsequent White Paper, AEGIS cemented 
the preoccupation of the press with 'mental hospital scandal' and 
instigated the process which produced succeeding inquiries. 
Without AEGIS, it is difficult to conceive how Ely, Farleigh and 
Whittingham would have happened. The group was the major 
force in bring to light the hospital scandals.
Sources are instrumental to sensitisation and the expansion of 
coverage. Journalists depend on sources. Hall categorises these 
into 'primary and secondary definers'. Primary definers are 
people at the top of a 'hierarchy of credibility' or the 
likelihood that those in power or high status positions will be 
understood to have greater access to specialist information on 
particular topics than the majority of the population. Their 
definition of a problem therefore sets the terms for reference by 
establishing what is an issue for debate.
Golding and Middleton identify three major categories of primary 
definer for social policy issues: politicians, pressure groups and
^ G o l d i n g  et al. op. cit. p.39 
-^Ibid. pp.59-60 
Continued on following page
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professionals. That politicians and civil servants are key,
'authorative' sources for the press, has three consequences of 
concern here. First, politicians are crucial to the process of 
agenda-setting. This was the role which Crossman sought to play 
in publishing the Ely Report, and stealing some of the initiative 
from the Ministry's external critics. He was a politician highly 
sensitive to his media image and the importance of media 
management. Some politicians are more technically skillful at 
this than others; similarly some personalities are more colourful 
and flamboyant and therefore make better copy than others.^5 
Coverage was therefore skewed towards inter-personal conflicts and 
individual styles; Barbara Robb's own flamboyance made her good 
copy as a political adversary. Secondly, (and ironically) in the 
early days of its campaign, AEGIS ability through Strabolgi and 
Mrs Robb, to involve the Minister directly attracted press 
coverage.
Journalists classify pressure groups as reliable and unreliable. 
They also make a separate distinction between those representing 
the cause of others, and 'axe-grinders' representing their own or 
their members interests. Since the relationship between a 
pressure group and the media is a central aspect of this study, 
Golding's summary of the role of groups is particularly 
pertinent.
"By and large the more successful, articulate and 
aggressively publicity-oriented groups have been those for 
whom Fleet Street and Westminster are primary targets and 
whose objectives seem acceptably reformist in content 
however radically expressed and promulgated. For the 
journalists, pressure groups are used less and less often as 
source of primary material than as a source of expert 
comment on policy initiatives j from government. They serve a 
twin function. On the one hand they act as research
Continued from previous page
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agencies, able to point out the inconsistencies or evasions 
in official version of policy. On the other hand they 
provide hand-wringing reactions to the iniquities of
government policy that can be used to 'balance' a story.
The success of some pressure groups lies in their ability to 
exploit these functions and shrewdly to produce what 
journalists need."36
There can have few if any pressure groups who have performed these 
roles more successfully than AEGIS. The role played by Barbara
Robb in quickly establishing herself as a reliable source and
feeding good copy direct to her contacts was critical.
The third group are professional organisations, and particularly 
their specialist journals. There is often a 'three step flow' as 
the quality press take stories from the journals and the populars
then pick up stories from the qualities. They players in this
game are the specialist correspondents in all three outlets who 
read each other and keep each other informed. Indeed the very
fact that one senior journalist covers a story is often enough to
confirm its news value in the eyes of others, so that coverage is 
amplified. Two contrasting features of the campaign are relevant 
here. Firstly AEGIS quickly and successfully recruited 
influential nursing journalists who in turn acted as a second, 
primary definer to AEGIS itself. Secondly, by paying little or no 
attention to AEGIS and the press campaign until the publication of 
the Sans Everything White Paper, organised medicine failed in this 
role by default. By the time it started it get its views into the 
press, opposing change in complaints machinery, it was denying an 
already established and legitimised case.
The media themselves are the secondary definers, or 'switchmen' 
diverting attention to a limited range of metaphors and 
explanations, orchestrating and reinforcing among the volume and 
range of attitudes more widely abroad. It is in this context that
35fiarbara Castle is often cites as being a good copy politician. 
Continued on following page
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their formulation of newsworthiness is important to the selection 
and presentation of material. Major news values are entertainment 
value, and extraordinariness.^7 Entertainment value skews 
selection towards the exceptional or sensational. This effect of 
repeatedly presenting unusual cases is to make them appear typical 
or commonplace. As a result the scale of the relatively rare 
event can become exaggerated in the eyes of the readership and 
without any attempt by the press to measure the extent of 
problems, isolated incidents of 'mugging', 'scroungerphobia' 
'staff cruelty' are soon widely believed to be merely the 'tip of 
iceberg'. It is for this reason that the more extreme forms of 
neglect and ill-treatment dominated the coverage of the mental 
hospital inquiries. These themes also correspond to a second key 
news value, 'negative consequences' which embraces crime, 
corruption and disaster.
How does this impact on public opinion and relatedly, but 
separately, politicians? After definition and at the second 
stage, ".... the ensuing period evokes a steady stream of 
previously latent mythologies about the 'social problem' thus 
dramatically 'uncovered'".^® Thirdly, "....the legislative, 
administrative and possibly judicial responses to this cultural 
thrust reinforce its potency and provide a real shift in the 
structure of state responses to the definitions provided in the 
moral panic. The responses in turn provide material and 
confirmation of the arrival of a new matter of concern on the 
political agenda."^9 Again, AEGIS extracted responses from the 
Minister which in the eye of journalists simply reinforced its 
case.
Continued from previous page
•^Golding, p f and Middleton, S., op.cit. p.9 
^Seymour-Ure, c. , op.cit p.90
3®Golding P., and Middleton S., Op.cit pp.59-60
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The media can also act as primary definers by adopting an active, 
campaigning stance, which assumes public opinion and plays it back 
to elites with a demand for action. In turn elite groups often 
interpret this as 'impartial evidence' of what the public wants, 
although of course, the public has been completely bypassed. This 
is most likely to happen where journalists are following a story 
in areas which primary definers such as politicians and civil 
servants try not to recognise. Again this was exactly the role of 
journalists as primary definers which the Ministry under Kenneth 
Robinson inadvertently encouraged.
More frequently, Hall contends, the media plays a mediating role 
in the formulation and orchestration of public opinion. At its 
inception, opinion begins as the interplay of factual knowledge, 
rumour, and folklore dispersed and fragmented amongst the wider 
public. Events and issues become public when the professional and 
lay worlds of the press and the public overlap, such as when
correspondents are researching stories on the ground. In the case
of AEGIS, correspondents undertook direct research by visiting
hospitals, or by getting jobs as nurses. As opinion on an issue
thus passes into the public domain the press structure and 
interpret it using the same ideological framework which governs 
selection of news items. The dominant consensus thus shapes 
public opinion by underpinning and supporting viewpoints already 
in circulation thus helping "to close the consensual circle, 
providing the linchpin of legitimation."
The media's search for novelty leads them to present information 
on events which are outside the direct experience of most people; 
Hall calls this 'structured ignorance'. The media is thereby cast 
in the dual-role of interpreter and communicator of public 
o p i n i o n . I n  the case of mental hospital scandals, there is no 
evidence of direct participation by the public at large in
39Ibid
40Hall et al. op.cit. pp.137-8
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defining the issues. This was purely undertaken by AEGIS, other 
members of the 'policy community'4  ^ in mental health or staff in 
the service.
How is this communicated back to politicians? The channels are 
the letters columns, the editorials, the volume of coverage and 
more personally through the 'lobby system'. The letters columns 
often act as the point of entry of issues into the political 
arena. The quality press attract and carry letters from members 
of elite groups to influence issues 'from within'. The populars 
seek to represent the opinions of their readers to those in power 
and their letter columns contain correspondence from the 'ordinary 
public'. Again there is little evidence of the 'general public 
writing' to the press in this case study. It was members of the 
policy community, individual professionals and (rarely) patients' 
relatives, who filled the letters columns of popular and quality 
papers alike. There is anecdotal evidence of nursing staff in 
mental hospitals, at the height of the adverse publicity, being 
taunted by neighbours accusing them of ill-treating their patients 
as 'all mental hospitals do'^3, but we can never know what the 
public really thought.
Editorials have a relatively small audience but it comprises the 
influential and the powerful. Volume of coverage simply 
reinforces the likelihood that an issue will be seen as a 
legitimate subject for government action.44 From January 1967 
until the mid-1970s, the volume of coverage was of course huge.
The Lobby system serves as the direct, personal interface between 
journalists and politicians. Although, throughout the 1960s the 
Lobby was staffed increasingly by specialist correspondents in 
areas like economics or social policy. The Lobby is particularly
41Ibid. p.64
4^This concept is discussed in more detail in the next chapter
4^Direct discussions with senior psychiatric hospital staff. 
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involved when legislation is going through and certainly was
active in some detail during the passage of the Health Service
Commissioner clauses of the 1973 NHS Reorganisation Bill, widely 
covered in the press.
The last stage in the analysis is to understand how politicians 
react to the press. Seymour-Ure singles out two means of 
influence on politicians; vertical and horizontal communication. 
Vertical communication links public opinion to three different
sections of the 'political public'; Ministers and civil servants,
Government backbenchers and party officials, and thirdly the 
Opposition. Seymour-Ure's main argument is that whatever the 
empirical reality, the significant factor is the belief by 
politicians that newspapers influence public opinion. They are 
one of the key transmitters of perceived public opinion. Secondly 
the media are primary information sources to party activists, 
Backbenchers and the Opposition who in turn bring pressure to bear 
on the Executive. In the course of the campaign there were myriad 
such examples of press coverage (often inspired by AEGIS) being 
fed back to Ministers by backbenchers during Parliamentary debates 
as reflections of public feeling.
Horizontal communication takes place when newspapers act as 
sources of information for the political public about its
members.^ This can either take the form of partial coverage 
which threatens further revelations, or innuendo and oblique 
references for 'those in the know'. There was ample evidence of 
horizontal communication in the AEGIS campaign. Partial 
revelation in the press, and replication of the minutiae of 
current arguments with the Ministry in the letters columns, was 
used extensively by AEGIS during the campaign for an independent 
inquiry into Sans Everything to keep the threat of further 
revelations firmly in the mind of the Executive. Once AEGIS 
became an insider group, Barbara Robb submitted pieces to the
^Golding P., and Middleton S, op.cit. p.65
^See Role of the Press in this guise in the Profumo Affair in 
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Dally Telegraph, or persuaded her Fleet Street allies to publish 
feature articles at strategic points in the campaign, less to 
inform the public, than to remind politicians and officials that 
she retained the option of whipping up the media if appropriate 
policy outputs were not forthcoming.
As Seymour-Ure argues, it is problematic to measure the extent of 
media influence over politicians. Nevertheless three main sources 
can be summarised. Firstly they transmit perceived public opinion 
to which politicians respond. Secondly they wield power by 
virtue of belief on the part of the political public that they 
influence public opinion. Thirdly they can exercise a key 
sanction over politicians by publishing (or threatening to) on 
issues which the latter would prefer kept secret.
Parliament
What then of the role of the people's representative body, 
Parliament? To begin with, mental health was not a party 
political issue and therefore party competition is not a major 
parameter. This would tend to discount a pluralist, 
representative democracy model of its role. Lack of party 
antagonism in turn reflects the fact that mental health is an 
issue which does not influence voter support to a marked degree: 
although Crossman was ever concerned at the ability of hospital 
scandals to damage the Government's caring image. Public choice 
theory would tend to predict from this that Parliamentarians would 
show no interest in the subject. However the study has shown that 
although Parliament has not been highly prominent as a source of 
policy change, it has played three important roles.
Firstly MPs and Peers have provided pressure groups with a 
platform from which to develop national recognition of an issue. 
Given the focus of press interest on Parliament, this is not an 
insignificant role. Perhaps unsurprisingly, for an issue which 
does not win or lose elections, the Lords has been prominent here.
Continued from previous page 
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Strabolgi's speech originally launched AEGIS, and Peers from the 
medical profession represented the BMA line during the passage of 
the Health Service Commissioner clauses of the 1973 NHS 
Bill.
The Commons was more active in the second major function, that of 
acting as a source of pressure on Ministers. Even if the public 
is largely uninterested, Ministers still have a Parliamentary 
constituency and reputation which are important to their career 
path. A Minister who is consistently apologising to Parliament 
for problems in his policy sphere widely reverberating in the 
press, or worse has to admit one month what was denied three 
earlier, is unlikely to inspire confidence either in backbenchers 
or members of his own Frontbench. In this regard, it may be 
significant that the ministerial career of the first holder of a 
high profile portfolio in the 1964 and 1966 Labour Government, and 
who scored such a great success in re-negotiating a new contract 
for General Practitioners and appeared to be on the crest of a 
cabinet post, was in 1968 given a second junior post before moving 
out of Government.
The third function was to amend the legislation on the Health 
Service Commissioner to ensure that the office could take 
complaints direct from hospital staff raising concerns about 
standards of care. Although AEGIS claimed this as a great 
triumph, it was a marginal concession by the Government which in 
practice has proved to be relatively insignificant due to the 
limitations on the Office otherwise carried through Parliament. 
There was certainly a very strong campaign by the Opposition 
parties to make it a more powerful office. But as the Secretary 
of State explained to the Committee Stage of the Bill, the formula 
he presented had been agreed by the BMA and he was not prepared to 
move on it.^6 Parliament was therefore approving a formula which 
had already been subject to a degree of effective veto by the 
medical profession.
Continued from previous page 
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It is also significant that although the Opposition health team in 
the Commons which pressed for the inclusion of clinical complaints 
within the Commissioner's remit was led by the Secretary of State 
for Social Services from 1974 to 1976, she brought forward no 
amending legislation even though she also published the South 
Ockendon Report. To be fair to her, Barbara Castle did more than 
any politician to try and implement the major components of the 
Davies Report but in two years, a senior Cabinet Minister, did not 
succeed. This is a clear indication that in mental health and 
health complaints policy, even the Executive can be subservient to 
other interests. This is the concern of the next chapter.
^^See Chapter 9
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
POLICY-CHANGE IN MENTAL HEALTH - THE STATE *S RESPONSE
"Policy analysis involves the use of social science tools 
that produce inherently uncertain and incomplete findings, 
and these doubtful findings are then brought forward in an 
attempt to understand goals which are ambiguous and 
conflicting.
To complete the evaluation of the five models of state activity, 
this chapter focuses on the response of the state to the demands
placed upon it by the major spheres of input politics analysed in
the previous chapter. The aim is to examine what the AEGIS 
campaign, the hospital scandals and the policy reforms they 
precipitated can elucidate about the structure of power in
society. Two major spheres of analysis are employed. Initially, 
the nature of the process of decision-making within the Executive 
is considered. Secondly, its structure, its internal dynamics and 
its responses to demands are analysed against the competing 
theories of the State. A final section draws together the
findings of both evaluative chapters into a concluding commentary 
on the appropriateness of these models. As in Chapter 12, 
Dunleavy and O'Leary's typology is the major source for the 
characterisation of each model.2
iRein, M. Social Science and Public Policy. (London: Penguin, 
1976) p.76
^Dunleavy, P. and O'Leary, B., Theories of the State. (London: 
Macmillan, 1987)
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Nature of the decision-making process
Elite and neo-pluralist theorists describe the process of 
decision-making as 'rational'. Elite prescribes that decision­
making should be rational, comprehensive and search for the
optimum policy strategy. Policy-makers review current outputs,
formulate precise objectives, identify all policy options which 
could meet the objectives, subject the options to systematic 
evaluation and implement the best-performing option. In the face
of criticism from pluralists, this was modified by neo-pluralists 
into the 'bounded rationality' model, or, as Etzioni has termed 
it, 'mixed scanning'-*, which has five components: the
factorisation of problems into separate issues dealt with by sub- 
organisations; the more limited aim of 'satisfising' or meeting a 
narrower spectrum of needs and demands: the range of alternatives
considered is limited; uncertainty in the environment is absorbed 
as much as possible; there are standard operating procedures that 
categorise problems and formulate category-specific 
approaches
Bounded rationality is said to have resulted in a gathering trend 
towards the specialisation and 'technocratisation' of policy 
development and resource planning. Techniques such as cost 
benefit analysis^, and PPBS^, have superseded political
^Etzioni, A., Mixed scanning: a third approach to decision­
making, Public Administration Review. Vol. 27, No. 5, December
1967, pp.38^-392
^See Dror, Y., Policy-making Re-examined, (New York: Elsevier, 
1973) Chapter 12, and Dror,Y., Muddling Through - Science or 
Inertia, Public Administration Review Vol.24. No.3, pp.153-57 and 
Etzioni, A., Mixed Scanning - A third approach to decision-making, 
in Ed. Faludi, A., A Reader in Planning Theory. (Oxford: 
Pergamon, 1973) pp.219-229
^Williams, A., The Cost-Benefit Approach, British Medical 
Bulletin, vol.30 No 4. (1974) pp.252-256
^See Etzioni, A., 'Mixed Scanning - A third approach to 
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considerations as criteria for decision-making. This 
disadvantages non-specialists and the wider community in the 
process and increases the relative autonomy of professionals and 
experts.
In contrast, pluralist conceptions are both descriptively and 
normatively Incremental. Normative because comprehensive- 
rationality is dismissed as impossible. Descriptive, because 
empirical research indicates that the base outputs of policy and 
budget are rarely examined and changes take place only at the 
m a r g i n s .  ^ Policy-making is also pragmatic. Since decision­
making is the product of group bargaining and because policy­
makers cannot know all the facts pertinent to complex problems, 
the process is often 'disjointed'. It is based on accommodation 
between organised interests or 'partisan mutual adjustment': a 
phrase associated with Lindblom. Policy-makers practise the art 
of 'muddling through'.®
The process of decision-making in this study suggests that the 
polarity between incremental and rational models is an over­
simplification. Prior to Crossman's administration, the Executive 
made marginal changes to existing policy but only in the context 
of a general denial of the case for more radical change. After 
Ely, and with a new administration in the Department of Health, 
the case was accepted. Of central importance was Crossman's
Continued from previous page
decision-making, in Ed. A. Faludi, A Reader in Planning Theory, 
(etc) pp.219-229
^Heclo, M., and Wildavsky, A., The Private Government of Public 
Money. (London: Macmillan, 1974)
®See the seminal statement of this position by Lindblom, C.E., 
The Science of Muddling Through', Public Administration Review. 
Vol. 19, 1959, pp.79-88, also Edwards, G., and Sharansky I., The 
Policy Predicament (San Francisco: W.H.Freeman, 1978) pp.6-12, and 
Wildavsky, A., Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS, Public 
Administration Review. Vol.28. (1969) pp.189-200
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decision to use outsiders to construct the programme and whose 
work was coordinated by a professor in empirical social 
administration, pre-disposed to bounded rational approaches. He 
brought into the exercise two further academics, Pauline Morriss 
and Peter Townsend both of whom were on the record with criticism 
of policy for failing to examine the base. The work of the post- 
Ely working party constructed a 'rational' policy. Better 
Services for the Mentally Handicapped reviewed existing outputs, 
re-formulated objectives, identified need both qualitatively and 
quantitatively and constructed a policy programme which tailored 
objectives to need; research and monitoring mechanisms then 
provided the feedback loop. Once the post-Ely policy had 
established this approach, a second academic and technically- 
oriented Secretary of State developed it and applied it when the 
Whittingham report established the case for re-examining policy 
objectives in mental illness. A year after he left office, Better 
Services for the Mentally 111 was the result. In each cases 
crisis was the catalyst.
The financial strategy conflicted with incrementalism since a re­
appraisal of the NHS revenue budget led eventually to programme 
targets which restructured programme shares, effectively 
redistributing the base. As Chapter 10 notes, although the 
relative shift in real resources across programmes over time has 
been substantial, movements towards target were incremental since 
it was not possible to move large volumes of resources across 
functional boundaries over a short period. There is a natural 
lead-in time for development, and even if feasible, any attempt to 
implement the policy in one year would have generated huge 
political opposition from the Regions and the BMA. Similarly, 
both policy reviews were conducted within a commitment established 
after the 1957 Royal Commission Report to de-institutionalise 
psychiatric and mental handicap s e r v i c e s .  ^ From this
perspective they could be seen as incremental reforms. However, 
this extant policy emerged from a major review in the mid-1950s.
^See Chapter 2
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In summary then, bounded-rationality was used to formulate 
objectives to be achieved by incremental changes. Similarly, 
resources were redistributed incrementally. However in each case 
there was a framework of bounded rationality which accordingly 
emerges as the predominant feature of the process of decision.
Public choice and Marxist theories are less concerned with process 
than outputs. According to the former, there are two major 
tendencies in government activity; institutional atrophy and 
ever-expanding budgets. Institutional atrophy is a process of 
degeneration from collective goals into the individual interests 
of those holding official positions. Since the state is so large, 
diversified, complex and not least, secretive, citizens can rarely 
mount any effective scrutiny and hence rarely waste time and money 
trying. Second, unlike commercial managers whose earnings are 
profit-related, the welfare of bureaucrats is linked to the size 
of their empires and budgets from which power, status and often, 
increased remuneration levels are derived, and therefore aim to 
maximise them. In this the interests of officials and political 
heads converge. So long as the effect of official action does not 
reduce the welfare of society, the tendency will be towards an 
over-supply of the output of government agencies.^
There is insufficient evidence in the study to evaluate whether 
institutional atrophy can be said to characterise the process. An 
entirely cynical view that all the participants were in it for 
themselves seems unsupportable. Also, successive governments 
have sustained the priorities policy and elaborated the strategies 
for moving services from large hospitals to the community as 
experience and research uncover unmet needs and demands at a more 
detailed level of policy disaggregation. It is conceivable that 
more recently, predominant interests at local level, which in 
health services generally favour the acute sector, may be 
reversing the trend of redistribution of resources and in so 
doing, have the tacit approval of the centre. There was probably
l^Dunleavy P., and O'Leary, B. p.115-7
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a degree of empire building amongst some of the participants, and 
budgets in mental health have increased steadily in real terms 
where health authorities hold the line on Priorities whilst the 
number of hospital residents has and continues to decline. Over­
supply can certainly happen in the NHS, as for example in the 
continued over-provision and even rebuilding of acute hospital 
beds in parts of inner-London. Whether the British mental health 
services are heading for a position of over-supply is difficult to 
evaluate; although, an informed impression suggests that twenty 
years after the Ely Report was published, they may still have some 
way to go.
Since Marxists are primarily concerned with identifying the 
structural determinants on the policy-process and less with 
the process itself, their characterisations are considered in the 
next section.
The activity of the state
The nature of decision-making and the inputs politics can now be 
used to supplement an analysis of state activity to evaluate the 
appropriateness of the macro theories of the state to the case 
study. Each is examined in turn.
Pluralism
Thus far the claims of pluralists are not substantiated in the 
case study. Once the case was accepted, decision-making was not 
incremental. The media was not an open, freely-accessible mirror 
on society. The pressure group community, although polyarchic, is 
not infinitely dynamic and open to all interests.
What of the nature of the state? Pluralist accounts contend that 
the character of policy outputs demonstrates the state's 
neutrality in dealing with competing interests and present the
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state as dynamic and reflecting the balance of pressure group 
forces at any one time. The 'neutral state' model sees the ideal 
state as one which balances, re-weights and referees pressure 
group contests to protect unorganized or weakly organised groups 
in the public interest, actively enforcing the rules of fairness 
and championing the underdog. The model asserts the ideal of a 
constitutional bureaucracy to safeguard the public interest, 
recruited meritocratically and motivated by a public service 
ethic.
The nature of the policy outputs in the AEGIS campaign and their 
bias towards professional demands indicates that the state has not 
acted neutrally. Within bias towards selected demands, which, one 
could argue, Parliament simply reflected in the passage of the 
Health Service Commissioner, the Executive actively managed what 
Dunleavy and O'Leary term a 'deformed polyarchy'.H  The
administrations of Crossman and Joseph resisted medical demands, 
which favoured the status quo, in areas where this had been 
demonstrated to be no longer legitimate. They were not passive, 
'weathervanes'. This could be interpreted as supportive of the 
'neutral state' model of a bureaucracy championing the public 
interest. However, Crossman had to bring in outsiders to assert 
the policy over his permanent officials and in any case, British 
Parliamentarians, senior civil servants, and Ministers were not 
meritocratically recruited in the mid-1960s.^
According to the 'broker state' model, state activity equates to 
the aggregation of internal pressure group activity and policy 
outcomes are the outcome of bureaucratic politics reflecting self- 
interest of officials as much as outside pressure. Therefore if 
external contending groups are equally balanced, state officials 
can tip the policy decision in favour of their own preferences. 
This model identifies 'policy communities' or internal coalitions
H-Dunleavy and O'Leary, op.cit.
l^Guttsman, W.L., The British Political Elite. (London: 
Macgibbon and Kee, 1963)
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within the civil service, however, cohesion and coordination only 
happens when group interests accidentally coincide with the
general interest.^
If Crossman is correct in identifying the resistance and denial of 
Barbara Robb's case during the first three years of AEGIS as 
typical of the preferences of the dominant coalition of the 
Ministry of Health, then the broker state model is not
appropriate. Crossman's Post-Ely working arrangements represented 
a means effectively to counter any policy community amongst his 
officials.
There is some evidence of the kind of shifts in position under
pressure which pluralist systems approaches would predict. When
AEGIS appeared as a threat, the first reaction of the Ministry was 
to ignore and deny. Once it became clear that this strategy was 
failing, minimal but cumulative policy responses, characteristic 
of 'dynamic conservatism' were produced. The threat grew and the 
next response was to try and co-opt AEGIS to divert its energy to 
the Department's overall objectives. With the crisis generated by 
Sans Everything and Ely, the 'system' changed, but in terms the 
impact of the resultant policies, the compliance with demands was 
minimal, in Schon's terms 'token' rather than 'significant'.^ 
The problem with this approach is that a system is self-contained. 
Whereas in the case study, the state and the inputs acting on it 
were not always distinct from one another. Professionals in the 
environment had representatives inside the 'system', and 
individual AEGIS advisers played diverse roles and 'wore more than 
one hat' at once.
l^Dunleavy and O'Leary op.cit. pp.45-47
l^Schon D., Beyond the Stable State. (London:Pelican, 1973) 
Chapter 2 'Dynamic Conservatism'
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Public Choice theory
Public choice theory encompasses two major models. The demand- 
side model is based on the median-voter theorem which is said to 
govern the output of the Executive. Political markets are 
aggregated to assert the self-interest of the majority and direct 
budgets accordingly. This model is singularly inappropriate to 
this study. Although mental illness afflicts a substantial 
proportion of the population, there is not the overt recognition 
of this amongst the general public which translates itself into 
commensurate demands for spending (as in acute services). Within 
the NHS budget, the assertion of the needs of the mentally
disordered must overcome the predominant political pressure to 
spend money in other sectors. One could argue that between 
central government programmes, shifting money into priority
sectors is achieved only by expanding the budget which in turn is 
a result of median-voter pressure. However, this redistribution 
continued even in the mid 1970s when due to the oil crisis, the 
trend of expanding budgets in acute services shifted into reverse, 
(albeit temporarily).
According to the 'supply-side' model, policy outputs are the 
result of log-rolling and pork-barrel politics within the 
government machine. The earlier discussion on pressure groups 
argued that neither of these conceptions are appropriate to the 
case study.^ AEGIS does not conform to the characterisation of 
interest groups in public choice theory. However, all actions of
other members of the policy community could be seen as promoting
their vested interests, if one had the inclination so to interpret 
human motivation. Medicine was protecting its empire from 
nursing. Parliamentarians and academics were enhancing their 
reputations. A group like the NAMH was a coalition of all these 
vested interests. QCs were creating business for themselves. 
Ministers were making political capital to promote their careers. 
Without in-depth examination of the personal motives of all the
l^See Chapter 12
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participants this study cannot be conclusive here although two 
observations are pertinent. If Barbara Robb was not motivated by 
material gain, as she was not, then why should she have been the 
only person involved acting with altruism? Moreover, a public 
choice interpretation requires a degree of cynicism unsupported 
even in the Crossman Diaries!
Elite Theorists
A major theme in elite models of state activity is the focus on 
the executive b u r e a u c r a c y . ^  More radical elite theorists argue 
that policy-level functionaries are either directly controlled by 
a business-elite or, through the use of limited selection 
criteria, including specific educational background and the 'old 
boy network' , are implicitly biased by social background with a 
shared culture, and interests of the business elite. Secondly, 
politicians are seen as dominated by their officials who have 
greater experience and technical knowledge and sustain 
continuity as Ministers come and go. A more 'revisionist' 
approach lies in the concept of 'technocracy' used to describe 
administrative elites who operate primarily in their own interests 
or according to their own professional norms, whilst being 
unbeholden to outside elites.
There are several strands to the technocratic mentality. Firstly, 
it asserts the superiority of the technical over the political in 
decision-making. Secondly, technocrats are organisational 
imperialists, ever-ready to expand their spheres of interest and 
budgets and restructure the organisation in their favour. 
Thirdly, they play a critical role as coordinators by writing 
policy programmes, and implementing the processes without which 
the tasks of government would be impossible. Fourthly, their 
technical expertise makes them difficult to replace easily,
l ^ D u n l e a v y  and O'Leary, op.cit. pp.169-73
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therefore they can only be removed as part of a medium-term 
strategy. Lastly, their focus on specialist policy areas tends 
towards 'tunnel vision' to the exclusion of a multi-dimensional 
perspective on issues.
During the 1960s, senior British Civil servants were recruited 
from a narrow social stratum. They were largely educated at
Oxbridge in subjects not directly relevant to most of the 
specialist areas they came to work in, particularly social 
services. Indeed the recruitment policy in the Civil Service 
favoured the generalist to the functional expert. The Department 
of Health had professional divisions but the personnel who 
fulfilled the coordinating role were generalists. This was one of 
Crossman's principal complaints about the Permanent Staff. His 
response was to import specialists to construct a technical policy 
programme. The Post-Ely Working Party can thus be seen as an 
alternative technocracy to a generalist permanent staff. The
approach to policy-making developed by this group was continued by 
Joseph who like Crossman was a technical politician. Although 
there was some circumstantial evidence that the permanent staff 
may have won back a little ground during the former's period of 
office. The drafting of the 1971 Better Services White Paper was 
'flattened out' with all references to Ely removed so that the new 
policy appeared as a consistent development from the old.^7 The 
HAS no longer reported direct to the Minister but was mediated by 
his officials. Despite wide calls for a legal appointment to the 
office of Health Commissioner, the first postholder was a former 
Deputy Permanent Secretary at the DHSS.
Bringing in outsiders is also a sub-theme, within elite theory, of 
the assertion of political leadership which is ascribed four 
roles. Firstly, it has a symbolic, non-rational role as a 
charismatic authority which is 'running the show', and creates an
atmosphere which appears to fulfil electoral promises and
obligations to interest groups whilst in reality, the
l^Crossman's term for diluting the drafting, see Chapter 6
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configuration of policy-making and outputs may be scarcely 
affected. Secondly, it concentrates power in a core Executive 
which is selectively recruited. Thirdly, it determines policy 
direction by ensuring ideological conformity in key areas of
influence within the government machine. The leadership's
tentacles are extended through parties and political appointees to 
the bureaucracy. Fourthly leaders take crisis decisions "....when 
the normally routinized operations of the bureaucracy are 
insufficient or cannot be relied on, when decisions have to be 
pushed through the chain of command..."^-®
All three Secretaries of State in the case study were high- 
profile, charismatic figures with distinct ideological identities 
and potent personal styles. There are particularly strong 
resonances between the three other roles of leadership and 
Crossman's administration where more detailed evidence is
available. To begin with, he engineered a crisis by publishing 
the full text of the Ely Report, to push through a programme and 
assert his authority over resistant officials. He then created a 
core executive, selectively recruited, including senior academics 
associated with his own political party and thus extended the
tentacles of his leadership into the permanent staff. The concept 
of an 'imported technocracy' serving the interests of a 
charismatic politician with whom it shared policy objectives seems 
accurately to characterise the most significant role of academics 
in this case study. They were certainly idea definers as Banting 
s u g g e s t s ^ ,  but their ideas were not absorbed by the Executive 
until the political climate was right. Townsend had been writing 
on the conditions of the elderly in longstay care for seven years 
before he was brought in by Crossman. Academics were directly 
involved in the lobbying which helped create the climate, but
l ^ D u n l e a v y  and O'Leary, op.cit., p.168 Note: Crossman and Ely to 
force his hand and legitimate his direct involvement in detail 
policy areas.
l^See Banting K., Poverty. Politics. and Policy (London, 
Macmillan, 1979) and discussion in Chapter One
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their impact was most potent when they were on the inside of 
government.20
The third theme is the central-periphery dynamic. Democratic 
elite theorists argue that the role of peripheral agencies and 
local governments as implementors of central policy has grown and 
offset any trend in the centralisation of policy-making. However 
the radical theorists argue that this is merely window dressing 
because it represents the diversification of central elite 
domination through networks of patronage and the control of 
expenditure.21 Central political authority is simply extended
into lower-tier sub-organisations. The decision-making process 
appears open and ostensibly legitimate, however the membership of 
quasi-government agencies to whom authority is devolved can be 
controlled by the centre but cannot be overturned electorally. 
This process also serves to spread the blame when things go wrong 
thus immunising the central elites.
The fourth theme focusses on the link between business and the 
state and is not relevant h e r e . 2 2
The development of systematic monitoring in the NHS is consistent 
with the critique of the use of quasi-government agencies at local 
level whose membership is controlled by the centre. The post-Ely 
shockwaves were used to re-assert the centre's authority over the 
health authorities responsible for implementing Ministerial policy
20Klein's position here is closest to the findings of this case 
study. He argues that academics working with Labour ministers 
"....used policy analysis as a springboard to influence public 
policy... and have conducted overtly political campaigns", Klein, 
R., The rise and decline of policy analysis: the strange case of 
health policy-making in Britain, Policy Analysis. Vol. 2, No.3, 
(1976) p. 474
21-Dunleavy P. and O'Leary B. , op cit p.179
22Dunleavy and O'Leary also discuss a fifth theme of the role of 
the law and judiciary which is not relevant to the concerns here.
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which Ely had found deficient in ways which rebounded on the 
centre through pressure brought by AEGIS and the press. Crossman 
used this to reverse previous policy of genuine devolution to
extend his networks of leadership through the regional board 
chairmen into the periphery. He employed systematic,
'technocratic', information gathering and feedback on performance 
against centrally-determined targets designed largely by the 
outsiders in the post-Ely working party. These early attempts at 
monitoring and review were continued by Keith Joseph and
subsequently more fully developed into the systems now in u s e .  
The amount of discretion available to health authorities has 
thereby been systematically and inexorably reduced. It remains to 
be seen whether the implementation of proposals to create National 
Health Service Trusts will produce more genuine independence at 
local l e v e l . 2^ As the NHS now spends over £ 2 5  billion of public 
money, the Treasury is bound to require close scrutiny and control 
of this expenditure both within central economic policy and not 
least since its Ministers and officials are answerable to the 
Public Accounts Committee for any cases of apparent ineffective 
resource use which may come to light. It also seems difficult to 
conceive how political accountability can be circumvented to the 
extent that health ministers no longer have to answer to 
Parliament for standards of service delivered on the ground in an 
area as party political as the NHS has become. Certainly the
proposals to reduce the size of health authorities and create
executive members at unit, district and regional level25 seems to 
be a logical development of the trend to centralisation 
established in the late-1960s.
Two models of the state in elite theories seem pertinent. 
According to the 'autonomous model', the state is run by elected
2^See Chapter 10.
2^See NHS, Working for Patients. Working Paper 1, Self-governing 
Hospitals. (London: HMSO, 1989)
2%HS, Working for Patients. (London :HMSO,1989) pp. 64-66
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governing elites or bureaucracy, but each group is separated from 
control by socially-privileged groups. To begin with politicians 
are able to resist outside pressure. They have other personal 
options if they lose office, many others have safe constituencies 
and besides any outside influence on public opinion is only 
important at election times. Secondly officers devise strategies 
to enhance their autonomy and countervail pluralist pressures. 
They can alter opinion and attitudes and weaken or instil 
uncertainty amongst their enemies. Officials choose which 
interest groups are consulted.
There was certainly an element of choice in the selection of 
pressure-groups for consultation. However, the way AEGIS moved 
from an outsider to an insider group demonstrates that the central 
bureaucracy can have its choice circumscribed by the power of 
outside pressure. Moreover, the failure of Crossman to get 
agreement for his more radical health service complaints policy in 
the face of medical opposition, replicated during the Castle 
administration, is counter-indicative of autonomy of action. 
Besides, most politicians who reach Cabinet status have invested a 
great deal of personal commitment, energy and many years to a 
political career. It is not something they readily put at risk, 
even if a directorship of a major company is on offer, since 
moving out of politics is often construed as having failed.
The 'liberal corporatist model' identifies B....a pattern of 
interest group representation where a liberal democratic state 
does not outlaw rival interest groups but rather accords certain 
corporate groups a monopoly over representing given social 
i n t e r e s t s ” .26 Interests are thus integrated and non-competitive 
but their influence is dependent upon the observation of certain 
controls on the selection of their leaders and articulation of 
demands and supports. Elected governments and functionaries 
facilitate bargains struck by corporatist elites. Officials set
^^Dunleavy, P. and O'Leary, op.cit. p.193
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the agenda, decide participants and exercise considerable 
influence if the area is technical.
The policy communities described later in the chapter are evidence 
of a liberal corporatist model of policy-change. The spheres of 
political action were limited in number and most were coopted at 
various stages. There were rules of the game and the Executive 
struck bargains. For example, AEGIS agreed not to use its muscle 
to fight the Sans Everything white paper in the press so long as 
the Executive was embarked upon a programme of acceptable policy 
outputs. However to characterise state activity in the case study 
by this model would be to deny the tensions and conflicting 
interests between the communities. There was a significant degree 
of polyarchy in the input politics, albeit bounded and deformed. 
Moreover the range of possible operational details of the same 
broad policy innovation and the various means of implementation 
create a wide variety of policy outcomes. Thus AEGIS' 
prescription for the remit of Health Commissioner was very 
different from that agreed between the government and the BMA.
Marxism
Original Marxist theory conceptualised the state are as a markedly 
repressive apparatus serving the interests of capital. This 
appeared inconsistent with the 'welfare consensus' of the 60s and 
70s and therefore was modified in three forms. Of these 
functionalist approaches are the most frequently used in Marxist 
explanations of the development^? and purpose of welfare 
s e r v i c e s . These interpret the state's primary aim as 
maintaining capitalist development. There are four sub-functions. 
The state preserves order through 'social expenses' (eg. the
2?See Scull A.T., Museums of Madness. (London:Prentice Hall, 
1979)
2®Gough, I., The Political Economy of the Welfare State. (London: 
Macmillan, 1979)
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police). It promotes capital accumulation through social 
investment (eg. infrastructure), and manufactures legitimation 
through social consumption (welfare state). It has a reproductory 
function by maintaining a healthy, educated workforce. Decision­
making is deliberately pluralist "mopping up political energies, 
providing a reassuring appearance of controversy and popular 
influence and sustaining a needs-oriented ideology which seems to 
indicate the social neutrality of state policy".^9
Structuralist Marxism is a variant of functionalism. It seeks to 
derive an understanding of political phenomena from the 
fundamental economic relations involved in the capitalist mode of 
production, interpreting policies as determined by impersonal 
changes in economic and political and ideological systems. The 
state apparatus acts with a measure o£ autonomy from the owners of 
capital and again the direction of policy is towards the 
preservation of the overall social order within which the 
processes of capital accumulation can proceed. The state also has 
a legitimation role, within which the welfare state is crucial 
since it portrays the state as equitable.
How can a case study in mental health, presented at such a marked 
level of disaggregation and whose net effects were reforms to 
existing programmes, serve to evaluate such abstract arguments? 
To begin with it has already been contended that of all the 
perspectives on the role of the media in politics, Marxist 'sub­
cultural' theorists who emphasise ideology as a power parameter 
have developed the most sophisticated analysis of how mass 
media coverage of given issues arises and a national scandal or 
'moral panic' is created. They also have the most highly 
developed conception of the dynamic between the media and state 
activity. Applied to the AEGIS campaign this approach offers a 
workable explanation of the centrality of the press to the policy 
process in the study.
^Dunleavy and 0;Leary op.cit. p.252
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Scull has tried to apply a functional Marxist approach more widely 
in mental health in his book on the development of community-based 
psychiatric programmes on both sides of the A t l a n t i c . T h e  
relative poverty which has characterised implementation in parts 
of the US, together with some unlikely political alliances are 
presented to validate Scull's argument that 'decarceration' should 
be seen as part of a growing concern in powerful circles with the
massive increases in state spending since the war and its
relationship to profitability and capital accumulation in the 
private sector of advanced capitalist countries. Community care 
is therefore seen as the cheap alternative to institutional care 
in both welfare and penal policy. The financial evidence for this 
thesis is largely American and in the author's own words "highly 
fragmentary and incomplete". His perspective seems less 
appropriate to the British experience of expanding real budgets on 
hospital services in priority groups relative to other groups in 
health care, and alongside substantial growth in local authority 
expenditure on these sectors. Whether without AEGIS and the
scandals the progress to community care would have proceeded more 
cheaply is a hypothetical question, although AEGIS certainly 
discouraged any initiatives in that direction. As noted in
Chapter 10, concern has been expressed recently about the
possible additional social security cost of de-institutionalising 
large numbers of people. But this seems to arise as much from a 
concern to ensure that the entirety of existing hospital budgets 
in priorities are redirected into community programmes in other 
agencies so that the Exchequer avoids 'paying twice than a
•^Scull, A.T., Decarceration. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1977) 
31lbid p .144
^^There is some suspicion that health authorities managing large 
hospitals are trying to retain at least some of the revenue 
accruing from the rundown of large hospitals for redistribution to 
other service sectors, whilst social security benefits pay the 
large part of the cost of de-institutionalising .ong stay hospital 
residents.
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desire to retrench the programmes overall. To date, however, 
Ministerial commitments at least to maintain the current spend in 
the priorities seem to have been held. As the number of 
inpatients in institutional care continues to dwindle and provided 
the level of spend remains constant, community care will not be a 
cheap alternative in the UK.
This is not to say Marxists have nothing to contribute to the 
debate. A critical dimension to the politics in this case study 
was the influence of organised medicine. The BMA became seriously 
involved in events driven by Barbara Robb when AEGIS proposed 
radical changes to the complaints machinery, and revived earlier 
concerns about the role of the Parliamentary Commissioner and the 
profession's determination to keep this Office away from clinical 
complaints. But there is also an undercurrent of medical 
influence which derives from the wide acceptance amongst 
politicians, and most of the participants, including AEGIS, that 
psychiatry is a branch of somatic medicine and is therefore the 
legitimate professional territory of doctors.
This consensus masks a controversy elsewhere surrounding the 
claims of conventional, positivist medical science uniquely to 
understand the aetiology and treatment of mental illness. There 
are the critics from within the profession who have argued that 
the concept of mental illness is entirely metaphorical and that 
the conditions said to symptomatic of it are best understood and 
treated from the knowledge base of the behavioural and social 
sciences. One of the least controversial, Russell Davis, has thus 
characterized the approach of somatic psychiatry as the 'diabetes- 
model' of psychiatry which approaches the disturbed individual as 
a biological malfunction - rather than a social being in a social 
context to which the psychiatrist is inevitably integral.^3 Like 
diabetes, the 'illness' is not curable but can be managed by drug
^^Russell Davis, D., Depression as Adaptation to Crisis, British 
Journal of Medical Psychology. Vol.43 (1970), pp.109-16
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therapy subject to occasional 'breakdowns' which may require 
hospitalisation to restore the 'equilibrium'.
There are also external antagonists such as Ingleby and others who 
have won few friends in the psychiatric profession by disputing 
its claims to be a medical science and asserting those of other 
professions who are still largely subordinate to psychiatry in the 
treatment of madness in the UK.-^ After well over a century of 
searching, it is far from clear that an organic base for major 
mental illnesses (the equivalent of the disease-entity in 
diabetes) is demonstrable in physically healthy adults. 
Moreover, such indicative evidence as exists may convince doctors 
predisposed to understand problems somatically, but it has not 
resolved the dilemma of extraneous variables and cause and effect. 
If the brain of a person in an acute psychotic phase shows 
biochemical and electro-physical activity different from that of a 
person in full self-control perhaps we should not be surprised. 
It does not prove that the physical change is causing the 
emotional and behavioural abnormality: the reverse is equally
logical. Moreover physical treatments and drug therapies are also 
known only to be palliative (and should not be undervalued for 
that considering how debilitating some severe disorders can be). 
Neither does their history inspire confidence. Insulin Coma 
Therapy (ICT), once the great wonder of the pre-war psychiatric 
age, was later abandoned as ineffective. The source and extent of 
the effectiveness of ICT's post-war successor and the most durable 
physical therapy, ECT, is so contentious today that some 
psychiatrists decline to use it. Wilding's observation is 
relevant here:
"The important point is that any attributes listed by 
occupational group members must be regarded as assertions 
until they are proved s u b s t a n t i a l . " ^
^^Ingleby, D., 'Understanding Mental Illness', in Ed. Ingleby,
D., Critical Psychiatry. (London:Pelican, 1981) pp.23-71 
^^Wilding P., Professional Power and Social Welfare 
Continued on following page
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Friedson interprets the existence of a wide range of schools in 
professional practise and the variability of treatment outcomes as 
evidence of a substantial subjective element in the diagnosis and 
choice of intervention, which calls into question the the 
"stability and and objectivity of the corpus of professional 
knowledge"36. Taking this one stage further, the widescale
acceptance by policy-makers of medicine's legitimacy as the
pre-eminent profession in mental health becomes essentially 
ideological. It is therefore the dominant ideology in an 
antagonistic power relationship with subordinate ones. Thus far 
there is some consistency with a structuralist approach.
The difficulty arises in attempting to follow Marxist method and
locate a material basis for this ideology. Its acceptance
certainly has much to do with making the stigma of madness 
manageable to people. 'Being mad' becomes an illness thereby 
bestowing normality and removing culpability^? and thus the
patient become complicit with professional bias. Doctors
accordingly restore respectability to 'the lunatic' and his or her 
family. Thus for Wooton writing in the 1950s when medical models 
sealed their dominance:
"Without question.... in the contemporary attitude towards 
anti-social behaviour, psychiatry and humanitarianism have 
marched hand in hand. Just because it is so much in keeping 
with the mental atmosphere of a scientifically-minded age, 
the medical treatment of social deviants has been a most
Continued from previous page
(London:Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982) p.5
^ F r i e d s o n  e., The Profession of Medicine (New York:Dodd Mead,
1975) p.262
3?Bott, e . Hospital and Society, British Journal of Medical 
Psychology. Vol.49 (1976) pp.97-140
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powerful, perhaps the most powerful, reinforcement of 
humanitarian impulses..."®®
Also, psychiatrists shoulder the responsibility for the sufferer's 
condition (particularly where there are contextual but hidden 
inter-personal difficulties) absolve him or her from certain 
social obligations such as work or family responsibilities®^, and 
provide a 'technological fix' which 'resolves' the problem without 
challenging established power relations in the person's social 
circumstances. 'Psychiatrists as doctors' also dominate the 
hierarchy of status and material rewards amongst competing mental 
health professionals.^
If an explanation of the development of institutionalised 
psychiatry can be convincingly located in the rise of capitalism 
and the utilitarian poor law as Scull has demonstrated^, we may 
be able to develop some argument about medical models of de- 
institutionalisation being functional to late twentieth century 
capitalism^. This requires an analysis of how schizophrenia and 
depression are threatening to capitalist accumulation and 
reproduction or perhaps symptoms of it, and why a somatic approach 
is reactionary. So far attempts to develop the links needed to 
support any such contentions seem tenuous, and speculative. 
Moreover as the medical model comes under increasing pressure from 
professions with alternative approaches, so capitalism seems to
®®Wooton B., Social Science and Social Pathology. (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1959) p.206 
®^See Talcott Parson's definition of the sick role in Friedson,
E. The Profession of Medicine (New York: Dodd Mead and Company, 
1975) pp.228-231 
^Se e  Freidson, op.cit. pp.48-70 
^se e  Scull, A.T. , (1979) lp.cit.
^Scull A.T., From Madness to Mental Illness, European Journal of 
Sociology. Vol. 16, No.2
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grow more secure than it has been since before the First World 
War. Marxists would reply that this simply supports their general 
contentions that all social welfare professions are functional to 
c a p i t a l ^ .  gut the argument starts to sound circular. If the 
state is functional to capital, professions work for the state, so 
that professions are functional to capital, because the state is 
functional to capital.
However, for the time being, we can suggest that the claims of 
somatic psychiatry in conflict with other models amounts to an 
ideological determinant on policy. This may or may not be a 
material structural determinant as Marxists such as Baruch and 
Treacher would imply.^ For the time being, it can only be seen 
with confidence as a Weberian 'ideal type' which requires further 
research.^
Neo-pluralism
The emphasis on the central role of professional ideology is used 
in neo-pluralist analysis to address the fundamental problem of 
how professions who are recognised as legitimate to inspire policy 
gain, sustain and exercise their influence. Neo-pluralist 
interpretations of state activity stress the professionalisation 
of decision-making, and the high level of fragmentation of state 
organisational structures.
The 'professionalised state' model contends that although Western 
democracies remain basically pluralist in their mode of operation, 
state activity is characterised by the professionalisation of 
government. The process remains fundamentally pluralistic due to 
three developments: the development of internalised controls
^ W i l d i n g ,  Op.cit. pp. 12-18
^Baruch G. and Treacher, A., Psychiatry Observed. 
(London:Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978) pp.8-21 
^See Chapter One
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amongst state professionals, the creation of a fragmented network 
of interactive policy-systems and the growth of issue-specific 
forms of public participation.
Firstly, many of the operational functions of the state are 
undertaken by professional experts governed by a code of ethics. 
Secondly, the professional code, comprising the doctrines of self- 
regulation and the public interest ethic, has persuaded 
governments to grant substantial discretion to professionals over 
policy-development and delivery. The public interest ethic 
manifests itself either as a commitment to scientific integrity 
and impartiality in technical spheres, or in the case of social 
policy areas, a commitment to the interests of the client.^
Third, the professionalisation of policy-making transfers power, 
particularly over policy-implementation. Expert judgement is 
preferred to interest group representation or direct political 
control. Professional influence over policy has two strands. The 
profession is a key forum for developing and testing knowledge, 
setting standards and policing both policy-making and 
implementation. New techniques of service delivery and new models 
of policy so developed, create demands on the government 
bureaucracy through the privileged position of professionals as 
insider groups in input politics and are thus translated into 
national policy. Policy-making can also become 'implementation 
skewed'; as innovations in technical practice give rise to 
retrospective, overt policy change or a change by default 
manifested in a radical alteration to policy through service 
delivery.
In addition, neo-pluralists argue that there remain few areas of 
government which are managed directly by central departments 
(defence, foreign policy, taxation, transfer payments). The 
remainder have been devolved to local government or the
^ D u n l e a v y ,  p.f Quasi-governmental sector professionalism, in 
Barker, A., Quangos in Britain. (London: Macmillan, 1981)
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proliferating quasi-government agencies. There is no single policy 
elite therefore. Rather there are many separate elites with lines 
of communication between them. Complex systems of inter-agency 
relations have evolved creating 'policy communities' - networks 
of personal contacts or more importantly, professional or 
occupational groups. There are two types of policy community. 
Firstly a hierarchical system of mutual dependency, wherein 
usually the centre controls strategy and resource allocation and 
the periphery controls detailed policy and implementation. 
Second, responsibility for different aspects of decision in 
complex policy areas can be split across a number of 
agencies.^ Thirdly, rationalised participation is required to 
prevent professionalised organisations becoming too insular and 
losing sight of the public interest.
Controls can be exercised, as in the AEGIS campaign, by set-piece 
investigations into particularly areas which are at their most 
powerful when precipitated by scandal.^®
They can also be hierarchical, thus centrally-formulated 
performance targets used to determine differential resource 
allocations to competing peripheral agencies. Other scrutineers 
include independent policy agencies such as the health policy 
units in universities who are also part of the insider lobby 
network or are able to attract media interest.
The National Health Service is a prime policy area for testing out 
neo-pluralist contentions. It is a multi-tiered organisation with 
professional representation at each tier. There are two major 
professions - nursing and medicine upon whom policy-makers and 
managers are dependent to implement policy. Because of the 
widespread acceptance of the concept of clinical judgement, the 
medical profession has enjoyed particular autonomy in the 
deployment and use of resources.
^ D u n l e a v y  and O'Leary op. cit. pp.307-8 
^®Dunleavy and O'Leary op.cit. pp.311-2
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A network of spheres of influence or community^ in this case 
study has been referred to earlier. The number of individuals 
inhabiting these spheres was small. AEGIS had links to the NAMH, 
through Barton and Rolph, to the Bar through Fitzwalter Butler, to 
the nursing profession through Kirkpatrick and Barbara Robb, to 
the political head at the DHSS through Abel-Smith and through 
Barbara Robb's informal contacts with Baroness Serota and Rolph's 
with Crossman. The NAMH had links through membership of the Ely 
(Russell Davies), Farleigh and Davies inquiries (Mary Applebey) 
and through Kenneth Robinson. Barbara Robb had her small caucus 
of keen supporters in Fleet Street, and Barry Askew, the lead 
journalist at Whittingham and Anne Shearer of the Guardian were 
also members of the Davies Committee. There were close networks 
between the QCs since medical litigation was a relatively small 
area in the late 1960s and therefore a small specialist 
community. The Chairmen of some of the inquiries shared Chambers. 
Howe, of course, was a member of the PEP working party and Russell 
Davies had been his colleague at Ely. Abel-Smith was a founder of 
AEGIS, Crossman's special adviser. He was also acquainted with 
Howe, and a close academic colleague of Townsend who supervised 
Pauline Morriss's PhD; both were on Crossman's PEP. Both nursing 
and medicine were represented in the professional divisions of the 
Department of Health, in the NAMH and through representation on 
all the inquiries and working parties, including PEP. Even 
Russell Barton of AEGIS was in the BMA. In addition, John Revans 
of PEP and Kathleen Bell, a member of the Council on Tribunals 
were both members of the Davies Committee.
The documentary evidence is replete with the formal, public 
consultation inputs and reports of delegations to the Minister. 
However, Barbara Robb's files also contain substantial inter­
community correspondence which would have been characteristic of 
each sphere, but which is generally unavailable to researchers.
4^i find Laffin's attempt to draw a distinction to these terms 
unconvincing, Professionalism and Policy. (London: Gower, 1986)
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Just as important, she left a record of all informal discussions 
with individuals over dinner or over the telephone, which at times 
were critical to outcomes. It can be safely assumed that
numerically, these were the tip of the iceberg of all the informal 
cross-talk that went on between the various spheres as policy was 
developed. This community can be represented diagrammatically, as 
follows:
AEGIS Campaign - Policy
Communities
Medicine
DHSS
Officials Ministers
Special
Adviser
PEP PEP
Press
Inquiries
Academics
BAR/
QCs
AEGIS
Nursing
Psychiatry
Public
Opinion
Lord
Chancellor's 
Office
These communities were largely outside the formal structure of the 
Service. The nature of more formal centre-peripheral relations in 
the study also supports neo-pluralist contentions. As argued
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earlier, the post-Ely policy set into reverse an established 
dynamic in the relations between the Ministry of Health and Health 
Authorities which had formally accorded considerable discretion to 
the latter. As noted earlier, since the early 1970s there has 
been a trend towards increasing centralisation over the periphery 
on policy and use of resources. Moreover the evidence of any 
sanctions by the wider public over professional action is scant 
indeed.
There is also ample evidence in the AEGIS campaign that 
professional interests have played a significant part in 
determining the detail of policy. The medical profession secured 
medical leadership of the Hospital Advisory Service nominated from 
a list prepared by the Chief Medical Officer. It fought the 
Crossman's Health Service Commissioner proposal and although it 
seemed to concede the major argument after the Farleigh Report, it 
soon became clear that the BMA had secured concessions which 
substantially diluted the impact of the Office. The Association 
has since been able to stave off a number of attempts to bring 
clinical decisions under independent scrutiny, except through the 
courts. Analysis of this professional influence is complicated 
since it involves three major professions, nursing, medicine and 
the law, with differing perspectives on the problem and 
accordingly differing loyalties and objectives. Moreover there is 
also evidence of a heterogeneity of view within the medical 
profession. An investigation of these complexities and an 
understanding of why the medical profession wields such influence 
in health policy requires further elaboration on the role of 
professionals in policy-making beyond the confines of neo­
pluralism which adequately incorporates the significance of 
professional ideologies.
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Professions and Policy
Following Dunleavy,50 the starting point is marked by critiques 
of descriptive approaches which used to characterise the sociology 
of the professions. So-called 'trait analysis' identifies 
characteristics said to define professions and differentiate 
occupations into 'semi-' and 'full' professions. Following 
Friedson-^, Larson^^> an<j. Johnson-^, the concern here is more 
with the impact of professional organisation on patterns of social 
and institutional power, and particularly the role of professional 
ideology in the formulation and implementation of policies.^
At the outset, an important distinction is drawn between 
professionalisation and professionalism. For Larson,
professionalisation is a process through which an occupational 
group seeks to establish its monopolies over the supply of a 
service commodity, and the supply and training of its own members, 
in order to secure a price over and above the value they would 
command if the labour market was free and competitive. 
Professionalism is a mode of exercising power distinguished where 
such monopolies are under-pinned by state protection and license, 
in turn based in the acceptance of a professional ideology which 
comprises the assertion of a unique, relevant, highly specialised 
and technical knowledge-base, and a professional ethic said to 
qualify the profession uniquely to deliver the service over which 
it seeks to establish a monopoly. The professional ethic claims 
to value the interests of the client before the material concerns 
of the professional. An occupational group has thus achieved what 
Friedson calls legitimised autonomy which grants social status,
^Dunleavy P., Quasi-governmental sector professionalism, in 
Barker A., op.cit. pp.182-3 
51-Friedson, op.cit.
^^Larson, M.S., The Rise of Professionalism. (London: University 
of California Press, 1977)
^Johnson, T.J. Professions and Power. (London:Macmillan, 1979) 
^Dunleavy op.cit.
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material privileges and power over the sphere of work not afforded 
to other occupational g r o u p s . ^5 For Dunleavy, the relationship 
to the state is of primary concern. The ideology of 
professionalism places a particular emphasis on the organisation 
of an 'occupational community' emphasising, work autonomy both 
individual and collective, occupational self-regulation, and state 
licensing through formal recognition of professional monopoly of 
certain skills or titles.^6 Professions can also compete for a 
particular sphere of activity both in terms of material reward and 
autonomy. At any time a given profession will be dominant if its 
ideology is perceived as most legitimate.
The major concern here is in British health care where 
professionals are almost exclusively employed and practise within 
the public sector. In this context, two aspects of the internal 
organisation of the state are relevant: these are patterns of 
influence between central and peripheral agencies, and levels of 
policy-making autonomy.
Dunleavy argues that conventional policy analysis which focuses 
either on the formal relationships between agencies or on those 
informal relations which are essentially interest group activity, 
the role which Eckstein accords the BMA^, overlooks the ability 
of professional groups to nationalise the process of policy change 
through two distinct mechanisms. Firstly, the profession creates 
a national-level forum for proselytising new innovations and 
professional practises in one peripheral agency through which they 
can be generalised to others. National level developments in the 
profession can also define the techniques available to 
professionals in peripheral agencies and effect consistent changes 
in professional practice within government. Secondly, where both 
central and peripheral agencies employ the same professions, the
S^Friedson op.cit. pp.47-48 
^Dunleavy, p. Op.cit.
^Eckstein, H., Pressure Group Politics, pp.83-91
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profession comes to subvert horizontal distinctions between tiers. 
The profession's national body influences the central agency 
thereby strengthening the position of peripheral agencies, where 
its members work, viz-a-viz the c e n t r e . ^ 8  Thus both nursing and 
medicine have representatives on advisory machinery, and as 
permanent officials at all levels in the NHS and in the various 
policy divisions in the Department of Health.
The national professional ideology also determines the parameters 
and even the character of policy changes by professionals at the 
periphery, so that they are at once both defining and being 
constrained by national policy changes.^9 These are the 
mechanisms through which somatic psychiatry has been able to 
dominate policy at all levels in the NHS. The pattern of post-war 
mental health policy, particularly in mental illness services, has 
been founded on a consensual view of the legitimacy of doctors to 
treat mental illness and thus the validity of somatic psychiatry. 
As Keith Joseph told the House of Commons in 1971:
"Psychiatry is to join the rest of medicine  the
treatment of psychosis, neurosis and schizophrenia have been 
entirely changed by the drug revolution. People go into 
hospital with mental disorders and they are cured and that 
is why we want to bring this branch of medicine into the 
scope of the 230 District General Hospitals that are planned 
for England and Wales."^0
Indeed as Ramon notes, since all politicians shared this view lack 
of resources was inevitably blamed for failures in service, such 
as those revealed by AEGIS, and very few people asked whether a
^Dunleavy op.cit.
59Ibid
^ H ouse of Commons Official Report. Vol. 879. col. 280-281, 
Written Answers 7.12.71.
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hospital-based, institutional philosophy of care might have been a 
major contributory factor.
The dominance of somatic psychiatry is reinforced by two further 
consequences of professionalisation and professionalism in the 
policy process: the relationship between policy formulation and 
implementation; and patterns of policy change.^2 Dunleavy argues 
that professionalism produces an implementation-skewed process of 
policy-definition, which increases the potential for the 
implementation of policy to be constitutive of policy-making. 
There is a high level of generality in legislation and executive 
regulations, specifically to avoid professional direction in the 
substantive content of policies. Definitions of what is good 
detailed policy are often omitted. Instead, legislation 
establishes organisations and lays down general goals. Policy­
makers thereby become highly dependent upon professionals to 
implement policy according to the spirit of the law, as well as to 
exercise the responsibilities conferred upon politicians by the 
health service legislation. Both sides are mutually-dependent and 
cooperation is bought at the cost of a privileged role for
professional representatives at all stages in the preparation of 
policy proposals and detailed guidance.^3 Thus government sets 
an administrative framework within which somatic psychiatry is 
widely practised and thus reinforces the legitimacy of the
framework.
Professionalism also increases the scope and intensity of policy 
conflicts particularly where issues of professional competence are 
at stake. This issue was and remains central to the argument
about involving the Health Service Commissioner in clinical
judgement. The case for the office was established by failures in
^Ramon, S., Pscvhiatrv in Britain. (London: Croom Helm, 1985)
p.268
62rbid pp.201-4
6^See Eckstein op.cit. pp. 78-91
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the psychiatric and mental handicap sectors. The interests within 
medicine were divided over some of the reforms which resulted. 
For example, the policy of redistributing resources from acute to 
priority sectors disadvantages professionals working in the former 
sphere who, along with the regional boards made known their 
opposition to Ministers and initially, at least, limited the 
extent of the policy. However, leaving aside dissidents such as 
Barton and Whitehead, the BMA has spoken with one voice over the 
Commissioner proposal.
More fundamentally, the case for the Health Service Commissioner
and Davies' proposals for the scrutiny of clinical judgement call
/ '
into question the competence of doctors to exercise that judgement 
autonomously, to undertake professional self-regulation to prevent 
abuse and failure, and to promote the interests of the client. As 
noted earlier, the case grew out of the deficiencies in the 
psychiatric services, but since psychiatry was an established 
medical specialty there could be no question of the BMA allowing 
it to be singled out for special treatment on clinical judgement 
since this would have risked an enormous rift within the 
profession as a whole. Not least, any case against psychiatry 
could not, on the evidence, be generalised to all branches of 
medicine. The mental hospital scandals established no general 
case to bring clinical decisions by surgeons and general 
physicians within the remit of the Office. Indeed the curative 
clinicians within organised medicine may have viewed the scandals 
as something discrete to a relative low status specialty such as 
psychiatry.^
Therefore, an acceptance by the medical profession of the general 
case that its judgements should be subject to legal or 
administrative scrutiny on a fairly routine basis, would have been 
to concede the cornerstones of its legitimised autonomy over its 
market and sphere of work, thus its unique knowledge base and
^^Watkins, S., Medicine and Labour. (London: Lawrence and
Wishart, 1987) pp. 108-9
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public interest ethic. Since this legitimacy is based on the wide 
acceptance of doctors as uniquely competent to exercise clinical 
judgement, the questioning of it by those, such as lay people in
AEGIS, and lawyers, seen as not so endowed, was unlikely to be
favourably received by the agency accepting the expertise and 
conveying the legitimacy; thus the state. To do so could have
undermined the whole basis of the government's relationship with
medicine upon which, as we have seen, the state is dependent to 
undertake its responsibilities and implement policy.
What of the dynamics between professions? The balance of opinion 
on the issue amongst the legal profession supported the case for 
scrutiny of medical decisions by non-medical professionals, namely 
lawyers. However, this is a relatively marginal concern for 
them. In contrast it is crucial to medicine maintaining its 
autonomy and 'market share' viz-a-viz competing professions such 
as nursing, and in mental health, psychology and social work. The 
balance of power between medicine and the law, generally seen as 
the most powerful professions, is difficult if not impossible, to 
measure on an issue which is disproportionately significant to 
each. It is interesting to note, that the inquiry reports 
criticised the competence of some nurses and administrators, but 
merely drew public attention to the excessive use of drug 
treatment and seclusion by consultant psychiatrists - remaining 
content to accept these practices in the name of clinical 
judgement. Even in the minds of barristers who practised in 
medical litigation, this was the legitimate territory of medicine. 
Unlike numerous nurses involved, no doctors were ever so seriously 
censured that they faced dismissal.
Certainly one could cynically argue that nursing staff had much to 
gain in their relative status and autonomy, by backing a campaign 
which was critical of a system where doctors were the dominant and 
major competing professional group. Politically, the support 
which AEGIS enjoyed amongst nurses was critical in countervailing 
the medical opposition. Again, however, the forces are difficult 
to quantify. And in the final analysis, a number of nurses faced
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the Courts and dismissal. The period of the campaign was one in 
which the reputation of the nursing profession was enhanced by 
virtue of its willingness to confront the inadequacies within it.
The policy process in mental health
The discussion over the last two chapters has largely eliminated 
conventional pluralist and public choice theories as adequate 
explanations of the input politics in the policy process in mental 
health and health service complaints during the period under 
detailed review. In terms of the case study material on pressure 
group activity, elite theory contentions of government partiality, 
the coopting of groups into compliant positions, and a limited 
number of key policy participants, if not corporatist in the 
classic sense, were all to some degree supported by the evidence. 
In terms of the nature of state partiality, the neo-pluralist 
model of the privileged position of professional views in policy 
outputs was similarly sustained. It was also shown that not only 
did Marxist cultural theorists offer the most sophisticated 
analysis of the role of the media in public policy, there were 
loud resonances with the AEGIS campaign, including, the concept of 
'moral panic', the importance of professional ideology amongst 
journalists, and the extent to which this can reflect a wider, 
dominant ideology in society.
In terms of prescriptive models of decision, 'bounded 
rationality' aptly describes the framework used by central 
government to review and decide on policy change. In terms of the 
actual process of decision-making, pluralist models and public 
choice theories of state activity are largely contra-indicated by 
the case study evidence. What of the remaining three? There was 
strong evidence to support elite theory. Technocratic decision­
making combined with charismatic leadership to extend central 
policy into the periphery through tighter monitoring and financial 
controls. There was a limited and relatively impermeable policy 
community, recruited from a narrow stratum of society, which was
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neo-corporatist in its nature and operations. However, to 
characterise the process as elite would overlook the real degree 
of plurality between the competing spheres of interest. There was 
not one but the several policy communities identified in neo- 
pluralism. Moreover the process of change and the nature and 
impact of policy outputs firmly supports the professionalised 
state model.
Yet to confirm a diagnosis of neo-plural ism also remains 
problematic since there is one further issue which only Marxist 
theory seems to resolve satisfactorily and that is why, in a field 
of competing professions, do medical interests predominate. As 
noted earlier this is a particularly relevant question in regard 
to mental health where somatic psychiatry remains controversial 
and open to challenge.
There would seem to be strong evidence to support the concept of 
professional ideology, in conflict with other competing belief 
systems, as an ideological determinant on the direction of policy. 
The major problem from a Marxist point of view is that drawing 
links between the medicalisation of mental health policy and 
material relations under capitalism is highly problematic and most 
attempts to date have been crudely and speculatively functional. 
Historically, it is difficult to accept the contention that 'non- 
alienating' socialist relations of production would eliminate the 
medicalisation of madness.
The conclusion must therefore be that the policy process in this 
case study is best explained by elements of elite, Marxist and 
neo-pluralist theory. Neo-pluralism emerges as the dominant of 
the three in describing the process and predicting outcomes. 
Marxists offer a means of understanding why outcomes and processes 
take a certain consistent form which is not understandable on face 
value. The approach remains unsatisfactory nonetheless since the 
full extent of the theory cannot be applied.
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For those who advocate self-contained theories of the state, this 
is a rather unhelpful conclusion. However at the outset, this 
study cited the question posed by Johnson et al. of the value of 
synthesising the best elements of competing methodological 
approaches in order to progress the development of method.^5 The 
outcome of this study is a good example of the value of this 
approach. On the evidence reviewed, the policy process in mental 
health is therefore an example of the professionalised state 
thesis in neo-pluralism, set within an ideological framework which 
establishes medicine as the dominant profession.
A final word on AEGIS
The content of the case study is much neater in its findings. 
Through her network of influential friends and advisers, Barbara 
Robb was able to change the course of DHSS policy. In the space 
of five years her campaign and its wider ramifications hauled 
mental illness and mental handicap to the top of the political 
agenda. AEGIS made a major contribution to rescuing these 
services from the twilight world of decrepid Victorian asylums 
where they had been festering throughout the post-ward period. 
She also changed the self-perception of pressure groups in these 
fields from polite, self-apology to pro-active assertiveness. The 
style of high proflile, media-based campaigning, now typical of 
MIND, the National Schizophrenia Society and RESCARE, was largely 
invented by Barbara Robb - although whether they use the approach 
as effectively as she did is an issue to too broad to explore 
here.
Lastly, there are lessons for politicians in the mental hospital 
scandals of the 1960s and 1970s. If a policy arena is so 
seriously negelected for so long and if the reality of that 
neglect is consistently denied, the pressure inexorable mounts.
6^Johnson, T. , Dandeker, C. and Ashworth, C. , The Structure of 
Social Theory. (London: Macmillan, 1984), See discussion in
Chapter One.
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As we move to a more diversified pattern of care for the mentally 
disordered and the elderly, effective monitoring, inspection and 
accreditation will be required to ensure continuing improvement in 
quality and penetration of services.
Yet history offers little comfort to those who expect this to 
happen as a matter of course. The regularity over the last two 
centuries with which public outrage and scandal have forced 
politicians to review policy and resource allocation in mental 
health (or other areas without natural political clout) is 
sufficient to convert the most radical anarchist to cyclical 
theories of history. Isolated cases of individuals left uncared 
for at home or drifting into vagrancy are already creeping into 
the press. If we are going round this wheel again, before the 
century is out some ambitious and talented politician may be 
destined to have his or her career reversed by being unfortunate 
enough to be in office when the opening of the next sustained 
period of media cries of scandal, neglect and cruelty explodes in
front of an unsuspecting public.
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Appendix 1
List of people interviewed for research
Brian Abel-Smith
Mary Applebey
Sir George Godber
Audrey Harvey
Sir Geoffrey Howe
W.A. Kirkpatrick
Sir Kenneth Robinson
David Roxan
C.H.Rolph
Lady Serota
Lord Strabolgi
Dr J . Anthony Whitehead
Hugo Young
Sir Arnold France was approached but declined to be interviewed. 
The content of the research has also been discussed with a number 
of current and former Departmental officials and senior health 
authority officers who have asked not to be named.
-389-
Appendix 2
A Postscript
Barbara Robb and Richard Crossman met twice whilst he was
Secretary of State. The second meeting was not of major 
significance in terms of political outcome, although both 
principal participants left detailed records of it. The event 
and the background to it provide a rare insight into the means 
through which Barbara Robb synthesised her public campaigning and 
her use of informal contacts, it also demonstrates the respect 
that AEGIS commanded as a pressure group. Additionally, it gave 
clear testimony of her fearlessness, formidable talent for 
penetrating argument and not least her pointed sardonic wit.
It has been previously noted that Mrs.Robb agreed to maintain a 
dignified silence about her dissatisfactions with the Sans 
Everything White Paper, in exchange for an assurance that the 
conduct of the inquiries would be investigated. According to 
Mrs. Robb she had agreed with Abel-Smith that the health ombudsman 
would, upon taking office, conduct an inquiry into the 
Reports.^
This was a matter of some importance to her given that her 
personal reputation had been questioned both by the attack on her 
in the Friern Report and also by her failure to give evidence to 
the Committee Inquiry at that hospital which suggested to those 
who were already disinclined towards her that she did not have a 
case to present. She also had a certain score to settle with the 
previous Minister who had opposed her campaign and consistently 
denied her cause for three years. Now as 1969 gave way to 1970 
there was still no sign of any inquiry from Crossman's 
administration. Indeed, the Secretary of State had not gone on 
the record with so much as a good word for her and her 
"organisation". Mrs. Robb therefore began to get a little
1-See Correspondence between B.Robb and Eric Moonman MP in Robb 
Files Sans E. Vol.11
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suspicious. She also had in the back of her mind, the advice of 
Doctors Barton and Whitehead to maintain the momentum of public 
revelations to sustain pressure on the government.
Crossman was aware that she posed a threat as a potential source 
of bad publicity, particularly as the Government appeared to be 
out of favour with public opinion. He therefore committed an 
uncharacteristic public relations error when in February 1970, in 
the course of a debate on the mental health services, he made a 
critical remark about the chapter on Cowley Road Hospital in Sans 
Everything. In his diaries he elaborated on his feelings.
"This hospital has had a very bad time because it had been 
attacked by Mrs. Robb's book....and defended in a rather 
half-hearted White Paper. Clearly what had happened had 
been that this driving little doctor.... had intimidated 
the nurses to keep these old people active, to shove and 
push and let only the acute cases be in the wards.... And of 
course, if you take bad staff and second rate nurses, say 
push them and shove them, they will push and shove the old 
things and there will be lots of cruelty as well and 
obviously that's what had happened at Cowley Road"2.
Clearly then he had given the House the impression that the 
attack in Sans Everything was unwarranted, whereas privately he 
was perfectly ready to believe that there had been cruelty and 
second rate nursing care. Whether by accident or design, he 
appeared to be discrediting AEGIS. It was a very unwise move.
To begin with the two contributors to the book wrote to Crossman 
expressing their alarm at his remarks. They pointed out that 
their complaints had been in essence that the excellent work of 
the doctor in charge was not being implemented on the wards^. 
Mrs. Robb discussed the matter with Rolph who agreed to approach
^UWMRC Crossman Diaries JH/68/69
^Letter from E.Porter and S.Skrine to R.H.S.Crossman 19.2.70 in 
Robb Files Sans E. Vol.11
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the Secretary of State as a personal friend4 . He explained 
Mrs.Robb's growing impatience that the reports had not yet been 
reviewed and hope that Crossman would find a way of doing this 
without her having to return to public print. In his reply, 
Crossman explained that the words which had given offence were in 
response to an intervention not reported in Hansard. However, he 
avoided the issue of reviewing the White Paper and tried instead 
to reassure AEGIS that the HAS teams would be visiting the Sans 
Everything hospitals carrying with them a copy of the book.^ 
In his reply to the two nurses he explained:
"For someone like myself who is seeking to prod public 
opinion by exposing the scandalous overcrowding without 
demoralising the staff of our long-stay hospitals, the Ely 
Report was in a sense providential because it gave me a 
chance to clear the air by showing that I was not going to 
cover up or whitewash, but use the exposure of malpractice 
in order to create the climate of public opinion required to 
come to the rescue of these hospitals."**
4It is also clear that they were to become colleagues after the 
election as Crossman had decided to leave politics and become 
editor of the New Statesman. Letter C.H.Rolph to Crossman 9.3.70 
in Robb Files Op.Cit.
^Letter Crossman to Rolph 19.3.70 Copy in Robb Files Op.Cit.
**In his reply to the two nurses he explained:
"For someone like myself who is seeking to prod public 
opinion by exposing the scandalous overcrowding without 
demoralising the staff of our long-stay hospitals, the Ely 
Report was in a sense providential because it gave me a 
chance to clear the air by showing that I was not going to 
cover up or whitewash, but use the exposure of malpractice in 
order to create the climate of public opinion required to 
come to the rescue of these hospitals." Letter Crossman to 
S.Skrine and E.Porter 23.3.70 in Robb Files Op.Cit.
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This strategy was strengthened by a letter to Mrs. Robb herself 
adopting the same line, and inviting her to meet him to discuss 
her concerns after Easter.  ^ As he recorded:
"I had said in an ad lib ...that I was cross with Barbara 
Robb for attacking Cowley Road, and this was a great danger. 
Were we going to reopen the sores, and have her attacking us 
all over again?.... In the case of Ely I wanted an 
annihilating report which did show up a scandal because that 
helped me, but an annihilating report which showed up an 
incidence of cruelty in a hospital of tremendous 
reputation.... this is something more complicated for me 
and I want them to understand it".®
Mrs Robb was not appeased and decided that in order to set the 
record straight, and also promote constructive progress on the 
health commissioner front, AEGIS would have to go back to public 
campaigning, this time for a statutory inquiry into the White 
Paper. Again the tactics were exemplary. She enlisted Eric
Moonman to write to Crossman urging him to instigate the 
inquiry^, and ensured that this letter, together with her own 
replylO, arrived on the Secretary of State's desk on same day 
she had arranged to brief journalists at St.Bride's church Fleet 
Street. She told the press of her agreement to keep quiet, 
however, especially now that Crossman seemed to be bowing to 
pressure against the health commissioner proposals, the time had 
come for a statutory inquiry to reveal the "inaccuracies, 
inconsistences and .... the denial of natural justice" contained 
in the White Paper.H She also provided a detailed brief for
^Crossman to B.Robb 26.3.70 in Robb Files Op cit
^Diaries 70/sw/116
^Letter E.Moonman to Crossman 30.3.85 in Robb Files Op.Cit. 
l^B.Robb to Crossman 30.3.70 in Robb Files Op Cit
l^AEGIS Press Statement 1.4.70 in Robb Files: Sans E.Vol.11
Forwarded in advance to her contacts on The Times. The Guardian.
The Daily Mail. The New Statesman. The Nursing Mirror. The Nursing
Continued on following page
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Hugo Young on the Sunday Times, who obliged her with a 2000-word 
feature article on the reports headed by photographs of Crossman 
one side and on the other, a smiling Mrs Robb sporting one of her 
most striking, broad-brimmed h a t s . This article rehearsed the 
background to the reports and for the first time, published 
extracts from the dossier on the Friern Inquiry which Mrs Robb 
had presented to the Council on Tribunals.^
Hence, backed by this highly orchestrated and highly successful 
publicity campaign, Mrs. Robb met Crossman in his office at the 
Commons on April 30th. Fortunately, both protagonists left 
detailed accounts of the event, Mrs Robb's "written immediately 
afterwards"!^ and Crossman's dictated a few days later.
When she was shown in, Crossman was sitting in his shirt-sleeves 
with his foot on a leg rest. His Private Secretary and Brian
Abel-Smith were also in the room. She remarked that she had not 
expected to see the Professor whom she believed was kept locked 
up at the Elephant^; Crossman explained that he was let out 
occasionally "to do a little grazing". Mrs. Robb was wearing a 
green maxi-coat, newly in fashion at the time, which she refused 
to take off when invited since she had purchased it specially for 
the occasion; it was part of her image. Crossman found her:
"a curious little thing, terribly neat, precise, cold and
venomous, with a certain serpentine charm".^
Continued from previous page
Times, The Lancet. The Medical Tribune. The Brtiish Hospital 
Journal. The Hospital Times. New Society. Peace News and to a 
certain Nigel Lawson on The Spectator. 
l^The Sunday Times 5.4.85 
l^See previous Chapter.
l^In Robb Files Sans E Vol.lOB "Some Events" 
l^DHSS Headquarters at Elephant and Castle. 
l^UWMRC Crossman Diaries JH/70-26
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As she sat down, Crossman noticed her large red ring-file and 
asked if it was the AEGIS dispatch box. Mrs. Robb made an 
amiable reply and "trotted out" a pre-prepared agenda in her 
usual efficient style and its was agreed that this would 
structure the meeting. Firstly she wondered if Crossman had ever 
repeated the remarks he made about AEGIS in the Commons; Crossman
had no recollection of having done so and assured her he would
never say them again. He explained that a speech only comes
alive when the speaker leaves his script and speaks from the
heart. He added that all he knew of her satisfied him that she
was passionate but had a cold heart and would be unable to
understand how a sentimental person such as himself could get 
slightly carried away. Mrs. Robb remarked^given they had hardly 
ever met he could have no knowledge of her personality and if he 
genuinely wanted accurate information on the state of her heart 
he should consult one of her friends. Crossman replied that he 
and Lady Serota cheered themselves up by discussing her. 
Mrs.Robb was gratified to know that she provided them with 
relaxation but advised him in future to stick to his scripts.
"I asked him "Are you telling me that you really said those
things without knowing you were saying them?" He insisted
that this was so. I said, "There's a fine thing! The 
Secretary of State for Health and Social Services stands up 
in the Commons in an important debate and speaks and doesn't 
know what he's saying. Marvellous!""17
They then disputed the merits of publicising cruelty at a 
hospital such as Cowley Road; Crossman conceded that she had a 
certain "nuisance value" but complained that she never stopped to 
think of the problems she created for a Minister trying to keep 
up morale. She denied this, suggested his Private Secretary 
should read her evidence on Cowley Road and handed over her file; 
Crossman assured her that he would read it himself. She then 
posed her "million dollar question" which was a request for a 
categorical assurance that Kenneth Robinson had not required any
l^Robb Files Op.Cit
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of the QCs heading the inquiries to alter their reports. 
Crossman had no information on this. Mrs. Robb explained that 
she had good reason for asking, a point which Crossman did not 
follow up suggesting to her that he knew more than he was letting 
on.
This took her onto her demand for a statutory inquiry which would 
indicate that the Government was honourably motivated rather than 
concerned to save the faces of members of the whitewashing 
establishment. AEGIS also hoped that opposition to an effective 
ombudsman would be resisted. Crossman refused her demand and
remarked that to begin asking for a statutory inquiry nearly two 
years after the White Paper was published was a little late in
the day. Mrs Robb retorted that he knew very well why she had
said nothing since he came to office and who had so persuaded 
her. Crossman then argued that even if he thought the White
Paper was a fraud, Cabinet responsibility would prevent him for 
saying so.
"She sparred with me for an hour...trying to persuade me to 
agree that I should investigate the whitewashing operation. 
And I said of course I worit investigate a White Paper made 
by my predecessor. I am perfectly prepared to investigate 
conditions in all the five hospitals you are complaining 
about and indeed the new HAS will be onto these geriatric
hospitals within at least 18 months. You can be sure of
impartial investigation."1®
This was what Crossman would allow her to tell the press. He 
then suggested that her continued interest in the White Paper was 
part of a personal dispute with the Robinsons.
"..that was her pound of flesh to destroy Kenneth Robinson, 
and I said it's a pity to have a personal squabble (that was
1®UWMRC Crossman Diaries JH/70-27
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the only time she got really angry) because of course it's 
true she and Elizabeth Robinson were bosom friends.."^9
In her defence, Mrs.Robb suggested that no one could have been 
more moderate in the face of the attacks she had suffered from
Kenneth Robinson. Was she to understand that the Secretary of
State wished her to tell the press that he regarded the White 
Paper as part of a family quarrel? Crossman was firm that she
should not. The discussion then became a little more
conciliatory. Mrs. Robb complimented him on his record thus 
far. He was doing magnificently in investigating the hospitals 
and she was sure he do his utmost to get a satisfactory
commissioner.
""But I am very disappointed that the Socialist Government 
which is supposed to stand for peoples' rights and for this 
and that and the other and so forth, is prepared to let this
dreadful, dishonest, libelous White Paper stay on its
records." I accused him of behaving, in this health service 
matter "....like a politician: I'm very d i s a p p o i n t e d . " " ^
Crossman replied that she could not have expected any other
response from a Minister. As she got up to go she again 
expressed her disappointment. Crossman, however, had to confess 
that he had not been disappointed in her. He promised that Abel- 
Smith would arrange for her to see some of Dr.Baker's reports to 
help put her mind at ease.
"Well, I talked to her at great length, and I have now 
written a letter to Eric Moonman which is to some extent an 
appeasement of her because of course, AEGIS her 
organisation, like the CPAG^l, these small splinter groups, 
can be extremely powerful if they provide the press with
19Ibid
2QRobb Files Op.Cit.
21-Child Poverty Action Group
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hot, poisonous news. They really damage our image a great 
deal, and I want really to avoid that being done this 
summer, and also I happen to rather like her..."22
22uwMRC Crossman Diaries op.cit.
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Appendix 3
Selected Mental Hospital Scandals in addition to the Sans 
Everything. Elv. Farleigh. Whittfnphain and South Ockdendon 
Hospitals. 1968-1973
Garlands Hospital
One of the cases forwarded by David Roxan to the Department of 
Health in August 1967 along with the Ely allegations, was the 
alleged ill-treatment of the patients at Garlands hospital. This 
listed hosing down, punching, and excessive sedation.^ The 
Ministry of Health originally turned down the HMC's request for a 
full inquiry only to reverse its decision in J anuary.  ^ The
report upheld the allegations of violent assault on patients by 
staff; usually in circumstances of staff shortages, long working 
hours and when patients themselves were acting up.^
St Margaret*s Hospital. Birmingham
In January 1968, 2 nurses were dismissed and 4 others reprimanded 
following an attack on patient.^ In August 1971, an RHB
inquiry reported gross overcrowding, the exploitation of working 
patients and discovered further allegations of violence against
^The News of the World. 10.12.67 
^The Yorkshire Post. 11.12.68
^Newcastle Regional Hospital Board, Report of the Committee of 
Inquiry at Garlands Hospital, March 1968
T^he Daily Telegraph and The Daily Mail of 27.1.69.
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patients.5 A second inquiry upheld them and a student nurse 
was sacked and convicted, for sticking a needle into patients for 
fun®. The hospital was repeatedly in the press over the next
18-months. The most serious case was that of a sectioned patient 
who escaped and raped and assaulted two girls. This led to a yet 
a third inquiry.^
Randolph Wemvss Hospital. Buckhaven. Fife
In February 1968, the press report ill-treatment of elderly 
patients, including the use of sticking plaster to seal patients
mouths to keep them quiet, and an assault on an elderly man
leading to a dislocated shoulder.®
Shelton Hospital
In February 1968, 24 women patients died in a fire when locked 
in a secure ward. The incident led to a spate of recriminations,
including a former HMC Chairman who told the press that he had
been sacked from his position for trying to get something done 
about conditions at the hospital.^ Having assured the Commons 
that his Department were unaware of this, the Minister of Health 
instigated a Section 70 Inquiry into the disaster, which reported 
in December that year. It made banner headlines in all the
5T h e  Daily Telegraph. The Times. The Guardian. The Daily Mail of 
26.8.71
6T h e  Yorkshire Post of 5.1.72
7T h e  Daily Telegraph of 16/6/73 and The Times of 23/8/73 
®The Daily Telegraph. The Times. The Daily Express (Front Page 
lead), The Scottish Daily Express. Editions of 8/2/68 
9T h e  Daily Telegraph 25, 26, and 27.2.68
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d a i l i e s . I® This was followed by a spate of mental hospital 
expose articles including one in the Lancet headed 'Psychiatric 
Dinosaurs' which observed:
"The student of Lunacy reform, when he reflects upon the 
iniquities of the past which are self-evident to the present 
generation, must himself ask what aspects of today's 
services will be judged barbaric by our grandsons, as we 
think of chains or whirling stools. Surely they will 
condemn us for allowing these antique monstrosities, these 
mausolea for the living to survive into 1968.
High Rovds Hospital
In March 1968, the local coroner passed an open verdict on the 
death of a 54-year old patient who had suffered abdominal 
injuries on New Year's Eve 1967.12 Two years later two doctors 
died under strange circumstances at the hospital, apparently 
poisoned with drugs.1^
Haroerburv Hospital
Also in March 1968, Ann Shearer reported that 40 children were 
being kept in unclean, locked accommodation at this mental 
handicap hospital. The HMC complained to the Press Council who 
upheld the complaint. This produced a rather gloating letter from 
the Chairman of the North-West Metropolitan RHB, followed by a 
spate of correspondence attacking him from nurses and parents.I4
l^See editions of 17.1.68
11-Lancet 2.3.68 
l^The Daily Telegraph. 1.3.68 
H The Yorkshire Post. 21.1.70
14The Guardian. 28.3.68, 11.12.68, 14.12.68, 20.12.68
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Broadmoor Hospital
Again in March 1968, a report from the House of Commons Estimates
Committee on Special Hospitals, found appalling overcrowding.^-^
This was picked up in the press, and the Government decided to 
build what became Moss Side Hospital.
Springfield Hospital. Tooting Bee. London
In August 1968, the press reported that a 12 year-old boy was 
secluded on an adult secure ward.^ The Daily Mail estimated 
that there were 1000 similar cases across the country. This led 
to a series of articles reporting similar cases, over the next 6 
months.
Friern Barnet Hospital
Also in August, Friern Barnet was back in the news after a patient 
was found dead in the hospital grounds after six weeks of absence 
from his ward. He was found on the 1st of July or 8 days before 
the Sans Everything White Paper reported.1® Then in October
1971, one of Barbara Robb's allies on the Daily Mail got a job at
Friern through a local labour exchange and wrote a series of
l^House of Commons: The Special Hospitals and the State
Hospital. Report from the Estimates Committee, (London, 
HMSO:1968)
l®The Times 22.3.68 and The Guardian and Daily Telegraph of 
29.3.68
■^The Daily Mail 1/8/68, The Daily Telegraph. 2/8/68, , and The 
Daily Mail. The Times and The Guardian. 3/6/68 
-^®The Hornsey Journal. 23.8.68
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expose a r t i c l e s . T h e  HMC held an inquiry which attacked the 
journalist in its report.2® The HMC in turn was accused of 
complacency by one of its own consultants and numerous other 
correspondents in the press, including Tony Whitehead of AEGIS.2  ^
The Nursing Times carried a leading article supporting the Daily 
Mail, headed "The Monstrous Inhumanity of Authorities".22
Carlton Haves Hospital, near Leicester
In March 1969, six patients died in a fire and there was a 
Committee of Inquiry.2^
Coldharbour Hospital
In July 1972, the front-pages of the press were filled with 
reports of the deaths of 30 residents of a longstay ward at 
Coldharbour Mental Handicap Hospital. The papers carried graphic 
photographs of an evidently shocked Secretary of State amongst the 
charred and twisted remains of the steel-framed bunks in which the 
sleeping residents were incinerated. The fire was started by a 
patient when the nursing staff had left the ward unattended for 20 
minutes. Sir Keith Joseph established an Inquiry under Section 70 
of the NHS Act, two days after the fire which the press covered in 
full.24 Its report was published in December, once the Director
19The Daily Mail. 18.10.71 and 19.10.71
20The Daily Mail. 19.10.71
21The Daily Mail. 28.10.71
22The Nursing Times. Vol 6743, October 28.1971, p.1327
2^The Daily Telegraph 12.3.69 and The Nursing Mirror 25.10.69
24The Evening Standard. 5.7.72, described it as "A nightmare to 
inflame the conscience of the nation", see also The Times. Daily 
Telegraph, and The Guardian and Daily Mail, of 6.7.72, and The 
Nursing Times Vol.68 No.28 (13.7.72), Editions of 17.7.72,
Continued on following page
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of Public Prosecutions had decided that there were no grounds for 
criminal proceedings against the staff on duty at the time of the 
incident. The inquiry criticised night staff for leaving wards 
unattended for long periods, and also raised questions about the 
hospital's policy on locking wards, otherwise, there was no 
criticism of management and no national policy implications. The 
inquiry was formal, with legal representation of the major 
interested parties, and conducted in public.
Nansburv Hospital
A rather different procedure was adopted for the inquiry into 
professional practices at Napsbury psychiatric hospital, whose 
report was published in February 1973. This investigation 
followed complaints about conditions on two wards "...alleging 
dirty unhygienic conditions, broken windows, neglect of patient 
care, abrupt withdrawal of drug therapy leading to deterioration 
and harsh attitudes by medical and nursing staff...".^5 The 
complaints arose from the consultant's clinical policy which aimed 
to hand responsibilities to the patient by the planned withdrawal 
of nursing care. Instead of appointing a formal, legally-chaired 
inquiry, the Department chose a committee of senior professionals 
given that the object was to review clinical practice on the wards 
concerned. The Committee found that although the theoretical 
basis may have been unexceptionable, the practical application led 
to to situations and conditions which should not have existed in 
an NHS hospital.
Continued from previous page
covering the hearing, and Editions of 14.12.72 covering the 
Report.
25ibid para 36.
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Appendix 4
Detailed cost and activity data
Table 1:Hospital services in England and Wales 1959-1986 - 
spend by type (£000s)
Year
(31.12)
All Acute MI MH Other
1959 323 169 156 620 49 242 17 365 99 942
1963 429 596 211 974 63 647 23 749 130 226
1964 458 643 229 790 67 122 25 190 136 541
1965 493 103 248 207 72 152 27 200 145 544
1966 546 319 277 660 78 142 30 068 160 449
1967 587 626 303 253 82 438 32 045 169 890
1968 626 852 328 312 84 892 34 072 179 576
1969 684 140 358 905 92 452 37 730 195 053
1970 745 128 395 763 99 018 41 940 208 407
1971 880 405 471 797 113 188 51 810 243 610
1972 1,036 850 563 879 132 526 63 401 277 044
1973 1,187 385 656 391 150 980 74 521 305 493
1974 1,376 166 765 694 175 738 87 447 347 287
1975 1,989 410 1,128 322 247 310 124 683 489 096
1976 2,602 654 1,490 950 318 881 161 919 630 904
1977 3,015 439 1,761 433 360 724 179 368 713 914
1978 3,383 107 1,925 487 397 147 203 653 856 820
1979 3,827 219 2,190 824 437 619 231 971 966 805
1980 4,606 611 2,648 098 502 350 276 035 1,180 128
1981 5,945 339 3,437 330 667 676 357 276 1,483 057
1982 6,670 416 3,910 657 746 165 394 392 1,619 202
1983 7,055 230 4,257 915 788 666 422 709 1,585 940
1984 7,435 915 4,534 773 822 204 441 725 1,637 213
1985 7,881 487 4,822 341 866 936 465 924 1,726 286
Sources: Health and Personal Social Services for England 
and Wales 1970-73:
Health and Personal Social Services for England 1974-86 
Health and Personal Social Services Statistics for Wales 
1974-86.
net
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Table 2: Hospital services in England and Wales - % distribution
of spend by sector
Year All Acute MI MH Other
1964 100 50.1 14.6 5.5 29.8
1965 100 50.3 14.6 5.5 29.5
1966 100 50.8 14.3 5.5 29.4
1967 100 51.6 14.0 5.5 28.9
1968 100 52.4 13.5 5.4 28.6
1969 100 52.5 13.5 5.5 28.5
1970 100 53.1 13.3 5.6 28.0
1971 100 53.6 12.9 5.9 27.7
1972 100 54.4 12.8 6.1 26.7
1973 100 55.3 12.7 6.3 25.7
1974 100 55.6 12.8 6.4 25.2
1975 100 56.7 12.4 6.3 24.6
1976 100 57.3 12.3 6.2 24.2
1977 100 58.4 12.0 5.9 23.7
1978 100 56.9 11.7 6.0 25.3
1979 100 57.2 11.4 6.1 25.3
1980 100 57.5 10.9 6.0 25.6
1981 100 57.8 11.2 6.0 24.9
1982 100 58.6 11.2 5.9 24.3
1983 100 60.4 11.2 6.0 22.5
1984 100 61.0 11.1 5.9 22.0
1985 100 61.2 11.0 5.9 21.9
Source: as table 1
-406-
Table 3: Hospital services in England and Wales - net spend by
sector standardised at 1964 spend
Year All Acute MI MH Other
1964 100 100 100 100 100
1965 103 104 103 104 102
1966 109 110 106 109 107
1967 113 116 108 112 110
1968 117 123 109 116 113
1969 122 128 113 123 117
1970 127 134 115 130 119
1971 139 149 122 149 129
1972 151 164 132 168 136
1973 159 176 138 182 138
1974 170 189 149 197 144
1975 194 220 165 222 160
1976 208 237 174 235 169
1977 215 250 175 232 171
1978 223 253 179 244 190
1979 232 265 181 256 197
1980 239 274 178 260 205
1981 253 292 194 276 212
1982 263 308 201 284 215
1983 263 316 201 286 198
1984 264 322 200 286 195
1985 265 324 199 286 195
Sources: as in table 1
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Table 4
Cost per Inpatient Week by hospital type (£)
Year
end
31/3
Acute* L/S MI MH MI as % MH 
of acute of
as % 
acute
1958 23.2 9.3 6.5 6.1 28 26
1959 24.7 10.1 7.0 6.4 28 26
1960 26.7 11.1 7.6 7.0 29 26
1961 28.5 12.7 8.4 7.5 29 26
1962 30.6 13.8 9.1 8.1 30 26
1963 32.4 14.7 9.8 8.6 30 27
1964 34.0 15.6 10.5 9.1 31 27
1965 37.2 16.9 11.3 9.9 30 27
1966 41.2 18.9 12.6 10.9 31 26
1967 46.7 20.5 13.6 11.6 29 25
1968 49.5 21.3 14.4 12.3 29 25
1969 53.8 23.5 16.1 13.5 30 25
1970 59.7 25.7 17.6 15.0 30 25
1971 71.4 29.7 21.4 18.9 30 26
1972 84.2 34.9 25.5 23.4 30 28
1973 98.0 40.3 30.3 28.0 31 29
1974 115.9 46.7 36.6 33.7 32 29
1975 166.9 67.8 53.7 48.2 32 29
1976 218.0 88.8 70.8 62.7 32 29
1977 249.1 100.2 81.8 71.3 33 29
1978 284.9 116.6 95.2 81.2 33 29
1979 319.6 131.7 108.9 94.1 34 29
1980 383.8 159.0 133.1 114.8 35 30
1981 506.2 209.6 176.5 152.8 35 30
1982 555.4 232.9 197.8 173.6 36 31
1983 603.1 247.8 217.0 191.7 36 32
1984 626.2 258.4 232.3 205.6 37 33
1985 665.6 277.6 256.8 228.4 39 34
1986 697.4 295.8 275.6 248.1 40 36
* over 300 beds and teaching hospitals 
up to 1969 England and Wales
1970 onwards England Only (between 95 and 100% of both E and W) 
No figures for 1974/5 issued as immediately post reorganisation 
To 1974/5 gen acute figures adjusted for teaching hospitals 
1975/6 onwards RHA teaching hospitals in with general acute 
Source: Health Service Costing Returns 1958-1986 
Cost per Inpatient Week by hospital type at 1985 prices
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Table 5
Year GDP/NHS 
Multi­
plier *
% increase 
over prev­
ious year 
(inflation 
rate)
1964 6.47 N/A
1965 6.21 4.27
1966 5.91 4.99
1967 5.70 3.73
1968 5.56 2.62
1969 5.30 4.85
1970 5.05 4.86
1971 4.70 7.57
1972 4.33 8.51
1973 3.98 7.32
1974 3.67 6.67
1975 2.90 16.18
1976 2.37 20.42
1977 2.11 11.65
1978 1.96 12.20
1979 1.80 9.67
1980 1.54 14.44
1981 1.26 15.65
1982 1.17 8.94
1983 1.11 6.75
1984 1.06 4.46
1985 1.00 4.27
1986 0.95 5.63
1987 0.89 3.06
GDP inflation to 1971-2 then NHS price index
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Table 6: Hospital services in England and Wales - Cost per I/P
week at 1984/5 prices
Year Acute* L/S MI MH MI as % 
of acute
MH as % 
of acute
1964 220.5 101.0 67.8 58.8 31 27
1965 230.9 104.6 70.2 61.4 30 27
1966 243.8 111.8 74.6 64.4 31 26
1967 266.1 116.7 77.3 66.0 29 25
1968 275.1 118.3 79.8 68.2 29 25
1969 285.3 124.3 85.2 71.4 30 25
1970 301.5 129.9 89.1 75.6 30 25
1971 335.6 139.4 100.5 88.6 30 26
1972 364.4 150.9 110.2 101.3 30 28
1973 390.4 160.4 120.9 111.6 31 29
1974 425.7 171.7 134.4 123.7 32 29
1975 483.8 196.4 155.6 139.7 32 29
1976 516.6 210.5 167.7 148.6 32 29
1977 526.3 211.8 172.7 150.7 33 29
1978 557.2 227.9 186.2 158.8 33 29
1979 575.2 237.1 195.9 169.3 34 29
1980 590.5 244.7 204.7 176.6 35 30
1981 638.9 264.5 222.8 192.9 35 30
1982 651.5 273.2 232.0 203.6 36 31
1983 666.6 273.9 239.9 211.9 36 32
1984 660.7 272.7 245.1 216.9 37 33
1985 665.6 277.6 256.8 228.4 39 34
1986 663.1 281.3 262.0 235.9 40 36
Source: Health Service Costing Returns 1958-1986 
* over 300 beds and teaching hospitals
1970 onwards England only (within 100-95% of both E and W)
No figures for 1974/5 issued as immediately post reorganisation 
and therefore mid-point 1973/4 and 75/6 used. To 1974/5 general 
acute figures teaching hospitals shown separately and therefore 
apportioned. 1975/6 onwards returns include RHA teaching 
hospitals in with general acute.
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Table 7: Hospital services in England and Wales - annual percentage
Increases in cost per I/P week by sector
Year Acute* L/S MI MH
1964 N/A N/A N/A N/A
1965 4.7 3.6 3.5 4.4
1966 5.6 6.8 6.3 4.9
1967 9.1 4.4 3.6 2.5
1968 3.4 1.3 3.3 3.3
1969 3.7 5.0 6.7 4.8
1970 5.7 4.5 4.6 5.8
1971 11.3 7.4 12.8 17.2
1972 8.6 8.2 9.6 14.3
1973 7.2 6.2 9.7 10.2
1974 9.0 7.1 11.2 10.8
1975 13.6 14.4 15.7 12.9
1976 6.8 7.2 7.8 6.4
1977 1.9 0.6 3.0 1.4
1978 5.9 7.6 7.8 5.4
1979 3.2 4.0 5.2 6.6
1980 2.7 3.2 4.5 4.3
1981 8.2 8.1 8.8 9.2
1982 2.0 3.3 4.1 5.6
1983 2.3 0.3 3.4 4.1
1984 -0.9 -0.4 2.2 2.4
1985 0.7 1.8 4.8 5.3
1986 -0.4 1.3 2.1 3.3
Source as table 3
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Table 8: Hospital services in England and Wales - cost per I/P week
standardised at 1964 spend
Year Acute L/S MI MH
1964 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1965 104.5 103.4 103.3 104.2
1966 110.1 110.2 109.5 109.0
1967 120.0 114.9 113.3 111.6
1968 124.0 116.4 117.0 115.2
1969 128.3 121.9 124.5 120.4
1970 135.2 127.2 130.0 127.2
1971 152.9 138.6 148.8 151.3
1972 205.7 186.0 202.3 214.4
1973 218.8 196.1 220.2 234.5
1974 236.7 208.4 243.2 258.0
1975 244.1 221.4 261.3 270.5
1976 253.5 225.5 267.7 273.5
1977 254.5 223.5 271.6 273.2
1978 267.7 239.0 290.9 286.1
1979 274.3 246.7 303.8 302.7
1980 273.5 247.3 308.3 306.7
1981 281.7 254.5 319.4 318.8
1982 285.6 261.4 330.7 334.7
1983 291.1 261.1 340.6 347.0
1984 287.9 259.3 347.2 354.4
1985 289.1 263.2 362.7 372.0
1986 288.0 266.7 370.1 384.2
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Table 9: Hospital services in England and Wales - Available beds 
by specialty
Number 000s % distribution
Year Non- chron MI MH total Non- chron MI MH total
Psych /ger Psych /ger
1964 202 59 145 61 467 43.3 12.6 31.0 13.1 100
1965 201 58 143 62 464 43.3 12.5 30.8 13.4 100
1966 202 59 141 62 464 43.5 12.7 30.4 13.4 100
1967 201 60 139 62 462 43.5 13.0 30.1 13.4 100
1968 201 60 136 62 469 42.9 12.8 31.1 13.2 100
1969 199 60 134 62 455 43.7 13.2 29.5 13.6 100
1970 197 60 130 62 449 43.8 13.4 29.0 13.7 100
1971 198 61 127 62 448 44.3 13.5 28.4 13.8 100
1972 196 62 121 60 439 44.7 14.1 27.5 13.6 100
1973 193 61 116 59 429 45.0 14.2 27.1 13.7 100
1974 192 61 110 58 421 45.7 14.4 26.2 13.7 100
1975 189 61 105 57 412 46.0 14.8 25.5 13.8 100
1976 188 61 103 56 408 46.2 15.0 25.2 13.7 100
1977 185 61 99 55 390 46.4 15.3 24.7 13.7 100
1978 181 62 96 54 393 46.0 15.8 24.5 13.6 100
1979 178 61 94 53 386 46.1 15.8 24.5 13.6 100
1980 175 61 92 52 377 46.0 16.1 24.3 13.6 100
1981 173 61 90 50 374 46.2 16.3 24.0 13.4 100
1982 171 61 89 49 370 46.2 16.5 24.0 13.3 100
1983 169 61 87 48 365 46.3 16.7 23.8 13.2 100
1984 165 61 84 46 357 46.3 17.2 23.5 13.0 100
Sources: Health and Personal Social Services for England and
Wales 1970-73: Health and Personal Social Services for England
1974-86: Health and Personal Social Services Statistics for
Wales 1974-86.
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Table 10: Hospital services in England and Wales - Discharges and 
deaths
Net 000s (Workload)
Year Non- chronic 
Psych /ger
MI MH total
Per available
Non- chronic 
Psych /ger
bed(throughput) 
MI MH Avg
1964 4389 157 168 11 4580 21.7 2.7 1.2 0.2 9.8
1965 4477 158 171 12 4730 22.3 2.7 1.2 0.2 10.2
1966 4544 157 174 12 4820 22.5 2.7 1.2 0.2 10.4
1967 4656 159 179 12 4894 23.2 2.7 1.3 0.2 10.6
1968 4774 165 185 12 5018 23.8 2.8 1.3 0.2 10.7
1969 4902 167 189 12 5270 24.6 2.8 1.4 0.2 11.6
1970 4941 184 189 14 5328 25.1 3.1 1.5 0.2 11.9
1971 5104 187 189 16 5496 25.8 3.1 1.5 0.3 12.3
1972 5140 200 193 18 5550 26.2 3.2 1.6 0.3 12.7
1973 5043 202 191 17 5453 26.1 3.3 1.6 0.3 12.7
1974 5092 205 187 17 5501 26.5 3.4 1.7 0.3 13.1
1975 4872 216 189 18 5295 25.8 3.5 1.8 0.3 12.9
1976 5142 241 192 18 5593 27.4 4.0 1.9 0.3 13.7
1977 5231 248 189 21 5689 28.3 4.1 1.9 0.4 14.3
1978 5252 261 185 22 5720 29.0 4.2 1.9 0.4 14.6
1979 5280 263 183 24 5750 29.7 4.3 1.9 0.4 14.9
1980 5524 290 196 27 6036 31.6 4.7 2.1 0.5 15.9
1981 5596 309 200 30 6135 32.3 5.0 2.2 0.6 16.4
1982 5533 327 198 32 6090 32.3 5.4 2.2 0.6 16.4
1983 5812 359 205 38 6414 34.3 5.9 2.4 0.8 17.5
1984 5949 387 210 43 6589 36.0 6.3 2.5 0.9 18.5
Sources: Health and Personal Social Services for England and
Wales 1970-73: Health and Personal Social Services for England
1974-86: Health and Personal Social Services Statistics for
Wales 1974-86.
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Table 11: Discharges and Deaths by type of hospital, 1963-84as %
distribution
Year acute chronic
/ger
MI MH total
1963 92.7 3.5 3.6 0.2 100
1964 95.8 3.4 3.7 0.2 100
1965 94.7 3.3 3.6 0.3 103
1966 94.3 3.3 3.6 0.2 102
1967 95.1 3.2 3.7 0.2 101
1968 95.1 3.3 3.7 0.2 102
1969 93.0 3.2 3.6 0.2 100
1970 92.7 3.5 3.6 0.3 100
1971 92.9 3.4 3.4 0.3 100
1972 92.6 3.6 3.5 0.3 100
1973 92.5 3.7 3.5 0.3 100
1974 92.6 3.7 3.4 0.3 100
1975 92.0 4.1 3.6 0.3 100
1976 91.9 4.3 3.4 0.3 100
1977 91.9 4.4 3.3 0.4 100
1978 91.8 4.6 3.2 0.4 100
1979 91.8 4.6 3.2 0.4 100
1980 91.5 4.8 3.2 0.4 100
1981 91.2 5.0 3.3 0.5 100
1982 90.9 5.4 3.3 0.5 100
1983 90.6 5.6 3.2 0.6 100
1984 90.3 5.9 3.2 0.7 100
Source as table 6
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Table 12: Trends in staffing levels in mental illness hospitals
figures show per 100 patients resident
Year Cons All
Nurses
Qual
Nurses
Unqual
Nurses
% u/t* Domes- 
Nurses tics
Psychol­
ogists
Thera
-pists
1964 0.36 24.5 9.5 15.0* N/A 4.1 0.08 0.62
1967 0.44 27.0 11.6 15.4* N/A 4.9 0.15 0.77
1969 0.63 31.9 19.2 12.7 39.8 5.4 0.20 0.92
1970 0.66 33.9 19.9 14.0 41.3 6,0 0.27 1.05
1971 0.72 36.9 21.2 15.7 42.5 6.8 0.26 1.59
1972 0.81 42.2 23.6 18.6 44.1 8.2 0.35 1.88
1973 0.92 45.3 25.0 20.3 44.8 9.1 0.45 2.28
1974 1.04 48.1 26.6 21.5 44.7 10.1 0.53 2.76
1975 1.15 54.8 28.5 26.3 48.0 11.0 0.59 3.19
1976 1.28 57.7 30.9 26.8 46.4 11.9 0.67 3.50
1977 1.36 59.1 33.1 27.6 46.6 11.3 0.73 3.38
1978 1.47 62.7 34.2 28.5 45.5 11.7 0.81 3.58
1979 1.53 65.1 35.2 29.9 45.9 12.1 0.89 3.68
1980 1.58 70.8 37.3 33.5 47.3 12.4 1.01 4.40
1981 1.67 75.7 39.3 36.4 48.1 12.8 1.08 4.79
1982 1.77 80.2 42.3 37.9 47.2 13.1 1.17 5.15
1983 1.88 83.2 45.1 38.1 45.8 13.1 1.19 5.33
1984 2.04 87.1 48.2 39.0 44.7 12.8 1.31 5.11
1985 2.22 90.9 50.6 40.2 44.3 11.3 1.45 6.00
Source: Ministry of Health, DHSS: The facilities and services in
mental illness hospitals 1964-1985
1974 onwards England staffing figures only
*includes SENs (later figures excluded them)
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Table 13: Trends in staffing levels in mental handicap hospitals
Figures show per 100 patients resident
Year Cons All Qual 
Nurses Nurses
Unqual % u/t* Domes- 
Nurses Nurses tics
Psychol­
ogists
Thera
pists
1964 0.22 23.2 7.6 15.6 3.5 0.07 0.44 67.2
1967 0.22 24.6 8.1 16.5 3.5 0.07 0.44 67.1
1969 0.23 25.8 14.9 10.9 4.5 0.10 0.63 42.2
1970 0.22 28.6 16.2 12.4 5.3 0.12 0.78 43.4
1971 0.24 32.2 16.7 15.5 7.1 0.15 1.85 48.1
1972 0.27 36.7 17.4 19.3 8.3 0.15 2.16 52.6
1973 0.28 38.8 18.0 20.8 9.7 0.16 2.44 53.6
1974 0.31 41.3 18.6 22.7 9.8 0.19 2.77 55.0
1975 0.33 46.6 19.9 26.7 11.1 0.23 3.05 57.3
1976 0.34 48.6 21.5 27.1 11.5 0.25 3.03 55.8
1977 0.36 51.4 22.4 28.9 12.3 0.29 3.29 56.3
1978 0.38 54.2 23.6 30.6 12.7 0.33 3.62 56.4
1979 0.38 56.7 24.3 32.4 13.0 0.37 3.88 57.2
1980 0.39 61.7 25.8 35.8 13.9 0.43 3.97 58.1
1981 0.42 67.9 27.4 40.5 14.7 0.48 4.35 59.6
1982 0.45 73.9 29.3 44.5 15.4 0.51 4.69 60.3
1983 0.45 72.5 30.2 42.2 15.3 0.56 0.00 58.3
1984 0.43 73.8 30.9 42.9 15.0 0.55 0.00 58.1
1985 0.46 78.5 32.1 46.4 13.7 0.63 0.00 59.1
Source: Ministry of Health, DHSS: The facilities and services in
mental illness hospitals 1964-1985
1974 onwards England staffing figures only
^includes SENs (later figures excluded them)
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